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United States v. Frazer, 93-1110 (1993)

Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Number: 93-1110 Visitors: 8
Filed: Sep. 07, 1993
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: September 7, 1993 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT ___________________ No. 93-1110 UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. JAMES E. FRAZER, Defendant, Appellant.), ______________ ______ cert. United States v. Monroe, 990 F.2d _____________ ______ 1370, 1376 (D.C.Cir.
USCA1 Opinion









September 7, 1993 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]


UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT


___________________


No. 93-1110




UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

JAMES E. FRAZER,

Defendant, Appellant.


__________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

[Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]
___________________

___________________

Before

Cyr, Boudin and Stahl,
Circuit Judges.
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___________________

Robert P. Woodward on brief for appellant.
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Peter E. Papps, United States Attorney, on brief for
________________
appellee.



__________________

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Per Curiam. Appellant, James Frazer, pled guilty to a
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fourteen count indictment charging conspiracy to commit and

the commission of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371

& 1344. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of thirty

months. In imposing this sentence, the court applied a two

level upward adjustment for obstruction of justice, pursuant

to U.S.S.G. 3C1.1. The court also denied Frazer's request

for a two level downward adjustment in his sentence, pursuant

to U.S.S.G. 3B1.2(b), on the ground that he had been a minor

participant. Frazer appeals both the upward adjustment and

the denial of the downward adjustment in his sentence.



The facts in this case are not in dispute. According to

the Pre-Sentence Report, Frazer was a participant with ten to

fifteen other individuals in a scheme to defraud banks. The

scheme involved the illegal acquisition of business checks

and check writing machines, the acquisition of information on

actual account holders, and the manufacturing of false

identification. A stolen check was made payable to the

actual account holder who was identified on the check as an

employee of the business from which the check had been

obtained. A conspirator then would go to each branch of the

actual account holder's bank and, using false identification,

either cash the check or split deposit it, i.e., the

conspirator would deposit part and receive part in cash. The



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scheme defrauded banks throughout New England of tens of

thousands of dollars. Frazer was one of the "runners" or

check cashers in this scheme. From July to September 1991,

Frazer cashed checks which defrauded banks of over eight

thousand dollars. He received one third of the total take

from his role in the scheme.

After pleading guilty, Frazer was released on bail and

scheduled to be sentenced on December 2, 1992. This was

later continued by the court until December 7, 1992. Frazer

did not appear on December 7. A bench warrant was issued and

Frazer was arrested on January 5, 1993. On January 13, 1993,

he appeared before the court and was sentenced. Due to his

previous failure to appear for sentencing, the court found

Frazer willfully to have obstructed justice and increased his

sentence, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3C1.1.1



Frazer contends that the court erred when it increased

his offense level two levels for obstructing justice by

willfully failing to appear at his sentencing hearing on

December 7, 1992. Frazer argues first that the court erred

when it allowed the government to recall a witness to correct

earlier testimony as to the date of his failure to appear.

He also contends that the government failed to meet its


____________________

1. Subsequently, Frazer was indicted and pled guilty to a
violation of 18 U.S.C. 3146(a)(1) for his failure to appear
at sentencing.

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burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his

failure to appear was "willful." We find merit in neither

argument.

On the afternoon of the sentencing hearing on January

13, 1993, the court allowed the government to recall Deputy

Marshall Shurtleff. The government had previously rested its

case after the morning recess. Shurtleff had testified on

that morning that he had been in court on December 2, 1992,

and that Frazer had failed to appear for sentencing on that

date. When the court returned for its afternoon session, it

became apparent that there was confusion as to whether the

sentencing hearing at which Frazer had not appeared had been

on December 2 or on December 7. Over Frazer's objection, the

court allowed the government to recall Shurtleff who

testified that he had been mistaken in his morning testimony

and that in fact the date of the hearing had been December 7.

We find no merit in appellant's objection to the

admission of this evidence. To be sure, the defendant enjoys

a due process right to be sentenced only upon information the

court has determined to be neither false nor materially

incorrect. United States v. Curran, 926 F.2d 59, 63 (1st
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Cir. 1991). In this case, however, there is no claim that

the amended testimony was inaccurate nor that the error in

the morning testimony was due to anything other than

confusion caused by the change in sentencing dates. We find



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the sentencing court to have been well within its discretion

in allowing the government to recall Shurtleff and in

permitting him to amend his previous testimony. See Id. at
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61 ("district court has broad discretion in the information

it may receive and consider regarding defendant and his

conduct").

According to the commentary to Section 3C1.1 of the

Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant's offense level is to be

increased two levels for obstruction of justice if he

"willfully fail[s] to appear, as ordered, for a judicial

proceeding." U.S.S.G. 3C1.1, comment. (n.3(e)). As with

other upward adjustments, the government bears the burden of

proving the requisite facts by a preponderance of the

evidence. United States v. Aymelek, 926 F.2d 64, 67 (1st
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Cir. 1991). This court reviews a finding of obstruction of

justice only for clear error. United States v. McCarthy, 961
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F.2d 972, 978 (1st Cir. 1992).

In this case, Frazer stipulated at the sentencing

hearing that he was aware of the requirement that he attend

his sentencing hearing on December 7, 1992, and the evidence

that he did not attend is undisputed. Frazer argues,

however, that the government presented no evidence that his

absence was willful. In particular, he suggests that his

absence may have been due to a "mind-altering state, caused

by cocaine" and that he thus did not possess the mens rea for
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obstruction of justice. At the sentencing hearing, however,

Frazer's attorney only suggested that cocaine use was a

possible "scenario" for explaining his client's absence.2

No representation was made that this had in fact been the

reason for Frazer's absence on December 7. Nor was there any

proffer of proof to this effect.

Courts which have considered the mens rea requirement of
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U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 have found that it "requires that the

defendant consciously act with the purpose of obstructing

justice." United States v. Thompson, 962 F.2d 1069, 1071
______________ ________

(D.C.Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1418 (1993) (citing
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United States v. Lofton, 905 F.2d 1315, 1317 (9th Cir.),
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cert. denied, 498 U.S. 948 (1990)). "[K]nowledge of the
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requirements placed upon him by the court and his conscious

decision to ignore its mandates" have been found central to a

finding of willfulness. United States v. Monroe, 990 F.2d
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1370, 1376 (D.C.Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Teta, 918
_____________ ____

F.2d 1329, 1334 (7th Cir. 1990) and United States v. Perry,
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908 F.2d 56, 59 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1002
____ ______

(1990)); see also, McCarthy, 961 F.2d at 980 (upholding
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upward adjustment under 3C1.1 where "[d]efendant was fully

aware that he was delaying his sentence by fleeing").




____________________

2. Frazer's attorney did indicate that Frazer had tested
positive for cocaine when he reported to the probation office
in November 1992.

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In the instant case, the government presented

uncontradicted evidence that Frazer was, as a condition of

bail, required to report for the sentencing hearing on

December 7, 1992 and that he did not appear. Frazer himself

stipulated to having been aware of the sentencing date.

Moreover, evidence was presented that he made no effort,

after the hearing date, to contact the court or the United

States Marshals Office prior to his arrest in January.3 On

this basis, the sentencing court found that "the elements of

the offense of willfully failing to appear have occurred."

The evidence supporting the finding was circumstantial.

However, the court did not commit clear error when it

inferred from this evidence that Frazer's absence from the

sentencing hearing was willful. See e.g. Teta, 918 F.2d at
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1332 (upholding finding of "willful" failure to appear where

sentencing court found credible evidence that defendant knew

he was to appear on date but did not).



Frazer also asserts that the sentencing court erred in

refusing to grant him a two level downward adjustment for


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3. Frazer unavailingly seeks analogous support in United
______
States v. Stroud, 893 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1990), for his
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assertion that mere failure to appear is insufficient to
establish willfulness. Stroud found that mere flight in the
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immediate aftermath of a crime is not obstruction of justice
because it is "instinctual" and a "natural attempt to avoid
apprehension." Id. at 508. Frazer's failure to report
__
either for sentencing on December 7 or during the next five
weeks is clearly more conscious behavior.

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having been a minor participant in the bank fraud scheme.

He contends that, while the conspiracy to defraud the banks

involved a complex scheme, including stealing checks from

businesses, the acquisition of information on account holders

and the production of false identification, his role in the

scheme was limited to the cashing of checks. Moreover,

Frazer notes that he was not the only "runner" in the

conspiracy.4 According to Frazer, he was "less culpable

than most other participants" in the scheme and hence

entitled to the two point downward adjustment for having had

a minor role. U.S.S.G. 3B1.2, comment. (n.3). We review

role in the offense determinations only for clear error.

United States v. St. Cyr, 977 F.2d 698, 705-06 (1st Cir.
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1992); United States v. Gregorio, 956 F.2d 341, 344 (1st Cir.
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1992).

Frazer bears the burden of establishing by a

preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to a

downward adjustment for his role in the offense. United
______

States v. Ocasio-Rivera, 991 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993).
______ _____________

Furthermore, the mere fact that a defendant is the least

culpable among those charged does not entitle him to an

adjustment for having had a minor role. United States v.
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Daniel, 962 F.2d 100, 103 (1st Cir. 1992). Rather, the
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4. Frazer did, however, cash more checks than any other
runner in the scheme.

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defendant must show that his conduct was "substantially less

culpable than the average participant." U.S.S.G. 3B1.2,

comment. (backg'd); Gregorio, 956 F.2d at 344.
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In this case, the court found that Frazer's role in the

offenses with which he was charged was "no less important and

significant to the successful completion of this scheme than

the other participants, with perhaps the exception of the

organizers." In each instance he was the individual who

entered the bank and cashed the check.5 The fact that the

defendant may have had a lesser role in a larger criminal

activity with which he was not charged is not relevant to any

role in the offense adjustment. See Id. (appellant's focus
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on wider fraud rather than the particular offense with which

he was charged irrelevant to role in the offense adjustment);

United States v. Cepeda, 907 F.2d 11, 12 (1st Cir. 1990)
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(even if defendant had a lesser involvement in the large

conspiracy he is not entitled to role in the offense

adjustment because his role in the offense of conviction was

not "minor"). The court also found that Frazer may have

contributed to the conspiracy through his involvement in the

illegal obtaining of one of the check writing machines used

by the conspirators. Given the deference owed to the

sentencing court in factual determinations, we cannot say


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5. Although the bank fraud conspiracy included other
runners, Frazer was charged only with those instances of bank
fraud in which he cashed the check.

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that the court was clearly erroneous in determining that

Frazer did not have a minor role in the charged conspiracy.

See Gregorio, 956 F.2d at 344 (criminal conduct not minor
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where it was "important" to the criminal enterprise charged);

United States v. Ocasio, 914 F.2d 330, 333 (1st Cir. 1990)
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(same).

The sentence imposed by the district court is affirmed.
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Source:  CourtListener

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