BOLGER, Justice.
Timothy G. asserted in the superior court that the statute of limitations had been tolled on his claim against the Office of Children's Services because he was mentally incompetent following years of abuse by his stepfather. The superior court held an evidentiary hearing on this issue and concluded that Timothy had failed to prove that he was incompetent. On appeal, Timothy argues that the superior court should have ruled in his favor if he produced more than a scintilla of evidence to support his assertion. But we conclude that the superior court applied the proper burden of proof and the proper test for competency, and that the court did not clearly err in finding that Timothy did not prove his incompetence.
Timothy G.
On May 25, 2012, Timothy filed a complaint naming OCS and his stepfather as defendants.
In response, OCS moved under Alaska Civil Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss Timothy's claims as time-barred. It argued that the applicable statute of limitations required Timothy's claim to be filed within two years of its accrual;
Timothy replied that he was incompetent by reason of mental disability and that the statute therefore remained tolled after his eighteenth birthday.
Along with his opposition to OCS's motion to dismiss, Timothy submitted an affidavit from his friend Sarah G. describing his mental disability. Sarah met Timothy in 2008, and in 2010, when she learned he was homeless, she invited him to live in her home. She asserted that "based upon [her] personal involvement with [Timothy], his treating mental health care professionals[,] and various state and federal agencies, [it was her belief] that Timothy suffers from a mental disability."
The superior court treated OCS's motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment because in ruling on it the court considered matters outside of the pleadings, including Sarah's affidavit and OCS's responses to
The court scheduled an evidentiary hearing to resolve the statute of limitations dispute, noting that the parties had raised "preliminary questions of fact that should be decided by the court." The court stated that at this hearing, "[t]he burden [would] be on... [Timothy] to establish that he was incompetent as contemplated by AS []09.10.140(a)... during the relevant period."
The superior court held the hearing on September 4, 2014. Two witnesses testified on Timothy's behalf: Sarah and Timothy's former psychiatrist. Sarah described her role in Timothy's life as an "advocate." She testified that she tried to help Timothy find work, complete high school, and obtain disability benefits and counseling and that she routinely transported him to appointments and court appearances. Timothy signed a medical release giving Sarah access to his medical records, and she sometimes sat in on his counseling sessions. She testified that without her help, Timothy would not make it to his court dates or appointments: "He misses court dates[;] he can't remember them[;] ... he doesn't have the ability to keep track of [his appointments]."
Timothy's former psychiatrist testified as an expert in psychiatry; he treated Timothy from approximately 2007 to 2013. According to the psychiatrist, "[Timothy] was diagnosed with [p]ost[-][t]raumatic [s]tress [d]isorder and his case was a very complicated case dealing with sexual abuse and sexual trauma. [Timothy] ... also had depression and anxiety... [and] [b]i-polar disorder." The psychiatrist also verified the accuracy of a letter he wrote in 2012 to support Timothy's claim for disability benefits in which he stated: "[T]he trauma that he has suffered is one of the most egregious cases I have ever had to manage." The psychiatrist specifically testified that he did not believe Timothy was capable of understanding his legal rights or advocating for himself without assistance.
OCS called Timothy as a witness. He stated that in 2010, when he testified before a grand jury about his stepfather's abuse, he understood that what his stepfather had done was wrong. Timothy testified that after the grand jury proceedings he "just kind of wanted to walk away from it," but Sarah encouraged him to file this lawsuit. He acknowledged that, although he had appeared in court several times before to face criminal charges and to obtain a divorce, he had never claimed to be incompetent and had expressly stated that he understood his legal rights. And he testified that he felt comfortable asking clarifying questions to the judge during those proceedings if he did not understand a particular point.
On cross-examination, Timothy testified that Sarah helped him with most of his criminal cases and that although he represented himself in his divorce, Sarah helped him understand and fill out the paperwork. He also testified that he frequently missed court dates when he was not living with Sarah, for a variety of reasons. Timothy stated: "[A]ll my other rides fall through, people don't pick me up, I miss the bus[,] ... I forget times... or my phone will die and I won't ... make it in time." Finally, he testified that although he is "reluctant to tell society and average people [about his mental disability],... [he is] not afraid to ... tell [courts, doctors, and professional people] about [his] issues," and he is "not afraid to ask ... for help when needed."
On September 12, 2014, the superior court issued an order granting OCS's motion to dismiss, finding that Timothy's mental condition did not toll the statute of limitations. The court noted that the standard for mental incompetency is "whether a person could know or understand his legal rights sufficiently well to manage his personal affairs," and the court found that Timothy had not met his burden to show his incompetency during the period following his eighteenth birthday. The court found it telling that
Timothy now appeals, arguing that the superior court should instead have applied the summary judgment standard at the hearing and denied the motion.
"When the superior court holds an evidentiary hearing to resolve factual disputes about when a statute of limitations began to run, we review the resulting findings of fact for clear error."
Timothy's primary argument on appeal is that the superior court applied the wrong legal standard when granting OCS's motion to dismiss. He interprets the court's order as a grant of summary judgment and argues that the court should therefore have denied OCS's motion if there was "more than a scintilla of ... evidence" supporting his claim of mental incompetency.
In Cikan v. ARCO Alaska, Inc. we held that if material questions of fact exist as to a statute of limitations issue, summary judgment is improper and the superior court should instead consider the statute of limitations defense at a pre-trial hearing.
The superior court precisely followed the procedure set out in Cikan: After determining that summary judgment was improper because Timothy had raised a factual issue as to his competency during the relevant period, the court held an evidentiary hearing to weigh the evidence and resolve the factual issue prior to trial.
We find that the superior court followed the correct procedure for resolving factual disputes over statute of limitations issues, as set out in Cikan, and applied the proper burden of proof to the evidence presented at the hearing.
Timothy also argues that the superior court erred in finding that he was competent. He argues that the court applied the wrong test and that the court's factual finding was erroneous. Both of these arguments appear only in his reply brief and are therefore waived.
The superior court used the test set out by this court in Adkins v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc. to determine mental competency.
Timothy argues that the superior court should also have asked whether, even if he could understand his legal rights, he "nevertheless failed to act upon those rights because of [his] mental disability." He cites to two cases in which he claims this court adopted his preferred test. In Hikita v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd., we characterized the issue as whether the individual claiming mental incompetency "was sufficiently competent to run his own legal affairs during the period in question."
However, both Hikita and Hernandez-Robaina reaffirm that Adkins provides the appropriate test. In Hikita, we began our discussion of Hikita's mental competency by citing to the Adkins test.
Here, we likewise reaffirm our commitment to the Adkins test. Timothy presents no authority that would justify a departure from this established test.
Timothy also argues that the superior court "abused its discretion by finding that `[Timothy] ha[d] not shown he was unable to understand his legal rights following the removal of his disability of minority.'" But there was considerable evidence presented at the hearing to support that finding. Timothy consistently acknowledged that he understood his legal rights in previous court proceedings, and he testified that he was telling the truth when he did so. He testified that he had discussed filing a lawsuit with Sarah as early as 2008, when they first met. He confirmed that he had successfully represented himself in his divorce litigation, and he specifically testified that he understood that if his ex-wife's child had been born while they were still married, he could be liable for child support, even though the child was not his. Although he also testified that he relied heavily on Sarah's help in his divorce and in his other legal proceedings, requiring assistance to pursue one's legal rights does not necessarily mean that one is incapable of understanding them.
Timothy himself acknowledged in his brief that "an inference may be drawn that [his] pro se divorce litigation demonstrated an understanding of matters legal." Although he went on to argue that this evidence "falls short of conclusively proving that [he] met the Adkins test for competency," OCS did not have to conclusively prove anything; rather, Timothy had the burden to prove his own incompetency.
We AFFIRM the superior court's order dismissing Timothy's claims against OCS.
WINFREE, Justice, not participating.