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Witty v. Dukakis, 93-1238 (1993)

Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Number: 93-1238 Visitors: 13
Filed: Sep. 02, 1993
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT _________________________ No. 93-1238 PAUL WITTY, ET AL. The district court subsequently refused to amend either the new or the old judgment and, by order dated February 3, 1993, again denied appellants' request for attorneys' fees. ________ 11
USCA1 Opinion









UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

_________________________

No. 93-1238

PAUL WITTY, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,

v.

MICHAEL S. DUKAKIS, ETC., ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
_________________________

GERALD S. KRAMER, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants.

_________________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]
___________________

_________________________

Before

Selya and Stahl, Circuit Judges,
______________
and Fuste,* District Judge.
______________

_________________________

Mary Winstanley O'Connor with whom Gaffin & Krattenmaker,
_________________________ _______________________
P.C. was on brief, for appellants.
____
Margaret Monsell, Assistant Attorney General, Commonwealth
________________
of Massachusetts, with whom Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General,
_________________
was on brief, for defendants-appellees.

_________________________

September 2, 1993

_________________________

________________
*Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.



















SELYA, Circuit Judge. After failing to strike while
SELYA, Circuit Judge.
______________

the iron was hot, appellants invited the district court to

overlook their lassitude and award them attorneys' fees under 42

U.S.C. 1988. The district court demurred. We find the court's

declination of appellant's invitation, premised on the lack of a

timely fee petition, to be appropriate. Consequently, we affirm.

I
I

We need not dwell on the provenance of the underlying

suit. For present purposes, it suffices merely to say that

parents of several mentally and physically handicapped children

brought suit in a Massachusetts state court charging the named

defendants, state officials, with dereliction of duty and seeking

injunctive relief. The original plaintiffs averred in substance

that the state had an obligation to continue the children's

special education past age twenty-two; that the state legislature

appropriated money to accomplish this objective; and that the

executive branch then wrongfully impounded the funds. Plaintiffs

later added a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. Appellants,

parents of similarly situated children, moved to intervene as

parties plaintiff, making virtually identical claims. On October

10, 1989, a state judge granted their motion.

On October 18, defendants removed the action to the

federal district court. All plaintiffs, including the

appellants, moved to remand. On January 24, 1990, the district

court, in an order reminiscent of the precedent proposed by

Solomon to resolve conflicting claims of parentage, see 2 Kings
___ _____


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3:16-18, remanded the state-law claims but retained jurisdiction

over the section 1983 claim. The parties subsequently reached a

settlement resolving all the state-law claims. By virtue of this

settlement, the plaintiffs, and all persons similarly situated,

including appellants, achieved complete relief.

On January 15, 1991, plaintiffs asked the district

court for attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988.1

Appellants did not file a similar application. On June 21, 1991,

the judge issued a memorandum order awarding plaintiffs

$147,288.17. On August 12, 1991, final judgment entered. The

judgment commemorated the fee award and dismissed the underlying

claims as moot. On the same date, the case was administratively

closed.

On April 23, 1992, appellants stirred from their

apparent slumber and applied for fees. On July 17, the district

court denied the application as untimely under D. Mass. Loc. R.

54.3, which requires a prevailing party to move for attorneys'

fees within thirty days next following the entry of judgment, on

pain of preclusion. Appellants moved for reconsideration. The

court denied that motion on December 7. Appellants then tried a

different route, moving for entry of judgment pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 54(b). Appellants contended that, because the district

court's earlier entry of judgment did not specifically mention


____________________

142 U.S.C. 1988 provides in pertinent part that, in
actions brought under the aegis of 42 U.S.C. 1983, "the court,
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."

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"intervenors," it "adjudicate[d] fewer than all the claims . . .

of fewer than all the parties," and therefore failed to

"terminate the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).2 By virtue of

this maneuver, appellants hoped to restart the clock in regard to

the filing of an application for counsel fees. On December 31,

1992, the district court granted the motion for entry of judgment

stating explicitly, however, that it was doing so "with respect

to the only issue remaining, [appellants'] claim for attorney's

fees." A judgment commemorative of the December 31 order entered

on January 4, 1993. The district court subsequently refused to

amend either the new or the old judgment and, by order dated

February 3, 1993, again denied appellants' request for attorneys'

fees. This appeal ensued.


____________________

2Rule 54(b) provides in pertinent part:

When more than one claim for relief is
presented in an action, . . . or when
multiple parties are involved, the court may
direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims
or parties only upon an express determination
that there is no just reason for delay and
upon an express direction for the entry of
judgment. In the absence of such
determination and direction, any order or
other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims
or the rights and liabilities of fewer than
all the parties shall not terminate the
action as to any of the claims or parties,
and the order or other form of decision is
subject to revision at any time before the
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims
and the rights and liabilities of all the
parties.



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II
II

Ordinarily, a prevailing plaintiff in a section 1983

case is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees "unless

special circumstances would render such an award unjust."

Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 89 n.1 (1989); Newman v.
_________ ________ ______

Piggy Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). Local Rule
_________________________

54.3 conditions this entitlement by requiring prevailing parties

to file fee applications within thirty days next following the

entry of judgment or else forever hold their peace. The

genealogy of this timeliness requirement is impeccable. See
___

White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Empl't Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 454
_____ ____________________________________

(1981) (suggesting that courts adopt such rules); Baird v.
_____

Bellotti, 724 F.2d 1032, 1037 n.6 (1st Cir. 1984) (similar).
________

In general, rules limiting the time within which fee

claims may be filed are enforceable according to their tenor.

Here, appellants do not question the propriety of such rules. By

like token, appellants have shown insufficient reason why they

should be excused from the operation of Local Rule 54.3.

Nevertheless, appellants weave an imaginative tapestry featuring

manifold reasons why the district court erred in refusing to

entertain their fee petition. Having pulled each asseverational

thread, we find the fabric to be unserviceable.

First, appellants say that, inasmuch as the 1991

judgment made no particular mention of them, it could not have

been a final judgment within the meaning of the Civil Rules and,

therefore, the 30-day time period specified in Local Rule 54.3


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did not begin to run until January 4, 1993 (when the district

court, at appellants' behest, entered another judgment). But,

appellants proceed from a mistaken assumption.

A judgment is final "when the court enters a decision

resolving the contested matter, leaving nothing to be done except

execution of the judgment." United States v. Metropolitan Dist.
_____________ __________________

Comm'n, 847 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1988).3 Since appellants had
______

intervened as parties plaintiff and their substantive claims

matched those of the original plaintiffs, the action was

effectively ended when the court dismissed plaintiffs' federal

claims as moot. See 7C Charles A. Wright et al., Federal
___ _______

Practice and Procedure 1920, at 488 (1983) (explaining that, as
______________________

a general rule, "the intervenor is treated as if he were an

original party and has equal standing with the original

parties"). At that point in the proceedings, then, appellants'

claims had no independent life.

We add a postscript. We think that the 1991 judgment,

by dint of plain language and surrounding context, disposed of

all remaining claims. If, however, any ambiguity existed, we

would be bound to defer to a reasonable interpretation of the

judgment's meaning and effect elucidated by the judicial officer

who authored it. See, e.g., Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 847 F.2d
___ ____ _________________________

at 14; Martha's Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, Inc. v.
_________________________________________________

____________________

3It is, of course, well settled that a judgment is
considered "final" if it resolves the merits, despite the fact
that it leaves claims for attorneys' fees to be adjudicated at a
later date. See White, 455 U.S. at 452 & n.14; Crossman v.
___ _____ ________
Maccoccio, 792 F.2d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
_________

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Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Steam Vessel, 833 F.2d 1059,
_________________________________________________

1066-67 (1st Cir. 1987); Lefkowitz v. Fair, 816 F.2d 17, 22-23
_________ ____

(1st Cir. 1987); Advance Fin. Corp. v. Isla Rica Sales, Inc., 747
__________________ _____________________

F.2d 21, 26 n.10 (1st Cir. 1984). Here, the district judge, in

denying the fee application as untimely, made it crystal clear

that she believed the 1991 judgment disposed of all remaining

claims, appellants' included, and that she intended the judgment

to have precisely that culminative effect. Because the district

judge's reading is, far and away, the most plausible

interpretation that can be placed on the judgment, appellants'

attempt to argue otherwise can only be viewed as a prime example

of disappointed litigants elevating hope above reason.

Second, appellants asseverate that the 30-day period

specified in Local Rule 54.3 began to run anew when the district

court entered another judgment on January 4, 1993. This argument

is also flawed. To the extent it relies upon the alleged

incompleteness or lack of finality of the earlier judgment, it

fails on the basis of what we have already written. To the

extent that this argument has a somewhat different focus, it

conveniently overlooks that the 1993 judgment entered at

appellants' express request. From the district court's

standpoint, the judgment's only effect was to put a tidy end to

appellants' belated quest for fees.4 A party confronted by a

set period for taking an action cannot allow the time to lapse

____________________

4The district court made this abundantly clear both in the
wording of its order and in holding fast to its earlier refusal
to grant fees.

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and then resurrect his rights merely by asking the court to

reconsider or to confirm what the court has already done. See,
___

e.g., Fisichelli v. City, Etc. of Methuen, 884 F.2d 17, 18-19
____ __________ ______________________

(1st Cir. 1989); Rodriguez-Antuna v. Chase Manhattan Bank Corp.,
________________ __________________________

871 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989); see also Browder v. Director, Ill.
___ ____ _______ ______________

Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 263 n.7 (1978). After all,
_____________________

"[t]he law ministers to the vigilant not to those who sleep upon

perceptible rights." Puleio v. Vose, 830 F.2d 1197, 1203 (1st
______ ____

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 990 (1988).
_____ ______

Third, appellants argue that the 1991 judgment had no

dispositive effect because they received no contemporaneous

notice of its entry. This suggestion ignores an abecedarian rule

of civil practice: parties to an ongoing case have an

independent obligation to monitor all developments in the case

and cannot rely on the clerk's office to do their homework for

them. See Vargas v. Gonzalez, 975 F.2d 916, 917 (1st Cir. 1992);
___ ______ ________

Spiller v. U.S.V. Labs., Inc., 842 F.2d 535, 537 (1st Cir. 1988);
_______ __________________

cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 77(d) (providing that "lack of notice of the
___

entry [of a judgment] by the clerk does not affect the time to

appeal"). Had appellants exercised even a modicum of diligence,

they would have known that proceedings were in progress to assess

attorneys' fees and, thereafter, that the case had been closed.

In sum, appellants' professed lack of awareness cannot be

permitted to frustrate the 30-day time limit limned in Local Rule

54.3.

Next, appellants assert that the district court's


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denial of fees was inexplicit it did not particularly describe

the "special circumstances" that rendered a fee award "unjust,"

Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 89 n.1 and, therefore, defective. This
_________

assertion blinks reality. The pertinent facts are as follows.

The district court initially rebuffed appellants' fee application

on July 17, 1992. The court's order explained that the fee

request was time barred. Appellants later made two subsequent

motions that, in effect, asked the court to revisit the matter of

fees. The district court denied these motions without comment;

the operative orders were entered on December 7, 1992 and

February 3, 1993, respectively.

Appellants urge us to set aside the last two orders for

lack of findings. We see no need to do so. So long as a

district court's reason for denying fees or monetary sanctions is

(1) well founded, (2) sufficient to the stated end, and (3)

apparent on the face of the record, a reviewing tribunal will not

insist on unnecessary punctilio. See, e.g., Figueroa-Ruiz v.
___ ____ _____________

Alegria, 905 F.2d 545, 549 (1st Cir. 1990) (requiring explanation
_______

only when reason for denial of sanctions is "not obvious or

apparent from the record"); Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp.,
______ ________________________

901 F.2d 186, 195 (1st Cir. 1990) (similar); see also Brewster v.
___ ____ ________

Dukakis, ___ F.2d ___, ___ (1st Cir. 1993) [No. 92-2399, slip op.
_______

at 11-12] (affirming reduction in claimed attorneys' fees despite

absence of explicit findings); Jacobs v. Mancuso, 825 F.2d 559,
______ _______

564 (1st Cir. 1987) (acknowledging that there are some

circumstances in which judges confronted by fee requests may "be


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allowed to draw conclusions . . . without full articulation").

The case at bar comes squarely within this principle. It is

perfectly clear that the district court's thinking had not

changed between July 17 and December 7, and that the denial of

fees on the latter date, and thereafter in February of 1993,

stemmed from the court's steadfast, unarguably correct belief

that the time for filing a viable fee application had expired.

Because the record clearly confirms the existence of this

"special circumstance," no more is exigible.

Finally, appellants claim that the district court's

failure to grant their motion for postjudgment relief in a manner

that would have opened a new 30-day window constituted an abuse

of discretion. But the district court's discretion under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 60(b) is "wide," Cotto v. United States, 993 F.2d 274,
_____ ______________

277 (1st Cir. 1993); accord Valley Citizens for a Safe Env't v.
______ _________________________________

Aldridge, 969 F.2d 1315, 1317 (1st Cir. 1992),5 and we discern
________

no abuse in this instance. Whether the district court, as a

matter of grace, might have had discretion to vacate and reenter

the 1991 judgment or otherwise relieve appellants from the burden

of Local Rule 54.3 is not the issue. Here, the judge did not see

fit to extend discretionary relief and we can hardly fault her

for refusing to extricate appellants from a self-dug hole. See,
___

____________________

5It makes no difference that appellants also invoked Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59(e). The same expansive discretion inheres under that
rule. See Mackin v. City of Boston, 969 F.2d 1273, 1279 (1st
___ ______ _______________
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1043 (1993); United States
_____ ______ _____________
v. Land at 5 Bell Rock Rd., 896 F.2d 605, 611 (1st Cir. 1990);
_________________________
Appeal of Sun Pipe Line Co., 831 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1987),
_____________________________
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988).
_____ ______

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e.g., Zaklana v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 906 F.2d 645, 649 (11th
____ _______ ____________________

Cir. 1990) (affirming trial court's denial of fee petition for

applicant's failure to comply with timeliness requirements of

local rule; stating, inter alia, "[p]ractitioners must adhere to
_____ ____

applicable local rules in order for those local rules to have

effect and federal courts by enforcement will preserve the

integrity of local rules, absent problems of a constitutional

dimension").

III
III

We need go no further. Local Rule 54.3 provides a

reasonable period of time following the entry of judgment within

which a prevailing party may bring an application for attorneys'

fees. Appellants dawdled well past the deadline; they did not

file their application until eight months after judgment entered.

The district court acted well within its discretion in refusing

to entertain so stale an entreaty.



Affirmed.
Affirmed.
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