BERNARDO P. VELASCO, Magistrate Judge.
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Gregory Allen Stanhope's pro se Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody. (Doc. 1). In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(c)(1), all parties consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct any and all further proceedings in this case, including trial and entry of a final judgment, with direct review by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals if an appeal is filed. (Doc. 19). For the following reasons, the Court denies and dismisses Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Petitioner was indicted in Arizona Superior Court, Pima County, cause number CR08635, on July 6, 1982, and charged with two counts of armed robbery, two counts of kidnapping, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of burglary. (Reply (Doc. 31), Exh. 1) The following factual and procedural background is taken from the Arizona Court of Appeal's opinion on Petitioner's direct appeal:
State v. Stanhope, 139 Ariz. 88, 90, 676 P.2d 1146, 1148 (App. 1984). The appellate court affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentences. Id. Petitioner filed four petitions for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure in the state court, and unsuccessfully petitioned this Court for a writ of habeas corpus in March 1998. (See Answer (Doc. 20) at 3). The Ninth Circuit affirmed this Court's denial of habeas relief in August 2002. Stanhope v. Stewart, 2002 WL 1996510 (9th Cir. 2002).
Petitioner initiated a fifth petition for post-conviction relief in state court on June 26, 2000, that was denied in 2001. (Answer, Exhs. A, B). In 2005, Petitioner filed a special action in the trial court alleging due process violations from prison disciplinary proceedings that ended in 2006. (Answer, Exh. C). On June 1, 2005, Petitioner initiated a sixth post-conviction proceeding in the trial court that was denied in 2007. (Answer, Exhs. D, E.) Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court in January 2007. (See Answer at 4)). This Court found that Petitioner's due process rights had been violated at one prison disciplinary proceeding and ordered that the State remedy the violation by either restoring 60 days of earned release credits ("ERC") or providing Petitioner a new hearing. (See id.). On November 12, 2012, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, and the State subsequently filed a notice of satisfaction of judgment providing evidence that 60 days of ERC had been restored to Petitioner. (Id.).
While Petitioner's appeal of this Court's decision on his second petition for writ of habeas corpus was pending, Petitioner filed a "Motion for Goodtime Jail Credits Pursuant to ARS § 41-1604.07(A)" in state trial court in February 2011. (Reply, Exh. 2). The court appointed counsel, set a briefing schedule, and a hearing date. (Id.). Two additional motions, unidentified in this record, were subsequently filed by Petitioner and forwarded to his appointed counsel, whom the court referred to as his counsel appointed to represent him in his "Rule 32 proceedings." (Reply, Exh. 3). On July 12, 2011, Petitioner filed an amended motion asserting that in addition to the ERC to which he was entitled, he was improperly denied a commutation hearing. (Reply, Exh. 4). The procedural path of this proceeding is discussed in more detail below. Ultimately, the trial court denied Petitioner's request for relief on the merits on October 17, 2012. (Answer, Exh. P). The court further denied Petitioner's motion for rehearing. (Answer, Exhs. Q-R).
Petitioner filed a petition for review from the trial court's ruling in the court of appeals and the appellate court granted review but denied relief. (Answer, Exhs. S, V). Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the appellate court's decision was denied. (Answer, Exhs. W-X). The Arizona Supreme Court subsequently denied Petitioner's petition for further review and a request for an evidentiary hearing on December 20, 2013. (Answer, Exhs. Y-Z).
Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus, which is his third such proceeding in this Court, on January 8, 2014. Petitioner presents seven grounds for relief:
Respondents contend that: Petitioner's Ground One should be dismissed as a successive claim; Grounds Two through Six should be dismissed because they are not cognizable on habeas corpus review; and Ground Seven is procedurally defaulted. Respondents argue, in the alternative, that Grounds One and Two are also procedurally defaulted.
Because Petitioner's federal habeas petition was filed after April 24, 1996, this case is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("§ 2254). Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); see also Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 210 (2003).
Under the AEDPA, a writ of habeas corpus cannot be granted unless it appears that the petitioner has exhausted all available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). To exhaust state court remedies, the petitioner must "fairly present" his claims to the state's highest court in a procedurally appropriate manner. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999). "In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, `claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them.'" Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 n. 3 (9th Cir.2005) (quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).
A claim is fairly presented if the petitioner has described the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971). A petitioner must clearly alert the state court that he is alleging a specific federal constitutional violation. See Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 913 (9th Cir. 2004). He must make the federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing specific provisions of federal law or federal case law, even if the federal basis of a claim is "self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1999), or by citing state cases that explicitly analyze the same federal constitutional claim, Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
In Arizona, there are two procedurally appropriate avenues for petitioners to exhaust federal constitutional claims: direct appeal and post-conviction relief ("PCR") proceedings. Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure governs PCR proceedings and provides that a petitioner is precluded from relief on any claim that could have been raised on appeal or in a prior PCR petition. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). The preclusive effect of Rule 32.2(a) may be avoided only if a claim falls within certain exceptions and the petitioner can justify his omission of the claim from a prior petition or his failure to present the claim in a timely manner. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(b), 32.4(a).
A habeas petitioner's claims may be precluded from federal review in two ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised in state court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30. Second, a claim may be procedurally defaulted if the petitioner failed to present it in state court and "the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred." Id. at 735 n.1; see also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining that the district court must consider whether the claim could be pursued by any presently available state remedy). Therefore, in the present case, if there are claims that were not raised previously in state court, the Court must determine whether Petitioner has state remedies currently available to him pursuant to Rule 32. See Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 931. If no remedies are currently available, Petitioner's claims are "technically" exhausted but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1.
If there are claims that were fairly presented in state court but found defaulted on state procedural grounds, such claims will be found procedurally defaulted in federal court so long as the state procedural bar was independent of federal law and adequate to warrant preclusion of federal review. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989). It is well established that Arizona's preclusion rule is independent of federal law, see Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002), and the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly determined that Arizona regularly and consistently applies its procedural default rules such that they are an adequate bar to federal review of a claim. See Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 780 (9
Nonetheless, because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not jurisdiction, federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). As a general matter, however, the Court will not review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless the petitioner demonstrates legitimate cause for his failure to exhaust the claim in state court and prejudice from the alleged constitutional violation, or shows that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if the claim were not heard on the merits in federal court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.
Generally, "cause" for a procedural default exists if the petitioner can demonstrate that "some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule." Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); accord Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753. "Prejudice" is actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional error or violation. Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998). To establish prejudice resulting from a procedural default, the petitioner bears the burden of showing not merely that the errors at his trial were possibly prejudicial, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with errors of constitutional dimension. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982).
A habeas petitioner "may also qualify for relief from his procedural default if he can show that the procedural default would result in a `fundamental miscarriage of justice.'" Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1028 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321(1995)). See also Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770, 776-777 (9th Cir. 2002) (analyzing this exception in a non-capital case). This exception to the procedural default rule is limited to habeas petitioners who can establish that "a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent[.]" Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327; see also, Murray, 477 U.S. at 496; Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028. "`To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eye-witness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.'" Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324).
Respondents asserted in their Answer that Petitioner's first ground for relief was an unauthorized "second or successive" claim that must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the claim was available to Petitioner at the time he filed his second habeas petition. (Answer at 6-7). The Court agreed with Respondents and stayed this matter to allow Petitioner the opportunity to evaluate whether he wished to file an amended petition advancing Grounds Two through Seven only. (March 9, 2015 Order (Doc. 32)). While the stay was pending, Petitioner sought authorization from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to file a second or successive petition. (See Petitioner's "Motion for Authorization for a `Second or Successive' Habeas Corpus Petition" filed in Stanhope v. Ryan, docketed sub nom. Stanhope v. O'Neil, (9th Cir. April 6, 2015) (No. 15-71055), ("Petitioner's Ninth Circuit Application"); Petitioner's Filing of Court Order From the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Doc. 39)); see also 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(3) (a prisoner can file a second or successive habeas petition only after obtaining an authorization order from a three-judge panel in the appropriate court of appeals). The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner's request as "unnecessary" to the extent that he sought "authorization to allege a claim that in 2011 the Arizona Department of Corrections (`ADOC') erred in the manner in which it recalculated his sentence to include 21 days of presentence credit previously denied[.] See United States v. Buenrostro, 638 F.3d 720, 725 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curium) (prisoner may file second-in-time petition raising claim that became ripe for adjudication after conclusion of first habeas proceeding)." Stanhope v. O'Neil, No. 15-71055 (9th Cir. June 25, 2015 Order at 1) ("Ninth Circuit's Order").
Ground One includes Petitioner's contention that due to a 2002 change in Arizona law, he became eligible to receive 21 days of ERC
Thereafter, Petitioner, acting pro se, initiated a seventh post-conviction proceeding in the state trial court on January 6, 2012. (Answer, Exh. F). The trial court ordered that Petitioner's previous counsel, Ms. Danies, transfer her records to Petitioner. (Id., Exh. G). Ms. Danies filed a notice of transmittal of file. (Id., Exh. H; see also id., Exh. I (Response to Petitioner's Notice of Receipt of Documentation from Attorney Emily Danies)). She also filed a response to a notice she had received from Petitioner. (Id., Exh. I).
On April 11, 2012, Petitioner filed a pro se Rule 32 Petition ("Seventh PCR Petition") asserting that the ADOC failed to properly credit him with the 21 days at issue and also improperly failed to provide him with a commutation hearing. (Answer, Exh. J). Petitioner asserted that ADOC should have credited the sentence he was serving in 2002, when the amendment came into effect which made him eligible to receive such credit. (Id.). According to Petitioner, none of his sentences were credited. (Id.). Petitioner requested that the court award the 21 days of credit to the sentences for counts 5, 6, and 7, which he was serving at the time he filed his Seventh PCR Petition. (Id.). Petitioner simultaneously filed a "Motion to Have Witnesses Called to Testify a[t] the Rule 32 Evidentiary Hearing, Production of Documents Request." (Answer, Exh. K).
The trial court denied Petitioner's Motion to Have Witnesses Called to Testify at the Rule 32 Evidentiary Hearing and for documents as premature. (Answer, Exh. N). On October 17, 2012, the trial court denied Petitioner's Seventh PCR Petition. (Answer, Exh. P). With regard to Petitioner's claim concerning the ERC, the trial court denied the claim based upon the Notice of Relief filed by Ms. Danies, Petitioner's previously appointed counsel, and a letter from the Attorney General's office to Ms. Danies stating that ADOC "has in fact recalculated Petitioner's sentence to include 21 days of presentence credit previously denied." (Answer, Exh. P).
Petitioner filed a motion for a rehearing, which the trial court denied. (Answer, Exhs. Q, R). Petitioner next filed a petition for appellate court review. (Answer, Exh. S).
In opposing Petitioner's petition for review of the denial of his Seventh PCR Petition, the state argued that the credit had been included in the earned release credit calculation concerning Petitioner's sentence on counts 1 and 2 which, according to the state, resulted in an ERC date of April 6, 1998. (Answer, Exh. T at 4). The state also pointed out that before Petitioner reached that ERC date, he was granted parole to his consecutive sentences on counts 3 and 4, effective January 17, 1997. (Id.). The state argued that Petitioner, therefore, was awarded the credits and, in any event, the issue was moot because Petitioner "was paroled to his consecutive sentence before he even reached his ERC date." (Id. at 7). Petitioner countered that the state had not carried its burden of showing that the 21 days had in fact been included in the earned release credit calculation, especially because the calculation pertained to a sentence that ended long before the 2002 change in the law permitting the additional 21 days of ERC. (See Answer, Exh U). Petitioner also objected to the state opening an expired sentence to apply the ERC at issue. (Id.). The appellate court granted review but denied relief because Petitioner's claims were not cognizable under Rule 32. (Answer, Exh. V).
Although the Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner authorization to allege that ADOC failed to award earned release credits in accordance with a 2002 change in the law, the court also stated that Petitioner did not require authorization "to allege a claim that in 2011 the....[ADOC] erred in the manner in which it recalculated his sentence to include 21 days of presentence credit previously denied[.]" (Ninth Circuit Order at 1). Thus, to any extent that Petitioner alleges in Ground One that ADOC did not award him ERC in accordance with the 2002 change in Arizona law, such a claim is successive. However, based upon the Ninth Circuit's Order, Petitioner may proceed to the extent that he alleges in Ground One that the 21 days of ERC awarded pursuant to the 2002 change were not properly applied to his sentence. According to Petitioner, the ERC should have been applied to the sentences on counts 3 and 4 that he was serving when the law came into effect in 2002, not to his sentences on counts 1 and 2 that had expired before the law changed. (Petition at 6). Petitioner asserts that because the ERC was not applied to the sentences on counts 3 and 4, the credit should be applied to the sentences he is currently serving on counts 5, 6, and 7. (Id.).
Respondents assert that Ground One is procedurally defaulted because the state appellate court found Petitioner's claims were not cognizable under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32. According to Respondents, that ruling constitutes a procedural bar to Petitioner raising the same claim on federal habeas review and results in procedural default. (Answer at 13-14 ).
Generally, "[f]ederal courts `will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment." Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 580 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729). "To be deemed adequate, the state law ground for decision must be well-established and consistently applied." Id. 593 (citing Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 577 (9th Cir.1999) ("A state procedural rule constitutes an adequate bar to federal court review if it was []firmly established and regularly followed[] at the time it was applied by the state court."). Arizona case law appears to consistently hold that the appropriate vehicle to raise claims concerning good time credits similar to those advanced by Petitioner is a special action. See State v. Davis, 148 Ariz. 62, 64, 712 P.2d 975, 977 (App 1985) (claim concerning computation of good time credits was not cognizable under Rule 32 and was construed as a special action); see also Tittle v. State, 169 Ariz. 8, 815 P.2d 267 (App. 1991) (addressing claim regarding eligibility for good time credits as a special action); cf. State v. Goldin, 239 Ariz. 12, 17, 365 P.3d 364, 369 (App. 2015) ("a miscalculation by DOC, without more, would not be grounds for relief under Rule 32") (citing Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) & cmt.; Davis, 148 Ariz. at 64, 712 P.2d at 977). Yet, for a claim to be procedurally defaulted so as to preclude federal habeas review, the petitioner must not be able to return to state court to properly exhaust the claim. Respondents have not shown that Petitioner is unable to return to state court to file a special action. In such circumstances, Petitioner's claim remains unexhausted, but is not procedurally defaulted. Consequently, in this case, Petitioner's failure to exhaust state remedies does not render the claim unreviewable because this Court may deny a petition for writ of habeas corpus on the merits, notwithstanding the petitioner's failure to exhaust. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(b)(2); Cassett, 406 F.3d at 623-24 (a federal court may deny an unexhausted petition on the merits when the petition does not raise a colorable federal claim).
Regardless of whether the claim is exhausted, it is without merit. When the law was changed in 2002 so as to make Petitioner eligible for the 21 days of ERC, he was serving concurrent sentences on counts 3 and 4. Even if it was improper for ADOC to apply the 21 days of ERC to a sentence that had expired before the law came into effect (as ADOC claimed it did before the state appellate court), the record reflects that Petitioner was ultimately granted parole on his sentences on counts 3 and 4 on December 19, 2011. (See Answer, Exh. Q, internal exh. 2 at 2 (Doc. 22-1 at ¶¶10, 12)). Had Petitioner not been granted parole on sentences 3 and 4, the sentences were calculated to expire on January 16, 2018, and the projected earned release credit date was calculated to fall on October 16, 2012
Petitioner's Grounds Two and Five raise issues relating to ADOC's denial of Petitioner's January 2011 request for a commutation hearing. In Ground Two, Petitioner argues that the ADOC improperly denied him a timely computation hearing in violation of his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Ground Five, Petitioner argues that he was eligible for a commutation hearing and that then Arizona Attorney General Tom Horne and Assistant Arizona Attorney General Paul Carter "conspire[d] with the AD[O]C to cover up and hide the fact that the AD[O]C violated Stanhope's sentence and due process rights by not complying with the terms of his sentence. . . ." (Petition at 10). Petitioner requests that the Court direct ADOC to award him "336 days time served on his current sentence pursuant to their refusal to allow him a commutation hearing per the proper commute application submitted on 11-18-2011 that they improperly ruled him ineligible for and was then paroled on 12-19-11." (Id. at 14).
Respondents contend that both grounds for relief are not "cognizable on habeas review because a prisoner has `no constitutional or inherent right to commutation of his sentence.'" (Answer at 8 (quoting Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981)). Respondents also point out that "Arizona's clemency statutes do not provide a state prisoner with a protected liberty interest in having his sentence commuted." (Id. (citing Woratzeck v. Stewart, 118 F.3d 648, 653 (9th Cir. (1997) ("There is no constitutional right to a clemency hearing.")).
It is well-settled that "when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see also Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 525 (2011) ("Habeas [corpus] is the exclusive remedy. . . for the prisoner who seeks `immediate or speedier release' from confinement.") (quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005)); Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert denied, __ U.S. __, 137 S.Ct. 645 (2017). However, a habeas corpus action is not the proper method to address issues that will not necessarily impact the fact or duration of an inmate's confinement. See Nettles, 830 F.3d 934-35.
In Nettles the petitioner challenged a disciplinary proceeding that resulted in delay of his parole hearing and constituted grounds for future denial of parole. Id. at 927. The court held that because the challenged disciplinary proceeding would not necessarily impact the fact or duration of his conferment, Nettles's claims did not fall within "the core of habeas corpus" and, therefore, were not appropriately brought as a habeas corpus action. Id. at 927-31. In so holding, the Nettles court recognized that:
Id. at 935.
Arizona law is clear that regardless of any recommendation by the Arizona Board of Executive Clemency, ("the Board") "`[t]he governor retains ultimate authority to grant or deny a recommended commutation.'" State v. Vera, 235 Ariz. 571, 576, 334 P.3d 754, 759 (App. 2014) (quoting McDonald v. Thomas, 202 Ariz. 35, 40 P.3d 819, 824 (2002) and citing Wigglesworth v. Mauldin, 195 Ariz. 432, 990 P.2d 26, 33 (App.1999) (under present law, "an Arizona governor's discretion to act on the Board's recommendations remains unfettered, subjective, arbitrary, and a matter of grace.")); see also Banks v. Arizona State Board of Pardons and Paroles, 129 Ariz. 199, 201, 629 P.2d 1035, 1037 (App. 1981) ("[T]he Arizona courts have held that commutation is a matter of grace, not of right."). Consequently, even if Petitioner were to succeed on his claim that he was improperly denied a commutation hearing, it does not necessarily follow that such a determination would result in his immediate release from custody or the shortening of his sentence. As in Nettles, the absence of a commutation hearing in this case does not compel the grant of clemency. Accordingly, Petitioner's claims arising from the allegation that he was improperly denied a commutation hearing do "not fall within the core of habeas corpus" and are not properly brought pursuant to §2254. See Nettles, 830 F.3d at 935 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Petitioner argues the state court "abused its discretion. . ." by not holding an evidentiary hearing on his Seventh PCR Petition, which he contends violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Petition at 8). Respondents seek dismissal of Ground Three because it is not cognizable on habeas corpus review. (Answer at 8).
Respondents are correct. The Ninth Circuit "has specifically stated that federal habeas relief is not available to redress alleged procedural errors in state post-conviction proceedings." Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 939 (citations omitted). See also Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1045 (9th Cir. 1997) (errors allegedly occurring during state post-conviction proceedings are not cognizable in a federal habeas action); Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26, 26 (9th Cir.1989) ("A [habeas corpus] petition alleging errors in the state post-conviction review process is not addressable through habeas corpus proceedings."); Leon v. Ryan, 2014 289980, at *9-10 (D. Ariz. Jan 27, 2014) (claim that state court errored by not granting an evidentiary hearing during post-conviction review proceeding was not cognizable on habeas review). Ground Three is dismissed.
In denying relief on review of Petitioner's Seventh PCR Petition, the appellate court held that Petitioner's claims were not properly brought as a post-conviction review petition under Ariz.R.Cr.P. 32.1, because "[c]hallenges to the ADOC's computation of credit `are not cognizable under Rule 32 unless they result in the defendant remaining in custody when he should otherwise be free.'" (Answer, Exh. Y at 3 (quoting Davis, 148 Ariz. at 64, 712 P.2d at 977)). Petitioner argues in Ground Four that his Seventh PCR Petition, which contained his claims that ADOC improperly denied him ERC and a timely commutation hearing, was properly brought pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32. (Petition at 9). According to Petitioner, he has a "due process right and liberty interest in his ERC[] and how long he'll spend in prison. That due process rights extends to his receiving a timely [and] meaningful commutation hearing[,] too." (Id.).
"[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United Sates." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); see also Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010); Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 841 (9th Cir. 1995). Alleged errors in the application of state law are not cognizable in federal habeas corpus. Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010); Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 623 (9th Cir. 2002); Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 841 (9th Cir. 1995). Nor may a petitioner "transform a state-law issue into a federal one merely by asserting a violation of due process." Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Instead, on habeas review, the federal courts are to "accept a state court's interpretation of state law, . . . and alleged errors in the application of state law are not cognizable in federal habeas corpus." Id.; see also Franzen, 877 F.2d at 26 (assertions of error in the state post-conviction proceeding are not proper grounds for habeas relief).
Moreover, even if the Court were to consider Plaintiff's assertion of due process violation at face value, his allegations do not demonstrate a violation. Petitioner argued to the state court that he was entitled to relief under Rule 32.1(d), which permits relief only if he were "being held in custody after the sentence imposed has expired." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d); see also Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) cmt ("Paragraph (d) is intended to include claims of more traditional types—e.g., miscalculation of sentence, questions of computation of good time—which result in the defendant's remaining in custody when he should be free."). Petitioner did not argue that he would be entitled to immediate release, nor did he request same. Instead, he requested an award of 21 days of earned release credit plus an additional 336 days of credit for the time between when he applied for a commutation hearing and when he began serving his next set of consecutive sentences. Further, although Petitioner argued to the state court that the denial of a commutation hearing violated his constitutional rights, Rule 32.1 does not apply to claims of an alleged constitutional violation occurring during a petitioner's incarceration. See Davis, 148 Ariz. at 64, 712 P.2d at 977. In sum, Petitioner advances no federal claim and, to any extent this claim is somehow within the province of federal habeas relief, examination of Rule 32.1 and the comments thereto supports the conclusion that his claims were not cognizable under that Rule. Petitioner's Ground Four is dismissed.
Petitioner's statement of claim in Ground Six reads: "Is the Arizona State Court of Appeals, Div. II's finding that Petitioner is not entitled to ERC relief pursuant to the State Rule 32 process in conflict with Div. I of the State Court of Appeals finding in State v[]. Davis, 148 Ariz. 62, 64-65 (1985)[,] where they granted relief pursuant to the State Rule 32 process? Would this Court clarify that conflict?" (Petition at 11). According to Petitioner, "with the constitutional guarantee to habeas corpus, the Davis case should be controlling." (Id.).
In Davis, like the instant case, the Arizona appellate court held that a prisoner's challenge regarding computation of good time credit was not cognizable under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 because even if the claim was meritorious, the prisoner would not be entitled to immediate release from imprisonment. Davis, 148 Ariz. at 64, 712 P.2d at 977. The court went on to consider the matter "as an appeal from a denial of special action relief in the trial court[]" and ultimately granted relief. Id. at 64-65, 712 P.2d at 977-78 (recognizing that "where relief may be granted by extraordinary writ (special action), this court may grant the appropriate relief even though the writ applied for or the motion is not aptly titled."). In Arizona, "[a]cceptance of special action jurisdiction is highly discretionary." Pompa v. Superior Court, 187 Ariz. 531, 533, 931 P.2d 431, 433 (App. 1997). Petitioner requests that this Court "clarify" what he perceives as a "conflict" between Davis and the appellate court's decision in his case. In Petitioner's case, the appellate court did not discuss in its decision whether special action jurisdiction was appropriate. The appellate court also subsequently denied Petitioner's motion for reconsideration requesting, among other things, that the court remand the matter to the trial court as a special action. (Answer, Exhs. W, X).
As with Ground Four, Petitioner's Ground Six involves questions of state law and, at best, allegations of error in the interpretation or application of state law. In Ground Six, Petitioner does not identify any specific federal constitutional violation. Petitioner's Ground Six, like Ground Four, is not cognizable on habeas review. As discussed above, federal habeas relief is not available for alleged error in the interpretation and application of state law. Wilson, 562 U.S. at 5; Estelle, 502 U.S. at 62; Souch, 289 F.3d at 623; Bonin, 59 F.3d at 841. Petitioner's Ground Six is dismissed.
Petitioner claims that the trial court abused its discretion and his court-appointed counsel, Ms. Danies, "committed ineffective assistance of counsel . . ." by improperly treating his claims as arising under Rule 32. (Petition at 12). Petitioner's claim concerning the trial court's abuse of discretion does not state a violation of federal constitutional law. Additionally, Respondents persuasively point out that Petitioner failed to exhaust his Ground 7 claims because he did not present them to the trial court. Although Petitioner indicates that he presented this claim in his Motion to Reconsider filed in the appellate court, (Petition at 12), PCR claims presented for the first time on discretionary appeal are not fairly presented. Casey, 386 F.3d at 918.
Further, Petitioner's claim is procedurally defaulted because he cannot return to state court to properly exhaust the claim. Petitioner would no longer have a remedy if he returned to the Arizona courts to present the claims he raises here. Rule 32.2(a)(3) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a defendant is precluded from post-conviction relief on any ground that was waived in any previous collateral proceeding. Further, the time has now passed to seek such review. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a); see also Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir 2002) (a state post-conviction action is futile when it is time-barred). Nor do the claims qualify for any of the timeliness exceptions. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h). Thus, any additional petition would be subject to summary dismissal. See State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 266, 987 P.2d 226, 228 (App. 1999); State v. Jones, 182 Ariz. 432, 897 P.2d 734 (App. 1995); Moreno v. Gonzalez, 192 Ariz. 131, 135, 962 P.2d 205, 209 (1998) (timeliness is a separate inquiry from preclusion). On the instant record, Petitioner's claims raised in his federal habeas Petition are procedurally defaulted.
Petitioner has not established cause or prejudice to overcome the procedural default in this case. Nor has he argued that a fundamental miscarriage of justice has occurred which would require this Court to address his claims on the merits. Accordingly, Petitioner's procedural default cannot be excused. Petitioner's Ground Seven as procedurally defaulted.
Moreover, the only federal constitutional claim set out in Ground Seven concerns Petitioner's allegation of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel who represented him during his Seventh PCR proceeding. Petitioner cannot raise ineffectiveness of PCR counsel as a freestanding constitutional claim. See Martinez v. Ryan, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 756-57 ("a criminal defendant has no right to counsel beyond his first appeal in pursuing state discretionary or collateral review[.]"). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i). Instead, a claim that PCR counsel was ineffective can support an equitable remedy to allow a federal habeas petitioner in particular circumstances to attempt to overcome procedural bars to a claim that trial counsel was ineffective. See Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1320 ("Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective."). Thus, even if Petitioner had exhausted his claim, he would still not be entitled to federal habeas relief.
Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any of the claims presented. As discussed above, Grounds Two and Five do not fall within the core of habeas corpus. Generally, a habeas petition may be construed as a complaint alleging civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where the pleading "is amenable to conversion on its face, meaning that it names the correct defendants and seeks the correct relief[.]" Nettles, 830 F.3d at 936 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (before a petition may be converted, the petitioner should also grant informed consent to convert the pleading). Here, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to convert the Petition to a civil rights complaint. First, "the Court cannot construe a habeas corpus petition as a § 1983 complaint if it contains claims that fall within the `core of habeas corpus,'. . . ." Lyles v. Los Angeles County Courts, 2016 WL 4472934 at *4 (quoting Nettles, 830 F.3 at 927); see also Nettles, 830 F.3d at 927 ("The [U.S. Supreme] Court has long held that habeas is the exclusive vehicle for claims brought by state prisoners that fall within the core of habeas, and such claims may not be brought in a § 1983 action.").
Second, it does not appear that Petitioner has named "the correct defendants" and seeks "the correct relief." See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-73, 377 (1976) (To state a valid claim under §1983, the plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant and show some affirmative link between the injury and that defendant's conduct.); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Liability under § 1983 must be based on the personal involvement of the defendant."). Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff names ADOC Director Charles Ryan, to establish liability under § 1983 for Director Ryan in his official capacity, the plaintiff must allege injuries resulting from a policy, practice, or custom of the agency over which that individual has final policy-making authority. See Cortez v. County of Los Angeles, 294 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). Further, there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, which means that a defendant's position as the supervisor of someone who allegedly violated a plaintiff's constitutional rights does not make him liable. Monell v. N.Y. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989) (citation omitted). A supervisor in his individual capacity "is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them." Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. To any extent that Petitioner would seek to sue Charles Ryan in his official capacity as Director of ADOC, Petitioner must allege facts showing that ADOC's policy or custom led to the alleged violation. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991).
Additionally, a "habeas corpus action and a prisoner civil rights suit differ in a variety of respects—such as the proper defendant, filing fees, the means of collecting them, and restrictions on future filings—that may make recharacterization impossible or, if possible, disadvantageous to the prisoner compared to a dismissal without prejudice of his petition for habeas corpus." Nettles, 830 F.3d at 935 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For instance, the congressionally mandated filing fee for a prisoner civil rights complaint is currently $350, whereas the fee for a habeas petition is $5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). While a civil rights action may proceed despite the prisoner's inability to prepay the entire $350 if he is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), he must still agree to pay the entire filing fee in installments, even if his complaint is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, Petitioner has neither paid the required fee to file a civil rights action nor filed an IFP request to proceed with a § 1983 action.
Consequently, the Court finds that it is appropriate to dismiss Grounds Two and Five of the Petition without prejudice so that Petitioner has the opportunity to decide whether he wishes to incur the required filing fee and raise his claims through a civil rights complaint.
In the event Petitioner appeals from this Court's judgment, and in the interests of conserving scarce resources that otherwise might be consumed drafting an application for a certificate of appealability to this Court, the Court on its own initiative has evaluated the claims within the Petition for suitability for the issuance of a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed.R.App.P. 22(b); Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 864-65 (9th Cir. 2002).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), a Certificate of Appealability ("COA") may issue only when a petitioner "has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." This showing can be established by demonstrating that "reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner" or that the issues were "adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). For procedural rulings, a COA will issue only if reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and whether the court's procedural ruling was correct. Id.
Upon review of the record in light of the standards for granting a certificate of appealability, the Court concludes that a certificate shall not issue as the resolution of the instant Petition is not debatable among reasonable jurists and does not deserve further proceedings.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner's Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Doc. 1) is:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED and shall not issue.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send to Petitioner:
(1) a copy of the Instructions for a Prisoner Filing a Civil Rights Complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona; and
(2) a copy of the Instructions for Prisoners Applying for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 in a Civil Action (Non-habeas) in Federal Court.
The Clerk of Court is FURTHER DIRECTED to enter judgment consistent with this Order and to close the file in this matter.
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A certificate of service should be in the following form:
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You must identify any other lawsuit you have filed in either state or federal court while you were a prisoner. Print all of the requested information about each lawsuit in the spaces provided. If you have filed more than three lawsuits, you must provide the necessary information about each additional lawsuit on a separate page. Label the page(s) as "2-A," "2-B," etc., at the bottom of the page and insert the additional page(s) immediately behind page 2.
You must identify what rights each defendant violated. The form provides space to allege three separate counts (
Print the relief you are seeking in the space provided.
You must sign your name and print the date you signed the complaint. Failure to sign the complaint will delay the processing of your action. Unless you are an attorney, you may not bring an action on behalf of anyone but yourself.
You should follow these instructions carefully. Failure to do so may result in your complaint being stricken or dismissed. All questions must be answered concisely in the proper space on the form. If you need more space, you may attach no more than fifteen additional pages. But the form must be completely filled in to the extent applicable. If you attach additional pages, be sure to identify which section of the complaint is being continued and number the pages.
