CALLIE V. S. GRANADE, Senior District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Stacey Tillis's ("Tillis") and Defendants Ray S. Blanks ("Blanks") and the City of Selma's (the "City") cross-motions for summary judgment. A hearing being unnecessary, the Court considers the motions on the basis of Defendants' motion and memorandum (Doc. 13), Plaintiff's response (Doc. 26), and Defendants' reply (Doc. 29), and of Plaintiff's motion and supporting documents (Docs. 14-16), Defendants' response (Doc. 25), and Plaintiff's reply (Doc. 30). After due consideration, the Court finds it proper to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) instructs, "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The trial court's mission is to "determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial" and not to "weigh the evidence." See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
The burden is on the moving party to show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. Id. at 256. In conducting its summary judgment analysis, the Court must construe all evidence "in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
After the movant meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party "to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). If the nonmoving party fails to do so, the "complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 323. Further, Rule 56 "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324 (internal quotation marks omitted). There is no genuine issue for trial "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
With specific respect to the resolution of a summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity, the Eleventh Circuit has declared:
McCullough v. Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201, 1202 (11th Cir. 2009).
Tillis filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Dallas County against Blanks and the City, alleging violations of her Fourth Amendment rights through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Doc. 1). Defendants removed the case to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Id. In her First Amended Complaint, Tillis expanded her claims to include a claim against the City for failing to adequately train or supervise Blanks in his practice of executing warrants and failing to discipline Blanks for violating Tillis's constitutional rights; she also asserted two state law claims against Blanks and the City. (See Doc. 8). The Court exercises jurisdiction over the federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and over the related state law claims through supplemental jurisdiction granted in 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
After the close of discovery, the parties submitted cross motions for summary judgment, along with the appropriate responses and replies thereto. Defendants seek summary judgment in their favor as to all four counts, and Plaintiff asks this Court to grant summary judgment as to her two § 1983 claims (Counts I-II). (See Docs. 13, 14).
The Court has reviewed the parties' submissions and the evidence submitted in favor of and against their respective positions and considers the following facts, viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.
On January 16, 2014, Mr. Eric Kelly of Selma, Alabama, reported his home had been burglarized. (Doc. 14-3). The Selma Police Department ("SPD") responded and prepared Uniform Incident/Offense Report number 2014-1472. Id. Mr. Kelly stated a 50-inch flat screen television was missing but did not provide any manufacturing information or a serial number. Id. SPD Lieutenant Curtis Muhannad assigned the case to Detective Ray S. Blanks,
On January 21, Blanks met with Mr. Kelly, his then-girlfriend Ms. Asheemeka Howard, and a witness to the crime, Ms. Temeka Morgan. (Doc. 13-9, p. 1). Ms. Howard indicated Mr. Sylvester Lewis
Based upon this information, Blanks suspected Lewis was involved in the burglary of Mr. Kelly's home. (Doc. 13-9, p. 2). Blanks obtained an arrest warrant for Lewis on January 24, 2014 from Judge Joseph Hagood. Id. Blanks testified he followed routine practice in obtaining this arrest warrant, including having the District Attorney's office review the warrant. (See Doc. 14-5, p. 51).
A second burglary occurred on January 19, 2014 at the home of Mr. John Grayson. (Doc. 13-10). Mr. Grayson reported the incident to SPD, and officers were dispatched to his home and prepared Uniform Incident/Offense Report number 2014-1732. Id. Mr. Grayson stated the following items were missing from his home: (a) 33-inch flat screen television, possibly manufactured by Vizeo; (b) three [Dell] laptop computers; (c) one Compaq computer; (d) one Playstation 3 gaming console; (e) one 270-caliber rifle, possibly manufactured by Remington; and (f) one .22-caliber rifle, possibly manufactured by Remington.
During his investigation, Blanks learned Lewis lived with Tillis
After his investigation Blanks prepared a search warrant application and affidavit to obtain a search warrant for the stolen items on February 6, 2014. (Doc. 13-9, p. 12). In his application and affidavit, he stated:
(Doc. 14-6) (hereinafter the "Affidavit").
After receiving approval from Lt. Muhannad, Blanks presented the Affidavit before Judge Hagood. (Doc. 14-5, p. 23; Doc. 13-9, p. 1). Judge Hagood signed the Affidavit on February 6, 2014 at 9:33 A.M. (Affidavit). At that time, Judge Hagood issued a search warrant (the "Search Warrant") authorizing the search of Tillis's home, located at 215 Lawrence Street, for numerous items. (See Doc. 14-7). The Search Warrant authorized the search and seizure of the following:
(Search Warrant, Doc. 14-7) (emphasis in the original). Notably, the Search Warrant does not incorporate by reference any other document relating to Blanks's investigation, including his Affidavit or the arrest warrant for Lewis. Id. After receiving the Search Warrant, Blanks and other members of the SPD proceeded to Tillis's residence, where they arrested Lewis and executed the Search Warrant. (Doc. 13-9, p. 2).
Blanks executed the Search Warrant at approximately 9:45 A.M. on February 6, 2014 for approximately thirty to forty minutes. (Doc. 13-9, p. 2; Doc. 14-5, p. 132). Tillis had been at work when the search began but unexpectedly came home early; when she arrived, she found members of the SPD, including Blanks, at her home. (Doc. 13-1, pp. 3, 5). In his case report summary, Blanks stated, "I also executed a search warrant at the residence [in] which all electronic devices were confiscated from the residence." (Doc. 13-9, p. 2). The Evidence Property Receipts indicate the following items were seized from Tillis's home:
(Compare Doc. 14-8 with Doc. 13-7). The two evidence logs prepared by SPD evidence technician(s) submitted into evidence at this time do not reflect the same information. One evidence log omits the "red child four wheeler," and the other omits the "busted laptop" which was found on the property adjacent to Tillis's home. Id. Blanks indicates one form was given to Tillis at her home when SPD finished the search and seizure and that the second report was given to him from Evidence Tech as a part of the record of his investigation. (Doc. 14-5, p. 79).
Tillis testified Blanks and the SPD removed all the electronics from her home, including her personal cell phone, all televisions, her children's tablets, a gaming console, a Blu Ray/DVD player, and their four-wheeler. (Doc. 13-1, p. 13-14; Doc. 13-9, p. 4).
Blanks states he advised Tillis before leaving her residence, "any [seized] property that did not compare [to stolen property] would be released back to her." (Doc. 14-5, p. 56). Tillis claims Blanks told her she would have to go to the police station to determine what items had been seized from her home during the search. (Doc. 13-1, pp. 5-6). She further alleges Blanks was "real ugly about the situation" when she questioned him at her home. Id. at 8. The City's policy is to require proof of ownership of seized property before it will be released back to the claiming party. (Doc. 14-5, p. 95). Tillis states Blanks told her several times she would be able to retrieve her items if she brought documents establishing ownership. (Doc. 13-1, p. 8).
During his deposition, Blanks recounted his reasoning for believing Lewis had committed the Kelly burglary (see Doc. 14-5, p. 45). He further admitted he made a "mistake" by leaving out any information relating to the Grayson burglary in his Affidavit but affirmatively asserted that he considered the Grayson burglary when he was preparing the Affidavit and the Search Warrant. Id. at 55, 75. Blanks further stated, "my probable cause and the search warrant [for Tillis's home] are pretty much referenced from the information from the affidavit for the arrest." Id. at 28, 41-42. Blanks stated he "had a reasonable suspicion" that Lewis had committed the burglaries and revealed "the probable cause was developed by the DA's [District Attorney's] office."
During his deposition, Blanks also discussed how he determined which items to seize in the home:
(Doc. 14-5, p. 71-72, 74-75). Blanks further admitted he had no knowledge of any reports of a stolen red, children's four-wheeler prior to seizing the one at Tillis's home. Id. at 82. In general, Blanks testified that he seized all electronics in Tillis's home, regardless of whether he knew they were stolen, in order to check the serial numbers to determine whether the seized items are evidence of crimes. Id. at 114. He stated he had reasonable suspicion when searching the home to seize electronic items that had missing or damaged serial numbers, such as the four-wheeler and some of the tablets.
After the SPD concluded the search of her residence, Tillis collected evidence of proof of ownership of different items that had been seized and visited the police station in Selma. (Doc. 13-1, p. 8). Tillis states she attempted to show proof of ownership of certain items, such as the four tablets and the bicycles, when she arrived at the police station on February 6. Id. She indicates the SPD
Subsequently to Tillis's visits to the SPD, her vehicle was destroyed in an act of arson. (See Doc. 13-11). Lewis and Tillis reported the crime to SPD on May 20, 2014, and the SPD prepared an incident report numbered 2014-14130. Id. Tillis claims all of her receipts and evidence of ownership for the items taken during the search were still in her vehicle at the time it was destroyed. (Doc. 13-1, pp. 9, 12). After the original documentation was burned, Tillis did not obtain duplicates or other proofs of ownership.
The City, through the District Attorney's office, eventually returned almost all the items taken in the search of Tillis's home. (Doc. 14-9, p. 64). This official action, however, did not occur until about two years had passed. (Doc. 13-10, p. 2) (exact date not specified). Lewis testified he did not receive the black nylon bags or the bolt cutters back; moreover, he indicated the children's red four-wheeler was damaged and would not start. (Doc. 13-12, p. 4).
Tillis claims to have suffered humiliation, emotional distress, and mental anguish as a result of having to replace her children's toys and other lawfully owned electronics after they were seized from her home. (Doc. 14-10, pp. 1-2). She further suffered distress and anguish "in worrying how this experience may effect" her children, who were particularly upset that their Christmas gifts were taken by the SPD. Id. at 2. She further claims some of items were not returned to her in their original working condition and that she suffered monetary loss and other monetary damages; the four-wheeler, for example, requires approximately $230 of repairs. Id. at 2-3.
Both Blanks and Sgt. Ghant testified as to the City's customary practices and procedures regarding different aspects of searches and seizures governed by the Fourth Amendment. Officers typically prepare affidavits and applications for warrants using a template (Doc. 14-9, p. 12). Sgt. Ghant testified officers are trained to prepare the affidavits and applications on the basis that probable cause exists for the warrant to issue. Id. at 15. Generally, the officer will prepare the affidavit and application, as well as the warrant, based on his or her investigation of the case. Id. at 16. The officer's supervisor will "normally read over it" to "look for errors" and to ensure the warrant is supported by probable cause. Id. at 16, 19. The District Attorney's office generally reviews the drafted warrant and the supporting affidavit before the officer appears before the judge. Id. at 16-17.
Stg. Ghant attested to the broad language used in the Affidavit and Search Warrant authorizing search and seizure of "any or all televisions, computers, laptops, tablets and all or any electronics devises or stolen merchandise" would routinely be approved by an officer's superior. Id. at 20, 29-30, 47, 72-73. In her deposition, Sgt. Ghant affirmed it is the "customary practice of the City of Selma to approve search warrants with these general-type descriptions." Id. at 72. She further affirmed the City has "the custom or usage . . . to approve search warrants for items that are not identified in the application for [the] search warrant." Id. at 50. Moreover, Sgt. Ghant indicated it is common practice or customary "to confiscate items to further investigate just to check to see if it's stolen or not." Id. at 82; see also p. 21. She further affirmed "it is the policy of the City of Selma to seize those items regardless of whether they know it was stolen or not in order to make an investigation to find out of it was stolen or not." Id. at 23 (referring to items seized when a party lacks documentation that the item belongs to them).
In her capacity as the corporate representative, Sgt. Ghant also reviewed the City's customary practice or policy relating to the return of items seized during the execution of a search warrant. Sgt. Ghant indicated the City requires proof of ownership before any items seized can be returned to the claimant. (Doc. 14-9, p. 97). For some items, however, she acknowledged proof of ownership is impossible to obtain; for instance, some electronics are bought second-hand without receipts or other formal documentation. See id. at 23. When a party cannot produce formal documentation regarding proof of ownership, then SPD officers
Id. at 23.
In her review of the Affidavit during her deposition, Sgt. Ghant stated she most likely would have approved the Affidavit if she had been the reviewing supervisor. (Doc. 14-9, p. 37, 46). Despite her assessment that the Affidavit provides enough probable cause to issue a search warrant, she concedes, "you [i.e. a reasonable officer] can't tell" from the Search Warrant or Affidavit which property to seize because it does not clearly identify which electronics have been stolen or otherwise separate which might be lawfully possessed by the homeowner. Id. at 51. In his own deposition, Blanks admitted a reasonable officer would not be able to "differentiate the stolen televisions [Blanks was] looking for from a TV that somebody lawfully owned" because the Search Warrant did not provide any details about the stolen merchandise. (See Doc. 14-5, pp. 74-75).
In her First Amended Complaint, Tillis asserts two § 1983 claims against Blanks in his individual capacity (Count I) and against the City (Count II).
Tillis asserts Blanks infringed upon her Fourth Amendment
Blanks claims he did not violate Tillis's Fourth Amendment rights and seeks qualified immunity. "The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials `from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); see also Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1156 (11th Cir. 2005). "Qualified immunity allows government employees to carry out their discretionary duties without fear of litigation, `protecting from suit all but the plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly violating federal law.'" Id. (quoting Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002)). "`Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.'" Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231). Relevant here, qualified immunity protects officials from suit, not just from litigation; thus, if the claim against Defendants can be resolved at the summary judgment phase, the Court must appropriately do so. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231-32; Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001).
To receive qualified immunity, the public official "must first prove that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred." Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194 (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts consider "whether the government employee was (a) pursuing a legitimate job-related function (that is, pursuing a job-related goal), (b) through means that were in his power to utilize." Holloman ex rel. Hollman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004). Here, it is clear Blanks was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority, and the parties agree on this point. See Signature Pharmacy, Inc. v. Wright, 438 Fed. App'x 741, 744 (11th Cir. 2011). "Once the defendant establishes that he was acting within his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate." Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194.
Under Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the "threshold question" to be determined before any other inquiry is: "Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?" 533 U.S. at 201. Only if the answer to that question is affirmative may the Court proceed to determine "whether the right was clearly established . . . in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition." Id.; see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999) ("[A]s we explained in Anderson, the right allegedly violated must be defined at the appropriate level of specificity before a court can determine if it was clearly established"). The Court notes that this two-part inquiry established in Saucier is no longer mandatory. Pearson, 555 U.S. 223. If no constitutional right was violated, the court need not inquire further. Id. If, however, a constitutional violation occurred, the Court must then determine whether the right was clearly established. Id.
In considering the first step of Saucier's two-step qualified immunity inquiry, the Court must determine whether the plaintiff's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was violated. The Court, in making this determination, must presume that the plaintiff's version of events is true. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002) (The threshold inquiry is "whether plaintiff's allegations,
To determine whether a right was clearly established, we look to binding decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and the highest court of the pertinent states, here the [Alabama] Supreme Court. See McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1237 (11th Cir. 2007). Based on these decisions, we ask "`whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation confronted.'" Terrell v. Smith, 668 F.3d 1244, 1255 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Saucier, 553 U.S. at 202).
Id. at 1018.
Tillis argues Blanks violated her Fourth Amendment rights by executing an invalid search warrant lacking in probable cause and by conducting a general search in violation of the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement. (See Doc. 16, pp. 4, 9). The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides,
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In general, a search warrant must: (1) be based upon probable cause; (2) be supported by a sworn affidavit; (3) particularly describe the place to be searched; and (4) particularly describe the items to be seized. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004). The Court turns first to Tillis's argument that the search warrant in question failed to establish probable cause.
Probable cause to support a search warrant exists when "there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); United States v. Brundidge, 170 F.3d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1999). The Court considers the totality of the circumstances when determining the existence of probable cause. Brundidge, 170 F.3d at 1352. Indeed, "[p]robable cause for a search warrant is a fluid concept, turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts." Id. "The focus in a warrant application is usually on whether a suspect committed a crime and whether evidence of the crime is to be found [at the place to be searched]. . . . Specifically, the affidavit should establish a connection between the defendant and the residence to be searched and a link between the residence and any criminal activity." United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1315 (11th Cir. 2002). As the Eleventh Circuit has noted, the affiant "`must reveal facts that make it likely that the items sought are in that place when the warrant issues,'" and the probable cause supporting the affidavit and application for the search warrant "must exist when the magistrate judge issues" it. United States v. Harris, 20 F.3d 445, 450 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Domme, 753 F.2d 950, 953 (11th Cir. 1985)). The Court must determine "whether a reasonably well-trained officer in [Blanks's] position would have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he should not have applied for the warrant." Malley, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986). To determine whether Blanks's actions were objectively reasonable, the Court looks to the information known to him, viewed in a light most favorable to Tillis. See Harris v. Coweta County, 21 F.3d 388, 390 (11th Cir. 1994).
In his Affidavit, Blanks laid out a short narrative of facts purporting to establish probable cause for the search of Lewis's (and thus Tillis's) home. Blanks stated few facts, which are summarized as follows: he was investigating a single burglary in which one 50-inch television was stolen; he "developed a suspect," Lewis, and learned Lewis lived at 215 Lawrence Street; and Blanks had an active arrest warrant for Lewis for burglary. (See Doc. 14-6). Moreover, in the Affidavit, Blanks sought permission to obtain a search warrant for "
Defendants argue the Court must also consider Blanks's knowledge at the time he executed the warrant, even if that knowledge was not reflected in the warrant or the supporting affidavit. In so arguing, they rely on the Eleventh Circuit's non-binding decision in Signature Pharmacy, Inc. v. Wright, 438 Fed. App'x 741 (11th Cir. 2011). The Court is not persuaded by Defendants' interpretation of Signature Pharmacy or United States v. Burke, 784 F.2d 1090 (11th Cir. 1986), which is cited as supporting the proposition. In both cases, the Eleventh Circuit looked to the executing officer's knowledge of the premises to be searched when the warrant did not adequately specify or describe the sub-unit of the place to be searched. See Signature Pharmacy, 438 Fed. App'x at 744; Burke, 784 F.2d at 1092-93. The parties have not cited to case law requiring courts to consider an officer's knowledge of other crimes committed when analyzing an insufficient affidavit or search warrant. In fact, case law in this Circuit flatly contradicts this notion. It is uncontroverted that warrants may cross-reference other documents, so long as "the warrant uses appropriate words of incorporation, and if the supporting document accompanies the warrant." Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557-58 (2004). In this case, however, Blanks did not cross-reference any other documents he prepared in his investigation of Lewis and the Kelly and Grayson burglaries. Even though he later claimed, "my probable cause and the search warrant are pretty much referenced from the information from the affidavit for the arrest [warrant]," the Court cannot consider this because he failed to incorporate these documents into the Search Warrant. See Groh, 540 U.S. at 558. As the Supreme Court in Groh found, "[t]his warrant did not simply omit a few items from a list of many to be seized, or misdescribe a few of several items. Nor did it make what fairly could be characterized as a mere technical mistake or a typographical error." Id. Similarly, this Court cannot find Blanks's apparent "mistake" in forgetting to include any reference whatsoever to a second crime in his Affidavit as a "technical mistake" or other error. He failed to detail any facts connecting Lewis to the theft of anything other than a 50-inch television and cannot point to a single fact that indicates, with any degree of probability, a connection between the residence and the criminal activity. Moreover, Blanks flatly admitted his Affidavit failed to indicate any facts establishing probable cause to search for illegal narcotics, illegal paraphernalia, or weapons. (See Doc. 14-5, pp. 59, 61). At minimum, Blanks should have known he should not have applied for the Search Warrant including a search for narcotics, related paraphernalia, and weapons. See Malley, 475 U.S. at 345.
In their next defense of the Affidavit and Search Warrant, Defendants point to Judge Hagood's finding of probable cause by issuing the Search Warrant. In Messerschmidt v. Millender, the Supreme Court indicated the fact that a neutral magistrate issued the warrant does not, without further inquiry, guarantee the search and seizure was objectively reasonable or executed in "objective good faith." Messerschmidt v. Millender, ___ U.S. ____, 132 S.Ct. 1235, 1245 (2012). Chief Justice Roberts stated,
Id. The Supreme Court noted plaintiffs face a "high" threshold for establishing this exception, id., and Defendants argue it does not apply in this case. While Messerschmidt presents a properly narrow exception, the Court finds it does apply in this case. Blanks's affidavit is "so lacking in indicia of probable cause" to the point that "belief in its existence [is] entirely unreasonable." Id. As stated above, Blanks utterly failed to include any facts about the Grayson burglary, in which multiple electronics were stolen. He further failed to incorporate by reference any documents providing a more thorough explanation of the facts connecting (1) Lewis to the thefts of more than a 50-inch television and (2) the presence of stolen merchandise at Tillis's home. Blanks's request to search for "
As such, the Court turns to Tillis's second argument that the Search Warrant failed to meet the specificity requirement and as such issued as a general warrant.
The Fourth Amendment requires that every warrant particularly describe two things: "the place to be searched" and the "persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. As many Courts and scholars have noted, the unjust, unfettered access to a citizen's private home allowed by general warrants was at the forefront of the Founders' minds when drafting the Fourth Amendment. See generally United States v. Phillips, 834 F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir. 2016); see also Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181 (2016). "Given that the particularity requirement is set forth in the text of the Constitution, no reasonable officer could believe that a warrant that plainly did not comply with that requirement was valid." Groh, 540 U.S. at 556; see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 ("Finally, depending on the circumstances of the particular case, a warrant may be so facially deficient—i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized—that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.") (emphasis added). Having settled the particularity requirement was "clearly established" long before February 6, 2014, the Court now considers whether the Search Warrant issued and executed complied with it.
First, a warrant must describe the things to be seized with sufficient particularity so that the precise language informs officers how to separate properly seized items from irrelevant items. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927). However, "elaborate specificity is unnecessary." United States v. Betancourt, 734 F.2d 750, 754 (11th Cir. 1984). "The description is considered sufficiently particular when it enables the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things authorized to be seized." Id. at 754-55 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This requirement does not necessitate technical perfection; instead, it is applied with "a practical margin of flexibility." United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1259 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1349 (11th Cir. 1982)). "If the applicant for the warrant cannot give an exact description, but has probable cause to believe that such materials exist, the warrant is sufficiently particular if it is as specific as the circumstances and nature of the activity under investigation permit." United States v. Collins, 1:14-CR-302-TWT-AJB, 2016 WL 1639960, *16 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2016) (citing United States v. Roussea, 628 Fed. App'x 1022, 1025-26 (11th Cir. 2015)). To avoid overbreadth and thus violation of the Fourth Amendment, the warrant must "limit[] the seizure of items to only those items that constitute evidence of a criminal activity." Id. Second, the description of the things to be seized should be limited to the scope of probable cause established in the warrant. Together, these elements forbid agents from obtaining general warrants. A general order to search through a person's belongings is not permissible under the Fourth Amendment. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971) (A warrant is impermissibly overbroad if it authorizes "a general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings.") Instead, a warrant requires agents to conduct narrow seizures that attempt to "minimize[] unwarranted intrusions upon privacy." Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n. 11 (1976). Thus, "the test is whether the search was a general exploration or specifically directed to the means and instrumentalities by which the crime charged had been committed." Collins, 2016 WL 1639960 at *16 (citing Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 153-54 (1947)).
Tillis argues Blanks engaged in a "general rummaging" of her lawfully possessed property and that he engaged in a general, exploratory search. The Defendants counter that Blanks could not have been more specific in his descriptions because the exact details of the stolen property in both cases were unknown; they further argue the descriptions enabled the searchers to reasonably ascertain and identify the items to be seized. Defendants again rely on Signature Pharmacy. In Signature Pharmacy, the search warrant in question authorized seizure of numerous items, including "documents, records, bills, logs, computer equipment, and so forth,
Notably, however, Santarelli, like Signature Pharmacy and the cases on which it relies, all relate to white-collar crimes, such as loansharking. See id. In this case, however, Blanks was investigating—at most—two burglaries in which specific items were stolen. He knew Mr. Kelly was missing a 50-inch television. (See Doc. 13-4). He further knew Mr. Grayson had reported specific items, such as a Playstation 3 gaming station, three Dell laptops, one Compaq computer, and a 33-inch television. (See Doc. 13-10, p. 1). While the generic term "electronics" does, in fact, relate to the items stolen from these two homes, they do not allow reasonable officers to determine, with any specificity, which electronics in the modern-day American home are lawfully possessed or stolen property. As Blanks noted in his deposition, it is not illegal to own any of these items. (Doc. 14-5, p. 57). Further, he admitted a reasonable officer would be unable to ascertain and identify the items to be seized based on the language in the Search Warrant. Id. at 74-75. Sgt. Ghant similarly admitted she, or a reasonable office, would not be able to isolate the stolen property (if any) found in Tillis's home from the lawfully possessed property based on the language describing the items to be seized in the Search Warrant. (See Doc. 14-9, p. 51). The fact that Blanks seized two 40-inch televisions and two Xbox gaming consoles from Tillis's home indicates the Search Warrant failed to describe the items with sufficient particularity. (See Doc. 14-5, pp. 70, 73, 76, 97). If the officer who drafted the warrant cannot know exactly what he is looking for, how can the reasonable officer relying on the warrant separate the items to be seized from the items to be left?
While "catch-all" provisions, such as the "all and any" language included in the Search Warrant, have been allowed by prior Eleventh Circuit decisions, the language in this Search Warrant cannot stand. Unlike the warrants that have been upheld, this Search Warrant authorized search and seizure of "
Furthermore, the Court finds Blanks's explanations as to why he felt the need to confiscate
Id. at 71-72. This dialogue indicates the Search Warrant authorized, in the mind of Blanks, a general, exploratory search through Tillis's and Lewis's personal possessions. Further, it indicates Blanks failed to execute the Search Warrant in good faith, as is required by the law of this Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit has stated,
Gurleski v. United States, 405 F.2d 253, 258 (11th Cir. 1968). While the good-faith exception applies to general and overbroad search warrants, see Collins, 2016 WL 1639960 at *18, the Court cannot find the exception applies here to certain items seized. The Court considers items described in the Search Warrant, the Affidavit, and the victims' reports, see id., and holds that Blanks seized numerous items without probable cause. The Court holds the Search Warrant failed to particularize the things to be seized to such an extent that it was facially deficient; as such, Blanks could not—or should not—have presumed it was a valid warrant. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 922. Moreover, the Court finds Blanks engaged in a "general exploratory search" of the electronics in Tillis's home in the hope of "discover[ing] evidence of wrongdoing." See Gurleski, 405 F.2d at 258. As such, the Court finds Blanks violated Tillis's Fourth Amendment right is not entitled to qualified immunity as to Tillis's § 1983 claim (Count I).
For these reasons, the Court
Local governments may not be held liable for their employees' torts on a respondeat superior basis but may be held liable "when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury . . . ." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Sometimes, municipal liability may be premised not on an affirmative or express policy or decision, but rather the absence of or refusal to adopt a municipal policy of decision to prevent known and likely constitutional violations. In these "inadequate policy" cases, such as a failure-to-train claim, for example, "the inadequacy . . . may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact." City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989) (emphasis added). "The `deliberate indifference' standard . . . does not turn upon the degree of fault (if any) that a plaintiff must show to make out [the] underlying clam on a constitutional violation." Id. at 388 n. 8. Instead, "[i]f a program does not prevent constitutional violations, municipal decision makers may eventually be put on notice that a new program is called for," and their "continued adherence to an approach that they knew or should know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees may establish the . . . `deliberate indifference' . . . necessary to trigger municipal liability." Bd. of Cnty Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997) (citations omitted). Such circumstances, however, are limited, and the degree of causation required is strict, for fear of sliding towards a mere "but for" requirement and thus collapsing municipal liability into respondeat superior liability where, for example, the plaintiff would have suffered no injury had the offending employee not been hired. Id. at 410; Canton, 489 U.S. at 391-92 ("In virtually every instance where a person had had his or her constitutional rights violated by a city employee, a § 1983 plaintiff will be able to point to something the city `could have done' to prevent the unfortunate incident."). "The city's `policy of inaction' in light of notice that its program will cause constitutional violations `is the functional equivalent of a decision by the city itself to violate the constitution.'" Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61-62 (2011) (quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at 395 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Thus, "[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is `ordinarily necessary' to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train." Id. at 62 (quoting Bd. of the Cnty. Commr's of Bryan Cnty. Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997))).
Therefore, if a municipality has no notice of the need to train or supervise in a particular area, it cannot be liable as a matter of law for any failure to train or supervise. Wright v. Sheppard, 919 F.2d 665 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding sheriff's department not liable for deputy's acts when no evidence of a history of widespread prior abuse put the sheriff on notice of the need for improved training or supervision); Popham v. City of Talladega, 908 F.2d 1561 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding no liability for failure to train when no pattern of incidents put city on notice of a need to train). Tillis has not produced any specific examples of other cases in which Blanks has violated others' Fourth Amendment rights by executing a warrant without indicia of probable cause or by conducting a general, exploratory search. She has, however, uncovered an alarming tendency within the SPD to approve warrant affidavits and applications utilizing broad language or to approve search warrants for items not identified in the applications. (See Doc. 13-9, pp. 20, 29-30, 47, 50, 72-73). Indeed, Sgt. Ghant's testimony, along with Blanks's testimony and actions, reveals a perplexing disregard for the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Both Sgt. Ghant and Blanks noted it was customary practice or procedure to seize any items without proper documentation, regardless of whether they have been reported in connection to any crime, just to "investigate" whether the item is stolen. (See Docs. 14-9, pp. 21, 23; 14-5, p. 71-75). Moreover, no supervisor or other City official has ever advised Blanks his search warrant and affidavit language is overbroad or otherwise fails to meet the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. (Doc. 14-5, p. 117). In her deposition, Sgt. Ghant acknowledged she would approve a search warrant and affidavit similar to the ones prepared by Blanks in this case. (Doc. 14-9, pp. 30, 72-74).
Although these instances are not specific to any one, identifiable case, it is clear to this Court that the City has inadequately trained and supervised Blanks, among others, in aspects of the Fourth Amendment as related to searches and seizures. His officer profile report indicates Blanks has only received four continuing education courses relating to searches and seizures since his employment began in March 2006.
In addition to her federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Tillis alleges two state law claims (Counts III and IV). Count III is brought against Blanks is his individual capacity, and Count IV is brought against the City of Selma.
In Count III, Tillis alleges Blanks "negligently, carelessly, or unskillfully" prepared the search warrant affidavit, conducted a general rummaging search of her lawfully owned possessions, and seized items not identified in the search warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (See Doc. 8, ¶¶ 30-37). Just as Blanks invoked qualified immunity for the § 1983 claim against he, he has invoked state agent and/or discretionary function immunity for the Alabama state law claims pursuant to Alabama Code § 6-5-338. The Alabama Legislature enacted this provision in 1994, which provides:
Ala. Code § 6-5-338(a) (1975). In Ex parte Cranman, the Supreme Court of Alabama "restate[d] the rule governing State-agent immunity":
(4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State, including, but not limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or attempting to arrest persons . . . .
Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392, 405 (Ala. 2000) (emphasis in original).
But the analysis cannot end here. The Alabama Supreme Court continued, "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the forgoing statement of the rule, a State agent shall not be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity [. . .] when the State agent acts willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law." Id. (emphasis in original). At this point in the analysis, the burden shifts to Tillis, who must demonstrate the exception applies. See Ex parte City of Montgomery, 99 So.3d 282, 293-94 (Ala. 2012). To rise to this level, the Supreme Court of Alabama "has required the plaintiff to prove that the defendants' conduct was `so egregious as to amount to willful or malicious conduct or conduct engaged in in bad faith.'" Ex parte Tuscaloosa County, 796 So.2d 1100, 1107 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Couch v. City of Sheffield, 708 So.2d 144, 153-54 (Ala. 1998)). The inquiry as to whether the state agent qualifies for immunity under this section is a fact-specific one. See Ex parte Dangerfield, 49 So.3d 675, 682 (Ala. 2010).
It is settled that Blanks was engaged in official duties and exercising judgment in law enforcement. Tillis, however, argues Blanks acted in bad faith when he conducted a general, exploratory search of her home for stolen electronics. (Doc. 26, p. 27). She further asserts he engaged in willful misconduct or acted under a mistaken interpretation of the Fourth Amendment when drafting his affidavit. Id. at 27-28. "[The Supreme Court of Alabama] has previously held that poor judgment or wanton misconduct, an aggravated form of negligence, does not rise to the level of willfulness and maliciousness necessary to put the State agent beyond the immunity recognized in Cranman." Ex parte Randall, 971 So.2d 652, 664 (Ala. 2007); see also Adams v. City of Mobile, 2008 WL 4531768, at * 10-11 (S. D. Ala. Oct. 9, 2008) (applying this principle). As our sister court has noted,
Jaggers v. City of Sheffield, Ala., No. 3:14-cv-158-TMP, 2014 WL 2123210, *7 (N.D. Ala. May 21, 2014). Because a police officer is immunized from liability for his negligent conduct, Count III must be dismissed. Therefore, the Court
In Count IV of her First Amended Complaint, Tillis alleges the City "negligently, carelessly, or unskillfully failed to adequately train and supervise" Blanks and similarly "failed to discipline [him] for his unlawful and unconstitutional conduct." (Doc. 8, ¶¶ 40-41). The City has invoked immunity under Ala. Code § 6-5-338, see supra. Historically, "no Alabama court has expressly recognized a cause of action against a municipality for a supervisor's negligent training or supervision of a subordinate." Borton v. City of Dothan, 734 F.Supp.2d 1237, 1258-59 (M.D. Ala. 2010); Hamilton v. City of Jackson, 508 F.Supp.2d 1045, 1057-58 (S.D. Ala. 2007); Ott v. City of Mobile, 169 F.Supp.2d 1301, 1314-15 (S.D. Ala. 2001). The Supreme Court of Alabama, however, recently acknowledged a negligent training and supervision claim against the City could stand on its own:
Ex parte City of Montgomery, 99 So.3d 282, 299 (Ala. 2012); see also Ex parte City of Midfield, 161 So.3d 1158, 1169 (Ala. 2014) (reaffirming the principle that it is necessary for the municipality to identify whether the hiring, training, or supervising person is a police officer in deciding whether a municipality is immune). The need to identify the hiring, training, and supervising individual is based on the well-established principle that, "if a municipal peace officer is immune pursuant to § 6-5-338(a), then pursuant to § 6-5-338(b), the city by which he is employed is also immune." Montgomery, 99 So.3d 282 at 298. As the City of Selma has failed to introduce any evidence, at this stage of the proceedings, identifying the individual(s) involved in these processes and whether they qualify for state-agent immunity, this Court is compelled to
For the reasons set forth above, the Court deems it proper to
The only issues remaining to be tried are 1) the damages on Count I and 2) liability and any resultant damages on Count IV.
