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United States v. Mount, 93-1264 (1993)

Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Number: 93-1264 Visitors: 16
Filed: Dec. 16, 1993
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: December 16, 1993 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT ____________________ No. 93-1264 UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. CHARLES MERRILL MOUNT, Defendant, Appellant. See, e.g., Soviero v. United States, 967 F.2d 791, 792-93 (2d ___ ____ _______ _____________ Cir.
USCA1 Opinion












December 16, 1993 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________

No. 93-1264

UNITED STATES,
Appellee,

v.

CHARLES MERRILL MOUNT,
Defendant, Appellant.
____________________

No. 93-1330
No. 93-1331

CHARLES MERRILL MOUNT,
Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant, Appellee.
____________________

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]
___________________
____________________

Before

Cyr, Boudin and Stahl,
Circuit Judges.
______________
____________________

Charles Merrill Mount on briefs pro se.
_____________________
A. John Pappalardo, United States Attorney, and Tobin N. Harvey,
__________________ ________________
Assistant United States Attorney, on Memoranda in Support of Motions
for Summary Dismissal of Appeal, for appellee.


____________________



____________________















Per Curiam. In Nos. 93-1330 and 93-1331, appellant
___________

contends that the district judge lacked jurisdiction to

preside over his collateral proceedings because she presided

at trial. This allegation, which is identical to one we

recently rejected in another series of appeals from this

appellant, is frivolous. Appellant's reliance on Halliday v.
________

United States, 380 F.2d 270 (1st Cir. 1967), is misplaced.
______________

See, e.g., Panzardi-Alvarez v. United States, 879 F.2d 975,
___ ____ ________________ _____________

985 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1082 (1990);
____________

Tracey v. United States, 739 F.2d 679, 681 (1st Cir. 1984),
______ ______________

cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1109 (1985).
____________

In No. 93-1264, appellant appeals from the denial of a

motion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e) for return of property.

He there sought the return of some 135 historical documents

which, he alleged, had been stricken from the indictment due

to lack of proof of government ownership. This motion was

filed nearly four years after his conviction and over two

years after our affirmance thereof. See United States v.
___ _____________

Mount, 896 F.2d 612 (1st Cir. 1990). Because of such delay,
_____

the district court denied the motion on the ground of laches.

See, e.g., Soviero v. United States, 967 F.2d 791, 792-93 (2d
___ ____ _______ _____________

Cir. 1992) (noting that request for return of property,

whether deemed a Rule 41(e) motion or a separate civil

proceeding, is subject to equitable concerns). We find no

abuse of discretion. See, e.g., K-Mart Corp. v. Oriental
___ ____ ____________ ________



















Plaza, Inc., 875 F.2d 907, 911 (1st Cir. 1989) (laches
____________

determination reviewed "only for abuse of discretion").

We note initially that the factual premise on which

appellant's request rests--that 135 documents were stricken

from the indictment--flies in the face of the record. See
___

896 F.2d at 614, 616-20 (discussing proof of ownership as to

all 167 documents charged in superseding indictment).

Appellant points to a two-page excerpt from the trial

transcript indicating that certain exhibits (listed by number

but not otherwise identified) were stricken. To be sure, we

cannot rule out the possibility, on the limited record before

us, that such excluded exhibits may have included some small

number of documents as to which government ownership was

never established. Yet it is precisely because of the

difficulties of ascertaining such facts at this late stage

that the doctrine of laches was, we think, properly applied.

Appellant had ample opportunity to seek such relief in the

wake of his conviction, when the full record was readily

available and the events at trial were fresh in the minds of

all parties.1 His request that the trial record now be

parsed, document by document, in order to reconstruct proof

of ownership is one that the district court was justified in

summarily rejecting as a matter of equitable discretion.


____________________

1. Given the quantity of post-conviction motions and
petitions he has filed, his claim that he was disabled from
doing so because of his incarceration is frivolous.

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The judgments are affirmed.
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Source:  CourtListener

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