Filed: Feb. 13, 2002
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 13 2002 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. No. 01-1110 (D.C. No. 00-B-771) $9,020.00 IN UNITED STATES (D. Colo.) CURRENCY, Defendant, JEFFREY SCOTT COBB, Claimant-Appellant. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before EBEL , KELLY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 13 2002 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. No. 01-1110 (D.C. No. 00-B-771) $9,020.00 IN UNITED STATES (D. Colo.) CURRENCY, Defendant, JEFFREY SCOTT COBB, Claimant-Appellant. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before EBEL , KELLY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument w..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 13 2002
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 01-1110
(D.C. No. 00-B-771)
$9,020.00 IN UNITED STATES (D. Colo.)
CURRENCY,
Defendant,
JEFFREY SCOTT COBB,
Claimant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL , KELLY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
In this civil forfeiture case, claimant Jeffrey Scott Cobb appeals from the
district court’s ruling striking his pleadings and denying his motion to amend, and
from the subsequent judgment granting title to the subject money to the United
States. Because we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in the
initial ruling, we reverse the district court’s judgment and remand this case for
further proceedings. Claimant’s motion to proceed without prepayment of costs
and fees is granted.
Rule C(6) of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime
Claims governs the procedures for filing a claim in a civil forfeiture case.
See United States v. $88,260.00 in United States Currency , 925 F. Supp. 838, 840
(D.D.C. 1996). The version of the rule in place at the time this forfeiture case
arose provided that a claimant must file a verified claim within ten days after
receipt of proper notice of the complaint, 1
and shall serve an answer within
twenty days after the filing of the claim. The court may extend the time periods
for filing the initial claim. See United States v. 51 Pieces of Real Prop. , 17 F.3d
1306, 1318 (10th Cir. 1994). This court has remarked that “[t]he purpose of the
1
The Supplemental Rules were amended effective December 1, 2000, to
provide claimants with twenty days to file a claim where the forfeiture is based on
violation of a federal statute.
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time restriction in Supplemental Rule C(6) is to force claimants to come forward
as soon as possible after forfeiture proceedings have been initiated so that all
interested parties can be heard and the dispute resolved without delay. The
purpose of the verification requirement is to prevent false claims.” Id. at 1318
(quotation and citations omitted).
In this case, appellant, proceeding pro se, filed a pleading within ten days
of service of the forfeiture complaint, entitled “Petition for Remission.” It was
verified by affidavit. Appellant did not file a separate answer as envisioned by
Rule C(6). Nonetheless, the petition for remission asserted appellant’s claim to
the money, presented argument contesting the government’s allegations that the
money was derived from illegal sources, namely drug sales, and included
evidence supporting his claim to the money. When the government asserted that
appellant’s petition for remission did not satisfy the requirements of Rule C(6),
appellant first sought leave to restyle his petition for remission as a verified claim
and answer. After further argument from the government that his petition for
remission was not a proper answer, appellant sought leave to amend. He did not
attach proposed amended pleadings, but stated in his motion that he intended
solely to restyle his pleading to conform with the rule, and would not add new
claims, evidence, or arguments.
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Appellant’s argument, both before the district court and before this court on
appeal, is that the district court should have construed his petition for remission
as a verified claim and answer because it satisfies the fundamental requirements
of Rule C(6), or, alternatively, that the district court should have granted him
leave to amend his petition for remission to conform with the Rule. The district
court concluded that the petition for remission “cannot be considered either
a claim or an answer,” R. Vol. I, doc. 19, at 4, without discussing the
requirements of Rule C(6) or whether the contents of the petition for remission
satisfied them. The court then analyzed whether it should exercise its discretion
to allow a late filing of the claim and answer, without directly addressing
appellant’s motions to restyle the petition for remission or amend his pleadings.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
review these rulings of the district court only for abuse of discretion. See United
States v. Three Parcels of Real Prop. , 43 F.3d 388, 391 (8th Cir. 1994). We
conclude that the district court abused its discretion in ruling that appellant’s
petition for remission could not be construed as a verified claim and answer
because this ruling ignores the requirement that pro se pleadings are to be
liberally construed. The case cited by the district court as support for its ruling,
distinguishing petitions for remission in administrative forfeiture proceedings
from verified claims in judicial forfeitures, does not stand for the proposition that
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a pro se pleading styled as a petition for remission cannot be construed as
a verified claim and answer. Further, the oft-cited statement that courts may
require strict compliance with Rule C(6) does not negate the liberal construction
due pro se pleadings.
Appellant’s petition for remission satisfies the fundamental requirements of
Rule C(6) for the filing of a verified claim. It was both verified 2
and filed within
the ten-day time period required by the rule. As such, it clearly and promptly
notified both the court and the government that appellant was asserting a claim to
the money. In light of appellant’s pro se status, and because appellant’s petition
for remission satisfied both the requirements and underlying purposes of Rule
C(6), the district court should have construed his petition liberally as a verified
claim. See United States v. 1 Street A-1 , 885 F.2d 994, 999-1000 (1st Cir. 1989)
(construing a timely verified answer as both a claim and answer pursuant to
Rule C(6)).
The government concedes that the petition for remission could be construed
as a verified claim, but contends that it cannot be considered to be an answer as
2
The district court stated that appellant’s petition for remission was
“self-verified,” R. Vol. I, doc. 19 at 4, but applicable law does not require
otherwise. Appellant stated that his verification was under penalty of perjury
and made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746. That statute provides that unsworn
written statements subscribed under penalty of perjury will have the same effect
as verification for purposes of “any law of the United States.” Id. ; see Green v.
Branson ,
108 F.3d 1296, 1302 (10th Cir. 1997).
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well. It argues that the petition for remission fails as an answer because it did not
deny or admit the allegations in the forfeiture complaint or set out affirmative
defenses. This argument ignores both the substance of appellant’s petition for
remission and the meaning of liberal construction. This court has stated that
liberal construction of pro se pleadings “means that if the court can reasonably
read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it
should do so despite the plaintiff’s failure to cite proper legal authority, his
confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction, or
his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements.” Hall v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106,
1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (determining whether pro se plaintiff stated a claim under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)); see also
id. at 1110 n.3 (noting that the liberal
construction requirement applies to all proceedings involving pro se litigants).
A fair reading of appellant’s petition for remission clearly demonstrates a
challenge to the allegations in the government’s complaint and an intent to refute
the government’s case. Further, appellant did not rely on conclusory allegations,
but presented evidence supporting his contentions that the money was
unconnected with illegal activity. We conclude that appellant’s petition for
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remission satisfies the fundamental requirements of an answer to the
government’s complaint. 3
In this case, where the timeliness and verification requirements of
Rule C(6) have been met, and where the pro se petition for remission contains the
kinds of arguments, evidence, and implied denials generally accepted in pro se
answers, the district court abused its discretion in failing to construe appellant’s
petition for remission as a verified claim and answer under Rule C(6).
Having ruled that appellant had filed neither a claim nor an answer, the
district court further erred in failing to address appellant’s motions to restyle his
petition for remission as a verified claim and answer and to amend his pleadings
to conform with Rule C(6). Instead, the district court discussed whether it should
allow appellant to file a late claim and answer. Because appellant had timely
filed a pleading in the case, although unsatisfactory in the court’s judgment, the
inquiry should have been whether to allow appellant leave to amend his pleadings.
We agree with appellant that the district court failed to engage in the proper
3
The government makes two other arguments, both lacking in merit. First,
without citation to supportive authority on point, it asserts that the rule requires
two separate documents. This argument is in conflict with and weighs heavily
against the liberal construction due pro se pleadings. Second, it acknowledges
that while at least one circuit has construed a verified answer as both a claim and
answer, it “was unable to find any case standing for the reverse proposition.”
Appellee’s Br. at 12. Our legal system does not require such a narrow tailoring of
the facts before a case can be considered precedential or persuasive.
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analysis on this point, see, e.g., Castleglen, Inc. v. RTC , 984 F.2d 1571, 1585
(10th Cir. 1993), and further conclude that any such analysis would indicate that
amendment should have been granted. In light of appellant’s timely pleading
satisfying the requirements of both a verified claim and answer, there was no
undue delay in the case as a result of appellant’s conduct. The government cannot
claim surprise or prejudice because appellant set out the basis for his claim and
his arguments against the government’s case in his initial pleading. Finally, no
bad faith or dilatory motive has been ascribed to appellant. He has answered
every government pleading promptly and clearly set out his claims and objections.
The government argues that amendment of appellant’s pleadings would be
futile because the petition for remission fails to set out a legitimate defense to the
proposed forfeiture. It challenges appellant’s evidence and argues against his
claims. However, this is not the stage at which such an assessment should be
made. See United States v. 116 Emerson St. , 942 F.2d 74, 78 (1st Cir. 1991).
The overriding purpose of Rule C(6) is to identify claimants and allow them
standing in the forfeiture to proceed in defense. Cf. United States v. One Dairy
Farm ,
918 F.2d 310, 311-12 (1st Cir. 1990). Because appellant’s claims are
neither specious nor conclusory, we conclude that amendment would not have
been futile. Therefore, failing to allow amendment under these circumstances
was also an abuse of discretion.
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The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado is REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED for further proceedings
in light of this decision.
Entered for the Court
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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