ORDER

WILLIAM H. STEELE, Chief District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 273) filed by defendants Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc., and Crown Holdings, Inc. The Motion has been briefed and is ripe for disposition.

I. Relevant Background.

This is an asbestos action pending against 11 defendants,1 alleging various state-law tort claims and a wrongful death cause of action based on the alleged exposure of plaintiff's decedent, Rueben Morgan, to asbestos-containing products at various times and locations. Morgan was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma (a disease commonly linked to asbestos exposure) in or about February 2011. (Doc. 199, at Exh. A.) He died on or about November 5, 2012, at the age of 79. (Doc. 206, at Exh. A.)

On May 4, 2011, less than three months after his diagnosis, Morgan initiated this litigation against 42 named defendants (including Crown Cork & Seal and Crown Holdings). Morgan's pleadings alleged that he "was exposed to asbestos dust, asbestos particles, asbestos containing materials and products that were produced, manufactured, specified for use, installed, distributed, sold and/or placed into the stream of commerce by the producer and/or distributor Defendants during his employment as a machinist, engine room worker, and mechanic," as a result of which he was "diagnosed with an asbestos related disease." (Doc. 1, Exh. A-2, at 6.) On July 29, 2011, Morgan amended his Complaint to name certain additional defendants. (Doc. 4, Exh. B, at 1.)

Plaintiff's claims against Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc., and Crown Holdings, Inc.

(collectively, the "Crown Defendants") proceed from the theory that these entities are successors-in-interest to a company called Mundet Cork Corporation ("Mundet"), and that Morgan was exposed to asbestos-containing products manufactured by Mundet. (See doc. 1, Exh. A-2, at 8 ¶¶ 20-21.) For purposes of summary judgment, the Crown Defendants do not dispute that they are successors-in-interest to Mundet, and they do not litigate at this time the question of whether Alabama law would impute successor liability to them. Accordingly, the Court assumes (without deciding) for purposes of this Order that (i) the Crown Defendants are successors-in-interest to Mundet, and (ii) Alabama law would authorize successor liability for the Crown Defendants if plaintiff has brought timely claims against them for exposure to Mundet's asbestos-containing products.

Record facts concerning Morgan's interactions with Mundet products are as follows:2 Morgan was in the United States Navy from 1950 to 1954, during which time he worked as a machinist aboard three different vessels. (Morgan Dep. I, at 35-36.)3 In the course of his Navy service, Morgan worked in the vessels' boiler rooms (which he described as having steam lines covered with asbestos insulation) or engine rooms (which he described as having turbines and steam lines covered with asbestos insulation). (Id. at 37, 42.) According to Morgan, this asbestos insulation would yield dusty conditions in both the boiler room and the engine room. (Id. at 49.) Morgan indicated that there were times when the asbestos insulation would be torn off the piping, causing considerable dust to be created. (Morgan Dep. III, at 99.) Also, Morgan identified some of the asbestos material covering the pipes as "formed asbestos pipe coverings" manufactured by Mundet, and testified that it "really makes dust when you break and tear it off." (Id. at 99-100.) This Mundet "form pipe covering" is "asbestos pipe that's cut in half. And then it'd fit right over your ... piping. And you'd tie it down with a wire or some kind of metal strap. And then you'd put your sealant and woven asbestos material over it to finish it." (Id. at 196.)4

Mundet was not the only manufacturer of this form pipe covering that Morgan observed and worked with on Navy ships. In that regard, Morgan acknowledged that he had encountered form pipe covering from other manufacturers, such as Kaylo and Johns Manville. (Morgan Dep. IV, at 190-91, 193; Morgan Dep. III, at 99.) Morgan also conceded that once the form pipe covering had been removed from its packaging, he could not discern one company's product from another (i.e., Morgan knew of no means of distinguishing Mundet pipe covering from that of other manufacturers). (Morgan Dep. IV, at 191-92.) There were no markings or writings on the product itself that would have identified its manufacturer. (Id. at 192.) Also, Morgan did not recall having ever seen Mundet pipe covering in its original packaging or any kind of container, sack or package that displayed the name Mundet. (Id. at 189, 194-95.) The physical description that Morgan used for Mundet form pipe covering was, he admitted, equally applicable to all pipe covering that he had ever seen. (Id. at 190.)

From 1978 through 1992, Morgan worked at the Alabama River Pulp paper mill.

(Morgan Dep. I, at 95-96.) He was present during the mill's construction in the late 1970s, and was working there when steam pipe insulation products containing asbestos were installed and applied. (Id. at 102.) Not surprisingly, Morgan testified that "there was a lot of pipe covering done in ARP." (Morgan Dep. III, at 198.) He indicated that it "looked the same" as Mundet form pipe covering. (Id. at 198-99.) That said, Morgan qualified his testimony by acknowledging that he did not know "which brand name" of pipe covering was actually used at Alabama River Pulp. (Id. at 198.)5

Unambiguous record testimony confirms that Morgan did not associate Mundet with any products other than form pipe covering and that he did not claim to have been exposed to any asbestos-containing Mundet product other than pipe covering. (Morgan Dep. IV, at 171.) Thus, plaintiff's claims against the Crown Defendants necessarily stand or fall on plaintiff's ability to make a showing that Morgan was exposed to asbestos from Mundet form pipe covering within the relevant limitations period.

II. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment should be granted only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. The party seeking summary judgment bears "the initial burden to show the district court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial." Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). Once the moving party has satisfied its responsibility, the burden shifts to the non-movant to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. "If the nonmoving party fails to make `a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,' the moving party is entitled to summary judgment." Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)) (footnote omitted). "In reviewing whether the nonmoving party has met its burden, the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations of the truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 999 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). "Summary judgment is justified only for those cases devoid of any need for factual determinations." Offshore Aviation v. Transcon Lines, Inc., 831 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).

III. Analysis.

The Crown Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment proceeds from the premise that plaintiff lacks evidence that Morgan has any timely claims of exposure to Mundet's asbestos-containing products to support liability under Alabama law. In analyzing this question, the Court considers the following categories of evidence in turn: (i) evidence of Morgan's exposure to Mundet form pipe coverings during his employment in the Navy and Coast Guard (spanning the time frame from 1950 through 1964); and (ii) evidence of Morgan's exposure to Mundet form pipe coverings at the Alabama River Pulp plant (spanning the time frame from1978 through 1992). These are the only Mundet exposures alleged by plaintiff in his summary judgment filing.

A. Morgan's Exposure to Mundet Products from 1950 through 1964.

The parties' briefs devote considerable attention to evidence that Morgan encountered and worked directly with asbestos-containing Mundet insulation in the boiler rooms and engine rooms of vessels on which he served as a member of the armed forces during the 1950s and early 1960s. Plaintiff documents in some detail the condition of the product, the way it would create dust when broken or torn off the piping, and the way it would come off on Morgan's hands like chalk when he worked around it. To the extent that plaintiff would predicate the Crown Defendants' liability on these exposures, however, his claims suffer from an insuperable legal defect. Under well-established, unambiguous Alabama law, any claims against the Crown Defendants for exposures to Mundet asbestos during the 1950-1964 time frame are time-barred by the applicable Alabama limitations period. See Ala. Code § 6-2-38(l) ("All actions for any injury to the person or rights of another not arising from contract and not specifically enumerated in this section must be brought within two years.").6

Historically, Alabama applied a "last exposure rule" governing commencement of the limitations period for claims alleging personal injuries resulting from exposure to a harmful substance, regardless of when those injuries were manifested. See Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So.2d 516, 521 (Ala. 1979) ("[W]e hold that the statute of limitations ... began to run when plaintiff was last exposed to radiation and plaintiff's ignorance of the tort or injury, there being no fraudulent concealment, does not postpone the running of the statute until the tort or injury is discovered.").

Shortly after Garrett was decided, the Alabama legislature stepped in to modify the judge-made accrual rule in the asbestos context, enacting the following provision: "A civil action for any injury ... resulting from exposure to asbestos, including asbestos-containing products, shall be deemed to accrue on the first date the injured party, through reasonable diligence, should have reason to discover the injury giving rise to such civil action." Ala. Code § 6-2-30(b). This "discovery rule" for accrual of personal injury claims in asbestos cases took effect on May 19, 1980. The following year, the Alabama Supreme Court examined the retroactivity of § 6-2-30(b), and held that if, before the effective date of that provision, "one year had elapsed between the date of plaintiff's exposure and the date on which plaintiff's action was commenced, then that claim is nevertheless barred by the statute of limitations." Tyson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 399 So.2d 263, 267 (Ala. 1981). Subject to that important caveat, the Tyson Court expressly upheld § 6-2-30(b)'s establishment of "a discovery rule for the accrual of asbestos injury actions in Alabama." Id. at 272.

In the three decades since Tyson was decided, Alabama courts have consistently hewed to the principle that if a plaintiff's last exposure to a defendant's asbestos-containing product predated May 19, 1979, then the resulting personal injury claims were time-barred before § 6-2-30(b) was ever enacted and cannot be revived by operation of that statute. See, e.g., Henderson v. MeadWestvaco Corp., 23 So.3d 625, 630 (Ala. 2009) (following Tyson's determination that asbestos claims are time-barred if, as of May 19, 1980, one year had elapsed between the date of exposure and date of commencement of suit); Johnson v. Garlock, Inc., 682 So.2d 25, 28 (Ala. 1996) (reaffirming principle that "§ 6-2-30 cannot apply retroactively to actions already barred by the statute of limitations as interpreted and applied in Garrett").7

The net result, then, is that Alabama has different rules for accrual of personal injury actions relating to asbestos exposure, depending on whether the last exposure occurred prior to May 19, 1979 (in which case the Garrett "last exposure rule" governs) or whether the last exposure occurred thereafter (in which case the § 6-2-30(b) "discovery rule" applies).8 See In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. VI), 2011 WL 3240827, *2 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 2011) ("Under Alabama law, all claims for pre-1979 exposure to asbestos must be filed within one year of the last date of exposure. For any exposure to asbestos after May 17, 1980, the claim accrues upon discovery of an asbestos-related disease.").

As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, any claims relating to Morgan's exposure to Mundet's asbestos-containing products during the 1950-1964 time period are time-barred by straightforward application of black-letter Alabama law, as set forth in Tyson and its progeny. See, e.g., Henderson, 23 So.3d at 630 ("Tony Henderson's claim of personal injury resulting from exposure to asbestos would have accrued in 1972, on the date of his last exposure to asbestos at CAPCO. Based on the one-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury claims at the time ..., his claim was time-barred in 1973.").

Under Alabama law, Morgan's claims of personal injury resulting from exposure to Mundet's asbestos-containing form pipe covering during his employment in the U.S. Navy would have accrued in 1954, when he was last exposed to Mundet products there. Likewise, any claims of personal injury concerning exposure to Mundet pipe covering during his service in the Coast Guard would have accrued in 1964. Based on the one-year statute of limitations applicable at the time, Morgan's claims for these exposures would have become time-barred in 1955 and 1965, respectively, several decades before he sued the Crown Defendants. By operation of the Tyson line of Alabama Supreme Court decisions, those time-barred claims were not revived, revitalized or resuscitated by the Alabama legislature's subsequent enactment of § 6-2-30(b). Plaintiff has offered no persuasive argument or authority that might allow these claims for pre-1979 exposure to asbestos-containing products manufactured by Mundet to be deemed timely under Alabama law; therefore, the Crown Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted insofar as it relates to those pre-1979 events and exposures during Morgan's military service in the Navy and Coast Guard.9

B. Morgan's Exposure to Mundet Asbestos at Alabama River Pulp.

"Under Alabama law, when a plaintiff shows post-1979 exposure to asbestos, his or her action does not `accrue' until the individual knew or should have known of an asbestos-related disease." In re Asbestos, 2011 WL 3240827, at *3. To avail himself of this more lenient discovery rule, the plaintiff must satisfy the condition precedent of showing post-1979 exposure to the defendant's products containing asbestos.10 Plaintiff has not done so. There is no evidence that form pipe covering manufactured by Mundet (or any other Mundet asbestos products) were in use at the Alabama River Pulp mill where Morgan worked from 1978 through 1992.

In an effort to provide such evidence and overcome the Crown Defendants' Rule 56 Motion, plaintiff points to Morgan's testimony that pipe covering at Alabama River Pulp "looked like Mundet" and was used in the same manner as Mundet's product. (Morgan Dep. III, at 198-99.) The trouble with this line of proof is that Morgan also admitted that all asbestos pipe covering looked the same, that there were several other manufacturers of asbestos pipe covering, that he did not remember which brand or brands were in use at Alabama River Pulp, that he could not identify the manufacturer or brand name of any pipe covering at Alabama River Pulp, and that he did not have personal knowledge of being exposed to any Mundet product after 1978. In short, Morgan's testimony is that Alabama River Pulp used asbestos pipe covering, but it could have been manufactured by Mundet or Kaylo or Johns-Manville or somebody else. Morgan simply did not know. And Morgan's testimony is all plaintiff offers on this product identification/causation question.

That is not good enough. Under applicable law, much more is required to show liability in an asbestos case than the mere possibility that a defendant's products may have been in use in the plaintiff's workspace. See, e.g., Sheffield v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 595 So.2d 443, 451 (Ala. 1992) (in asbestos case, "the parties bearing the burden of proof on the issue of causation must, at a minimum, demonstrate that an asbestos product manufactured by [the defendant] was aboard a ship on which each plaintiff served at the times relevant to that service").11 In Sheffield, for example, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the manufacturer of Kaylo (coincidentally, another brand of asbestos form pipe covering), when the plaintiff's evidence created "nothing more than a `mere possibility' that Kaylo was [present in plaintiff's workplace], and, consequently, that it was a cause-in-fact of the alleged injuries." Id. at 451. Plaintiff's evidence equally supports the conclusion that the asbestos-containing pipe covering at Alabama River Pulp was manufactured by Mundet, or Kaylo, or Johns-Manville, or some other company. Plaintiff's evidence provides no factual basis for a finder of fact to sort through or select among these various possibilities; thus, on this record, the only way a jury could find that Mundet supplied the pipe covering to which Morgan was exposed would be via speculation, conjecture or guesswork.

Of course, "[s]peculation does not create a genuine issue of fact; instead, it creates a false issue, the demolition of which is a primary goal of summary judgment." Cordoba v. Dillard's, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted); see also Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158, 1165 (11th Cir. 2009) ("A `mere scintilla' of evidence is insufficient; the non-moving party must produce substantial evidence in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment."). Simply put, "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (citation omitted). This record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find that Morgan was ever exposed to Mundet asbestos-containing products after May 19, 1979. In other words, no reasonable jury could conclude from this evidence that Morgan's illness and death were caused by asbestos exposure that (i) was attributable to Mundet and (ii) occurred after the effective date of the discovery rule of accrual fashioned by § 6-2-30(b).12 Accordingly, the Crown Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on grounds that the record lacks sufficient evidence of product identification/causation within the applicable limitations period. See Lee v. Celotex Corp., 764 F.2d 1489, 1491 (11th Cir. 1985) (defendant entitled to summary judgment where "[t]he allegation that plaintiff was exposed to defendant's asbestos-containing product is not supported by reasonable inferences arising from the undisputed facts, but is based on speculation and conjecture that renders them mere guesses or possibilities").

IV. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and that movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 273) filed by defendants Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc. and Crown Holdings, Inc. is granted, and plaintiff's claims against those defendants are dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate Crown Cork & Seal and Crown Holdings as parties defendant.

DONE and ORDERED.