SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN, Senior District Judge.
Plaintiff James Oneal Lake brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his applications for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits [DIB], and supplemental security income [SSI]. After review of the record, the parties' submissions, and the relevant law, the court is of the opinion that the Commissioner's decision is due to be affirmed.
Mr. Lake filed an application for a period of disability and DIB on February 8, 2012, and an application for SSI on March 16, 2012, alleging a disability onset date of January 27, 2012. (Doc. 8-6 at R.187, R.195.)
Mr. Lake requested review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council. (See id. at R.30.) The Appeals Council denied the request for review, stating that it "found no reason under [its] rules to review the [ALJ's] decision." (Id. at 1.) Therefore, "the [ALJ's] decision is the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security in [Mr. Lake's] case." (Id.)
Mr. Lake filed an appeal in this court on October 9, 2014. (Doc. 1.)
In reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act, this court's role is a narrow one: "Our review of the Commissioner's decision is limited to an inquiry into whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the Commissioner, and whether the correct legal standards were applied." Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988). The court gives deference to factual findings. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1991). The court "may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner], rather [it] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence." Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir.1983)) (internal quotations and other citation omitted). "The Commissioner's factual findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence." Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1221 (citing Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990); Allen v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 600, 602 (11th Cir. 1987)). "Substantial evidence" is "more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Winschel v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Conclusions of law made by the Commissioner are reviewed de novo. Cornelius, 936 F.2d at 1145. "No . . . presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner's] conclusions of law." Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982).
The regulations require the Commissioner to follow a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether a claimant is eligible for a period of disability, DIB, and/or SSI. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1)-(2); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(1)-(2); see Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470 (1986). "[A]n individual shall be considered to be disabled for purposes of [determining eligibility for DIB and SSI benefits] if he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a)(3)(C)(1); see also 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
The specific steps in the evaluation process are as follows:
First, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is engaged in "substantial gainful activity." Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 137 (1987). The regulations define "substantial gainful activity" as "work activity that is both substantial and gainful."
The ALJ found that Mr. Lake had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 27, 2012, the alleged onset date. (Doc. 8-3 at R.36.)
If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner must next determine whether the claimant suffers from a severe impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c). "[A] `physical or mental impairment' is an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(D). The regulations provide: "[I]f you do not have any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, we will find that you do not have a severe impairment and are, therefore, not disabled. We will not consider your age, education, and work experience." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). "An impairment can be considered as not severe only if it is a slight abnormality which has such a minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual's ability to work, irrespective of age, education, or work experience." Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 920 (11th Cir. 1984); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(a); 20 C.F.R. § 416.921(a). A complainant may be found disabled based on a combination of impairments even though none of the individual impairments alone are disabling. Walker v. Brown, 826 F.2d 996, 1001 (11th Cir. 1985); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523; 20 C.F.R. § 416.923. A claimant has the burden to show that he has a severe impairment or combination of impairments. Reynolds-Buckley, 457 Fed. Appx. at 863.
The ALJ found that Mr. Lake had "the following severe impairments: fibromyalgia, Crohn's disease, erosive gastritis, duodenitis, depression, and anxiety." (Doc. 8-3 at R.36.) He found that Mr. Lake had not alleged arthritis was a severe impairment and, because this condition did not result in any work-related limitations, arthritis was not a severe impairment. (Id.)
If the claimant has a severe impairment, the Commissioner must then determine whether the claimant's impairment and whether it is equivalent to any one of the listed impairments, which are impairments that are so severe as to prevent an individual with the described impairment from performing substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d)-(e); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (d)-(e); see 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 [The Listings]. If the claimant's impairment meets or equals an impairment listed in the regulations, the Commissioner must find the claimant disabled, regardless of the claimant's age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). The claimant has the burden of proving that his impairment meets or equals the criteria contained in one of the Listings. Reynolds-Buckley, 457 Fed. Appx. at 863.
The ALJ found that Mr. Lake did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix I. (Doc. 8-3 at R.37.)
If the impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or equal the criteria of a Listing, the claimant must prove that his impairment or combination of impairments prevents him from performing his past relevant work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (f); 20 C.F. R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv), (f). At step four, the Commissioner "will first compare [her] assessment of [the claimant's] residual functional capacity [RFC] with the physical and mental demands of [the claimant's] past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b); 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(b). "Past relevant work is work that [the claimant has] done within the past 15 years, that was substantial gainful activity, and that lasted long enough for [him] to learn to do it. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(b)(1). If the claimant is capable of performing his past relevant work, the Commissioner will find he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(e); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). The claimant bears the burden of establishing that the impairment or combination or impairments prevents him from performing past work. Reynolds-Buckley, 457 Fed. Appx. at 863.
Based on his "consideration of the entire record," the ALJ found that Mr. Lake could perform a limited range of medium work; he found:
(Doc. 8-3 at R.38 [footnote added].) The ALJ found that Mr. Lake could not perform his past relevant work as a "psych aide," a sales clerk in retail, a slitter operator, and a pest control technician. (Id. at R.42-43.)
If the claimant establishes that he is unable to perform his past relevant work, the Commissioner must show that the claimant — in light of his RFC, age, education, and work experience — is capable of performing other work that exists in substantial numbers in the national economy. Reynolds-Buckley, 457 Fed. Appx. at 863; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c)(1). The regulations provide:
20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(1); 20 C.F. R. § 416.960(c)(1). If the claimant is not capable of performing such other work, the Commissioner must find the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f). If, however, the Commissioner finds that the claimant can perform other work, the claimant has the burden to prove he is not capable of performing such other work.
The ALJ found that Mr. Lake, who was born in 1968, was a "younger individual" on the alleged onset date, and that he had at least a high school education and could communicate in English. (Doc. 8-3 at R.43.) The ALJ consulted a vocational expert [VE]; the VE testified that an individual with Mr. Lake's RFC and vocational factors could perform "jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy," including assembler, inspector, and box maker. (Id. at R.43-44.) Based on this testimony, the ALJ found Mr. Lake could make as successful adjustment to perform other work. (Id. at R.44.)
Therefore, the ALJ found that Mr. Lake had not been under a disability at any time from January 27, 2012, the alleged onset date, through May 17, 2013, the date of the ALJ's decision. (Id.)
Mr. Lake raises two issues on appeal: (1) "the ALJ failed to properly consider the opinion of plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Schmidt," (doc. 10 at 7), and (2) "the ALJ failed to properly consider plaintiff's impairments in combination," (id. at 10). For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that the Commissioner's decision is due to be affirmed.
Mr. Lake contends that the ALJ erred by failing to give the opinion of his treating physician, Allen James Schmidt, Jr., M.D., substantial weight. (Doc. 10 at 7-10.) According to his Decision, the ALJ discounted Dr. Schmidt's opinion because Dr. Schmidt had made diagnoses outside of his speciality, he had examined Mr. Lake on "relatively infrequent" occasions, and he had relied on Mr. Lake's subjective reports of symptoms and limitations, which the ALJ found were not supported by Dr. Schmidt's examinations and notes of record. (See doc. 8-3 at 42.)
Flowers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 441 Fed. Appx 735, 740 (11th Cir. 2011). The Eleventh Circuit has held "that the opinion of a treating physician is entitled to substantial weight unless good cause exists for not heeding the treating physician's diagnosis." Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 583 (11th Cir. 1991). "Good cause exists `where the doctor's opinion was not bolstered by the evidence, or where the evidence supported a contrary finding.' [The court] will not second guess the ALJ about the weight the treating physician's opinion deserves so long as he articulates a specific justification for it." Hunter v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 808 F.3d 818, 822-23 (11th Cir. 2015)(quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997); citing Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005)); see also Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 ("Good cause exists when the: (1) treating physician's opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) [the] treating physician's opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor's own medical records.")(internal quotations and citation omitted).
Mr. Lake's treating physician, Allen Schmidt, M.D., an internist, wrote two substantially similar letters in support of Mr. Lake's claim for disability benefits. (See doc. 8-8 at R.358; doc. 8-9 at R.366.) In the first letter, dated July 15, 2012, Dr. Schmidt stated:
(Doc. 8-8 at R.358.) The second letter, dated March 13, 2013, includes a diagnosis of spondyloarthropathy, but is otherwise identical to the July 2012 letter. (Compare doc. 8-9 ast R.366 with doc. 8-8 at R.358.)
With regard to these letters and Dr. Schmidt's treatment records, the ALJ found:
(Doc. 8-3 at R.39-42 [footnotes added].)
The court finds that the ALJ clearly stated the weight given Dr. Schmidt's opinion and he adequately stated his specific justification for it. The ALJ's justification is supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, this court will not disturb his finding. See Hunter, 808 F.3d at 823.
Mr. Lake contends that the ALJ failed to properly consider his combined impairments and he failed to consider his arthritis at all. (Doc. 10 at 10.) The court finds these contentions do not provide a basis for reversing the Commissioner's decision to deny Mr. Lake disability benefits.
At step two, the ALJ found that, although Mr. Lake had a diagnosis of arthritis, arthritis was not a severe impairment. (Doc. 8-8 at 36.) Nevertheless, the ALJ found that Mr. Lake had other severe impairments — "fibromyalgia, Crohn's disease, erosive gastritis, duodenitis, depression, and anxiety." (Id.) Because the ALJ moved beyond step two of the sequential evaluation, any error in not finding arthritis to be a severe impairment was harmless. See Jamison v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 585, 588 (11th Cir. 1987).
"Where a claimant has alleged several impairments, the Commissioner must consider the impairments in combination and determine whether the combined impairments render the claimant disabled." Hearn v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 619 Fed. Appx. 892, 895 (11th Cir. 2015)(citing Jones v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 941 F.2d 1529, 1533 (11th Cir. 1991)). "An ALJ's statement that [he] has considered a combination of impairments is adequate to meet this standard." Id. (citing Jones, 941 F.2d at 1533).
In this case the ALJ stated:
(Doc. 8-8 at 38 [emphasis added].)
The Eleventh Circuit has held that these types of statements are sufficient to show that the ALJ considered a claimant's impairments in combination. Hubbard v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 618 Fed. Appx. 643, 649-50 (11th Cir. 2015)(citing Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1224-25 (11th Cir. 2002); Jones, 941 F.2d at 1533)). Therefore, the court finds no error based on Mr. Lake's contention that the ALJ failed to consider his impairments in combination.
Based on the reasons set forth above, the decision of the Commissioner, denying plaintiff's claim for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI will be affirmed. An Order affirming the decision of the Commissioner will be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1572; 20 C.F.R. § 416.972.
