November 12, 1993 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 93-1355
CHARLES MERRILL MOUNT,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant, Appellee.
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No. 93-1411
CHARLES MERRILL MOUNT,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
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No. 93-1655
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
CHARLES MERRILL MOUNT,
Defendant, Appellant.
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APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]
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Before
Breyer, Chief Judge,
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Torruella and Selya, Circuit Judges.
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Charles Merrill Mount on briefs pro se.
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A. John Pappalardo, United States Attorney, and Tobin N. Harvey,
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Assistant United States Attorney, on briefs for appellee/respondent.
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Per Curiam. The judgments in these consolidated appeals
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are each affirmed. The contention that the district judge
lacked jurisdiction to preside over appellant's collateral
proceedings because she presided at trial is frivolous.
Appellant's reliance on Halliday v. United States, 380 F.2d
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270 (1st Cir. 1967), is misplaced. See, e.g., Panzardi-
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Alvarez v. United States, 879 F.2d 975, 985 (1st Cir. 1989),
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cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1082 (1990); Tracey v. United States,
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739 F.2d 679, 681 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
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1109 (1985). Nor is there any reason to disturb the denial
of appellant's motion to "cancel" the $50 special
assessments. Contrary to his assertion, such assessments are
to be imposed "per count rather than per defendant." United
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States v. Smith, 857 F.2d 682, 686 (10th Cir. 1988); see,
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e.g., United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d 148, 152 n.5
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(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 184 (1991). The
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statutory directive that the "obligation to pay an assessment
ceases five years after the date of the judgment," see 18
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U.S.C. 3013(c), contemplates no judicial intervention, at
least in the absence of an ongoing attempt to secure payment.
And cessation of the obligation to pay is not the equivalent
of nullification ab initio of the assessment.
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The judgments are affirmed. Appellant's petition is
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denied. Appellant's "cross-motion for summary judgment" is
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denied.
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