Appellant Sweet was convicted in a jury trial of failing to report for induction, in violation of 50 U.S.C. App. 462 (1970). In this appeal he contends that the conviction was barred 1) by his local board's failure to state reasons for rejecting a conscientious-objector claim, and 2) by the trial court's refusal to allow as a defense the issue of legality of the Vietnam war.1 We affirm.

The facts are uncontested. After registering for the draft on August 19, 1969, appellant received a classification questionnaire (SSS Form 100) from Local Board No. 167. He mailed the form back on September 16 and the board received it on September 18. In the form, appellant claimed conscientious-objector status by signing Series VIII.2 Elsewhere on the form he stated reasons for doing so.3 In response, the board then mailed to appellant a special form for conscientious-objector claims, SSS Form 150. Appellant received this form but never returned it, as was noted in his selective-service file. The board reviewed the file on April 24, 1970, and classified appellant 1-A. He received notice of the classification, plus a separate form advising him of his rights to a personal appearance before the board, to an appeal of the classification and to the assistance of a specified appeal agent. The 1-A notice did not, however, include an explicit rejection of the conscientious-objector claim. Appellant took no action after receiving the notice. Subsequently, he was ordered to report for a physical. He did so, passed, and a statement of acceptability was mailed to him on August 7, 1970. On January 6, 1971, the board ordered appellant to report for induction. He failed to do so and the instant prosecution followed.

Appellant first contends that by signing Series VIII on the initial classification questionnaire and including therewith his statement of reasons he established a prima facie claim for conscientious-objector status which the local board could not reject without at least providing a statement of reasons of its own. United States v. Edwards, 450 F.2d 49 (1st Cir. 1971). The trial court never decided this issue. Instead, assuming arguendo the establishment of a prima facie claim,4 the court held that appellant nevertheless was barred from challenging his indictment on that ground because, unlike the registrant in Edwards, he had failed to utilize any of the administrative appeal procedures available to him and thus provide the board an opportunity to correct the assumed error.

As a general rule, the validity of a 1-A classification may not be challenged in a section 462 prosecution if the defendant has previously failed to utilize normal, available administrative remedies. See McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479, 483, 91 S. Ct. 1565, 29 L. Ed. 2d 47 (1971). The rule is well founded in policy. As indicated by the trial court, it seeks to insure that selective service registrants will make use of the administrative remedies which are especially prepared to deal with complaints and contentions concerning the draft. See 372 F. Supp. at 74. The rule also helps prevent the scenario in which a registrant might detect a substantial procedural defect in his file, yet keep the knowledge to himself until the last possible moment, thereby hoping to escape both the induction process and any criminal prosecution. Of course, as a policy-oriented rule, the exhaustion requirement is not to be applied 'blindly in every case.' McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 201, 89 S. Ct. 1657, 23 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1969). But whether an exception will be recognized in any given case necessarily depends on the case's particular facts. McGee v. United States, supra, 402 U.S. at 485, 91 S. Ct. 1565. The inquiry is whether the policies underlying the exhaustion requirement will not be served because of the individual fact situation. Id.

Here, we have a selective-service registrant whose only assertion of a conscientious-objector claim appeared in the initial communication with his board. After that, until his trial for refusing induction, it was as though he had not asserted the claim at all. Through the series of subsequent contacts with the board, including his 1-A classification and physical, appellant raised no objection and made no mention of conscientious-objector status. Certainly, he had ample opportunity to do so. In particular, he was expressly offered an administrative appeal and personal appearance following the 1-A classification. But as appellant acknowledged at trial, he simply chose to do nothing. In these circumstances, we have no reason to relax the exhaustion requirement. Appellant's complaint was the king which could have been corrected through administrative appeal. His refusal to avail himself of the remedy was the only barrier. The cases cited by appellant as mandating an exception are all distinguishable on their facts. They involve situations where the registrants at least offered explanations for their respective failures to pursue administrative remedies. See United States v. Newmann, 478 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Rabe, 466 F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1972). The instant case is closer to McGee itself. See also United States v. Hayes, 493 F.2d 1279 (1st Cir. 1974).5

Appellant's second contention, that he should have been permitted to challenge the section 462 prosecution on the ground that the Vietnam war was illegal, was rejected by this court in United States v. Jacques, 463 F.2d 653, 656-657 (1st Cir. 1972). We stand by that decision.

Affirmed.