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Albiston v. ME Com of HS, 93-1137 (1993)

Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Number: 93-1137 Visitors: 22
Filed: Sep. 27, 1993
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary:  King v. Smith, 392 U.S. ____ _____ at 333 (asserting that State of Alabama breached its federally ________ ___ _________ imposed obligation [under statutory predecessor to 602(a)(10)] _______ __________ to furnish 'aid . Again, ______ however, Maine misapprehends Suter's holding.
USCA1 Opinion










UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________

No. 93-1137

SUSAN ALBISTON, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs, Appellees,

v.

MAINE COMMISSIONER OF HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellants.

____________________


APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

[Hon. Gene Carter, U.S. District Judge]
___________________

____________________

Before

Selya, Cyr and Boudin,

Circuit Judges.
______________

____________________



Christopher C. Leighton, Deputy Attorney General, with whom
________________________
Michael E. Carpenter, Attorney General, and Thomas D. Warren, Deputy
____________________ _________________
Attorney General, were on brief for appellants.
Mary T. Henderson with whom Patrick Ende, Linda Christ, and Pine
__________________ ____________ ____________ ____
Tree Legal Assistance were on brief for appellees.
_____________________


____________________

September 27, 1993
____________________






















CYR, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs-appellees Susan Albis-
CYR, Circuit Judge.
_______ _____

ton and Anita Wingert brought a class action, under 42 U.S.C.

1983, to compel timely disbursement of "pass-through" and "gap"

payments under Titles IV-A and IV-D of the Social Security Act.

Defendants-appellants, in their official capacities,1 challenged

plaintiffs' standing. The district court rejected the challenge.

We affirm.


I
I

BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND
__________



Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 601

et seq., creates a voluntary, cooperative federal-state program
__ ____

for Aid to Families With Dependent Children ("AFDC"). The AFDC

program, administered by participating states, provides federal

financial assistance to needy families with children who are

deprived of parental support through death, disability or deser-

tion. States are not required to participate in the AFDC pro-

gram, but must agree to administer it in accordance with a

federally approved AFDC plan if they elect to participate. King
____

v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968).
_____

____________________

1The nominal defendants are the Commissioner of the Maine
Department of Human Services, 22 M.R.S.A. 3781, and the Commis-
sioner of the Maine Department of Finance, 5 M.R.S.A. 282-283,
1541. Since the State of Maine is the real party in interest,
however, we refer to defendants-appellants collectively as the
"State," or "Maine." See Stowell v. Ives, 976 F.2d 65, 67 n.1
___ _______ ____
(1st Cir. 1992) ("Stowell I").
_________

2

















In 1975, Congress amended Title IV-A, by requiring AFDC

recipients to assign to the State their "rights to support from

any other person" (including the right to child-support payments

from an absent parent), as a condition to their receipt of AFDC

benefits. 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(26)(A). States in turn were

required to amend their Title IV-A plan, see id. at 602(a)(27),
___ ___

assuming responsibilities for enforcement of absent parents'

child-support obligations [hereinafter "child-support enforce-

ment," or "CSE"], under a program outlined in a new Title IV-D of

the statute, 42 U.S.C. 451 et seq.2 Among other provisions,
__ ____

Title IV-D requires States to "pass through" to AFDC recipients

the first $50 of each monthly child-support payment the States

recover from absent parents of AFDC recipients. See id. at
___ ___

657(b); see also Wilcox v. Ives, 864 F.2d 915, 916-17 (1st Cir.
___ ____ ______ ____

1988) (discussing origins and statutory background of States'

"pass-through" obligation). Moreover, under Title IV-A, a State

____________________
which pays out less in AFDC benefits than a family's predeter-
2In order to monitor State performance under Title IV-D,
mined "level of need" is required to provide supplemental monthly
Congress established an Office of Child Support Supervision
["OCSE"], to which it delegated substantial authority for stan-
payments, drawn from its Title IV-D child-support recovery, up to
dard-setting and administrative review. See 42 U.S.C. 652(a);
___
see also Carelli v. Howser, 923 F.2d 1208, 1213-15 (6th Cir.
___ ____ _______ ______
the amount necessary to fill the "gap."3 42 U.S.C. 602(a)-
1991) (comprehensive review of OCSE duties and authority).

3In order to offset expenditures made on the AFDC recip-
ient's behalf, the State may retain any child-support recoveries
from the absent parent above the amount required to fund the
"gap" payments to the AFDC recipient. See 42 U.S.C. 602(a)-
___
(8)(A)(vi); 657(b) (4). If a family is not receiving AFDC, or if
the child-support recovery raises a family above the minimum
income threshold for AFDC eligibility, the State must "pass
through" the support payment in its entirety. See id. at
___ ___
657(b), 657(c); see also 45 C.F.R. 232.20(b)(1).
___ ____

3

















(28); see also Stowell v. Secretary of HHS, ___ F.2d ___, ___
___ ____ _______ _________________

(1st Cir. 1993) ("Stowell II") (describing "gap-filling" under
___________

the Act); Doucette v. Ives, 947 F.2d 21, 24-25 (1st Cir. 1991)
________ ____

(discussing origins and statutory background of "gap" payment

obligation); see generally Wehunt v. Ledbetter, 875 F.2d 1558,
___ _________ ______ _________

1569-70 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (Clark, J., dissenting)

(comprehensive analysis of Title IV-D legislative history).

"Gap" payments are considered supplemental AFDC

disbursements under Title IV-A, see Fed. Reg. 29223-25 (August
___

15, 1988), and must be "furnished with reasonable promptness to

all eligible individuals," 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(10), "without any

delay attributable to the [State] agency's administrative pro-

cess." See 45 C.F.R. 206.10(a)(5). The $50 "pass-through"
___

payments mandated by 657(b) are disbursed under Title IV-D, not

Title IV-A, and therefore are not covered by 602(a)(10)'s

"reasonable promptness" requirement. However, in 1988, respond-

ing to persistent reports of "long delays [by States] in distrib-

uting child support collections," see Cong. Rec. S7993 (June 16,
___

1988) (remarks of Senator Bradley), Congress amended Title IV-D,

directing OCSE to establish specific time frames for "prompt"

disbursement of "pass-through" payments by the States. 42 U.S.C.

652(i). Pursuant to its statutory authority, OCSE adopted

regulations requiring "pass-through" payment disbursements to

eligible AFDC recipients, under 42 U.S.C. 657, within fifteen
_______

days of the State's receipt of child-support payments from an
____

4

















absent parent or collecting agency. See 45 C.F.R. 302.32(f)-
___

(2).4


II
II

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
__________________


Maine participates in the AFDC program as a "gap"

state, i.e., one whose AFDC benefits do not fully meet the AFDC
____

recipient's designated "level of need."5 Accordingly, Maine

must make "gap" payments, as well as "pass-through" payments, to

eligible AFDC recipients. Plaintiffs Albiston and Wingert are

eligible AFDC recipients who assigned their child-support rights

to Maine under 602(a)(26)(A), but experienced significant

delays (two and six months, respectively) in receiving "gap" and

"pass-through" payments. Alleging "systemic" administrative

deficiencies, plaintiffs brought the present class action for





____________________

4The Secretary subsequently amended the 15-day requirement
to provide that the "pass-through" payment may be made within
fifteen days after the month in which payment was due from the
_____ __ _____ _______ ___ ___
absent parent. See 57 Fed. Reg. 54519 (Nov. 19, 1992). Unless
___
otherwise indicated, however, we refer to the version in effect
at the time the present action was initiated.

5When this action was brought, the gap between AFDC benefits
and "level of need" for a family of three (one adult and two
children) was $ 199. Maine subsequently reduced its "level of
need," narrowing the "gap" obligation somewhat. Maine's AFDC
"gap," and its later reduction in the "level of need," are
discussed in Stowell I, 976 F.2d at 67, and in Stowell II, ___
_________ __________
F.2d at ___ [slip op. at 3-4 & n.1].

5

















declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983.6

Although Maine disputes the severity of its "systemic"

problems, it acknowledges that "gap payment" disbursements are

delayed in individual cases by a variety of administrative

factors, including inadequate staffing, computer programming

errors, clerical mistakes, and errors caused either by collection

agencies or other states. Maine also acknowledges that, as of

the initiation of this lawsuit, it missed OCSE's 15-day deadline

for processing "pass-through" payments in approximately 66% of

its qualifying AFDC cases. But it argues that Titles IV-A and

IV-D, which require "substantial compliance" on penalty of

cutbacks in federal funding, see 42 U.S.C. 604(a)(2), 603(h),
___

impose no corresponding, judicially cognizable obligation to make

timely "gap" and "pass-through" payments in individual cases, and
__ __________ _____

that plaintiffs therefore lack standing to enforce a timely-

____________________

6The district court certified Albiston and Wingert as repre-
sentative of a plaintiff class consisting of

all present, former and future AFDC recipients with a
present entitlement to pass-through and gap payments
within the State of Maine:

(a) who have not received or will not receive their
$ 50.00 pass-through payment under 42 U.S.C. 657(b)-
(1) within 15 days of the date the child support from
which the $ 50.00 payment is derived was received by
the State of Maine; and

(b) who have not received or will not receive their
"GAP" payment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(28) by the
month after the month in which the child support pay-
ment from which the GAP payment is derived was received
by the State of Maine.

6

















payment obligation in a private action under 1983.7

III
III

DISCUSSION
DISCUSSION
__________


The 1983 remedy presumptively encompasses violations

of federal statutory rights by state officials. See Maine v.
___ _____

Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (finding private cause of action
_________

under 1983 to enforce rights conferred by Social Security Act).

Nevertheless, certain post-Thiboutot cases, see, e.g., Suter v.
_________ ___ ____ _____

Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
_________ ____________________________

Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), have been "difficult for lower
_________

courts to reconcile" with the presumptive availability of a

private right of action for statutory enforcement. See Evelyn V.
___ _________

v. Kings County Hosp. Center, 819 F. Supp. 183, 190 (E.D.N.Y.
__________________________

1993) (surveying 1983 caselaw from Thiboutot to Suter).
_________ _____

In Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S.
__________________________ ___________

103, 106 (1989), and Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S.
______ _____________________

498, 508-09 (1990), the Supreme Court synthesized prior case law,

reaffirming the presumptive availability of a 1983 remedy for

violations of federal statutory rights, but articulating several




____________________

7The Secretary is charged with conducting periodic audits of
State performance under Title IV-D and has promulgated regula-
tions deeming a State in "substantial compliance" with Title IV-D
provided the applicable statutory requirements are met in 75% of
the cases reviewed in the particular State. See 45 C.F.R.
___
305.20.

7

















broad exclusions.8 First, because "section 1983 speaks in terms

of 'rights, privileges, or immunities, [rather than] violations
______

of federal law," Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106 (1989) (emphasis
_____________

added), private relief is considered unavailable if the federal

statute at issue does not "create enforceable rights." Wilder,
______

496 U.S. at 519 (citing Wright, 479 U.S. at 423). Whether a
______

statute creates "enforceable rights"

turns on [A] whether 'the provision in
question was intend[ed] to benefit the
putative plaintiff.' If so, the provision
creates an enforceable right unless it [B]
reflects merely a 'congressional preference'
for a certain kind of conduct rather than a
binding obligation on the governmental unit,
or unless [C] the interest the plaintiff
asserts is 'too vague and amorphous' such
that it is 'beyond the competence of the
judiciary to enforce.'"

Id. at 509 (citations omitted). Second, 1983 may be unavail-
__

able if "Congress foreclosed [private] enforcement in the enact-

ment" whose enforcement is sought, by providing an alternative,

comprehensive administrative scheme for redressing individual


____________________

8The Court in Wilder found a private right to enforce a
______
Boren Amendment requirement that Medicaid expenses be reimbursed
at rates that a "State finds, and makes assurances satisfactory
to the Secretary, are reasonable and adequate to meet the costs
which must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated
facilities." 496 U.S. at 507. The Court in Golden State upheld
____________
a private right, under 1983, to enforce National Labor Rela-
tions Act provisions against state interference in collective
bargaining procedure. 493 U.S. at 112-13. Both cases cited
approvingly to Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous.
______ _______________________________________
Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987), which upheld a private right to
_____
enforce the Brooke Amendment's statutory directive that public
housing rents incorporate "reasonable" utility rates.

8

















plaintiffs' grievances under the statute. Smith v. Robinson, 468
_____ ________

U.S. 1, 10-20 (1981); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National
_______________________________ ________

Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981).
__________________

The framework established in Golden State and Wilder
____________ ______

continued to be used for several years in determining whether

1983 permitted a private right of action for the enforcement of

federal "spending" statutes. See, e.g., Playboy Enterprises v.
___ ____ ___________________

Public Svce. Com'n, 906 F.2d 25, 32-33 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
___________________ _____ ______

111 S. Ct. 388 (1990) (applying Wilder analysis; upholding private
______

enforcement of "editorial control" provisions in Cable Communica-

tions Policy Act). Then, the Supreme Court appeared to depart

from this framework in Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360, where
_____ _________

it considered whether an enforceable private right of action

arose under the "reasonable efforts" provision of the Adoption

Assistance and Child Welfare Act ["AACWA"]. The Suter Court
_____

acknowledged that the AACWA was "mandatory in its terms," in that

it required States to "have a plan approved by the Secretary

which . . . provides that, in each case, reasonable efforts will

be made (A) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to

prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his

home, and (B) to make it possible for the child to return to his

home." Id. at 1367 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 671(a)(15)). Suter
___ _____

noted, however, that the States were given "a great deal of

discretion" in defining the terms of their compliance with the

AACWA, since the statute, its legislative history, and the

9

















accompanying regulations provided no "further . . . guidance

. . . as to how 'reasonable efforts' [were] to be measured." Id.
___

at 1368-69. Accordingly, Suter held, Congress intended "to
_____

impose only a rather generalized duty on the State." Id. at
___

1370. And, this "generalized duty" was too vague to permit an

inference that Congress had intended to "confer upon the child

beneficiaries of the Act a right to enforce the requirement that

the State make 'reasonable efforts' to prevent a child from being

removed from his home, and once removed to reunify the child with

his family." Id. at 1367. Suter's failure explicitly to apply
___ _____

the framework outlined earlier in Wilder led two dissenting
______

Justices to assert that the holdings of the two cases were

"plainly inconsistent," and that the Suter majority had "changed
_____

the rules of the game without even minimal justification," in

effect overruling Wilder, sub silentio. 112 S. Ct. at 1371, 1377
______ ___ ________

(Blackmun, J., dissenting).

In Stowell I, 976 F.2d at 68-70, this court examined
_________

the Suter dissenters' claim that Suter had overruled Wilder.
_____ _____ ______

Stowell I concluded, however, that though Suter "shed new light
_________ _____

on this fuliginous area of the law," it was "much too early to

post epitaphs for Wilder and its kin," and that it was "both
______

prudent and possible to synthesize the teachings of Suter with
_____







10

















the Court's prior precedents." 976 F.2d at 68.9 Revisiting the

issue today, we conclude that Suter left the basic Wilder frame-
_____ ______

work intact, but added a further threshold inquiry, applicable in

cases involving "federal-state funding statutes" enacted pursuant

to the "Spending Clause." See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17-18
___ _________

(noting special attributes of statutes enacted under Spending

Clause, which assume "the nature of a contract" between state and

federal governments); see also Suter, 112 S. Ct. at 1366 & n.7
___ ____ _____

(quoting Pennhurst, and noting AACWA's enactment pursuant to
_________

Spending Clause). When federal-state funding statutes enacted

pursuant to the Spending Clause "fail[] to impose a direct
______

obligation on the States, instead placing the onus of compliance
__________ __ ___ ______

____________________

9 For one thing, Suter offered no analytic
_____
framework to replace the structure erected in
the Court's previous decisions. For another
thing, the Suter Court, while weakening ear-
_____
lier precedents in certain important re-
spects, was careful not to overrule them.
Indeed, the majority relied on those prece-
dents as pertinent authority.

Stowell I, 976 F.2d at 68. Other courts of appeals also have
_________
found Suter reconcilable with "Wilder and its kin." See, e.g.,
_____ ______ ___ ____
Procopio v. Johnson, 994 F.2d 325, 331 n.9 (7th Cir. 1993);
________ _______
Clifton v. Schaefer, 969 F.2d 278, 283-85 (7th Cir. 1993); Dorsey
_______ ________ ______
v. Housing Auth. of Baltimore, 984 F.2d 622, 631 (4th Cir. 1993).
__________________________
Some further confirmation of this position may have been offered
last Term, when Justice White, a member of the Suter majority,
_____
cited Suter alongside Wilder and Wright in a dissenting opinion
_____ ______ ______
a juxtaposition which went unremarked by the majority. See
___
New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2445 (1992) (White,
_________ _____________
J., dissenting) ("we have upheld 1983 suits to enforce certain
rights created by statutes pursuant to the Spending Clause
[citing Wilder and Wright], though Congress must be cautious in
______ ______
spelling out the federal rights clearly and distinctly [citing
Suter]").
_____

11

















with the statute's substantive provisions on the federal govern-

ment, no cause of action cognizable under section 1983 can

flourish." Stowell I, 976 F.2d at 70 (emphasis added).
_________

Viewed in this light, Suter's impact on our 1983
_____

jurisprudence is neither particularly "far-reaching" nor "plainly

inconsistent" with prior precedent. Since Suter, 1983 cog-
_____

nizability in the ambiguous context of shared state-federal

obligations contemplates that the alleged breach of statutory

rights shall have resulted from some impermissible "state ac-
_____

tion," rather than from a mere default in the performance of a

federally-retained obligation. This said, however, two other

aspects of Suter's holding require our consideration.
_____

First, although a congressional intent to create
______

"enforceable rights" may be presumed simply from the enactment of

a federal statute mandating performance of specific duties, see
___

Golden State, 493 U.S. at 112-13, a congressional intent to
_____________

impose those obligations on participating States may not be
______ _____ ___________ __ _____________ ______

presumed, but must be demonstrated by the 1983 plaintiff.

Suter, 112 S. Ct. at 1367-68. Second, and equally important, in
_____

order to "impose a direct obligation on the States," the plain-

tiff must show that Congress has delineated the obligation

"unambiguously," i.e., with sufficient specificity to permit
____

States to "exercise their choice [to participate in the statutory

scheme] knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their partic-

ipation." See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17. A federally-imposed
___ _________

12

















statutory obligation is not enforceable in a private action

against the State under 1983 if its terms are so vague and

generalized that their "meaning will . . . vary with the circum-

stances of each case" so as to be insusceptible to judicial

enforcement. See Suter, 112 S. Ct. at 1368-70; see also Penn-
___ _____ ___ ____ _____

hurst, 451 U.S. at 17 ("The legitimacy of Congress' power to
_____

legislate under the spending power . . . rests on whether the

State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 'con-

tract.' There can . . . be no knowing acceptance if a State is

unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is

expected of it") (citations omitted).





























13

















A. A Statute Enacted Under the Spending Power Must
A. A Statute Enacted Under the Spending Power Must
Delegate a Mandatory Duty Directly to the States
Delegate a Mandatory Duty Directly to the States
________________________________________________

We agree with plaintiffs that the challenged statute

and its implementing regulations satisfy Suter's threshold
_____

mandate by imposing reasonably clear, judicially enforceable

obligations directly on the participating States. We begin with

the statutory provisions covering gap payments. Under Title

IV-A, in order to receive federal subsidies under the AFDC

program, a State is obligated to adopt a plan, see King v. Smith,
___ ____ _____

392 U.S. at 333, which ". . . provide[s] that aid to families

with dependent children shall be furnished with reasonable
_____

promptness." See 42 U.S.C. 602(a) (10)(A) (emphasis added).
___

Moreover, the State's obligation does not cease once it obtains

initial administrative approval of its plan; even after the
_____

Secretary has given administrative approval, the State must also
____ ____

"comply substantially with [all] provisions required by section

602(a) . . . to be included in the plan," id. at 604(a)(2). If
___

a State is not in compliance with the terms of its plan, the

Secretary "shall make no further payments to such State (or shall
_____

limit payments to categories under or parts of the State plan not

affected by such failures)." 42 U.S.C. 604(a) (emphasis

added). Like the "reasonable efforts" requirement in Suter,
_____

these requirements are "mandatory in [their] terms," 112 S.Ct. at

1367. Indeed, then-Justice Rehnquist's Pennhurst opinion quoted
_________

the statutory predecessor to 602(a)(10), including its "reason-


14

















able promptness" language, as an example of an "instance[] where

Congress . . . intended the States to fund certain entitlements

as a condition of receiving federal funds, . . . [and] proved

capable of saying so explicitly." 451 U.S. at 17-18. See also,
___ ____

e.g., Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 600 (1972) (stating
____ ________ _________

that 602(a)(10) "places on each State participating in the AFDC
__ ____ _____

program the requirement that 'aid to families with dependent

children shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all

eligible individuals") (emphasis added); King v. Smith, 392 U.S.
____ _____

at 333 (asserting that State of Alabama "breached its federally
________ ___ _________

imposed obligation [under statutory predecessor to 602(a)(10)]
_______ __________

to furnish 'aid . . . with reasonable promptness to all eligible

individuals'") (emphasis added).

Seemingly no less clear is the delegation to the States

of the Title IV-D mandated obligation to disburse "pass-through"

payments in a timely fashion. Section 654(13) provides that a

State child-support plan must provide, in pertinent part, "that

the State will comply with such other requirements and standards

as the Secretary determines to be necessary." Section 657(b) of

Title IV-D governs the terms under which "amounts collected as

support by a State . . . shall . . . be distributed" by the
_____

collecting State. (Emphasis added.) The 1988 amendments to

Title IV-D require OCSE, as part of its "standards for State

programs," 42 U.S.C. 652(a)(1), to promulgate mandatory regula-

tions which "shall include standards establishing time limits
_____

15

















governing the period or periods within which a State must dis-
____

tribute, in accordance with section 657 of this section, amounts

collected as child-support pursuant to the State's plan." Id. at
___

652(i) (emphasis added). The OCSE regulations in effect at the

commencement of this litigation provided that

Amounts collected by the IV-D agency on be-
half of recipients of aid under the State's
title IV-A . . . plan . . . shall be distrib-
_____
uted as follows:

(i) . . . When the IV-A agency sends payments
to the family under 302.51(b)(1) of this
part, the IV-D agency must forward any amount
____
due the family under 302.51(b)(1) to the
IV-A agency within 15 calendar days of the
date of initial receipt in the State of the
first $ 50 of support collected in a month,
or, if less than $ 50 is collected in a
month, within 15 calendar days of the end of
the month in which the support was collected.

45 C.F.R. 302.32(f)(2) (later revised; see 57 Fed. Reg. 54519
___

(November 19, 1992)) (emphasis added). In addition, a State that

fails to achieve "substantial compliance" with the Title IV-D

requirements, including its 657 distribution obligations and

OCSE's 15-day "promptness" provision, shall have "amounts other-
_____

wise payable . . . reduced." 42 U.S.C. 603(h)(1) (emphasis

added). We conclude that these provisions impose a specific,

definite and mandatory obligation directly on participating

States. See generally Howe v. Ellenbecker, 774 F. Supp. 1224,
___ _________ ____ ___________

1230 (D.S.D. 1991) (considering Title IV-D in light of Pennhurst;
_________

"The language in Title IV-D is mandatory and set[s] out in

specific and definite terms . . . . what states must do to

16

















participate in the program"); Behunin v. Jefferson Cty. Dept. of
_______ _______________________

Social Servs., 744 F. Supp. 255, 258 (D. Colo. 1990) ("The
______________

mandatory language of Title IV-D, and its clear intent to benefit

children and their families[,] distinguish this statute from the

statute considered in Pennhurst"); Carelli v. Howser, 733 F.-
_________ _______ ______

Supp. 271, 276 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (citing 654(13); "the language

of Title IV-D is clearly mandatory rather than precatory," and

creates "specific and definite benefits"), rev'd on other
_____ __ _____

grounds, 923 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1991).
_______

It is the imposition of mandatory obligations directly

on the States, as distinguished from the Secretary, that sepa-

rates the "promptness" obligations under Titles IV-A and IV-D

from the statutory provisions considered in Suter and Stowell I.
_____ __________

In Suter, the Court concluded that the AACWA requirement of
_____

"reasonable efforts" was "mandatory," and "does place a require-

ment on the States," but held that because of its vagueness "that

requirement only goes so far as to ensure that the State have a
____ ____ __ ___ __ __ ______ ____ ___ _____ ____ _

plan approved by the Secretary which contains the 16 listed
____ ________

features." 112 S. Ct. at 1367 (emphasis added). Likewise, in

Stowell I, 976 F.2d at 69, plaintiffs sought 1983 enforcement
_________

of a statutory provision which

simply and forthrightly provides, in haec
____
verba, that 'the Secretary shall not approve
_____
any State plan for medical assistance' if the
State has reduced AFDC payment levels below
the level prevailing on May 1, 1988. 42
U.S.C. 1396a(c)(1). By its express terms,
section 1396a(c)(1) obliges the federal gov-

17

















ernment, in the person of the Secretary of
Health and Human Services not the State
to take action. The statute could scarcely be
clearer.

In the present case, on the other hand, although the

Secretary retains oversight responsibility for monitoring "sub-

stantial compliance" with the State's plan, plaintiffs do not

base their statutory claim on the Secretary's nonperformance of

these oversight obligations, but on the State's separate "com-
________

pliance" obligations as mandated. And, as discussed in Part D,

infra, the Secretary's oversight responsibilities are neither
_____

incompatible with, nor exclusive of, Congress' imposition upon
____

the participating State of the direct responsibility for fulfill-
___ _____________ _____

ing its plan obligations to the statute's intended beneficiaries.

Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420 (1970); Lynch v. Dukakis, 719
______ _____ _____ _______

F.2d 504, 511, 512 (1st Cir. 1983).10


B. The State's Obligation Must Be "Unambiguous"
B. The State's Obligation Must Be "Unambiguous"
____________________________________________


____________________

10Although further discussion of this issue is reserved for
Part D, infra, we pause to note one additional point. We do not
_____
read Suter as disturbing the principle, articulated in Wilder and
_____ ______
other cases, that a statute may impose obligations on the States
despite the existence of a parallel administrative scheme for the
enforcement of overall compliance with statutory provisions. See
___
Wilder, 496 U.S. at 512. Although Suter cited the AACWA's
______ _____
administrative enforcement mechanisms in passing, to "show that
the absence of a remedy to private plaintiffs under 1983 does
not make the reasonable efforts clause [of the AACWA] a dead
letter," it made clear that its brief discussion of this subject
was intended as an "aside," and not to supplant the more detailed
inquiry required by Smith v. Robinson, supra, and Middlesex
_____ ________ _____ _________
County Sewerage Authority, supra. See 112 S. Ct. at 1368-69 &
_________________________ _____ ___
n.11.

18

















Invoking Suter's requirement that delegated obligations
_____

be not only "mandatory" but "unambiguous," the State raises two

additional arguments concerning the alleged vagueness of the

obligations imposed by Titles IV-A and IV-D. First, the State

argues, the statutory requirement of "substantial" rather than

"total" compliance with a Title IV-D plan, see 42 U.S.C. 602(a)
___

(27), renders the State's "promptness" obligation under the plan

ambiguous in individual cases, and therefore unenforceable in a

private action under 42 U.S.C. 1983. See Mason v. Bradley, 789
___ _____ _______

F. Supp. 273 (N.D. Ill. 1992) ("full compliance with the regula-

tions in every case is clearly not required"); Oliphant v.
________

Bradley, No. 91-C3055, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8975, at *23 (N.D.
_______

Ill. 1992) ("had Congress intended to mandate compliance [in

individual cases] with the time frames set out in the regula-

tions, it would have conditioned receipt of federal funds on

total, rather than substantial, compliance") (emphasis add-
_____

ed).11

____________________

11But see King v. Bradley, No. 92-C1564, 1993 U.S. Dist.
___ ___ ____ _______
LEXIS 11041, at *16-17 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 1993), at *17 ("al-
though no individual plaintiff or class of plaintiffs has an
enforceable right or guarantee to be among the 75 percent of
cases that must be handled in conformance with federally regulat-
ed procedures . . . [,] [a]ny plaintiff or class of plaintiffs
that fails to receive services in compliance with federal regula-
tions when the state is running a Title IV-D program which does
not substantially comply with federal procedures does have the
right to sue to enjoin the State to improve its level of confor-
mance until it is in substantial compliance."). In the present
case, the district court's factual findings suggest that Maine
had not achieved "substantial compliance" with the relevant
statutory provision. Compare, e.g., Shands v. Tull, 602 F.2d
_______ ____ ______ ____

19

















We think Maine misapprehends the import of the 602(a)

(27) "substantial compliance" requirement in this case. By its

terms, the "substantial compliance" obligation applies only to

the State's compliance with the terms of the State plan itself,
____ ______

as defined in 42 U.S.C. 654. However, the 15-day compliance

time frame imposed by OCSE under 45 C.F.R. 302.32(f)(2) is not

directly imposed as part of the State's plan, but stems from a
__ ____ __ ___ _______ ____

separate statutory provision, 42 U.S.C. 652(i), which specifi-

cally relates the OCSE 15-day regulation to "the period or

periods within which the State must distribute [amounts collected

as child-support], in accordance with section 657 of this sec-

tion." As 657 itself is mandatory, the 15-day compliance

requirement imposed thereunder takes precedence over the more

general "substantial compliance" directive made applicable to the

State's plan by 602(a)(27).

Alternatively, it may be possible, of course, to

construe Maine's "substantial compliance" argument as resting on

the provisions of sections 604(a)(2) and 603(h), which authorize

the Secretary to withhold funds from States which do not "comply

substantially" with Titles IV-A and IV-D. But if this is Maine's

position, it too must fail. For one thing, with respect to the


____________________

1156, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1979) (barring private suit for enforce-
ment of AFDC statute, where State was in "substantial compliance"
with statutory provisions, but indicating that injunctive suits
may be permissible where "agencies have failed to reach even
substantial compliance with statutory standards").

20

















Secretary's argument under Title IV-D, 603(h)(3) provides that

"for purposes of section 602(a)(27) of this title, . . . a State

which is not in full compliance with the requirements of this

part shall be determined to be in substantial compliance only if

the Secretary determines that any noncompliance is of a technical
_________

nature which does not adversely affect the performance of the
______

child-support enforcement program" (emphasis added). More

generally, however, the "substantial" compliance required to

avoid administrative penalties under both provisions is indepen-
____

dent of, and narrower than, the State's direct obligation to AFDC

recipients. See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 514-15 & n.11 (findings and
___ ______

assurances to Secretary, prior to plan approval, are separate

from subsequent obligation to comply with assurances). As the

Ninth Circuit has stated, in an analogous context, "[t]he funding

standard [of 'substantial compliance'] is not . . . the measure

of what the regulations require; it is intended to measure how

great a failure to meet those requirements should cause funds to

be cut off." Withrow v. Concannon, 942 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir.
_______ _________

1991).

Indeed, the AACWA, construed in Suter, also contained a
_____

provision, 42 U.S.C. 671(b), requiring "substantial compliance"

with the terms of the State-presented plan, or face cutbacks in

aid. Although Suter cited this statutory provision for a differ-
_____

ent proposition, 112 S. Ct. at 1368-69 (discussing alternative

"enforcement mechanisms" under the AACWA), the Suter majority
_____

21

















nowhere intimated that it thought the administrative requirement

of "substantial compliance" contributed to the ultimate ambigu-

ousness of the States' "reasonable efforts" obligation.

Citing Suter's disapproval of the "reasonable efforts"
_____

provision, Maine also argues that the Title IV-A obligation of

"reasonable promptness," 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(10), is "'too vague

and amorphous,'" placing it "'beyond the competence of the

judiciary to enforce.'" Wright, 479 U.S. at 431-32. Again,
______

however, Maine misapprehends Suter's holding. A statute is not
_____

impermissibly vague simply because it requires judicial inquiry

into "reasonableness." See, e.g., Wilder, 496 U.S. at 519-20
___ ____ ______

("reasonable and adequate rates"); Wright, 479 U.S. at 437
______

("reasonable" utilities allowance); see generally, e.g., Virginia
___ _________ ____ ________

R. Co. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937) ("whether
_______ ____________________

action taken or omitted is . . . reasonable [is an] everyday

subjec[t] of inquiry by courts in framing and enforcing their

decrees"). Rather, the relevant question is whether the action
______

or purpose whose "reasonableness" is commanded has been clearly
__ _______

delineated and is susceptible of judicial ascertainment. See
___

Suter, 112 S. Ct. at 1368 (distinguishing Wilder as "set[ting]
_____ ______

forth in some detail the factors to be considered in determining

the methods for calculating rates") (emphasis added). Here, like
___________ _____

the "rates" considered in Wilder, or the utility allowance in
______

Wright and unlike the "efforts" prescribed, without elabora-
______ _______

tion, in the AACWA "promptness of payment" presents a straigh-

22

















tforward, identifiable standard which we previously have found

readily susceptible of judicial evaluation. Coalition for Basic
___________________

Human Needs v. King, 654 F.2d 838, 841 (1st Cir. 1981) (finding
___________ ____

AFDC plaintiffs "likely to succeed" on 1983 claim based on

violation of "reasonable promptness" provisions in 602(a)(10)).

Moreover, to the extent further guidance may be re-

quired to demarcate the contours of reasonable "promptness" in

the Title IV-A context, the regulations promulgated by the

Secretary state that "financial assistance [under the AFDC

program] . . . shall be furnished promptly to eligible individu-

als without any delay attributable to the agency's administrative
_______ ___ _____ ____________ __ ___ ________ ______________

process." 45 C.F.R. 206.10(a)(5)(i) (emphasis added). We are
_______

not persuaded by Maine's contention that "the language of the

regulation offers no . . . assistance in determining the differ-

ence between necessary processing time and administrative delay."

Cf. California Dept. of Human Resources Development v. Java, 402
___ ________________________________________________ ____

U.S. 121, 133 (1971) (relying on purposes of Social Security Act

to construe statutory requirement that state unemployment compen-

sation programs be "reasonably calculated to insure full payment

of unemployment compensation when due"). Rather, this inter-

pretation plainly equates reasonable "promptness" in furnishing

financial assistance with an absence of delay due to the State's
_______ __ _____ ___ __ ___ _______

administrative process. We think it clear, therefore, that the
______________ _______

reference to "delay," considered in context, means "unreasonable
____________

delay," excluding whatever reasonable processing time is required

23

















to credit the child-support received, determine the amount of the

gap payment, and issue a check. Cf. Beasley v. Harris, 671
___ _______ ______

F. Supp. 911, 915-16 (D. Conn. 1987) (similar argument).12


C. Section 1983 Plaintiffs Must Be Intended
C. Section 1983 Plaintiffs Must Be Intended
Beneficiaries of Delegated Obligations
Beneficiaries of Delegated Obligations
______________________________________

As we conclude that the relevant Title IV-A and IV-D

provisions satisfy the threshold test under Suter, by directly
_____

delegating to the States an unambiguous statutory obligation to

make reasonably "prompt" payments to AFDC recipients, we turn

next to Wilder's three-part test for determining whether the
______

statutory "rights, privileges and immunities" afforded AFDC

recipients under the Social Security Act are of a kind Congress

meant to be enforceable under 1983. Since we have determined

that the statutory responsibilities imposed upon the States by

the CSE program are "unambiguous" and "mandatory" within the

meaning of Suter, the second and third parts of the Wilder test,
_____ ______

requiring a similar analysis, seem clearly to be met. According-

ly, the Wilder "enforceable right" determination, "as reconfig-
______

ured by the neoteric principles announced in Suter," see Stowell
_____ ___ _______

I, 976 F.2d at 68, turns largely on the first part of the Wilder
_ ______

____________________

12We are not suggesting that error-free compliance is likely
to be achieved in administering this program, any more than in
other programs administered by agencies with limited resources.
But this reality does not afford the State a safe harbor merely
because its overall rate of compliance is adequate to avoid the
ultimate program sanction a cutoff of federal funding.
Moreover, if plaintiffs' allegations are to be credited, Maine
falls below even that level of compliance.

24

















test: "whether 'the provision in question was intend[ed] to

benefit the putative plaintiff.'" 496 U.S. at 509.

Maine concedes, for purposes of this appeal, that the

plaintiff class is comprised of "intended beneficiaries" of the

requirement that Title IV-D child-support be "promptly" distri-

buted. Although the Eleventh Circuit has held otherwise, see
___

Wehunt v. Ledbetter, 875 F.2d 1558, 1565-66 (11th Cir. 1989)
______ _________

(Title IV-D's collection provisions primarily intended to benefit

"the public fisc," not individual claimants, and therefore do not

give rise to enforceable private rights), we accept Maine's

concession, which conforms in any event with the conclusion

reached by most courts that have considered the issue, and with

our prior characterizations of Title IV-D in dictum. See, e.g.,
___ ____

Carelli v. Howser, 923 F.2d 1208, 1211 (6th Cir. 1991) (rejecting
_______ ______

Wehunt; finding that Title IV-D was intended both "to protect
______ ____

needy families with children [and to protect] the public fisc");

see also Doucette v. Ives, 947 F.2d at 24 (dictum) ("the CSE
___ ____ ________ ____

program [was] designed both to assist parents in collecting child
____

support . . . and to reduce state and federal government AFDC

expenditures") (emphasis added); accord, Howe v. Ellenbecker, 774
______ ____ ___________

F. Supp. 1224 (D. S.D. 1991) (same); Behunin v. Jefferson County
_______ ________________

Dept. of Social Services, 744 F. Supp. 255, 257-58 (D. Colo.
__________________________

1990) (same).


D. Congress Must Not Have Expressed Intent
D. Congress Must Not Have Expressed Intent
to Preclude Recourse to Private Remedies
to Preclude Recourse to Private Remedies
________________________________________

25

















Maine's final salvo is that Congress preempted private

enforcement actions under Titles IV-A and IV-D by establishing in

the governing statute a comprehensive and exclusive administra-
_________

tive enforcement scheme. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 520-21. The
______

Supreme Court repeatedly has stated that it "will not lightly

conclude that Congress intended to preclude reliance on 1983 as

a remedy for the deprivation of a federally secured right,"

Wright, 479 U.S. at 423. Accordingly, where a federal statute
______

erects an administrative scheme for its enforcement, the Court

has required States to demonstrate, "by express provision or

other specific evidence from the statute itself," id., a congres-
___

sional intent to preclude private enforcement actions. On only

two occasions, however, has the Court found "express preclusion"

of the 1983 remedy. In both instances the challenged statute

itself expressly included remedies permitting private citizens to
________

compel State compliance with the statutory scheme. Smith v.
_____

Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009-13 (1984) (statute provided indivi-
________

dualized administrative hearings and judicial review for individ-

ual beneficiaries); Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981) (statute
____________

created "quite comprehensive enforcement scheme," with "many

specific statutory remedies, including the two citizen-suit

provisions").

In the present case, Maine does not claim that Titles

IV-A and IV-D contain express provisions foreclosing private

enforcement actions. Nor does it contend that the statute

26

















provides a specific statutory remedy enabling aggrieved AFDC

recipients to obtain redress for wrongfully-delayed payments.

Instead, it argues that "express preclusion" of a private 1983

remedy is demonstrated by the statute's establishment of OCSE;

the grant to OCSE of responsibility for setting and monitoring

standards for "substantial compliance" with the statutory scheme;

and OCSE's administrative responsibility under the statute for

imposing financial sanctions on States whose programs do not

"substantially comply." 42 U.S.C. 652(a).

Although one court of appeals has accepted a similar

argument, finding it unlikely "that Congress intended to occupy

the same ground at the same time and in the same manner as the

Secretary," Carelli, 923 F.2d at 1215-16, we respectfully dis-
_______

agree. In our view, the OCSE administrative enforcement scheme,

authorizing penalties against participating States for "substan-

tial noncompliance," seems intended to protect important federal
_______

interests, including prompt disbursement of federal funds to

needy AFDC recipients as mandated by Congress, by ensuring that

overall performance by the participating State does not fall
_______

below federally-prescribed levels. The private remedy afforded

by 1983, on the other hand, safeguards the individual AFDC
__________ ____

recipient's interests in the timely receipt of the mandated
___________ _________

federal benefits. Though coexistent, at best these interests

overlap imperfectly. For example, a State may avoid coercive

administrative penalties by disbursing "pass-through" and "gap"

27

















payments reasonably promptly in 76% of its AFDC cases, while

violating the statutory rights of the other 24% of eligible AFDC

recipients. Cf. Wehunt, 942 F.2d at 1387 ("From the standpoint
___ ______

of the applicants or recipients who are denied [statutory bene-

fits] within the time mandated by federal regulations, it is no

comfort to be told that there is no federal remedy because the

state is in 'substantial compliance' with the federal require-

ments") (footnote omitted).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court repeatedly has held that

administrative enforcement schemes must be presumed to parallel
________

the private 1983 enforcement remedy, rather than to "occupy

the same ground" as the State contends. Rosado v. Wyman, 397
______ _____

U.S. 397, 420 (1970) (Secretary's authority to withhold funds

under 604(a) does not preclude private actions to enforce

individual rights under Title IV-A; "we are most reluctant to

assume Congress has closed the avenue of effective judicial

review to those individuals most directly affected by the admin-

istration of its program"); Howe, 774 F. Supp. at 1230 (rejecting
____

argument that Title IV-D rights are unenforceable under Sea
___

Clammers); see also Wright, 479 U.S. at 428 (Secretary's "author-
________ ___ ____ ______

ity to audit, enforce annual contributions contracts, and cut off

federal funds . . . [are] generalized powers [which] are insuffi-

cient to indicate a congressional intention to foreclose 1983

remedies"); see generally Ashish Prasad, Note, Rights Without
___ _________ _______________

Remedies: Section 1983 Enforcement of Title IV-D of the Social
_________________________________________________________________

28

















Security Act, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 197, 221 (1993) ("without a
____________

1983 remedy, needy families with children are completely

deprived of access to the federal courts to secure child support

enforcement services granted them by Title IV-D"). Indeed,

Wilder suggests that in certain circumstances an administrative
______

enforcement scheme may even support the finding of a private
_______

right. See 496 U.S. at 514-15 ("If the Secretary is entitled to
___

reject a state plan upon concluding that a State's assurances of

compliance are unsatisfactory . . . a State is on notice . . . .

[of] the concomitant obligation [to beneficiaries] to adopt

reasonable and adequate rates"). Accordingly, we decline to

disturb the presumption, articulated in Rosado, Wilder and
______ ______

earlier cases, that the OCSE administrative enforcement scheme

parallels and does not displace the private 1983 enforcement

remedy.


IV
IV

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
__________


We hold that individual AFDC recipients possess stand-

ing to bring a private action against the State, under 42 U.S.C.

1983, to enforce their right to prompt disbursement of their

child-support entitlements under Titles IV-A and IV-D of the

Social Security Act.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
______________________________________________



29







Source:  CourtListener

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