USCA1 Opinion
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
_________________________
No. 93-1206
RICHARD L. WRIGHT,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
ERNEST C. PARK, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
_________________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Morton A. Brody, U.S. District Judge]
___________________
_________________________
Before
Selya, Cyr and Boudin,
Circuit Judges.
______________
_________________________
Peter A. Anderson for appellant.
_________________
Michael M. DuBose, Assistant United States Attorney, with
_________________
whom Jay P. McCloskey, United States Attorney, and George P.
_________________ _________
Dilworth, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief, for
____________________________________________
appellees.
_________________________
October 4, 1993
_________________________
SELYA, Circuit Judge. This appeal requires us to
SELYA, Circuit Judge.
______________
consider whether civil rights actions can be maintained against
military officers in the chain of command by persons employed
under the National Guard Technician Act of 1968 (Technician Act),
32 U.S.C. 709 (1988). The district court granted summary
judgment because it deemed plaintiff's claims to be
nonjusticiable. See Wright v. Park, 811 F. Supp. 726 (D. Me.
___ ______ ____
1993). Although our reasoning differs from that of the court
below, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
I. BACKGROUND
The facts, insofar as they are germane to this
proceeding, are not seriously disputed. Plaintiff-appellant
Richard L. Wright served from 1970 to 1990 in a dual civilian-
military capacity as a technician at the Air National Guard (ANG)
base in Bangor, Maine. Wearing his civilian hat, appellant
served during the last three years of the period as an aircraft
maintenance specialist. Wearing his military hat, he served
during that same period as deputy commander for maintenance,
101st Air Refueling Wing, and as a colonel in the Maine ANG. In
these positions, appellant supervised approximately 450 persons
attached to the maintenance unit, including 130 technicians. His
primary mission was to keep Bangor-based military aircraft in a
state of combat preparedness, and to train others to do the same.
On March 2, 1990, Major General Ernest Park notified
appellant of his forthcoming reassignment to the position of
flight instructor. In compliance with Technician Personnel
2
Regulation No. 15, 2-5,1 Park's letter informed appellant that,
if he abjured reassignment, the letter itself would be deemed to
operate as a 30-day termination notice. Appellant did not
welcome the news: while the proposed shift in duties endangered
neither his pay nor his benefits, it promised to remove him from
the maintenance unit and divorce him from all supervisory
responsibilities. Consequently, appellant rejected the
reassignment. In due course, the threatened termination became a
reality. Park relieved appellant of his duties as a civilian
aircraft maintenance specialist and as deputy commander for
maintenance, while leaving intact his military rank.
His several hats askew, appellant brought suit in
federal district court against General Park and others presumably
responsible for cashiering him. He claimed that his habitual
whistleblowing during his tenure as maintenance officer, he had
filed repeated reports of safety violations, as well as a report
charging General Park with the unauthorized use of military
aircraft prompted a cabal of high-ranking officers to retaliate
against him and, ultimately, strip him of his job.2 His second
amended complaint (the operative document for our purposes)
alleges that the named defendants Generals Park, Eremita, and
____________________
1Regulation No. 15, promulgated by the Secretaries of the
Army and Air Force pursuant to 32 U.S.C. 709(a) (1988), covers
a wide range of personnel matters. Section 2-5 thereof addresses
non-disciplinary, management-directed reassignments of persons
employed under the Technician Act.
2Defendants deny these charges, contending that appellant's
reassignment was justified by discipline problems within the
maintenance unit and by the need to bolster flagging morale.
3
Durgin, and Colonel Hessert thereby violated the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985 (1988), the federal whistleblower
statute, 5 U.S.C. 2301-2302 (1988), and the state
whistleblower law, 26 M.R.S.A. 831-840 (1988).
The federal district court consolidated the case with a
related case.3 On January 26, 1993, the court granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding in substance
that the dispute concerned a nonjusticiable military controversy.
See Wright v. Park, 811 F. Supp. at 732. It reached this result
___ ______ ____
by applying the analytic framework first suggested in Mindes v.
______
Seaman, 453 F.2d 197, 201-02 (5th Cir. 1971), and subsequently
______
adopted by this court in Penagaricano v. Llenza, 747 F.2d 55, 60-
____________ ______
61 (1st Cir. 1984).
The appeal from the district court's judgment presents
a pair of interrelated issues: separability and justiciability.
Thus, we must make two inquiries: Assuming defendants
discriminated against appellant, can appellant be said to have
suffered injury in his capacity as a civilian worker, independent
of his military role? (2) If not, i.e., if appellant was
____
____________________
3An investigator for the Maine Human Rights Commission found
reason to believe that defendants discriminated against
appellant, and the Commission joined with appellant to bring suit
in federal district court. A parallel state action was removed
to federal court and then consolidated with the original action.
After the Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that the state
whistleblower law does not pertain to National Guard personnel,
see Maine Human Rights Comm'n v. Maine Dep't of Defense &
___ ___________________________ ___________________________
Veterans' Servs., 627 A.2d 1005 (Me. 1993), the Commission
_________________
dropped its appeal from the judgment below. The parties agree
that the state-law issues are now moot and, consequently, we do
not address them.
4
injured, rather, in his military capacity, can his injury form
the basis for a justiciable civil rights claim against the
defendants (all of whom are military officers)? To complicate
matters, answering the second query will require us to reexamine
our governing precedent on justiciability in light of recent case
law elsewhere.
II. AN OFFICER AND A GENTLEMAN
II. AN OFFICER AND A GENTLEMAN
Appellant, who remains a colonel in the ANG, argues
strenuously that, for purposes of this case, his civilian status
may be disentangled from his military status, and that he should
be free to sue for discrimination implicating the former. But
this balkanization of technicians' work is belied by Congress's
description of the functions that ANG technicians serve, by the
unmistakable intendment of the Technician Act (the statute that
Congress enacted in 1968 to regulate such personnel), and by the
resulting ties that bind technicians' civilian and military
roles.
The Technician Act makes technicians eligible for
military employment benefits and, in so doing, seeks to improve
national security by facilitating the recruitment of qualified
individuals. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. FLRA, 730
___ _________________________________ ____
F.2d 1534, 1542-47 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (analyzing legislative
history). The Act provides in relevant part that persons may be
employed as technicians only "[u]nder regulations prescribed by
the Secretary of the [relevant military branch]. . . ." 32
U.S.C. 709(a). Each such technician "shall, while so employed,
5
be a member of the National Guard and hold the military grade
specified by the Secretary concerned for that position." 32
U.S.C. 709(b). In substance, then, the Technician Act
evidences Congress's intention that technicians, while retaining
their positions as civil employees outside the competitive civil
service, will serve simultaneously as employees of the
appropriate military department, subject to its regulation.
It is axiomatic that the National Guard is military in
character. See H.R. Rep. No. 1823, 90th Cong. 2d Sess.,
___
reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3318, 3319 (recognizing the
_________ __
"military characteristics of the National Guard"). We think it
follows that technicians are martial in character. Indeed, under
the Technician Act's composite regime, technicians are
considerably more than nominal members of the military
establishment. In referring to the National Guard's mission,
Congress termed it "essential" as a matter of "military policy"
that "the strength and organization of the [National Guard] as an
integral part of the first line defenses of the United States be
maintained and assured at all times." 32 U.S.C. 102. Because
National Guard technicians serve as the Guard's support staff and
are, in fact, those whose job it is to maintain and assure the
Guard's strength and organization, they are indispensable to this
nation's defense. See, e.g., 32 U.S.C. 709(a) (assigning to
___ ____
technicians such distinctively military tasks as "(1) the
administration and training of the National Guard; and (2) the
maintenance and repair of supplies issued to the National Guard
6
or the armed services"). Nor do technicians merely perform tasks
that have a military ring to them; the record reflects that fully
one-half of appellant's outfit, the 101st Air Refueling Wing,
served in Operation Desert Storm or Desert Shield.
Given this mise-en-scene, it is unsurprising that, no
____ __ _____
matter the context, every court having occasion closely to
consider the capacity of National Guard technicians has
determined that capacity to be irreducibly military in nature.
See, e.g., Stauber v. Cline, 837 F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir.), cert.
___ ____ _______ _____ _____
denied, 488 U.S. 817 (1988); Illinois Nat'l Guard v. FLRA, 854
______ ____________________ ____
F.2d 1396, 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1988); American Fed'n, 730 F.2d at
______________
1545-46; New Jersey Air Nat'l Guard v. FLRA, 677 F.2d 276, 279
___________________________ ____
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982); Nesmith v. Fulton,
_____ ______ _______ ______
615 F.2d 196, 200-01 (5th Cir. 1980). We, too, conclude that,
since National Guard technicians' positions are encompassed
within a military organization and require the performance of
work directly related to national defense, such positions are
themselves military in nature.
Appellant strives valiantly to elude the grasp of this
logic. He says that his situation is different; it falls outside
the mine run of previous cases because he was ousted from his
civilian employment without being terminated from his military
post. This asseveration cannot withstand scrutiny.
For one thing, appellant mischaracterizes his own
situation: though he retains his commission as a colonel in the
ANG, the injury of which he complains has had repercussions
7
beyond the loss of his civilian mantle. He also has been
dismissed from the post of deputy commander for maintenance a
post which he admits is military in nature. For another thing,
appellant's self-portrait, even as he has painted it, is not an
original. In Nesmith, for example, the plaintiff lost his
_______
civilian post prior to the eventual loss of his military post.
Nesmith, 615 F.2d at 197. The court took care to analyze the
_______
initial dismissal independently, yet reached the same conclusion
as other courts that have considered the question: an ANG
technician's two identities are not scissile. See id. at 201;
___ ___
see also Stauber, 837 F.2d at 399 (holding that an injury
___ ____ _______
occurring in the course of plaintiff's civilian employment as an
ANG technician arose incident to military service); cf. New
___ ___
Jersey Air Nat'l Guard, 677 F.2d at 279 (holding that the
_________________________
Technician Act grants adjutants general final discretion relating
to discipline and discharge of ANG technicians).
We rule, therefore, that while a technician's job is a
composite, containing both civilian and military pieces, the
job's dual aspects are inseparable; they are, like Chang and Eng,
joined at the chest. And from the fact that the technician's
several roles are inextricably intertwined, it follows that the
adverse employment action against which appellant inveighs
necessarily implicates his military as well as his civilian
status. In other words, Colonel Wright, for present purposes, is
both an officer and a gentleman.
III. NO CLEARANCE FOR TAKEOFF
III. NO CLEARANCE FOR TAKEOFF
8
Having answered the separability question in the
negative, we proceed to the question of justiciability. The
touchstone of our inquiry is Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296
________ _______
(1983). Chappell held that "[t]aken together, the unique
________
disciplinary structure of the Military Establishment and
Congress' activity in the field constitute `special factors'
which dictate that it would be inappropriate to provide enlisted
military personnel with a Bivens-type remedy against their
______
superior officers." Id. at 304 (citation omitted).4 The
___
Chappell Court placed particular emphasis on the first of these
________
two factors:
The special nature of military life the
need for unhesitating and decisive action by
military officers and equally disciplined
responses by enlisted personnel would be
undermined by a judicially created remedy
exposing officers to personal liability at
the hands of those they are charged to
command. Here, as in Feres [v. United
_____ ______
States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)], we must be
______
"concern[ed] with the disruption of `[t]he
peculiar and special relationship of the
soldier to his superiors' that might result
if the soldier were allowed to hale his
superiors into court."
Id. (citations omitted).
___
Chappell broke new ground, and courts across the nation
________
____________________
4When the Chappell Court wrote about a "Bivens-type" remedy,
________ ______
it had in mind Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
______ _______________________________________
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens is the case
____________________ ______
establishing, as a general proposition, that victims of a
constitutional violation perpetrated by a federal actor may sue
the offender for damages in federal court despite the absence of
explicit statutory authorization for such suits. See Carlson v.
___ _______
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980) (restating Bivens rule); Morales v.
_____ ______ _______
Ramirez, 906 F.2d 784, 786 (1st Cir. 1990) (same).
_______
9
vigorously debated whether to read it narrowly, based on its
holding, or to read it broadly, based on its reasoning. See
___
Jorden v. National Guard Bureau, 799 F.2d 99, 107 (3d Cir. 1986)
______ _____________________
(surveying case law), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 815 (1987). Within
_____ ______
a year after Chappell emerged, this court decided Penagaricano,
________ ____________
747 F.2d 55, a case involving facts similar to those we sift
today. There, an ANG technician, having been discharged, alleged
a conspiracy to end his employment in retaliation for his
political ideas and affiliations. See id. at 58. In upholding
___ ___
the dismissal of plaintiff's claim, we took pains to acknowledge
the relevance of Chappell's emphasis on "the importance of the
________
military's decisionmaking autonomy," id. at 59, took into account
___
the factors identified by Chappell as counselling against
________
justiciability in the military context, id. at 59-60, and noted
___
that Chappell suggested a "predisposition to decline review," id.
________ ___
at 64. Nevertheless, believing that the holding in Chappell
________
should be confined to the context of enlisted personnel suing
superior officers, we declined to cede it controlling effect.
See id. at 59. Thus, although we ultimately found Penagaricano's
___ ___
claim to be nonjusticiable, we based that finding not on Chappell
________
but on an application of the balancing test limned by the Fifth
Circuit in Mindes, 453 F.2d at 201-02. See Penagaricano, 747
______ ___ ____________
F.2d at 60-61.
Time has shed new light on the debate over Chappell's
________
doctrinal reach. In United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669
_____________ _______
(1987) a case which the Court accepted for review specifically
10
to resolve the controversy over the proper dimensions of
Chappell, see id. at 676 the Justices came down on the side of
________ ___ ___
the broad constructionists. While conceding that "no holding can
be broader than the facts before it," and that some of Chappell's
________
language focused explicitly on the officer/subordinate dichotomy,
id. at 680, the Stanley Court pointed out that Chappell had self-
___ _______ ________
consciously patterned its analysis after Feres the case that
_____
barred tort liability for injuries that "arise out of or are in
the course of activity incident to [military] service." Stanley,
_______
483 U.S. at 684 (quoting Feres, 340 U.S. at 146). Given this
_____
symbiotic relationship between Feres and Chappell, the Stanley
_____ ________ _______
Court concluded that the Chappell approach should apply to all
________
activities performed "incident to service" rather than merely to
activities performed within the officer/subordinate sphere.
Stanley, 483 U.S. at 680-81. In this sense, then, Stanley both
_______ _______
"reaffirm[ed] the reasoning of Chappell," id. at 683-84, and
________ ___
widened the scope of its holding.
Of critical importance for present purposes, Stanley
_______
makes pellucid that the exception to Bivens liability established
______
by Chappell is coextensive with the exception to tort liability
________
established by Feres and its progeny.5 Consequently, "no Bivens
_____ ______
remedy is available for injuries that "arise out of or are in the
____________________
5To call the Feres doctrine an exception is an
_____
oversimplification. Feres is a judge-made exception to the
_____
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, 2671-2680 (1988 &
Supp. II 1990), itself a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity
from tort liability. Thus, if tort liability is the rule, Feres
_____
created an exception to an exception to an exception.
11
course of activity incident to service." Id. at 684. We now
___
join several of our sister circuits in accepting this bright-line
rule as the definitive statement on the justiciability of civil
rights claims in the military context, including the National
Guard.6 And, being reluctant to leave "derelicts on the waters
of the law," Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co., 341
__________________________ ________________
U.S. 341, 357 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), we overrule
Penagaricano to the extent that it mandates a different rule.7
____________
____________________
6See, e.g., Maddick v. United States, 978 F.2d 614, 615
___ ____ _______ ______________
(10th Cir. 1992); Kitowski v. United States, 931 F.2d 1526, 1529
________ _____________
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 371 (1991); Watson v.
_____ ______ ______
Arkansas Nat'l Guard, 886 F.2d 1004, 1006-07, 1009-10 (8th Cir.
____________________
1989). We would add, moreover, that several courts, even without
the benefit of Stanley's clarification of Chappell, anticipated
_______ ________
Stanley and adopted a per se prohibition of damages actions
_______ ___ __
brought against military officers for alleged violations of
subordinates' civil rights. See, e.g., Jorden, 799 F.2d at 107;
___ ____ ______
Trerice v. Summons, 755 F.2d 1081, 1084 (4th Cir. 1985); Mollnow
_______ _______ _______
v. Carlton, 716 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
_______ _____ ______
U.S. 1100 (1984); see also Martelon v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1348,
___ ____ ________ ______
1350 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1135 (1985). Most
_____ ______
significantly for our purposes, the Fifth Circuit, progenitor of
the Mindes multifactor test, has abandoned that approach in favor
______
of a per se prohibition. See Crawford v. Texas Army Nat'l Guard,
___ __ ___ ________ ______________________
794 F.2d 1034, 1036 (5th Cir. 1986). In short, Mindes has been
______
banished from its homeland.
7Although panel decisions of this court are ordinarily
binding on newly constituted panels, that rule does not obtain in
instances where, as here, a departure is compelled by controlling
authority. In such relatively rare instances, we have sometimes
chosen to circulate the proposed overruling opinion to all
members of the court prior to publication even though the need to
overrule precedent is reasonably clear. See, e.g., Trailer
___ ____ _______
Marine Transport Corp. v. Rivera Vazquez, 977 F.2d 1, 9 n.5 (1st
______________________ ______________
Cir. 1992). This procedure is, of course, informal, and does not
preclude a suggestion of rehearing en banc on any issue.
We have followed that praxis here and can report that none
of the judges of this court has objected to the panel's analysis
or to its conclusion that the justiciability regime limned in
Penagaricano has outlived its usefulness as precedent.
____________
12
Of course, Wright's suit invoked the Civil Rights Act
rather than following the Bivens route. But absent a specific
______
statutory provision to the contrary, there is no principled basis
for according state actors sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 a
different degree of immunity than would be accorded federal
actors sued for an identical abridgement of rights under Bivens.
______
See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 500 (1978). Thus, while the
___ ____ ________
Stanley Court's clarification of Chappell occurred in the context
_______ ________
of a Bivens action, Stanley can only be understood to apply
______ _______
equally to civil rights claims against state officials under
section 1983 and, for that matter, under kindred statutes. See
___
Watson v. Arkansas Nat'l Guard, 886 F.2d 1004, 1007 (8th Cir.
______ _____________________
1989) (collecting cases construing Chappell rule to cover suits
________
brought under section 1983). The federal whistleblower statute,
5 U.S.C. 2301-2302, relied on by appellant in association with
his civil rights claims, is a statute that falls comfortably
within this generality. Hence, the district court appropriately
declined to clear the case for trial.
IV. CONCLUSION
IV. CONCLUSION
We need go no further. Since a technician's dual roles
are too tightly imbricated to be pried apart at a litigant's
whim, appellant necessarily suffered the injury of which he
complains in his military capacity. See supra Part II. For that
___ _____
reason, the injury arose incident to military service. See supra
___ _____
Part III. In these circumstances, Stanley applies, and, under
_______
the Stanley rule, the statements of claim contained in
_______
13
appellant's second amended complaint fail the test of
justiciability.8
Affirmed.
Affirmed.
________
____________________
8Because appellant's suit is nonjusticiable, we need not
consider other potential deficiencies in appellant's case, e.g.,
____
whether the defendants can be said to have acted under color of
state law.
14
