ORDER

WILLIAM H. STEELE, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (doc. 19). The Motion has been the subject of extensive briefing and is now ripe for disposition.

I. Relevant Background.

Plaintiff, Jeffery Lee, is an Alabama death row inmate who was convicted in 2000 of three counts of capital murder in connection with the shotgun killings of Jimmy Ellis and Elaine Thompson in a pawnshop near Orrville, Alabama. In October 2000, a Dallas County Circuit Court judge sentenced Lee to death. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Lee's convictions and sentences in June 2003, and subsequent petitions for rehearing and for writ of certiorari in both the Alabama Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court were denied, such the Lee's direct appeals concluded in 2004. Lee's Rule 32 proceedings in state court lasted from February 2005 through October 2009, and his § 2254 proceedings in federal court commenced in October 2010 and concluded with the denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court in March 2014. See Lee v. Thomas, 134 S.Ct. 1542, 188 L.Ed.2d 557 (2014). All such appeals and collateral attacks were unsuccessful.1 At present, the State of Alabama has not set an execution date for Lee.

On September 8, 2016, Lee filed the instant Complaint (doc. 1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In this action, Lee asserts a series of constitutional claims challenging the method of his execution. As his First Cause of Action, Lee maintains that Alabama's three-drug lethal injection protocol "creates a substantial risk of excruciating and cruel pain to Mr. Lee because . . . there is a substantial likelihood that midazolam will fail to render Mr. Lee unconscious and insensate from the excruciating pain and anguish caused by the second and third drugs." (Doc. 1, ¶ 88.) Lee further alleges that "[t]he State's lack of an effective consciousness check exacerbates the risk that Mr. Lee will experience excruciating pain," that "[r]eadily available alternatives exist that the State could employ instead of its current three-drug lethal injection protocol," and that "[r]eadily available alternatives exist that the State could employ instead of its current, ineffective consciousness check." (Id., ¶¶ 89-91.) On that basis, Lee alleges that "[i]f the State's three-drug protocol is used to execute Mr. Lee, then Mr. Lee will be subject to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment." (Id., ¶ 94.)

As his Second Cause of Action, Lee brings a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge. In this claim, Lee asserts that the State's lethal injection protocol burdens his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment because Alabama replaced two drugs in its protocol without updating its consciousness assessment. As pleaded in the Complaint, Lee's "personal and medical history substantially increases the risk" of excruciating pain, and the State's procedures are inadequate to guard against such a risk. (Id., ¶ 99.) For his Third Cause of Action, Lee raises a due process claim predicated on "[t]he State's refusal to disclose material information about its new lethal injection protocol," which Lee says has the effect of "depriving him of notice and a meaningful opportunity to challenge the manner" of his execution. (Id., ¶ 105.)

The State has now moved to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety on grounds of timeliness and failure to state a cognizable claim.

II. Analysis.

A. Whether the Complaint is Time-Barred.

1. Governing Legal Standard.

Lee's § 1983 challenges to the method of execution are subject to a two-year limitations period. See, e.g., McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008) ("All constitutional claims brought under § 1983 are tort actions, subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the § 1983 action has been brought.. . . Callahan's claim was brought in Alabama, where the governing limitations period is two years.") (citations omitted). Circuit law teaches that "an inmate's method of execution claim accrues on the later of the date on which state review is complete, or the date on which the capital litigant becomes subject to a new or substantially changed execution protocol." Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1303 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).2

There can be no question that Lee's state review concluded back in 2004, well outside the two-year limitations period governing his § 1983 claims. Accordingly, the timeliness analysis in this case hinges on a determination of whether Lee became "subject to a new or substantially changed execution protocol" by the State of Alabama within two years prior to the September 2016 filing of his method-of-execution Complaint. See Arthur v. Thomas, 674 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2012) ("In order to defeat Alabama's statute of limitations defense, Arthur must show that he filed his § 1983 complaint within two years of a significant change in Alabama's method of administering lethal injections."); see generally Valle v. Singer, 655 F.3d 1223, 1229 (11th Cir. 2011) ("Thus, the Court must consider whether Valle has alleged facts supporting a conclusion that Florida has changed or substantially altered its execution protocol."). In this context, "a `substantial change' is one that `significantly alter[s] the method of execution.'" Brooks v. Warden, 810 F.3d 812, 822 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).

2. Whether Midazolam is a Substantial Change.

Plaintiff insists that the requisite "substantial change" may be found in Alabama's modification of its three-drug protocol to change the initial drug from pentobarbital to midazolam hydrochloride ("midazolam"). The Complaint pleads as follows:

* * *

(Doc. 1, ¶¶ 3-4.)3 This timeline of events, driven by the lack of availability of pentobarbital (which Alabama had previously designated as the first drug in its lethal injection protocol), has been recognized by the Eleventh Circuit. See Grayson v. Warden, ___ Fed.Appx. ____, 2016 WL 7118393, *2 (11th Cir. Dec. 7, 2016) ("Pentobarbital became unavailable in 2014. . . . Consequently, Alabama announced in September 2014 that it would begin using midazolam as the first drug in its lethal injection protocol.") (citations omitted).

Defendants counter that the substitution of midazolam for pentobarbital in Alabama's three-drug protocol has been held by binding authorities not to constitute a "substantial change" for limitations purposes in § 1983 actions challenging the method of execution. See, e.g., Brooks, 810 F.3d at 823-24 (concluding that "we cannot say that the 2014 switch to midazolam triggered a new statute-of-limitations period" because plaintiff had not "established a substantial likelihood that the substitution of midazolam for pentobarbital was a `substantial change' to Alabama's protocol, or that it `significantly alter[ed] the method of execution'"); Grayson, 2016 WL 7118393, at *4 ("As we recognized in Brooks, the Supreme Court and this Court have indicated that the substitution of midazolam for pentobarbital does not significantly alter a three-drug lethal injection protocol because, similar to pentobarbital, midazolam render[s] a prisoner unconscious and insensate during the remainder of a three-drug procedure.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).4

Lee's position is that the State's inclusion of midazolam in place of pentobarbital in its three-drug protocol is a substantial change for timeliness purposes. In his Complaint, he alleges that it is a substantial change because "[a]s a benzodiazepine, midazolam fits into an entirely different class of drugs than sodium thiopental or pentobarbital, both of which are barbiturates." (Doc. 1, ¶ 11.) The Complaint goes on to state that this distinction matters because

(Id., ¶ 39.) Plaintiff contends that "[e]ven at high doses, midazolam will not induce general anesthesia sufficient to prevent an individual from feeling pain from . . . the second and third drugs in the State's lethal injection protocol." (Id., ¶ 40.) On the strength of these factual allegations, Lee maintains that the Complaint is adequate to overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) hurdle as to timeliness and entitle him to discovery and an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the September 2014 modification of Alabama's three-drug protocol to utilize midazolam rather than pentobarbital constitutes a "substantial change" that started anew the two-year limitations clock for his § 1983 claims.

The State responds that Lee's allegations concerning midazolam are inadequate as a matter of law, and that binding authorities have rejected factual allegations comparable to Lee's for timeliness purposes. Of course, the Eleventh Circuit has cautioned that "[w]hether a significant change has occurred in a state's method of execution is a fact-dependent inquiry." Arthur, 674 F.3d at 1260; see also Grayson, 2016 WL 7118393, at *5 ("The question whether a significant change has occurred in a state's execution method is generally a fact-dependent inquiry.") (citation omitted). That does not imply, however, that a § 1983 plaintiff overcomes a limitations defense on a motion to dismiss merely by pleading factual allegations about a modification of the execution protocol that the appeals court has previously deemed inadequate to constitute a substantial change. To the contrary, the Eleventh Circuit has expressly rejected the argument that courts cannot deem a complaint "untimely unless [the plaintiff] is first given an opportunity to seek discovery in support of her allegations that [the State] has substantially altered its lethal injection protocol." Gissendaner, 779 F.3d at 1282 n.8. Rather, "a court may dismiss a complaint as untimely — without an evidentiary hearing or discovery — if the allegations and evidence presented are `materially the same' as those presented in a previous case in which the denial of relief was affirmed." Id.; see also Mann v. Palmer, 713 F.3d 1306, 1313-14 (11th Cir. 2013) (rejecting notion that "every inmate who files a complaint that challenges the use of pentobarbital is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the substitution of pentobarbital is a substantial change in the method of execution," and explaining that if the allegations in a pleading are "materially the same" as those presented in an earlier case in which the denial of relief was affirmed, then "the district court would have been obliged to dismiss [the] complaint as untimely"); Grayson, 2016 WL 7118393, at *5 ("Smith's allegations concerning midazolam are materially indistinguishable from the allegations that we rejected as untimely in Brooks. As such, an evidentiary hearing was not required for the district court to rule on the timeliness issue in this case.").

In light of the foregoing, the critical question is whether Lee's factual allegations regarding the substitution of midazolam for pentobarbital in Alabama's lethal injection protocol are "materially the same" as those in previous decisions in which the Eleventh Circuit or the Supreme Court have found no substantial change in the method of execution. The State argues that this question must be answered affirmatively because Lee's allegations concerning midazolam do not differ materially from those presented in Grayson and Brooks, among others. Confronted with that assertion, Lee fails to identify any respect in which the factual allegations in his Complaint as they relate to midazolam being a substantial change in Alabama's lethal injection protocol differ from those considered by controlling authorities that have concluded that switching to midazolam was not a substantial alteration that might trigger a new limitations period.5 Lee states in conclusory terms that he "has asserted sufficient facts to allow him to proceed forward with discovery and a hearing" on the issue of whether midazolam is a substantial change; however, he does not identify those facts or even attempt to distinguish his factual allegations from those the Eleventh Circuit has pronounced inadequate to establish that the substitution of midazolam for pentobarbital in September 2014 significantly altered Alabama's lethal injection protocol.6

The Court concludes that Lee's Eighth Amendment claim predicated on Alabama's use of midazolam in its three-drug execution protocol is untimely. The Complaint is devoid of facts showing that the substitution of midazolam for pentobarbital constitutes a substantial change in Alabama's method of execution that might restart the long-expired limitations clock; rather, Lee has relied on factual allegations that are materially the same as those presented in previous cases in which appellate courts have found no substantial change. Under the circumstances, neither discovery nor an evidentiary hearing on the "substantial change" issue is warranted. This claim is time-barred on its face.

3. Substantial Change and the Consciousness Check.

As noted, another component of Lee's Eighth Amendment claim is that "[t]he State's lack of an effective consciousness check exacerbates the risk that Mr. Lee will experience excruciating pain when the second and third drugs are administered to him." (Doc. 1, ¶ 89.) Likewise, Lee's equal protection cause of action rests in part on the State's consciousness assessment, as the Complaint alleges, "The State's decision to change its lethal injection protocol without updating its consciousness test has no rational basis nor is it narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest." (Id., ¶ 100.)7 The State moves for dismissal of these claims on timeliness grounds, as well. In so doing, the State maintains, and cites authority for the proposition, that Alabama's consciousness assessment has been unchanged since it was first adopted in 2007, such that Lee was required to raise any challenge to same by no later than 2009 in order to comply with the two-year limitations period.8

In opposing the State's limitations defense, Lee does not assert that Alabama has in fact altered its consciousness assessment procedure at any time since 2007. Instead, he posits that "the State's failure to adapt its consciousness assessment to its introduction of midazolam to its execution protocol is a substantial change." (Doc. 21, at 10.) He identifies no case authority anywhere endorsing the paradoxical reasoning that, for limitations purposes, a consciousness test can substantially change by staying the same. At any rate, the "substantial change" that Lee would necessarily be relying on in advancing such a theory would be the substitution of midazolam for pentobarbital; however, this Court (and the Eleventh Circuit) has already held that the midazolam modification is not a "substantial change" for limitations purposes. Lee cannot bootstrap an untimely consciousness-assessment challenge onto an untimely midazolam challenge and somehow obtain a timely claim. Stated differently, because the State's use of midazolam does not constitute a substantial change to the execution protocol, the State's failure to revamp the consciousness assessment to account for the use of midazolam likewise cannot constitute a substantial change to the execution protocol. These claims are time-barred because Lee could have raised them as far back as 2007, when Alabama first added the consciousness assessment to its protocol as a procedural safeguard. The two-year limitations period has long since expired. See, e.g., Grayson, 2016 WL 7118393, at *7 ("Smith's allegations concerning Alabama's consciousness assessment procedure could have been raised in 2007 and were time-barred as of 2009. . . . Brooks's execution did not involve any change, much less a significant change, to Alabama's consciousness assessment procedure that Smith challenges in his § 1983 claim.").9

4. Due Process Claim.

As his Third Cause of Action, Lee asserts a due process claim predicated on what he terms "[t]he State's refusal to disclose material information about its new lethal injection protocol, including the reasons for its decision to switch to midazolam and to retain the same consciousness assessment." (Doc. 1, ¶ 105.) Plaintiff alleges that such information "is critical to a determination of the constitutionality of [the State's] intended actions as applied to Mr. Lee." (Id., ¶ 106.)

The State persuasively argues that this claim is also time-barred. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has held that due process claims relating to Alabama's "secrecy" concerning its method of execution accrued in 2002, when the State first adopted a lethal injection procedure and cast aside the electrocution method. See, e.g., Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1305 (11th Cir. 2011) ("Powell could have challenged the ADOC's `secrecy' surrounding the method of execution beginning July 31, 2002, as the facts supporting this cause of action should have been apparent to any person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The State's substitution of midazolam for pentobarbital in its three-drug lethal injection protocol does not revive this kind of due process attack, and does not restart the two-year limitations clock. See id. ("Powell fails to show how his claim about the secrecy surrounding the ADOC's recent change in lethal injection protocol was revived by the ADOC's 2011 switch in drugs."); Hunt v. Myers, 2015 WL 1198688, *3 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 16, 2015) (as of July 2002, "Hunt could have challenged the secrecy surrounding Alabama's lethal injection protocol and the State's refusal to disclose to him all details about the protocol that will be used in his execution, but he waited over twelve years to do so . . . . Those claims fall well outside of the two-year statute of limitations, and the fact that two of the drugs in the protocol were changed in September 2014 does not . . . otherwise make those claims timely."). Confronted with these authorities, Lee does not advance any argument suggesting that his due process claim is timely or distinguishing his claims from the binding, on-point authority of Powell. The Court therefore finds that Lee's due process claim (like all other claims set forth in the Complaint) is properly dismissed as time-barred.

B. Merits Issues.

As demonstrated by the foregoing discussion, all of the claims asserted in Lee's § 1983 Complaint are time-barred; therefore, defendants' Motion to Dismiss is properly granted on that basis alone. Even if these claims were timely, however, dismissal would remain proper on the merits pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because Lee's Complaint fails to state any claims to relief that are plausible on their face.

1. Eighth Amendment Claim as to Midazolam.

The Supreme Court has explained that an inmate bringing an Eighth Amendment method-of-execution challenge must establish (i) "that the State's lethal injection protocol creates a demonstrated risk of severe pain," and (ii) "that the risk is substantial when compared to the known and available alternatives." Glossip v. Gross, ___ U.S. ____, 135 S.Ct. 2726, 2737, 192 L.Ed.2d 761 (2015) (citation omitted).10 The latter requirement is of critical importance here. After all, Glossip emphasized that prisoners "cannot successfully challenge a State's method of execution merely by showing a slightly or marginally safer alternative," but instead "must identify an alternative that is feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduce[s] a substantial risk of severe pain." Id. (citation omitted); see also Grayson, 2016 WL 7118393, at *6 (plaintiff's burden is "to show that there is a `feasible,' `readily available' alternative method of execution that would substantially reduce the risk of an unconstitutional level of pain as required by the second prong of Glossip").

Lee acknowledges — as he must — this pleading burden; however, he insists that the Complaint "plausibly alleges that there are multiple alternatives to the State's protocol that are available and that would reduce the risk of severe pain." (Doc. 21, at 16.) In the Complaint, Lee alleges in conclusory terms that "[t]he State could and should employ any number of readily available alternatives to its current three-drug lethal injection protocol." (Doc. 1, ¶ 79.) Unfortunately, the pleading is woefully short on particulars. The first "readily available alternative" identified by Lee's Complaint is "an individualized patient assessment to determine appropriate anesthetic agents based on inmate's personal and medical history followed by roncuronium bromide and potassium chloride." (Id.) This "alternative" is devoid of any specific information, and does not plausibly allege that any feasible, readily implemented, alternative anesthetic exists (in lieu of midazolam) for the first drug of the protocol. Merely saying "we'll talk about it and figure something out on an inmate-by-inmate basis" falls far short of satisfying Lee's burden under applicable law of pleading a "known and available alternative."

The only other "alternative" identified in the Complaint is the possibility of "a single-drug protocol, in which a lethal dose of anesthetic is administered." (Id., ¶ 80.) Lee pleads just one drug that might be suitable for such a single-drug protocol, to-wit: pentobarbital. (Id., ¶ 82 ("There are a number of different drugs available to states that employ single-drug protocols. One is pentobarbital . . . .").) Of course, pentobarbital is the anesthetic that Alabama used in its three-drug protocol until September 2014, when the State substituted midazolam for it because pentobarbital was no longer available.11 The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly acknowledged that pentobarbital is presently unavailable to the Alabama Department of Corrections for use in lethal injections. See, e.g., Brooks, 810 F.3d at 819-20 ("[I]n more recent filings, the ADOC has said that it has been unable to procure pentobarbital and that it does not have a source for pentobarbital. . . . Brooks has neither shown a substantial likelihood that there is now a source for pentobarbital that would sell it to the ADOC for use in executions, nor that an execution protocol involving this drug would be readily implementable by the ADOC.").12

It is not enough at the pleadings stage for Lee to make a conclusory allegation in his Complaint that "pentobarbital is readily available for use in executions in Alabama." (Doc. 1, ¶ 83.) Under Glossip, Lee must plead that the subject drug is both feasible and readily available. He cannot advance to discovery and an evidentiary hearing simply by alleging in blanket terms that pentobarbital is readily available, when the Eleventh Circuit "has noted many times" that pentobarbital is now "unavailable for use in executions" in Alabama. Grayson, 2016 WL 7118393, at *6. Rather, Lee must come forward with additional factual allegations or evidence to support his claim; otherwise, his bare allegation that pentobarbital is readily available for Alabama executions is insufficient on its face to withstand Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility review. To be clear, this burden of pleading and proof rests with Lee, and the State need not plead or prove anything as to pentobarbital availability or lack thereof.13

In an effort to meet this burden, Lee pleads in his Complaint that (i) pentobarbital "has also been used in dozens of single-drug executions [in other states] in the United States since January 1, 2014" (doc. 1, ¶ 82); and (ii) "[c]ompounding pharmacists have expressed their willingness to prepare pentobarbital for lethal injection" (id., ¶ 83). Neither allegation is sufficient to satisfy the "feasible" and "readily implemented" test under Glossip. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has rejected these types of allegations (even if backed by supporting evidence) as being insufficient to satisfy the Glossip test. See, e.g., Arthur v. Commissioner, Alabama Dep't of Corrections, 840 F.3d 1268, 1302 (11th Cir. 2016) ("We expressly hold that the fact that other states in the past have procured a compounded drug and pharmacies in Alabama have the skills to compound the drug does not make it available to the ADOC for use in lethal injections in executions."); Brooks, 810 F.3d at 819 (where inmate shows that other states have used pentobarbital to execute inmates in a single-drug protocol, "the fact that the drug was available in those states at some point over the past two years does not, without more, make it likely that it is available to Alabama now").14

To recap the analysis, in order to plead a plausible Eighth Amendment claim based on Alabama's use of midazolam in a three-drug lethal injection protocol, Lee is required to plead that there is a feasible, readily available alternative method of execution that would substantially reduce the risk of an unconstitutional level of pain. The only specific alternative identified in Lee's Complaint is a switch to a single-drug protocol using pentobarbital. However, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized on multiple occasions in the last two years that pentobarbital is not available for use in executions in Alabama. In order to satisfy his pleading burden and proceed to discovery and an evidentiary hearing, Lee was required to come forward with allegations tending to show new or different facts materially distinguishable from those in other cases in which the appellate court has deemed pentobarbital to be unavailable.15 He has not done so. To be sure, he cited a few stray lines from a deposition taken in another matter last year to assert that compounding pharmacists know how to make pentobarbital; however, he ignored the fact that the same witness later indicated that he had contacted more than a dozen pharmacists, none of whom were willing to supply compounded phenobarbital for executions in Alabama. This "fact" in the Complaint is speculative to the extreme, and falls well short (even at the pleadings stage) of alleging a plausible claim that a single-drug pentobarbital protocol is a feasible, readily implemented alternative. Thus, even if this claim were timely (and it is not), dismissal would remain appropriate because Lee has failed to state a plausible claim for relief.

2. Eighth Amendment Claim as to Consciousness Assessment.

As noted, embedded in Lee's Eighth Amendment cause of action relating to the State's substitution of midazolam for pentobarbital is a claim about "[t]he State's lack of an effective consciousness check." (Doc. 1, ¶ 89.) Assuming that Lee intends to claim that Alabama's consciousness assessment violates his Eighth Amendment rights, and assuming that claim to be timely presented, he still must plead and prove a known and available alternative to comply with Glossip. This he has not done.

Again, the Supreme Court requires a plaintiff in Lee's position to "identify an alternative that is feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduce[s] a substantial risk of severe pain." Glossip, 135 S.Ct. at 2737 (citation omitted). Lee must plead and prove that his proposed alternative "execution protocol . . . would be readily implementable by the ADOC." Brooks, 810 F.3d at 820.16 The Complaint does none of this. Instead, it simply alleges that "[t]he State also could employ readily available alternatives to its current consciousness assessment which would replace the meager pinch the State currently employs with pinches that apply much more pressure." (Doc. 1, ¶ 84.) Lee does not indicate with any specificity what alternative consciousness assessment he is proposing, what the procedure would be, how the State would implement it, or why it would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain. His cursory allegation in the Complaint that "readily available alternatives" exist does not satisfy threshold burdens of pleading and proof under Glossip and its progeny; therefore, this claim would fail on the merits even if it were not time-barred.17

3. Equal Protection Claim.

In his Second Cause of Action, Lee alleges that the State's lethal injection protocol violates his right to equal protection because (i) "inmates . . . subject to the new three-drug protocol are substantially more likely to feel the painful effects of the second and third drugs in the protocol than inmates executed under Alabama's prior three-drug protocols;" and (ii) "Mr. Lee's personal and medical history substantially increases the risk that he will experience the painful effects of the second and third drugs in the protocol than other inmates listed under Alabama's new three-drug protocol." (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 98-99.)

In this context, "[t]o state an equal protection claim, [Lee] must show that the State will treat him disparately from other similarly situated persons." DeYoung v. Owens, 646 F.3d 1319, 1327 (11th Cir. 2011). The State correctly observes that Lee has failed to plead a plausible claim of disparate treatment in the implementation of Alabama's three-drug lethal injection protocol. The Complaint does not dispute that, pursuant to this protocol, all Alabama death row inmates facing execution in the future will be subject to the same sequence of drugs, the same procedures, and the same safeguards in the execution process. There is simply no factual basis pleaded in the Complaint to support a finding of disparate treatment.18 Accordingly, this claim is properly dismissed on the merits for want of any plausible allegation in the Complaint that the State will treat Lee disparately from other similarly situated persons, which is a cornerstone of an equal protection claim.19

4. Due Process Claim.

As his third and final claim, Lee's Complaint alleges that the State violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by "refus[ing] to disclose material information about its new lethal injection protocol, including the reasons for its decision to switch to midazolam and to retain the same consciousness assessment." (Doc. 1, ¶ 105.) Even if this claim were timely asserted, the State has persuasively demonstrated that this Third Cause of Action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Courts in this and other circuits have consistently held that inmates do not have a due process right to know the details of the execution protocol or the deliberative processes of the state in constructing such a protocol for purposes of formulating a constitutional challenge to that protocol. See, e.g., Wellons v. Commissioner, Ga. Dep't of Corrections, 754 F.3d 1260, 1267 (11th Cir. 2014) ("Neither the Fifth, Fourteenth, or First Amendments afford Wellons the broad right to know where, how, and by whom the lethal injection drugs will be manufactured, as well as the qualifications of the person or persons who will manufacture the drugs, and who will place the catheters.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).20 In light of these extensive on-point point authorities, the undersigned agrees with the State that Lee's due process claim is not cognizable as a matter of law, and that it is therefore properly dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

III. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (doc. 19) is granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P. The Complaint is dismissed with prejudice because it is time-barred on its face and because it otherwise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A separate judgment will enter.