KATHERINE P. NELSON, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Freddie L. Carlisle, Jr. brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Defendant Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner") denying his applications for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq., and for supplemental security income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq.
Carlisle filed the subject applications for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI with the Social Security Administration ("SSA") on February 22, 2016. After they were initially denied, Carlisle requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") with the SSA's Office of Disability Adjudication and Review. A hearing was held on May 10, 2018; on May 23, 2018, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on Richardson's applications, finding him not disabled under the Social Security Act and thus not entitled to benefits. (See Doc. 14, PageID.91-105).
The Commissioner's decision on Carlisle's applications became final when the Appeals Council for the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review denied his request for review of the ALJ's decision on December 10, 2018. (See Doc. 14, PageID.53-58). Carlisle subsequently brought this action under §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) for judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) ("The final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security after a hearing [for SSI benefits] shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 405(g) of this title to the same extent as the Commissioner's final determinations under section 405 of this title."); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow."); Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007) ("The settled law of this Circuit is that a court may review, under sentence four of section 405(g), a denial of review by the Appeals Council.").
"In Social Security appeals, [the Court] must determine whether the Commissioner's decision is `"supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion."'" Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997))). In reviewing the Commissioner's factual findings, the Court "`may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the [Commissioner].'" Id. (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983))). "`Even if the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner]'s factual findings, [the Court] must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.'" Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).
Put another way, "[u]nder the substantial evidence standard, we cannot look at the evidence presented to [an administrative agency] to determine if interpretations of the evidence other than that made by the [agency] are possible. Rather, we review the evidence that was presented to determine if the findings made by the [agency] were unreasonable. To that end, [judicial] inquiry is highly deferential and we consider only whether there is substantial evidence for the findings made by the [agency], not whether there is substantial evidence for some other finding that could have been, but was not, made. That is, even if the evidence could support multiple conclusions, we must affirm the agency's decision unless there is no reasonable basis for that decision." Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1029 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (citations and quotation omitted).
"Yet, within this narrowly circumscribed role, [courts] do not act as automatons. [The Court] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence[.]" Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239 (citations and quotation omitted). See also Owens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) ("We are neither to conduct a de novo proceeding, nor to rubber stamp the administrative decisions that come before us. Rather, our function is to ensure that the decision was based on a reasonable and consistently applied standard, and was carefully considered in light of all the relevant facts."). "In determining whether substantial evidence exists, [a court] must... tak[e] into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the [Commissioner's] decision." Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). See also McCruter v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 1544, 1548 (11th Cir. 1986) ("We are constrained to conclude that the administrative agency here... reached the result that it did by focusing upon one aspect of the evidence and ignoring other parts of the record. In such circumstances we cannot properly find that the administrative decision is supported by substantial evidence. It is not enough to discover a piece of evidence which supports that decision, but to disregard other contrary evidence. The review must take into account and evaluate the record as a whole.").
Moreover, the "substantial evidence" "standard of review applies only to findings of fact. No similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner]'s conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims." MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986) (quotation omitted). Accord, e.g., Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982) ("Our standard of review for appeals from the administrative denials of Social Security benefits dictates that `(t)he findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive....' 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) ... As is plain from the statutory language, this deferential standard of review is applicable only to findings of fact made by the Secretary, and it is well established that no similar presumption of validity attaches to the Secretary's conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims." (some quotation marks omitted)). This Court "conduct[s] `an exacting examination' of these factors." Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). "`The [Commissioner]'s failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates reversal.'" Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991)). Accord Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994).
In sum, courts "review the Commissioner's factual findings with deference and the Commissioner's legal conclusions with close scrutiny." Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). See also Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) ("In Social Security appeals, we review de novo the legal principles upon which the Commissioner's decision is based. Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). However, we review the resulting decision only to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004).").
Thornton v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 597 F. App'x 604, 609 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished).
Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237-39).
"These regulations place a very heavy burden on the claimant to demonstrate both a qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work." Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211 (citing Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1090, 1093 (11th Cir. 1985)). "In determining whether the claimant has satisfied this initial burden, the examiner must consider four factors: (1) objective medical facts or clinical findings; (2) the diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the claimant's age, education, and work history." Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (citing Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)). "These factors must be considered both singly and in combination. Presence or absence of a single factor is not, in itself, conclusive." Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 (citations omitted).
If, in Steps One through Four of the five-step evaluation, a claimant proves that he or she has a qualifying disability and cannot do his or her past relevant work, it then becomes the Commissioner's burden, at Step Five, to prove that the claimant is capable—given his or her age, education, and work history—of engaging in another kind of substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999); Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 1985). Finally, although the "claimant bears the burden of demonstrating the inability to return to [his or] her past relevant work, the Commissioner of Social Security has an obligation to develop a full and fair record." Shnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987). See also Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) ("It is well-established that the ALJ has a basic duty to develop a full and fair record. Nevertheless, the claimant bears the burden of proving that he is disabled, and, consequently, he is responsible for producing evidence in support of his claim." (citations omitted)). "This is an onerous task, as the ALJ must scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all relevant facts. In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ must consider the evidence as a whole." Henry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citation and quotation omitted).
When the ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review of that decision, the Court "review[s] the ALJ's decision as the Commissioner's final decision." Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278. But "when a claimant properly presents new evidence to the Appeals Council, a reviewing court must consider whether that new evidence renders the denial of benefits erroneous." Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1262. Nevertheless, "when the [Appeals Council] has denied review, [the Court] will look only to the evidence actually presented to the ALJ in determining whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence." Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 1998).
At Step One, the ALJ determined that Carlisle met the applicable insured status requirements through December 31, 2018, and that he had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged disability onset date of September 28, 2015.
At Step Four,
At Step Five, after considering additional testimony from the vocational expert, the ALJ found that there exist a significant number of other jobs in the national economy that Carlisle could perform given his RFC, age, education, and work experience. (Doc. 14, PageID.104-105). Thus, the ALJ found that Carlisle was not under a disability as defined by Social Security Act during the relevant adjudicatory period. (Doc. 14, PageID.105).
Carlisle first argues that the ALJ's credibility finding on his subjective testimony as to the limiting effects of his impairments is not supported by substantial evidence. The undersigned is not persuaded.
A claimant may "attempt[] to establish disability through his or her own testimony of pain or other subjective symptoms." Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). "If a claimant testifies as to his subjective complaints of disabling pain and other symptoms, ... the ALJ must clearly articulate explicit and adequate reasons for discrediting the claimant's allegations of completely disabling symptoms. Although this circuit does not require an explicit finding as to credibility, the implication must be obvious to the reviewing court. The credibility determination does not need to cite particular phrases or formulations but it cannot merely be a broad rejection which is not enough to enable the district court ... to conclude that the ALJ considered her medical condition as a whole." Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citations and quotations omitted).
Strickland v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 516 F. App'x 829, 831-32 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished). "[C]redibility determinations are the province of the ALJ, and [a court] will not disturb a clearly articulated credibility finding supported by substantial evidence..." Mitchell v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
Here, the ALJ's decision included a thorough discussion of Carlisle's subjective complaints. (See Doc. 14, PageID.99-100). The ALJ found that, while Carlisle's "medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms[,]" his "statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record..." (Id., PageID.103). The ALJ first cited inconsistencies in Carlisle's own reports of the limiting effects of his symptoms, noting that he "testified to significantly more limited activities of daily living" at the May 10, 2018 ALJ hearing "than represented in [a] Function Report" dated March 7, 2016, submitted on Carlisle's behalf. (Id., PageID.99).
Carlisle suggests that the ALJ should not have relied on the Function Report because it was completed by someone else. However, he cites no authority indicating that an ALJ cannot rely on information provided in a Social Security form simply because someone else completed it on the claimant's behalf. Absent some indication in the record, an ALJ can reasonably assume that a Social Security form, whether completed by the claimant or someone else, is intended to convey truthful information about the claimant. Carlisle also claims that the ALJ's consideration of Carlisle's ability to do household chores "is inconsistent with the law of this Circuit."
For instance, the ALJ noted that, despite Carlisle claiming that "he could not work because of ... foot pain[,]" treating orthopedist Dr. Hurowitz opined that Carlisle could perform at least sedentary work. (See Doc. 14, PageID.100).
While Carlisle asserts the ALJ ignored evidence favorable to him, "`there is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision, so long as the ALJ's decision ... is not a broad rejection which is not enough to enable [a reviewing court] to conclude that the ALJ considered [the claimant's] medical condition as a whole.'" Mitchell, 771 F.3d at 782 (quoting Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211 (quotation and brackets omitted)). Here, the ALJ's decision adequately indicates that she considered Carlisle's medical condition as a whole in evaluating his subjective complaints. To a large extent, Carlisle questions the ALJ's credibility determination based solely on the fact that he has various impairments. "However, the mere existence of these impairments does not reveal the extent to which they limit h[is] ability to work or undermine the ALJ's determination in that regard." Moore, 405 F.3d at 1213 n.6. And the records Carlisle cites as "confirm[ing] he would be even more limited ... than what was provided by Dr. Hurowitz" (Doc. 18, PageID.979 (citing Doc. 14, PageID.675, 724, 833, 837, 944) largely document normal and mild findings, such as an "unremarkable MRI of the thoracic spine" (Doc. 14, PageID.724) and "mild" to "minimal" to "no abnormality" in the vertebrae. (Id., PageID.944).
"Even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's factual findings, the Court must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence." Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quotation omitted). In reviewing an ALJ's credibility determination, "[t]he question is not ... whether ALJ could have reasonably credited his testimony, but whether the ALJ was clearly wrong to discredit it." Werner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 421 F. App'x 935, 939 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished). The undersigned is satisfied that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's credibility determination; Carlisle's arguments to the contrary are unconvincing.
"`Medical opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [the claimant's] impairment(s), including [the claimant's] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [the claimant] can still do despite impairment(s), and [the claimant's] physical or mental restrictions.'" Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178-79 (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2)). "There are three tiers of medical opinion sources: (1) treating physicians; (2) nontreating, examining physicians; and (3) nontreating, nonexamining physicians." Himes v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 585 F. App'x 758, 762 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1)-(2), 416.927(c)(1)-(2)). "In assessing medical opinions, the ALJ must consider a number of factors in determining how much weight to give to each medical opinion, including (1) whether the physician has examined the claimant; (2) the length, nature, and extent of a treating physician's relationship with the claimant; (3) the medical evidence and explanation supporting the physician's opinion; (4) how consistent the physician's opinion is with the record as a whole; and (5) the physician's specialization. These factors apply to both examining and non-examining physicians." Eyre v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 586 F. App'x 521, 523 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c) & (e), 416.927(c) & (e)). "These factors must be considered both singly and in combination. Presence or absence of a single factor is not, in itself, conclusive." Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 (citation omitted). While "the ALJ is not required to explicitly address each of those factors[,]" Lawton v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 431 F. App'x 830, 833 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished), "the ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to different medical opinions and the reasons therefor." Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179.
"A `treating source' (i.e., a treating physician) is a claimant's `own physician, psychologist, or other acceptable medical source who provides[ ], or has provided[ ], [the claimant] with medical treatment or evaluation and who has, or has had, an ongoing treatment relationship with [the claimant].'" Nyberg v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 179 F. App'x. 589, 591 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (unpublished) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502). "The opinion of a treating physician... `must be given substantial or considerable weight unless "good cause" is shown to the contrary.'" Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240 (quoting Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440)). "Good cause exists `when the: (1) treating physician's opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician's opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor's own medical records.' With good cause, an ALJ may disregard a treating physician's opinion, but he `must clearly articulate [the] reasons' for doing so." Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240-41) (internal citation omitted). Failure to clearly articulate the reasons for giving less weight to the opinion of a treating physician "constitutes reversible error." Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440. "But if an ALJ articulates specific reasons for declining to give the opinion of a treating physician controlling weight, and those reasons are supported by substantial evidence, there is no reversible error." Horowitz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 688 F. App'x 855, 861 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing Moore, 405 F.3d at 1212). Accord Huigens v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 718 F. App'x 841, 844 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (unpublished).
Carlisle next claims that the ALJ reversibly erred in rejecting the medical opinions of treating physician Dr. Timberlake. The ALJ summarized Dr. Timberlake's opinions as follows:
(Doc. 14, PageID.102-103). The ALJ found that "Dr. Timberlake's extreme opinions are entitled to little to no weight" because "[h]is opinions are not consistent with or supported by the record as a whole, including his own treatment notes, which are discussed [previously in the decision]." (Doc. 14, PageID.103).
(Doc. 14, PageID.101). The ALJ, therefore, adequately explained that Dr. Timberlake's opinions were not supported by his own treatment notes and were not bolstered by the other evidence of record. Again, Carlisle largely attempts to contradict the ALJ by simply pointing to diagnoses in the record, and some evidence that could be seen as more favorable to Dr. Timberlake's opinions. He also suggests that it was inconsistent to reject Dr. Timberlake's opinions while giving "some weight" to those of treating orthopedist Dr. Hurowitz, but this is again based on Carlisle's unfounded belief that Dr. Hurowitz's opinions applied only to Carlisle's right foot, a contention the undersigned has previously rejected, see n.14, supra. The ALJ adequately articulated "good cause" to reject Dr. Timberlake's opinions, and substantial evidence supports that good cause.
Carlisle next argues that the ALJ's decision is otherwise not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ did not adequately account for other conditions noted in the record and otherwise failed to consider the record as a whole. Carlisle's arguments on this point are underdeveloped and unconvincing. The ALJ's decision adequately indicates consideration of the record as a whole and links her conclusions to substantial evidence in the record, and this Court "may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the Commissioner." Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178. The undersigned is not persuaded that Carlisle's arguments amount to anything more that requesting the Court to do exactly that.
"With a few exceptions, the claimant is allowed to present new evidence at each stage of this administrative process, including before the Appeals Council. The Appeals Council has the discretion not to review the ALJ's denial of benefits. But the Appeals Council must consider new, material, and chronologically relevant evidence that the claimant submits." Washington v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Com'r, 806 F.3d 1317, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citations and quotations omitted). "When the Appeals Council refuses to consider new evidence submitted to it and denies review, that decision is subject to judicial review ... [W]hether evidence meets the new, material, and chronologically relevant standard is a question of law subject to our de novo review." Id. at 1320-21 (quotations omitted). Moreover, effective January 17, 2017, the Social Security regulations also state that the Appeals Council will only consider new evidence if the claimant shows "good cause" for not submitting the evidence to the ALJ. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b).
Carlisle claims the Appeals Council reversibly erred in refusing to consider (1) a Medical Source Statement and Clinical Assessment of Pain, both dated August 13, 2018, and completed by Dr. Richard Jones (Doc. 14, PageID.80-84), and (2) a functional capacity evaluation dated August 7, 2018, and completed by John Ramsey, PT. (Id., PageID.86-88). The Appeals Council found that Dr. Jones's opinions were not material because they "did not show a reasonable probability that [they] would change the outcome of the [ALJ's] decision." (Id., PageID.54). See Washington, 806 F.3d at 1321 (new evidence is material when "there is a reasonable possibility that [it] would change the administrative result" (quotation omitted)). No reversible error has been shown. Carlisle does not argue that Dr. Jones should have been considered a treating physician,
As for the functional capacity evaluation, the Appeals Council found it was not chronologically relevant because it did "not relate to the period at issue" and therefore did "not affect the decision about whether [Carlisle] w[as] disabled beginning on or before May 23, 2018[,]" the date of the ALJ's decision. (Doc. 14, PageID.54). The Appeal Council did not err in this determination. New evidence is "chronologically relevant" if it "relates to the period on or before the date of the hearing decision..." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970(a)(5), 416.1570(a)(5). Even "medical opinions based on treatment occurring after the date of the ALJ's decision may be chronologically relevant." Washington, 806 F.3d at 1322.
Hargress v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 883 F.3d 1302, 1309 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam). See also Hunter v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 705 F. App'x 936, 940 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (unpublished) ("Here, we conclude that the opinions contained in Dr. Wilson's materials are chronologically relevant even though Dr. Wilson examined Hunter four months after the ALJ's decision. As in Washington, Dr. Wilson reviewed Hunter's medical records from the period before the ALJ's decision in preparing the evaluation. He also considered Hunter's statements about that same period, including her history of panic attacks. And the evaluation here was conducted closer in time to the ALJ's decision than the evaluation in Washington."). On the other hand, in Hargress, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Appeals Council properly found a medical opinion was not chronologically relevant because (1) "nothing in the form or any other documents indicated that [the physician] evaluated [the claimant]'s past medical records when forming that opinion[,]" and (2) the physician did not begin treating the claimant until after the date of the ALJ's unfavorable decision. Id. at 1310. See also Lindsey v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 741 F. App'x 705, 712 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (unpublished) ("Dr. Rodolfo Reni's opinion in the `supplemental mental impairment questionnaire' is not chronologically relevant, as nothing in the record indicates that: (1) Dr. Reni relied on Lindsey's prior medical records; or (2) Dr. Reni treated Lindsey during the relevant period." (citing Hargress, 883 F.3d at 1309-10)).
Here, nothing in the record indicates that Innercare Physical Therapy treated Carlisle until after the ALJ's decision, and the functional capacity evaluation, dated almost three months after the ALJ's decision, did not indicate that the examiner had considered medical records predating the ALJ's decision in completing the evaluation. Accordingly, the Appeals Council properly found that it was not chronologically relevant.
Carlisle has failed to show reversible error by either the ALJ or the Appeals Council. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Commissioner's final decision denying Carlisle's applications is due to be
In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is
Final judgment shall issue separately in accordance with this order and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.
Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238-39 (footnote omitted).
