THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.
Coldwater Holdings, LLC ("Coldwater"), filed a complaint alleging that it held title to certain real property of which John Robbins ("John") and Ruby Robbins ("Ruby") had possession. In its complaint, Coldwater sought a writ of possession, an award of rent for John and Ruby's use of the property since the date Coldwater made a demand for possession of the property, an award of damages for any injury to the property, and an award of an attorney fee. John and Ruby answered and denied the allegations of the complaint. John and Ruby later filed an amended answer asserting several equitable defenses, and they filed a counterclaim seeking to reform the deed to the property to indicate that they had a life estate in the property.
In May 2013, Coldwater moved for a summary judgment on its claim that it was entitled to possession of the property. John and Ruby opposed that summary-judgment motion, and Coldwater moved to strike their response. The trial court awarded John and Ruby additional time to submit evidence in support of their opposition to the partial-summary-judgment motion. In April 2014, the trial court also allowed Coldwater to "supplement" the record with filings from a 1997 bankruptcy proceeding involving John and Ruby.
In late April 2014, John and Ruby moved the trial-court judge to recuse himself. The trial court set that motion to be considered during the hearing on the summary-judgment motion already scheduled for May 22, 2014. During that hearing, the trial-court judge stated that he would deny the motion to recuse, but it did not enter an order expressly doing so. Regardless, the same trial-court judge has continued to preside over this action.
On May 23, 2014, the trial court entered an order in which it granted Coldwater's partial-summary-judgment motion, determining that Coldwater was entitled to possession of the property and ordering John and Ruby to deliver possession of the property to Coldwater within 30 days. On June 19, 2014, John and Ruby filed several motions, purportedly pursuant to Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., in which they raised a number of issues pertaining to the May 23, 2014, order. See Malone v. Gainey, 726 So.2d 725, 725 n. 2 (Ala.Civ.App.1999) (noting that a valid postjudgment motion may be made only in reference to a final judgment). The trial court denied those motions on June 20, 2014. On June 23, 2014, John and Ruby filed a notice of appeal to our supreme court, which transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala.Code 1975.
In their briefs submitted to this court, the parties have not addressed the issue of the finality of the May 23, 2014, order. However, because jurisdictional issues are of such importance, this court may take notice of them ex mero motu. Nunn v. Baker, 518 So.2d 711, 712 (Ala. 1987); Wilson v. Glasheen, 801 So.2d 848, 849 (Ala.Civ.App.2001).
In this case, Coldwater asserted a claim to possession of the property, a claim for the rental value of the property, a claim for damages for any injury to the property, and an attorney-fee claim. John and Ruby asserted a counterclaim seeking reformation of the deed to the property. We note that the pendency of Coldwater's attorney-fee claim did not affect the finality of the May 23, 2014, order. Wolfe v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 142 So.3d 697, 698-99 (Ala.Civ.App.2013). Further, we interpret the trial court's ruling on Coldwater's claim to possession of the property to be an implicit denial of John and Ruby's claim seeking the reformation of the deed to the property.
However, Coldwater did not move for a summary judgment on its damages claims, and the trial court's May 23, 2014, order did not address those claims. Accordingly, because it did not address the pending damages claims, the trial court's May 23, 2014, order did not constitute a final judgment that will support this appeal. Lucky v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 46 So.3d 966, 967 (Ala.Civ.App.2009); Palmer v. SunBank & Trust Co., 689 So.2d 152, 153 (Ala.Civ.App.1996).1 This court lacks jurisdiction of appeals from nonfinal orders. Wallace v. Belleview Props. Corp., 120 So.3d 485, 501-02 (Ala. 2012); and Dzwonkowski v. Sonitrol of Mobile, Inc., 892 So.2d 354, 363 (Ala.2004) ("[A] nonfinal judgment will not support an appeal."). Accordingly, we must dismiss the appeal as having been taken from a nonfinal order.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
PITTMAN, THOMAS, MOORE, and DONALDSON, JJ., concur.
On Application for Rehearing
THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.
Coldwater Holdings, LLC, has filed an application for rehearing asking this court to reinvest the trial court with jurisdiction to enter an order certifying as final, pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., the May 23, 2014, partial summary judgment awarding Coldwater possession of the disputed property and then, on return to remand, to address the appeal on the merits. Coldwater cites Metcalf v. Pentagon Federal Credit Union, 155 So.3d 256 (Ala. Civ.App.2014), which this court cited in note 1 of the opinion on original submission. In that case, Pentagon Federal Credit Union asserted two claims: an ejectment claim and a claim seeking damages for any injury to the property committed by Metcalf'. The trial court entered a summary judgment on the ejectment claim, and Metcalf appealed. This court remanded the action to the trial court either to determine whether it should enter a final judgment or to determine whether a Rule 54(b) certification would be appropriate. The trial court entered an order certifying the summary-judgment order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b); this court held that the Rule 54(b) certification rendered the order sufficiently final to support the appeal. Metcalf, 155 So.3d at 260. On application for rehearing, Coldwater argues that this court should similarly remand the action to the trial court to enter a Rule 54(b) certification.
However, Rule 54(b) certifications are not favored by appellate courts.
"It bears repeating, here, that `"[c]ertifications under Rule 54(h) should be entered only in exceptional cases and should not be entered routinely."' State v. Lawhorn, 830 So.2d 720, 725 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Baker v. Bennett, 644 So.2d 901, 903 (Ala.1994), citing in turn Branch v. SouthTrust Bank of Dothan, N.A., 514 So.2d 1373 (Ala.1987)). `"`Appellate review in a piecemeal fashion is not favored.'"' Goldome Credit Corp. [v. Player], 869 So.2d [1146,] 1148 [(Ala.Civ.App.2003)] (quoting Harper Soles Co. v. Brown, Stagner, Richardson, Inc., 742 So.2d 190, 192 (Ala.Civ. App.1999), quoting in turn Brown v. Whitaker Contracting Corp., 681 So.2d 226, 229 (Ala.Civ.App.1996)) (emphasis added)."
Dzwonkowski v. Sonitrol of Mobile, Inc., 892 So.2d 354, 363 (Ala.2004). "`Rule 54(b) certifications should be granted only in exceptional cases and "should not be entered routinely or as a courtesy or accommodation to counsel,"' quoting Page v. Preisser, 585 F.2d 336, 339 (8th Cir.1978)." Waiters v. Autry Greer & Sons, Inc., 784 So.2d 1068, 1070 (Ala.Civ.App.2000).
In this case, the parties asserted a number of claims, and the trial court resolved one of those claims. In the opinion on original submission, this court concluded that the trial court had implicitly denied the Robbinses' counterclaim and noted that an appellate court could still exercise jurisdiction in spite of the pendency of Coldwater's attorney-fee claim. 184 So.3d at 1027. However, in addition to the pending attorney-fee claim, two damages claims also remain pending in the trial court. Id.
Coldwater also argues that continued litigation, or" having the trial court reconsider whether to enter a Rule 54(b) certification, will waste resources in that court. However, Coldwater fails to recognize that, even if this court were to do as it asks and consider on appeal only one of the five claims asserted by the parties, its remaining claims for damages and for an attorney fee would still be pending in the trial court and subject to further litigation. Thus, with regard to the resources of the trial court, there is no discernible difference between the piecemeal litigation for which Coldwater argues and this court's dismissal, allowing for the resolution of all the remaining pending claims; either option requires further action by or proceedings in the trial court.1
Coldwater also argues that the prospect of continuing litigation would be costly to the parties. However, the parties have been represented by counsel well able to determine whether jurisdictional prerequisites, such as the entry of a final judgment, have been met. Further, the parties had the opportunity to address all of their claims during the hearing before the trial court; their failure to do so appears to have been a litigation choice. However, an appellate court is not a testing ground by which parties may seek the resolution of one issue between them and then determine whether to expend the effort to prosecute the remainder of the claims asserted against each other. Judicial economy is not served by allowing parties to litigate one claim in the trial court, obtain appellate review with regard to only that claim, and then litigate their remaining claims based on the appellate court's decision on only' a portion of the litigation. Such piecemeal review should occur in exceptional cases, see Dzwonkowski v. Sonitrol of Mobile, Inc., supra, and we cannot say that Coldwater has demonstrated that the facts or posture of this case warrant such piecemeal review by this court.
APPLICATION OVERRULED.
PITTMAN, THOMAS, MOORE, and DONALDSON, JJ., concur.
