MURDOCK, Justice.

Tonya Denson, a member of the Employees' Retirement System of Alabama ("the ERSA"), and Venius Turner, a member of the Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama ("the TRSA"), brought this action on behalf of themselves, individually, as well as similarly situated members of the Retirement Systems of Alabama ("the RSA"), in the Montgomery Circuit Court against (1) David Bronner, in his official capacities as chief executive officer and secretary-treasurer of the ERSA, the TRSA, and the RSA1 and (2) the officers and members of the respective boards of control of the TRSA and the ERSA, in their official capacities (Bronner and the officers and members of the boards of control are hereinafter referred to collectively as "the RSA defendants").

The RSA defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the trial court denied. The RSA defendants then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with this Court, asking that we direct the trial court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss and to grant the motion. We grant the petition.

I. Facts and Procedural History

The RSA includes the TRSA, which is administered for the benefit of public-education employees who are members of the TRSA, and the ERSA, which is administered for the benefit of state employees who are members of the ERSA. See supra note 1. Denson is a member of the ERSA; Turner is a member of the TRSA. The board of control of the TRSA is charged by statute with making and overseeing investments on behalf of the TRSA, just as the board of control of the ERSA is tasked with the same responsibility and authority as to the ERSA. See Ala.Code 1975, § 16-25-2(b) and § 36-27-2(b).

Section 16-25-20, Ala.Code 1975, provides:

See also Ala.Code 1975, § 36-27-25(a), (c), (d), and (e) (substantially similar provisions as to the board of control of the ERSA).2

In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the RSA defendants had violated their fiduciary duties. Quoting Ala.Code 1975, § 16-25-20(a)(1), governing the TRSA, and citing § 36-27-25(a), governing the ERSA and which, in all material respects, is identical to § 16-25-20(a)(1), the plaintiffs alleged that the RSA defendants are obligated to invest the respective retirement funds being managed by them "`with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with the matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.'"

The plaintiffs also alleged that the RSA has adopted a policy statement entitled "Investment Policies and Procedures" that states, in part, as follows:

The plaintiffs alleged that, "for as much as the most recent fifteen year period," the RSA defendants have made investments

(Emphasis added.) In this regard, the plaintiffs contended that "up to ... approximately 15%" of the investments made by the boards of control have been in such Alabama-based investments. They contend that the ERSA and the TRSA received lower returns on those investments than could have been realized on other investments, which, in turn, made it necessary for members of the ERSA and the TRSA and the State of Alabama to pay more to enable the ERSA and the TRSA to meet their obligations to retirees. They alleged that, "though the Alabama Investments may have been well intended, and may serve as a vehicle for creating goodwill, they have not been made in compliance with the Prudent Man Rule."

The plaintiffs asked the trial court to enter a judgment declaring

and declaring further that it is "beyond the authority" of the boards of control to invest "any assets and funds ... in Alabama Investments which the [RSA defendants] expected or were aware would yield less of a return than alternative or other investments." Similarly, the plaintiffs requested in their complaint that the trial court enjoin the RSA defendants from, among other things, investing "any assets" within their control in a manner not in accord with the "Prudent Man Rule" and from investing "in Alabama Investments ... which the [RSA defendants] expect or are aware will yield less of a return than alternative or other investments."

The RSA defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The motion, as initially filed, asserted two grounds for dismissal of the complaint. First, the RSA defendants asserted that State, or sovereign, immunity precluded prosecution of the claims. See Art. I, § 14, Ala. Const. 1901; Ala.Code 1975, §§ 16-25-2(b) and 36-27-2(b) (recognizing that the boards of control of the TRSA and the ERSA are instrumentalities of the State, that the TRSA and the ERSA are funded by the State, and that their officers and employees are immune from suit in their official capacities to the same extent as the State, its agencies, and its officers and employees). According to the RSA defendants, the plaintiffs' claims do not fall within any of the recognized "exceptions" to State immunity applicable to State officials. Second, the RSA defendants asserted that Denson and Turner lacked standing.4

Denson and Turner filed a reply in opposition to the motion to dismiss, contending that the plaintiffs' claims did in fact fall within recognized "exceptions" to State immunity. They also contended that they had standing, relying principally on a 1981 decision of this Court, Lee v. Bronner, 404 So.2d 627 (Ala.1981).

The RSA defendants filed a response to Denson and Turner's reply in opposition, adding arguments that the plaintiffs' claims were nonjusticiable and that Denson and Turner had failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

In December 2011, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The RSA defendants filed a timely petition for the writ of mandamus with this Court.

II. Standard of Review

A writ of mandamus is an

Ex parte Wood, 852 So.2d 705, 708 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Ex parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So.2d 501, 503 (Ala.1993)). "`When we consider a mandamus petition, the scope of our review is to determine whether the trial court clearly exceeded its discretion.'" Ex parte Thomas, 110 So.3d 363, 365-66 (Ala.2012) (quoting State v. Bui, 888 So.2d 1227, 1229 (Ala.2004)).

"Subject to certain narrow exceptions..., we have held that, because an `adequate remedy' exists by way of an appeal, the denial of a motion to dismiss... is not reviewable by petition for writ of mandamus." Ex parte Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 825 So.2d 758, 761-62 (Ala.2002). One of the recognized exceptions to this general rule is "that mandamus will lie to compel the dismissal of claim that is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity." Ex parte Blankenship, 893 So.2d 303, 305 (Ala.2004). Likewise, the writ may be issued where the plaintiff's claims fail to present a justiciable controversy. Gulf Beach Hotel, Inc. v. State ex rel. Whetstone, 935 So.2d 1177, 1182 (Ala.2006).

III. Analysis

The RSA defendants argue that they are entitled to immunity as to the plaintiffs' claims, that Denson and Turner lack standing because they "cannot allege an injury in fact," that the controversy at issue is nonjusticiable, and that Denson and Turner have failed to exhaust administrative remedies. In response to those arguments, the trial court identified a number of issues that gave it "considerable concern":

The issues that gave the trial court concern also give this Court concern. Unlike the trial court, however, we conclude that some of those issues are appropriate for consideration at this juncture in the litigation. In this regard, we turn first to the corollary questions of sovereign immunity and separation of powers.5

Section 14 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 provides: "[T]he State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity." As discussed below, the doctrine of sovereign immunity not only prohibits the State itself from being named as a defendant in an action, but it also prohibits State agencies and, as a general rule, State officials sued in their official capacity from being named as defendants in an action. As discussed further below, the bar of sovereign immunity aligns with and is buttressed by the doctrine of separation of powers to the extent the latter prohibits the judicial branch, through adjudications, from usurping functions dedicated to the executive and legislative branches. See Art. III, § 43, Ala. Const.1901.6

It has long been held that the wall of sovereign immunity erected by § 14 of the Alabama Constitution is formidable:

Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So.2d 137, 142 (Ala.2002) (emphasis omitted).

It is not merely when an action against a State official would "affect the financial status of the state treasury," however, that such an action is barred by § 14. This Court has long recognized that actions against State officials sued in their official capacity are barred by § 14 unless they fall within certain categories of actions that, as a rule, do not involve discretionary decision-making by those officials. As early as 1971, this Court recognized that those categories included:

Aland v. Graham, 287 Ala. 226, 229-30, 250 So.2d 677, 679 (1971).

To the four categories of action identified in Aland, this Court has since added and repeatedly recognized two additional categories of action against State officials that do not seek to invade the exercise of discretion delegated to them by State law and, therefore, do not qualify as "actions against the State" for purposes of § 14 immunity:

Ex parte Jackson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 164 So.3d 532, 536 (Ala.2014) (quoting Ex parte Moulton, 116 So.3d 1119, 1131 and 1141 (Ala.2013), quoting in turn other cases).7

Turning then to the present case, the gravamen of the plaintiffs' complaint is this: "Up to ... approximately 15%" of the investments made by the boards of control have been made in Alabama-based assets and, as a group, those investments have not yielded as much return to the ERSA and the TRSA as other investments that could have been made by the RSA defendants. As a consequence, the plaintiffs contend, the investments pursued by the RSA defendants reflects a violation of a "legal duty" imposed upon them by State law and therefore those investments are "beyond the [lawful] authority" of the RSA defendants.8

The RSA defendants argue as follows in their initial brief to this Court:

The parties acknowledge that certain Code provisions relating to trusts may shed light on the duties of the RSA defendants under the statutes at issue in this case. The plaintiffs point to, and the RSA defendants acknowledge, the general principle of trust law requiring trustees to "administer the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries." Ala.Code 1975, § 19-3B-802(a).9 Similarly, both sides acknowledge Alabama's codification for application to trusts generally of the so-called "prudent-investor rule," including § 19-3B-902(c), Ala.Code 1975 (part of Alabama's version of the Uniform Trust Act). Section 19-3B-902(c) provides:

The RSA defendants, however, reject the notion that those general principles of trust law require emphasis upon rate of return to the exclusion of other factors. Indeed, as indicated, § 19-3B-902(c) expressly contemplates investment decisions that take into consideration "the role that each investment ... plays within the overall trust portfolio" (which may include not just stocks, bonds, and other financial instruments, but also "interests in closely held enterprises, tangible and intangible personal property, and real property"); "the expected total return from income and the appreciation of capital"; "other resources of the beneficiaries"; the "need[] for ... preservation or appreciation of capital"; "an asset's special relationship or special value, if any, to the purposes of the trust or to one or more of the beneficiaries"; "the size of the portfolio"; and "the purposes and estimated duration of the trust."

The RSA defendants likewise take note of caselaw that explains that the traditional "prudent-investor rule," as applied in the context of a conventional trust agreement, allows for competing obligations — such as preserving the trust corpus, diversifying investments, avoiding unnecessary risks and volatility, and planning for tax consequences — to be taken into consideration. See, e.g., Withers v. Teachers' Ret. Sys. of City of New York, 447 F.Supp. 1248, 1258 (S.D.N.Y.1978), aff'd, 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir.1979) (table) ("In the area of investment decisions, the obligation to exercise prudence is essentially an obligation to give primacy to the preservation of the trust estate and the procurement of a reasonable income while avoiding undue investment risks, see e.g., King v. Talbot, [40 N.Y. 76] at 86 [(1869)]; In re Mendleson's Will, 46 Misc.2d 960, 261 N.Y.S.2d 525, 534 (Surrogate's Ct.1965)."). As has been aptly stated:

In re Bank of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 512, 517, 323 N.E.2d 700, 703, 364 N.Y.S.2d 164, 168 (1974).

The RSA defendants further emphasize that the question of the authority and responsibility of the boards of control is a function of a specific statutory scheme adopted by our legislature with respect to the ERSA and the TRSA. In § 16-25-19 as to the TRSA and in § 36-27-23 as to the ERSA, the legislature delegated to the applicable board of control "[t]he general administration and responsibility for the proper operation of the retirement system and for making effective the provisions of" the Code applicable to the ERSA and the TRSA. (Emphasis added.) More specifically, under § 16-25-20(a)(1) and § 36-27-25(a) (with minor wording variations), the legislature has provided that the boards of control for the TRSA and the ERSA "shall have full power to invest and reinvest the funds ... with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with the matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims."

Obviously, there is no single investment strategy that alone can be said to satisfy the responsibility and authority that has been delegated to the boards of control under those statutory provisions. Instead, the legislature unquestionably has delegated to the boards of control discretion in assessing what overall strategies, and what specific investments, will best serve the "aims" and "character" of the ERSA and the TRSA given the nature of the "enterprise" at issue. See, e.g., Withers, supra (recognizing an express statutory authorization of the challenged actions of public-pension fiduciaries, but also holding that the prudent-investor rule did not prevent those fiduciaries from considering possible bankruptcy of the city that contributed to the pension plan if the pension plan did not purchase the city's municipal bonds).

Ultimately, in fact, the plaintiffs concede that the RSA defendants may "legally consider factors other than rate-of-return." In this regard, the plaintiffs do not contend that the investment strategies and decisions of the boards of control are not "discretionary" in nature. The plaintiffs contend only that the discretion that has been delegated to the boards of control by our legislature is not "unfettered." This, however, is a proposition with which the RSA defendants do not disagree.

More specifically, the plaintiffs contend that the discretion afforded the boards of control is constrained by a fiduciary obligation to administer the ERSA and the TRSA solely in the interest of the members of the ERSA and the TRSA and, as prescribed in §§ 16-25-20(a)(1) and 36-27-25(a), to invest with the "care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing" that a "prudent man" acting in a "like capacity" would use in the conduct of "an enterprise of a like character" and "with like aims." The RSA defendants do not disagree with this proposition either.

The difference in the positions of the plaintiffs and the RSA defendants is that the plaintiffs would have the courts assume responsibility for examining what the fulfillment of the aforesaid statutory responsibilities should look like. For this or any court to be able to engage in such an examination as it relates to State officials, however, as opposed to private trustees, we must first surmount the wall of sovereign immunity that protects executive action from interference by the judiciary.

We cannot conclude, however, that, by asking the courts to enforce the general statutory obligations of the nature described above, the plaintiffs have sought enforcement of a "legal duty" of the nature contemplated by the first "exception" or category recognized in Aland. The "prudent-man rule" is, by its essential nature, a standard that allows for the exercise of ample discretion. It may provide general, guiding principles against which a court could assess a claim of personal liability or perhaps removal of a private trustee accused of making imprudent investment decisions, but it does not advance a specific duty that can serve as a basis for an order by the judicial branch to the executive branch to take certain action going forward. Compare, e.g., the "legal duty" cases cited in Aland: Department of Indus. Relations v. West Boylston Mfg. Co., 253 Ala. 67, 42 So.2d 787 (1949) (ordering refund to an employer of specific contributions made to the State's unemployment-compensation fund pursuant to a statute providing for such refunds), and Metcalf v. Department of Indus. Relations, 245 Ala. 299, 16 So.2d 787 (1944) (requiring the Director of Industrial Relations to collect no more than the statutorily prescribed amount pursuant to the unemployment-compensation contribution rate applicable to a given employer). Put differently, the general duty to invest prudently and in the best interests of plan participants, taking into consideration a variety of competing concerns, provides no more basis for surmounting the wall of sovereign immunity than would, for example, the general rule that the director of any executive agency should prudently administer assigned resources and employees. If such a director is performing the task of administering the applicable agency, poor decision-making does not of itself give cause for legal action that is not subject to the doctrine of sovereign immunity.10

By the same token, we do not have here a case that satisfies the "beyond authority" exception to sovereign immunity identified above. The boards of control have statutory authority to invest the assets of the ERSA and the TRSA. They are doing that. The fact that they might not do that in accordance with the legal standard to which they would be held liable if they could be sued does not mean that they can in fact be sued.

The standard for liability and the standard for overcoming the bar of sovereign immunity are two different things. Thus, one might question whether a State official has acted with sufficient care or prudence in his or her decision-making, but imprudence or lack of care has never, of itself, been a basis for overcoming the bar of sovereign immunity. Were it otherwise, the protection afforded State officials in their making of discretionary decisions would cease to exist. The "nearly impregnable" wall of immunity would be collapsed into the bare question of liability itself, e.g., whether a State official can be adjudged to have acted negligently, or merely unwisely. And the efficient and effective functioning of the executive branch free of the "hamstringing" effect of second-guessing by the judicial branch would be put at risk accordingly. Cf. Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392, 400-01 (Ala.2000) (plurality opinion) (explaining the correlation between § 14 immunity and the separation of powers required by § 43 and that "the vulnerability of State agents to suit, if not constrained, could lead to excessive judicial interference in the affairs of coequal branches of government, contrary to § 43").

Finally, even if we could overcome the bar of sovereign immunity in order to rule in favor of the plaintiffs on the issue of liability, it is not within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the courts to grant the relief requested here. Specifically, granting the remedy sought by the plaintiffs in this case would run afoul of the constitutionally mandated principle of separation of powers, a principle that not only is an underpinning of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, but also provides an independent basis for concluding that the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to act as requested in this case.

This is not a private-trust case in which the plaintiffs seek a divestiture of a particular investment, monetary damages to compensate for a specific investment decision, or even to remove a trustee from his or her post. Instead, the essential relief requested by the plaintiffs in this case is a permanent injunction to be enforced by the court into the indefinite future that would purport to require the boards of control to do two things going forward:

The latter form of relief is not an accurate statement of the "prudent-man rule" invoked in the former form of relief and, in fact, conflicts with it. The "prudent-man rule," or the "prudent-investor rule," itself, as discussed above, not only allows, but in fact requires, a trustee to take into consideration many factors other than the direct and immediate rates of return. As discussed above, those factors include, but are not limited to, general economic conditions, the effects of inflation or deflation, the need for diversification and the role each investment plays within the overall trust portfolio, the need for liquidity, the need for regularity of income, preservation or appreciation of capital, an asset's special relationship or special value to the purposes of the trust, the size of the portfolio, and the purposes and estimated duration of the trust. Furthermore, investments may include real property as well as tangible or intangible personal property.

Considering the first form of relief noted above, what the plaintiffs seek is merely a reiteration in a court order of what is already the statutorily prescribed standard applicable to the investment decisions of the boards of control. To simply order the RSA defendants to follow this statutorily prescribed "prudent-man rule" would provide the boards of control with no specific guidance as to how to exercise the discretionary authority invested in them under that rule. What it would do, however, is put the courts in the position of analyzing and overseeing the decisions of the boards of control on a continual and ongoing basis because any such order must of course be enforced by the courts in the years to come. It would put the courts in a position analogous in some ways to the position assumed by the federal courts in overseeing Alabama's mental-health system for several decades. See Wyatt ex rel. Rawlins v. Sawyer, 219 F.R.D. 529 (M.D.Ala. 2004). Unlike the federal courts acting in relation to the State of Alabama, however, Alabama courts are restricted by the doctrine of separation of powers in relation to their coequal branches of government.

In what came to be known as the "equity-funding case," this Court, in Ex parte James, 836 So.2d 813 (Ala.2002), stepped back from the brink of usurping the authority of a coordinate branch of our government to make decisions as to how, to what extent, and to what ends to fund our public schools. Although the Court acknowledged serious concerns as to the propriety of its previous judgment of liability, it ultimately found it unnecessary to resolve those concerns and, instead, "retreated" from its earlier judgment on the alternative ground that the remedy that it was being asked to order, and that it would be required to administer for years to come, would have put the Court on a collision course with § 43 of the Alabama Constitution. As the Court explained in Ex parte James:

836 So.2d at 815-19 (some emphasis in original, some emphasis added, and some emphasis omitted; footnotes omitted).

By the same token, the complex task of continually analyzing, comparing, and choosing from among the myriad of different investment vehicles available in today's sophisticated investment world is a task delegated by the legislature to the executive branch and to the boards of control in particular. The plaintiffs ask us nonetheless to assume going forward the ongoing responsibility of overseeing the decisions of the boards of control and evaluating the extent of their compliance with the "prudent-man rule." To send this case back to the trial court for further examination of this request would be to contemplate that the trial court, in order to enforce a permanent declaratory and injunctive order of the nature requested, could engage in an ongoing, in-depth factual inquiry into the advantages and disadvantages of various Alabama-based investment strategies the boards may consider from time to time and compare those strategies to the various advantages and disadvantages of all other alternative investment opportunities available to the boards, weighing in the process all relevant factors, including rates of return, volatility, security, diversification, general economic conditions, the effects of inflation or deflation, the role each investment would play within the overall trust portfolio, the need for liquidity, the need for regularity of income, and preservation or appreciation of capital. The type of continual oversight and analysis that would be required of this Court to assess compliance with permanent orders of the type sought by the plaintiffs highlights the fact that this is not a task for which the courts of this State are suited and is not a task that has been delegated to them. Instead, as was true in the equity-funding case, the remedy for any deficiency in the investment strategies pursued by the boards of control lies elsewhere. One possible remedy would be recourse to the ballot box for the election of different State officials who either serve on, or appoint some of the members of, the boards of control. See §§ 16-25-19(b) and 36-27-23(b), Ala.Code 1975. More likely, it might mean an even more direct political recourse in the form of an exercise of the "political power" specifically delegated by the legislature to ERSA and TRSA members themselves, who by statute are directly empowered to elect most of the members of each board of control. Id. We cannot conclude that it means the assumption by the courts of the continuing oversight of the investment decisions made by the boards of control in response to the actions alleged in this case.

IV. Conclusion

The legislature has delegated broad authority to the boards of control; it has vested in those boards flexibility and discretion to be exercised in the context of the "character" of the "enterprise" at issue and its "aims." The doctrines of sovereign immunity and separation of powers require that the judicial branch honor that delegation and not take upon itself the task of reviewing the investment strategies and decisions of the boards of control, at least not under the circumstances presented here.11

This Court has long recognized through adherence to the principle of separation of powers and the political-question doctrine "`the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution'" of every dispute affecting the operation of State government "`without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government.'" Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Ctr. Auth. v. City of Birmingham, 912 So.2d 204, 215 (Ala.2005) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)). For that matter, any oversight by this Court of investment choices made by the boards of control would be a task for which this and other courts are not equipped. The "[l]ack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards" supports the conclusion that the making and oversight of such choices has been, and should be, left to a branch of government other than the judicial. Id. at 218.

Although the ultimate question decided in Cranman regarded so-called State-agent immunity, that Court directly addressed the nature of the protection afforded by §§ 14 and 43 of the Constitution in a manner that is apposite here:

Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d at 401. "[Section] 14 [is] an expression of a strong public policy against the intrusion of the judiciary into the management of the State...." Id.

Based on the foregoing, we grant the RSA defendants' petition and issue the writ. We direct the trial court to vacate its order refusing to dismiss the complaint and to grant the RSA defendants' motion to dismiss.

PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

STUART, PARKER, and WISE, JJ., concur.

BOLIN and BRYAN, JJ., concur in the result.

MOORE, C.J., and SHAW, J., dissent.

MAIN, J., recuses himself.

MOORE, Chief Justice (dissenting).

I agree with Justice Shaw that it is premature at this point in the case to supplant the considered judgment of the trial court. "[A] Rule 12(b)(6)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] dismissal is proper only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief." Nance v. Matthews, 622 So.2d 297, 299 (Ala.1993).

The trial court took into account the concerns expressed in the main opinion when it stated that among the issues before it were the following:

I would defer to the trial court to adjudge these issues in the first instance upon a full summary-judgment record.

SHAW, Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. The motion to dismiss in this case raised numerous complex issues. Given that fact and the trial court's holding that "[t]hese issues should be presented to the court on a motion for summary judgment with supporting materials and law," I believe that it is premature to hold at this early juncture in the case that Ala. Const. 1901, art. I, § 14, bars this action or that any potential remedy would violate Ala. Const. 1901, art. III, § 43.

MOORE, C.J., concurs.