STUART, Justice.

The United States Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation consolidated in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division ("the MDL court"), approximately 1,800 cases involving claims seeking damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by exposure to welding fumes. In re Welding Rod Products Liability Litigation, 269 F.Supp.2d 1365 (J.P.M.L.2003). Several dozen of those cases are governed by Alabama law, and the MDL court has identified three issues of Alabama law that may be determinative in those cases, yet, the MDL court states, there is no clear, controlling precedent in the decisions of this Court resolving those issues. Accordingly, the MDL court has certified three questions to this Court pursuant to Rule 18, Ala. R.App. P. We answer those questions below.

I.

The MDL court provided the following background information in the certification order filed with this Court on August 11, 2010:

(Footnotes omitted.) By order dated September 20, 2010, we accepted the certified questions, and briefs have been filed by Jerkins, the defendant welding-rod manufacturers, and amici curiae the Business Council of Alabama and the Alabama Defense Lawyers Association.

II.

At the outset, we take the liberty of rephrasing the first question as follows so that the response we give accurately states Alabama law:1

As the MDL court correctly noted in the first certified question, the law that applies to Jerkins's claims is the law that existed in Alabama before this Court's decision in Griffin v. Unocal Corp., 990 So.2d 291 (Ala.2008). In Griffin, this Court overruled decades of caselaw to hold that a cause of action in which damages are sought for injuries sustained as a result of exposure to toxic substances accrues only when a manifest injury stemming from that exposure presents itself. 990 So.2d at 293. Before Griffin, this Court had applied the rule encapsulated in Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So.2d 516 (Ala. 1979), that a cause of action based on exposure to a toxic substance accrues on the date of the last exposure to that toxic substance — even if there is no manifest injury at that time. Although Griffin explicitly overruled Garrett, it also provided that its holding would apply prospectively only, that is, only to those persons whose last exposure to a toxic substance, and first manifest injury resulting from that exposure, occurred within the two-year period before this Court released its opinion in Griffin. Griffin was decided in January 2008; thus, Jerkins's action, filed in April 2004 and based on injuries occurring before that date, is outside the scope of Griffin.

Under the continuous-exposure rule of Garrett, the statutory period of limitations for a continuous tort begins to run from the "date of injury," 368 So.2d at 520, which is "the last day on which plaintiff was exposed to the danger." Garren v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 340 So.2d 764, 766 (1976). The parties in this case have stipulated that Jerkins's exposure to welding fumes was essentially continuous from 1979 through about 2008, and he filed the underlying action on April 21, 2004. Thus, Jerkins's action is clearly not barred by the statute of limitations, and the fundamental issue is therefore what restriction is placed upon his recovery of damages by pre-Griffin law.

This Court's pre-Griffin caselaw provides ample authority to support the proposition advocated by the defendant welding-rod manufacturers that a party alleging injury as a result of long-term exposure to a toxic substance can recover only damages attributable to injuries that occurred within the relevant limitations period.2 This principle has been clearly stated in Garrett, 368 So.2d at 521 ("Among our cases, continuous tort cases are significant in the limitation of actions context. It was thus that in American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Agricola Furnace Co., 236 Ala. 535, 183 So. 677 (1938), this Court held that recovery for a continuous tort could be had only for those damages which occurred within the period of limitations."), as well as Garren, 340 So.2d at 766 (affirming the trial court's judgment in an action where the plaintiff alleged that she had been injured as a result of continuously breathing dust and lint at her workplace over several years and stating that "any damages to which plaintiff might otherwise be entitled could not include those for any injuries suffered by plaintiff more than one year prior to [the date of filing suit]"), and American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Phillips, 491 So.2d 904, 908 (Ala.1986) (holding that the "defendants were entitled to an order limiting plaintiff's potential recovery to damages occurring within the year next preceding the filing of this action" where the action alleged that the plaintiff had been injured by inhaling cotton fibers at the mill where she worked), among other cases.3 Jerkins, however, argues that the principle articulated in these cases (1) is contrary to the plain language of the relevant statute of limitations, § 6-2-38(1), Ala.Code 1975; (2) was rejected by this Court even before Griffin; and (3) is unfair, irrational, and potentially unconstitutional. With regard to Jerkins's final argument, we note that the members of this Court thoroughly reviewed the state of the law with regard to injuries stemming from exposure to toxic substances fairly recently in both Griffin and Cline v. Ashland, Inc., 970 So.2d 755, 761 (Ala. 2007). Arguments similar to the arguments now made by Jerkins were made in those cases, and this Court considered the relevant constitutional and public-policy issues in those cases.4 As Justice See, concurring specially in Cline, 970 So.2d at 757, stated:

This Court resolved those issues in Griffin, and we are not now inclined to revisit them, nor are we inclined to accept Jerkins's invitation to reconsider the prospective application of Griffin. His first two arguments, however, are discussed in more detail below.

Section 6-2-38(1) provides that "[a]ll actions for any injury to the person or rights of another not arising from contract and not specifically enumerated in this section must be brought within two years." Jerkins argues that the plain language of this statute imposes no limitation on damages and that this Court is therefore prohibited from reading such a limitation into the statute. See Ex parte Carlton, 867 So.2d 332, 338 (Ala.2003) ("[T]his Court is not at liberty to rewrite statutes or to substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature."). Therefore, he argues, he is entitled to recover damages for injuries that occurred even outside the limitations period. We disagree; as this Court explained in Cazalas v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 435 So.2d 55, 57 (Ala.1983), such a limitation on damages is implicit in any statute of limitations.

In Cazalas, this Court considered the effect of § 6-2-30(b), Ala.Code 1975, which was enacted by the legislature following this Court's decision in Garrett and which expressly provided that all actions arising out of exposure to asbestos were not deemed to have accrued until "the first date the injured party, through reasonable diligence, should have reason to discover the injury giving rise to such civil action." After the Mobile Circuit Court subsequently held that 25 individuals suing based on injuries received as a result of exposure to asbestos were limited in the damages they were entitled to recover to those exposure-caused damages occurring within one year of the filing of their action, this Court reversed that judgment and held that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover for all injuries proximately caused by exposure to asbestos, stating:

435 So.2d at 57. Jerkins's claims, however, are not asbestos-related claims subject to § 6-2-30; rather, his claims are subject to the statute of limitations set forth in § 6-2-38(1) and, as Cazalas indicates, an implicit "function" of that statute of limitations is that Jerkins is now limited to seeking damages attributable to injuries that occurred within the period of limitations.

Jerkins next argues that this Court has rejected the holding reaffirmed in Garrett that "recovery for a continuous tort could be had only for those damages which occurred within the period of limitations," 368 So.2d at 521, even before Griffin was decided, most notably in Hillis v. Rentokil, Inc., 596 So.2d 888 (Ala.1992). In Hillis, a lumber-company employee alleged that he had been injured as a result of prolonged exposure to chromated copper arsenate ("CCA") during the course of his employment from September 1985 to December 31, 1987. The employee had been treated for maladies he later attributed to CCA in July 1986 and August 1987; however, it was not until September 25, 1987, that he was advised by his primary physician to visit a dermatologist because of an allergic reaction to CCA. He then continued to work at the lumber company until his employment was terminated on December 31, 1987, and, on November 15, 1989, he filed an action seeking damages for injuries allegedly suffered as a result of his exposure to CCA. The defendants thereafter moved for a summary judgment, arguing that the employee's action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations because he was aware of his injuries by, at the latest, September 25, 1987 — when his physician referred him to a dermatologist — yet he did not file his complaint until November 15, 1989. The trial court granted the motion and entered a summary judgment; however, this Court subsequently reversed that judgment, stating:

596 So.2d at 890. Thus, the plaintiff in Hillis was considered to have been injured both within and outside the limitations period, yet, Jerkins argues, this Court made no distinction between those injuries and placed no limitations on the damages available to him, stating only that "his tort claims were not barred by the statute of limitations." Id. The defendant welding-rod manufacturers acknowledge that Hillis was correctly decided because the injuries the plaintiff suffered from November 15, 1987, through his termination on December 31, 1987, did, in fact, occur within the limitations period; however, they argue that the Court failed to expressly limit his damages to injuries occurring after November 15, 1987, merely because such a limitation was implicitly understood by all the parties. We agree. If Hillis did, in fact, effect a sea change in this area of law and overrule at least to some extent Garrett and its progeny, as Jerkins now argues, it would have done so explicitly. See Liberty & Prosperity 1776, Inc. v. Corzine, 720 F.Supp.2d 622, 629 (D.N.J.2010) ("The Supreme Court would not have made such a sweeping change to the law by implication."). The rule limiting the recovery of damages to those resulting from injuries occurring within the period of limitations was not changed between this Court's release of its opinion in Garrett and its release of the opinion in Griffin; thus we must answer the first certified question in the affirmative.

III.

The second certified question concerns the MDL court's application of McKenzie v. Killian, 887 So.2d 861 (Ala. 2004), to Jerkins's wantonness claims. In McKenzie, this Court overruled Sasser v. Dixon, 290 Ala. 17, 273 So.2d 182 (1973), and succeeding cases and held that wantonness claims are subject to the six-year statute of limitations set forth in § 6-2-34(1), Ala.Code 1975, as opposed to the two-year statute of limitations set forth in § 6-2-38(1). 887 So.2d at 870. The MDL court now seeks guidance as to whether McKenzie should be applied (1) prospectively to claims filed after McKenzie was decided; (2) retroactively to claims that accrued no earlier than two years before McKenzie was decided; or (3) in some other fashion.

This Court recently reconsidered McKenzie in Ex parte Capstone Building Corp., [Ms. 1090966, June 3, 2011] ___ So.3d ___, ___ (Ala.2011),* and held that that case had been erroneously decided, concluding:

We also stated, however, that, for reasons of equity and justice, our holding should not be applied retroactively so as to "deprive [affected parties] of a vested right without granting them any opportunity to preserve it." ___ So.3d at ___.*** We accordingly provided the following instruction on how to apply our holding in Ex parte Capstone to other litigants:

___ So.3d at ___. Jerkins and any other Alabamians with wantonness claims now pending before the MDL court filed those claims before McKenzie was overruled by Ex parte Capstone. Applying the prospective nature of our decision in Ex parte Capstone to their cases, we accordingly conclude that a six-year period of limitations should apply to those wantonness claims. Whether the wantonness claims of other individuals are subject to the two-year or six-year statute of limitations should therefore be determined based on whether those claims were asserted pre- or post-Ex parte Capstone.

IV.

Having established in our answer to the first certified question that Jerkins is limited to recovering damages only for those injuries occurring within the limitations period, we must also consider the final issue raised by the MDL court: whether the burden falls upon Jerkins or the defendant welding-rod manufacturers to prove what injuries occurred within the applicable six-year limitations period. In Johnson v. Harrison, 404 So.2d 337, 340 (Ala.1981), this Court stated the general principle regarding which party bears the burden of proving damages:

This principle would appear to place the burden upon Jerkins to prove what damages he is entitled to recover as a result of injuries occurring within the applicable six-year limitations period; however, Jerkins argues that the defendant welding-rod manufacturers' assertion of the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense shifts that burden to them because they must prove each element of that defense. See Lands v. Lull Int'l, Inc., 963 So.2d 626, 629 (Ala.2007) (stating that the burden is on the party moving for a summary judgment on the basis of the statute of limitations to establish that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to any element of that defense). This argument is misguided, however, because a plaintiff's damages are never an element of an asserted defense — affirmative or otherwise; rather, as stated above, it is the plaintiff's responsibility to prove damages.

Moreover, this Court has previously considered the issue raised by the third certified question and has held that the burden of proving what damages are recoverable remains with the plaintiff even when some of the plaintiff's claims have been determined to be time-barred. In Chatham v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 613 So.2d 341 (Ala.1993), this Court considered a railroad employee's claim for damages based on a hearing loss he allegedly suffered as a result of years spent working in the train yard. We held that the employee could not recover for injuries that occurred outside the three-year limitations period set forth in the Federal Employers' Liability Act, which governed his claims, but that he could "claim damages for aggravation of his hearing loss if he [could] show a deterioration in his hearing caused by his work environment during the three years before he filed this action...." 613 So.2d at 346 (emphasis added). The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama likewise recognized this principle in Cloud v. Olin Corp., 552 F.Supp. 528, 534 n. 14 (N.D.Ala.1982), when, after stating that the plaintiff could recover damages for mental anguish associated with his timely — but not his untimely — claims, stated that "[t]he burden will be on plaintiff, at the trial, to establish such reasonable separation." Accordingly, we hold that a plaintiff injured by long-term continuous exposure to a toxic substance bears the burden of proving what injuries he suffered within the limitations period as a result of his exposure to that substance and what the appropriate damages for those injuries should be.

V.

The MDL court certified three questions to this Court pursuant to Rule 18, Ala. R.App. P. Our answer to those questions may be summarized as follows:

QUESTIONS ANSWERED.

WOODALL, BOLIN, PARKER, MURDOCK, SHAW, MAIN, and WISE, JJ., concur.

COBB, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part.

COBB, Chief Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

I concur in those parts of the majority opinion that do not rely on the holding and rationale of Ex parte Capstone Building Corp., [Ms. 1090966, June 3, 2011] ___ So.3d ___ (Ala.2011). With respect to Part III of the opinion, which does rely on Ex parte Capstone, I respectfully dissent.

On Application for Rehearing

STUART, Justice.

APPLICATION OVERRULED. NO OPINION.

MALONE, C.J., and WOODALL, BOLIN, PARKER, MAIN, and WISE, JJ., concur.

MURDOCK and SHAW, JJ., concur specially.

MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially).

I concur to overrule the application for rehearing. I write separately for two reasons: (1) to offer additional comments regarding this Court's response on original submission to the first certified question in this case and, (2) with respect to our answer to the second certified question, to address certain concerns expressed by the applicants for rehearing that are also addressed by Justice Shaw in his special writing on application for rehearing.

1. The First Certified Question

The following statement appears in American Law Reports:

Annot., When Limitation Period Begins to Run Against Cause of Action or Claim for Contracting Disease, 11 A.L.R.2d 277, 289 (1950). This passage speaks of a "single wrong," as well as a single limitation period — "the limitation period" — that commences to run only at the single point in time when that wrong ceases. Consistent with this passage, I had until this case been under the impression that Alabama's "continuing tort" theory of recovery for long-term exposure to toxic substances, when applied in tandem with the last-exposure rule recognized in Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So.2d 516 (Ala. 1979), meant that, so long as a claim was filed within the period of limitations following the plaintiff's last exposure to the hazardous substance, the plaintiff could recover all damages referable to the malady resulting from the exposure to the hazardous substance at any time during the plaintiff's term of employment.

On original submission in this case, however, the Court stated that "[a] plaintiff injured by long-term continuous exposure to a toxic substance is limited to recovering damages attributable to injuries occurring within the period of limitations." 103 So.3d at 11. A more careful review of the quoted passage from American Law Reports yields a possible explanation for the discord between it and our statement on original submission limiting the damages that can be recovered in a case governed by Garrett. The passage quoted from American Law Reports embraces a "single wrong" theory, and it does so based on the predicate that the plaintiff's injury may "develop" after exposure at some unknown and unknowable time. The analysis employed in Garrett, on the other hand, contemplates that the plaintiff actually suffers a physical injury when he or she suffers an exposure, even if that injury has yet to "develop" into something that is observable by the injured party.1

Moreover, my consideration of the present case has brought to my attention Alabama cases governed by the last-exposure rule of Garrett, which as noted by the main opinion on original submission, presaged our answer to the certified question before us, i.e., that damages are limited to those resulting from injuries occurring within the limitations period. Thus, in the case of Minyard v. Woodward Iron Co., 81 F.Supp. 414, 417-18 (N.D.Ala.1948), the federal district court was able to state:

(Emphasis added.)

In accord with this statement from Minyard is the following statement by this Court in Garrett, itself:

368 So.2d at 521 (emphasis added).

It is as a consequence of such authority that I concurred in the main opinion's response to the first certified question on original submission.2

2. The Second Certified Question

I first note that I agree with Justice Shaw that the decision in Cazalas v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 435 So.2d 55, 57 (Ala.1983), indicates a distinction for purposes of § 95, Ala. Const. 1901, between the ability of the legislature, by lengthening a statute of limitations, to revive a cause of action previously barred by lapse of time, and the ability of the legislature to legislate an expansion of the period as to which damages can be claimed in an action that is otherwise filed within a valid statutory limitations period. To the extent that Justice Shaw's writing also hints at some concern about this disparate treatment, I would agree with that as well. Such disparate treatment appears to be in conflict with the principles discussed in Part 1 above. In particular, as the main opinion on original submission observed, 103 So.3d at 7 (quoting Cazalas, 435 So.2d at 57), the rule governing the period within which injuries must have occurred to be recoverable "`does not ... operate independently of the statute of limitations,'" but, "`[t]o the contrary, it is a function the statute of limitations.'"

That said, I am reluctant to suggest merit in the defendants' argument that the prohibition in § 95, Ala. Const. 1901, against "reviving" an "otherwise time-barred claim" placed some limit on the Court's holding in McKenzie v. Killian, 887 So.2d 861 (Ala.2004), that a six-year limitations period was applicable to wantonness claims. Section 95 states that "the legislature shall have no power to revive any right or remedy which may have become barred by lapse of time, or by any statute of this state." (Emphasis added.) I see nothing in this language that requires us to apply § 95 to judicial decisions. To the contrary, doing so would be at odds with the strong bias in favor of retroactive application of judicial decisions, a bias that is a function of the so-called "declaratory theory" of judicial review.3

It is correct, as the welding-rod manufacturers argue on rehearing, that McKenzie was "wrongly decided." Nonetheless, it was decided. It thereby became the "law of the land." And it remained so until it was overruled in Ex parte Capstone Building Corp., [Ms. 1090966, June 3, 2011] ___ So.3d ___ (Ala.2011).*

This Court's bias in favor of retroactive application of judicial decisions, based on the declaratory theory of judicial review, has been explained as follows:

Alabama State Docks Terminal Ry. v. Lyles, 797 So.2d 432 (Ala.2001).

Consistent with this declaratory theory, the Court in McKenzie made a declaration as to the meaning of an existing statute. It was not acting as a legislature.

New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 370-71, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989) (quoting Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226, 29 S.Ct. 67, 53 L.Ed. 150 (1908)). This difference is the reason for § 95.

SHAW, Justice (concurring specially).

I concur to overrule the application for rehearing. However, I write specially to acknowledge the concerns expressed on rehearing by the defendant welding-rod manufacturers and amici curiae Business Council of Alabama and Alabama Defense Lawyers Association that application of the six-year limitations period set out in McKenzie v. Killian, 887 So.2d 861 (Ala. 2004), to Charles E. Jerkins's wantonness claim will have the unintended effect of reviving wantonness claims that would otherwise be subject to the two-year limitations bar that predated McKenzie. Specifically, the welding-rod manufacturers argue:

(Footnote omitted.)

As I understand the welding-rod manufacturers' argument, they do not challenge this Court's answer to the first certified question, which was summarized in the instant opinion on original submission as follows: "A plaintiff injured by long-term continuous exposure to a toxic substance is limited to recovering damages attributable to injuries occurring within the period of limitations." 103 So.3d at 11. They object, instead, to this Court's answer to the second certified question, which authorizes the application of the six-year limitations period and, by extension, a six-year period of recovery for damages to Jerkins's wantonness claim. In other words, the specific concern of the welding-rod manufacturers seems to be their perception that there is a constitutional impediment to allowing Jerkins to recover damages attributable to injuries occurring during the six-year period preceding the filing of his action.

Amici curiae argue generally that any application of McKenzie so as to revive a wantonness claim that would otherwise be subject to the bar of the pre-McKenzie two-year limitations period would be unconstitutional. They state:

(Emphasis in original.)

The welding-rod manufacturers and amici curiae cite Ala. Const. 1901, art. IV, § 95, and various cases in support of their position that a change in a statute of limitations, either directly by the legislature or indirectly by this Court, cannot operate to revive a cause of action already subject to the bar of a previous limitations period. See, e.g., Johnson v. Garlock, Inc., 682 So.2d 25, 27-28 (Ala.1996); Ex parte State Dep't of Revenue, 667 So.2d 1372, 1374 (Ala.1995); Crawford v. Springle, 631 So.2d 880, 881 (Ala.1993); and Lader v. Lowder Realty Better Homes & Gardens, 512 So.2d 1331, 1333 (Ala.1987).

However, I do not understand this Court's opinion on original submission as constituting authority for the general proposition that an otherwise time-barred wantonness claim may be revived by the application of the six-year limitations period set out in McKenzie. With respect to the welding-rod manufacturers' argument that the applicable period of recovery for damages could not constitutionally extend back more than two years from the date Jerkins filed his action, I note that there appears to be authority to the contrary. In Cazalas v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 435 So.2d 55 (Ala.1983), the rationale of which was not challenged on original submission and is not challenged on rehearing, this Court held that, at least in certain instances, § 95 would not necessarily restrict the applicable period of recovery for damages concomitant with a new limitations period. This Court stated: "While § 95 would prohibit the legislature from reviving a cause of action which had become barred by lapse of time, there is no constitutional requirement that damages be apportioned to conform with the prescriptive period for filing an action." 435 So.2d at 57. This Court did not address this issue on original submission; any reexamination of Cazalas must await a specific challenge to the logic of its holding.

With respect to the arguments of amici curiae that this Court has inadvertently held that otherwise barred claims may be revived, I note that the United States Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation consolidated in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division ("the MDL court"), in its certification, provided this Court with a limited procedural background of the multi-district litigation, as well as certain relevant, undisputed facts. The specific questions certified were framed under and based upon the facts of Jerkins's case, which I understood to be representative of other Alabamians with wantonness claims now pending before the MDL court. Jerkins's action was filed after this Court's decision in McKenzie, and his alleged exposure to welding fumes was essentially continuous from 1979 through about 2008. Applying the limitations period set out in McKenzie, see Crawford, 631 So.2d at 881 (noting that "generally the statute of limitations to be applied is that which is in effect when the action is filed"), and the continuing-exposure rule of Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So.2d 516 (Ala.1979), to Jerkins's action, this Court concluded on original submission that his action was clearly not time-barred. This Court was not faced with the issue whether a claim was being revived by the application of the six-year limitations period to Jerkins, i.e., the kind of issue illustrated by the example provided by amici curiae in their rehearing application.

In sum, the concerns expressed on rehearing, although in my view worthy of serious consideration, are outside the scope of the specific questions certified to this Court and thus must await resolution another day.