EDWARD J. DAVILA, District Judge
In the earlier part of the twentieth century, the United States government passed a series of laws affecting its relationship with the indigenous inhabitants of California and their descendants. One of those laws, the Indian Appropriations Act of 1906, permitted the Secretary of the Interior (the "Secretary") to purchase parcels of land, or "rancherias," throughout the state for use by California Indians.
At issue in this action is the termination and distribution of one of those rancherias, the Alexander Valley Rancheria (the "Rancheria"), which, when it existed, was located in Sonoma County. Plaintiff The Mishewal Wappo Tribe of Alexander Valley ("Plaintiff") alleges in this action against Secretary of the Interior Sally Jewell and Assistant Secretary of the Interior Kevin Washburn
Federal jurisdiction arises pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Presently before the court are two Motions for Summary Judgment, one filed by Plaintiff and one filed by the Federal Defendants. See Docket Item Nos. 185, 186. The court has carefully considered these motions and the oral presentations of counsel in conjunction with the extensive historical record provided. Of the parties' arguments, one made by the Federal Defendants' provides for complete resolution. Accordingly, for the reasons explained below, the court finds that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The Federal Defendants' motion will therefore be granted and Plaintiff's motion will be denied.
Pursuant to the Indian Appropriations Act of 1906, Pub.L. No. 59-258, 34 Stat. 325, 333, the Secretary purchased two parcels of land in 1908 and 1913 located in the Alexander Valley of Sonoma County, California. See AR, MWT-AVR-2012-000001-004, MWT-AVR-2012-000005-008, MWT-AVR-2012-000009-011. These parcels, totaling 54 acres together, were designated under the Indian Appropriations Act for the benefit of California Indians who wished to live there and eventually became known as the Alexander Valley Rancheria.
Until its distribution, legal title and ownership of the Rancheria's land was vested in the United States. See Decl. of David B. Glazer ("Glazer Decl."), Docket Item No. 185, at Ex. 2. Use of the Rancheria was designated through a somewhat informal "assignment" or "allotment" system, such that a right of use terminated upon abandonment of possession. Id. As a result, "Indians occasionally moved onto the property without any assignment, occupying a parcel abandoned or never assigned." Id. One observer wrote in a letter to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs on March 27, 1917, that Rancheria the "is not occupied regularly by the Indians as a home...." See AR, MWT-AVR-2012-000309. Five families lived there at the time. Id.
After the California rancherias had been established, Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act ("IRA"), 25 U.S.C. §§ 461 et seq., in 1934. Under the IRA, an Indian tribe was permitted to "organize for its common welfare" and adopt a constitution and bylaws. 25 U.S.C. § 476(a) (1934) (amended 1988). Any decision to organize as a tribe had to be "ratified by a majority vote of the adult members of the tribe or tribes at a special election authorized and called by the Secretary" and thereafter "approved by the Secretary." Id.
On May 20, 1935, the Wappo Indians living on the Alexander Valley Rancheria submitted a list of fifteen residents who they proposed could vote to organize under the IRA. See AR, MWT-AVR-2012-000053. The Sacramento Indian Agency approved fourteen of those voters on June 5, 1935. See AR, MWT-AVR-2012-000054. Although not directly explained in the record, the one unapproved voter, James Adams, was presumably excluded because he was designated as a "non-Indian." See AR, MWT-AVR-2012-000053.
On June 10, 1935, the Sacramento Indian Agency received returns from the Wappo Indians' IRA vote. See AR, MWT-AVR-2012-000359. All fourteen voters were in favor of organization. Id. By 1940, 44 of the 49 individuals living on the Rancheria were identified as members of the Wappo tribe, many of whom were children. See AR, MWT-AVR-2012-000069-072.
Congress enacted the CRA in 1958, which called for the distribution of lands and assets previously designated as rancherias or reservations after the completion of designated improvements. See Act of Aug. 18, 1958, Pub.L. No. 85-67, 72 Stat. 619. The CRA directed the Secretary to prepare a plan for distribution in consultation with interested Indians, notify all other interested Indians of the proposed distribution, and then submit the plan to a referendum of "of the adult Indians who will participate in the distribution of the property." Id. at § 2.
In May, 1959, the Secretary conditionally approved a plan for the distribution of the Alexander Valley Rancheria, and finally approved the plan without objection in September, 1959. See AR, MWT-AVR-2012-000196. The plan was then submitted to a referendum as required by the CRA. See AR, MWT-AVR-2012-000221, MWT-AVR-2012-000458, MWT-AVR-2012-000464. It was approved by unanimous vote and the Rancheria's land and assets were distributed between two families in 1961. See AR, MWT-AVR-2012-000255-256, MWT-AVR-2012-000257-258, MWT-AVR-2012-000259-261, MWT-AVR-2012-000262-264. Notice of the Rancheria's termination was then published in the Federal Register on August 1, 1961. See Property of California Rancherias and of Individual Members Thereof, Termination of Federal Supervision, 26 Fed.Reg. 6875-76 (Aug. 1, 1961); MWT-AVR-2012-000280.
On July 12, 1979, a class action lawsuit, Tillie Hardwick, was filed in this district challenging the termination of 36 California Rancherias. See Tillie Hardwick v. United States, No. 79-1710 (N.D.Cal.). That action was eventually resolved in December, 1983, through a stipulated judgment which restored seventeen class-member tribes to their former tribal status. See Glazer Decl., at Ex. 5. Claims asserted by persons who received assets from
In 1985, it was discovered that potential class members with claims arising from the termination of the Alexander Valley Rancheria were inadvertently omitted from the Tillie Hardwick class notice which issued prior to entry of the stipulated judgment. Id. at Ex. 8. The court therefore ordered on September 5, 1985, that notice be given to these potential class members. Id. On December 23, 1985, the court dismissed without prejudice claims arising from the termination of the Alexander Valley Rancheria. Id. at Ex. 7.
Plaintiff initiated this case on June 5, 2009, as "an American Indian Tribe consisting of Indian members and their descendants, and/or their Indian successors in interest, for whose benefit the United States acquired and created the Mishewal Wappo Tribe of Alexander Valley." See Compl., Docket Item No. 1, at ¶ 5. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on May 10, 2010. See Docket Item No. 49. It asserts five causes of action: (1) breach of fiduciary duty, (2) agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 USC §§ 701 et seq., (3) failure to conclude a matter within a reasonable time under the APA, (4) arbitrary and capricious action under the APA, and (4) violation of possessory rights. The Federal Defendants filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint on March 21, 2012. See Docket Item No. 167.
Several California cities and counties sought to intervene as parties to this case, claiming an interest in Plaintiff's request for the restoration of trust lands within their jurisdictions. See Docket Item Nos. 38 (Sonoma County), 41 (Napa County), 44 (Lake County), 68 (City of American Canyon and American Canyon Fire Protection District), 75 (City of Napa), 86 (City of St. Helena). Judge James Ware permitted the Counties of Napa and Sonoma participate as intervenors on May 24, 2010. See Docket Item No. 52. All other requests were denied. See Docket Item No. 128.
After the case was reassigned to the undersigned, the court heard a Motion to Dismiss filed by the Counties of Napa and Sonoma. See Docket Item No. 145. Plaintiff and the Federal Defendants opposed the motion. It was denied on October 24, 2011, and the Counties of Napa and Sonoma were eventually removed as intervenors on September 28, 2012. See Docket Item Nos. 150, 172. These summary judgment motions followed.
A motion for summary judgment should be granted if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir.2000). The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying the portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the moving party meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and designate specific materials in the record to show that there is a genuinely disputed fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
A genuine issue for trial exists if the non-moving party presents evidence from which a reasonable jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to that party, could resolve the material issue in his or her favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1134-36 (9th Cir.1991). Conversely, summary judgment must be granted where a party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
The Federal Defendants support their motion with a series of arguments. Only one requires discussion because its application is dispositive.
The Federal Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the six-year statute of limitations described in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) for claims against the government. The court agrees.
As a sovereign, the United States "is immune from suit unless it has expressly waived such immunity and consented to be sued."
Subject to exceptions not applicable here, "every civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues." 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). This catch-all statute of limitations for claims against the Government "`applies to all civil actions whether legal, equitable or mixed.'" Nesovic v. United States, 71 F.3d 776, 778 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting Spannaus v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 824 F.2d 52, 55 (D.C.Cir.1987)). Its reach therefore encompasses
In applying the statute of limitations, the Federal Defendants contend that all of Plaintiff's claims stem from a common allegation; specifically, that the process implemented by the Secretary to terminate the Alexander Valley Rancheria was procedurally defective and thereby unlawful. Based on that, the Federal Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims actually accrued for the purposes of § 2401(a) when notice of the Rancheria's termination was published in the Federal Register on August 1, 1961. As a result, the Federal Defendants believe that Plaintiff should have presented its challenge within six years of the publication, or no later than 1967.
A close review of Plaintiff's claims demonstrates why the Government's characterization is correct. Consistent with the Government's argument, each claim depends on the allegation that the process instituted by the Secretary to terminate the Alexander Valley Rancheria did not conform to the requirements of the CRA, such that the Rancheria was improperly terminated. Looking at the first claim, Plaintiff asserts that the Government breached its general duty as a fiduciary of Indian tribes by failing to provide proper notice of the meeting at which the Alexander Valley Rancheria distribution plan was approved, by failing to confirm that those voting for the distribution plan "were in fact members" of Plaintiff, by continuously failing to include Plaintiff on the list of federally recognized tribes, and by failing to include Plaintiff in the Department of the Interior's annual budget submission to Congress. See Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97, 62 S.Ct. 1049, 86 L.Ed. 1480, 86 L.Ed. 1777 (1942) (holding that the Government, in dealings with Indian tribes, must conduct itself "with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust" and will be "judges by the most exacting fiduciary standards."). As Plaintiff's own allegations demonstrate, this breach of fiduciary duty claim is dependent upon a determination that the Alexander Valley Rancheria was improperly terminated and distributed between 1959 and 1961. See Am. Compl., at ¶ 78 ("The purported termination of the Tribe was not lawfully effectuated in conformance with the requirements of the California Rancheria Act, thereby rendering the Tribe's purported termination and distribution of assets void and of no legal effect."). Indeed, the distribution meeting directly challenged in this claim occurred in 1959, and the later alleged breaches—the failure to include Plaintiff in the list of recognized tribes and failure to account for it in the budget—cannot stand unless the termination was unlawful.
The same is true of the APA claims. Under 5 U.S.C. § 706, Plaintiff asserts in the second and fourth claims that its exclusion from the tribal recognition list constitutes agency action that is arbitrary, capricious, and "unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed." Plaintiff avers in the third claim that the same failure to include it on the list of recognized tribes violates the APA's requirement that agency proceedings conclude within a reasonable time. See 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) ("With due regard for the convenience and necessity of the parties or their representatives and within a reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to conclude a matter presented to it."). But again, Plaintiff's allegations demonstrate that the viability of its claims depends on the central question of whether or not the Rancheria was properly terminated. See Am. Compl., at ¶ 94 ("Upon information and belief which is likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonably opportunity for further investigation
Similarly, the fifth claim relies on the improper termination of the Rancheria as a necessary predicate. There, Plaintiff asserts that the Government violated its possessory rights to use and occupy land within the historical location of the Rancheria. In order to maintain that assertion, however, Plaintiff must also allege that the Secretary "failed to comply with the California Rancheria Act, negotiated and approved an inadequate Distribution Plan, and failed to fulfill the terms of the Distribution Plan" since, absent such non-compliance, Plaintiff has no present possessory rights for the Government to violate. See Am. Compl., at ¶ 111.
Since Plaintiff's claims each rely on one common alleged injury—termination of the Rancheria—the critical inquiry becomes when that injury "first accrued" under § 2401(a). See Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 855 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed.Cir.1988) (holding that causes of action stemming from the same factual allegation share an accrual date for application of the statute of limitations). Generally, a claim subject to the § 2401(a) limitations period first accrues when the plaintiff comes into possession "of the critical facts that he has been hurt and who has inflicted the injury." United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979); Acri v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 781 F.2d 1393, 1396 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Under federal law a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff is aware of the wrong and can successfully bring a cause of action."). Stated another way, "[t]he moment at which a cause of action first accrues within the meaning of Section 2401(a) is when `the person challenging the agency action can institute and maintain a suit in court.'" Muwekma Ohlone Tribe v. Salazar, 813 F.Supp.2d 170, 190-91 (D.D.C.2011) (quoting Spannaus, 824 F.2d at 56).
On this issue, the relevant facts are undisputed. The CRA specifically designated the Alexander Valley Rancheria within a list of those that were to be terminated and distributed according to the Act's provisions. Act of Aug. 18, 1958, Pub.L. No. 85-67, 72 Stat. 619. Pursuant to Section 2(a) of the CRA,
This record demonstrates that Plaintiff's claims first accrued no later than 1961 since, by then, it had come into possession of the critical facts necessary to institute a suit in court. See Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122, 100 S.Ct. 352; Muwekma Ohlone Tribe, 813 F.Supp.2d at 190-91 (D.D.C.2011). As noted above, Plaintiff contends that the Rancheria's termination was contrary to the terms of the CRA and in violation of the Government's fiduciary duty because it did not properly notice the meeting concerning distribution Rancheria assets, did not verify the tribal membership of those who voted for termination, and did not create and fulfill a qualifying distribution plan. All of these alleged violations were fully knowable by the time notice of the Rancheria's final termination was published in the Federal Register on August 1, 1961, such that Plaintiff could have initiated a lawsuit challenging the termination within the subsequent six years. This conclusion is only reinforced by the CRA's terms, which unambiguously established the Secretary's duties in creating a distribution plan and included the completion of certain infrastructure improvements before distribution.
In its pleadings, Plaintiff focuses on certain language in Section 2(a) of the
Plaintiff also argues against application of the statute of limitations based on its theory that the Government continues to owe it a fiduciary duty. Citing Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc. v. United States, Plaintiff asserts that the failure to properly terminate it as a tribe renders the Government's duty ongoing and precludes commencement of the statutory period. 363 F.Supp. 1238, 1249 (N.D.Cal. 1973) ("[W]here, as here, there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties, the universal rule is that a statute of limitation does not begin to run where there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties until the relationship is repudiated. (internal quotations omitted)). This argument is unpersuasive because it conflates two distinct issues: (1) one that relates to Indian lands, which in the instant context can be described as the alleged improper distribution of rancheria assets and termination of
Thus, termination of the Alexander Valley Rancheria did not equate to the termination of Plaintiff's status as a federally-recognized tribe.
Finally, the court turns to Plaintiff's argument that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled. "[T]he equitable tolling doctrine `enables courts to meet new situations [that] demand equitable intervention, and to accord all the relief necessary to correct ... particular injustices.'" Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030, 1052 (9th Cir.2013) (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 650, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010)). Generally, the proponent of equitable tolling must establish two elements: (1) that the proponent has been pursuing rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in the way. Id.
For the first element, Plaintiff begins with reference to Tillie Hardwick, and points out that the Government made a series of representations subsequent to its dismissal from that case which led it to believe it would be restored short of litigation. But the Tillie Hardwick action was initiated in 1979. Thus, what is missing from Plaintiff's diligence presentation is any explanation or evidence describing the acts Plaintiffs took to pursue its rights in the eighteen year period between 1961—when the Rancheria was terminated—and 1979. Although this element does not require an "overzealous or extreme pursuit of any and every avenue of relief," it nonetheless does require "the effort that a reasonable person might be expected to deliver under his or her particular circumstances." Doe v. Busby, 661 F.3d 1001, 1015 (9th Cir.2011). Here, it is unreasonable for Plaintiff to have sat idly for nearly two decades when all of the facts needed to raise its claims were available to it long beforehand.
As to the second element, qualifying "extraordinary circumstances" have been found in "situations where the claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory period, or where the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary's misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass." O'Donnell v. Vencor Inc., 465 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir.2006). Plaintiff does not specifically identify the "extraordinary circumstances" that prevented it from bringing timely claims, and there is certainly no evidence of previously-filed defective pleadings or trickery on the part of the Government. To the extent Plaintiff relies on sporadic governmental
In the end, Plaintiff's arguments fail to counter the effect of the statute of limitations. As a result, the court sees no reason to depart from the conclusion that each is barred by § 2401(a).
Statutes of limitation are based on a theory "that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them." Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349, 64 S.Ct. 582, 88 L.Ed. 788 (1944). It is that theory which makes enforcement of the statute of limitations appropriate here. As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the Federal Defendants have met their burden to show an absence of triable material fact as to when Plaintiff's claims first accrued. The uncontroverted evidence confirms they accrued no later than 1961, and Plaintiff has not demonstrated otherwise despite its burden to do so.
A timely action challenging the distribution and termination of the Alexander Valley Rancheria under the CRA should have been filed between 1961 and 1967. Since this action was not commenced until forty years later, the court finds that all of the claims asserted by Plaintiff in this action are untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). On that basis, the Federal Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted and Plaintiff's cross-motion will be denied.
For the foregoing reasons, the Federal Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Item No. 185) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Item No. 186) is DENIED. Since this result represents a complete resolution of this case, judgment will be entered in favor of the Federal Defendants and the Clerk shall close this file.
Furthermore, the apparent importance of the Alexander Valley Rancheria to any tribal entity created as a result of the 1935 IRA vote only emphasizes the logical conclusion stated previously that the members of the tribe would have been aware of any errors in the rancheria termination process sometime before the limitations period ran in 1967. That those individuals may not have been aware of the significance of the Rancheria's termination is of no moment. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122, 100 S.Ct. 352 ("Ignorance of the legal effect of an injury is not a basis to toll the statute of limitations.").
Similarly, the Government conceded in the consolidated action of Smith v. United States, 515 F.Supp. 56 (N.D.Cal.1978), that the process utilized to terminate the Hopland Rancheria was inconsistent with its obligations under Section 3 of the CRA. There, however, the court was not faced with issues of tribal recognition since the lawsuit involved only "Indian people of the Rancheria." Those individual Indians could properly challenge the rancheria's termination since the CRA directly affected their rights. Here, in contrast, Plaintiff does not purport to represent the Indians whose individual statuses were terminated when the Alexander Valley Rancheria was distributed. To the contrary, Plaintiff's theory is based on its exclusion from participation in the process. That being the case, the statuses of Plaintiff's members would not have been terminated by Section 10(b) of the CRA since participation in the rancheria's distribution was required in order for individual status termination to occur.
