USCA1 Opinion
November 29, 1993 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 93-1535
DAVID WAYFIELD,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
TOWN OF TISBURY,
Defendant, Appellee.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Walter Jay Skinner, U.S. District Judge]
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Before
Cyr, Circuit Judge,
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Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
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and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
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David Wayfield on brief pro se.
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Tracie L. Longman and Roche, Carens & DeGiacomo on brief for
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appellee.
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Per Curiam. Appellant David Wayfield alleges that the
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Town of Tisbury, in conjunction with numerous private
parties, deprived him of his constitutional rights in
violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. After the defendants filed a
motion to dismiss the entire complaint, Wayfield moved to
amend his original complaint. This motion was denied by the
district court on the ground that the amended complaint would
also be subject to dismissal. Wayfield appeals the dismissal
of his civil rights action. With one exception, we affirm
the dismissal of Wayfield's claims.
In dismissing Wayfield's civil rights claims, the
district court seems to rely in part on the doctrine that
civil rights complaints must be pled with heightened
particularity. See Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College,
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889 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1989). However, the Supreme Court
has recently cautioned that civil rights claims are to be
subject only to normal standards of pleading. Leatherman v.
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Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
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113 S. Ct. 1160, 1163 (1993). The proper standard for
assessing the adequacy of the instant complaint then is
whether, accepting the factual allegations in the complaint
as true, and construing these facts in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, the pleading shows any facts
which could entitle plaintiff to relief. See, e.g., Gooley
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v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir. 1988).
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Moreover, as a pro se plaintiff, Wayfield is entitled to have
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his complaint "liberally construed." Estelle v. Gamble, 429
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U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
Even under this more generous standard, most of
Wayfield's causes of action are subject to dismissal for the
reasons stated in the district court opinion, dated March 29,
1993. However, we find that the amended complaint, liberally
construed, does state a cause of action under section 1983.
We therefore reverse the district court's denial of
Wayfield's motion to amend his complaint and vacate the
dismissal order in part.
According to his amended complaint, on December 14,
1990, Wayfield went to the Vineyard Haven Public Library
where he spoke with the Library Director, defendant Marjorie
Convery, and attempted to persuade her to stock several
"revisionist" books and periodicals. Ms. Convery did not
respond and "seemed very angry but controlled." Within an
hour, Wayfield was falsely accused by Ms. Convery of stealing
a menorah from the library. When he refused her request to
open his shoulder bag to be searched, Wayfield was
"assaulted" by Convery. On December 18, Wayfield received a
certified letter from Convery informing him that "[a]s a
result of the disruptive incident that occurred on Saturday .
. . your presence on the property or in the building will no
longer be permitted." On December 20, he received another
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letter dated December 19, 1990, from the Board of Trustees
for the Vineyard Haven Public Library, announcing that, due
to the "disruptive incident," he was banned from the library
until April 2, 1991. After Wayfield returned to the library
in January 1991, he was charged with trespassing. The
charges were eventually dropped. Wayfield admits to the
existence of a disturbance but alleges that he was the victim
of an illegal assault by Convery. He further alleges that
the ban imposed upon him was due not to any disturbance but
was in retaliation for his political views.
To state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a
plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support a
determination "(i) that the conduct complained of has been
committed under color of state law, and (ii) that [the
alleged] conduct worked a denial of rights secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States." Chongris v.
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Board of Appeals, 811 F.2d 36, 40 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
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483 U.S. 1021 (1987). Liberally construing the complaint and
accepting its allegations as true, we find that the complaint
states a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Ms.
Convery. First, as evidenced by her letter of December 18,
1990, banning Wayfield from the library, Ms. Convery
purported to act under the color of state law. Second, the
banning of Wayfield because of his political views would
appear to be a violation of his constitutional rights. Cf.
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Nestor Colon Medina & Sucesores, Inc. v. Custodio, 964 F.2d
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32, 40 (1st Cir. 1992) (denial of land use permit in
unjustifiable retaliation for expression of political views
constitutes a first amendment violation).
[While a] State or its instrumentality may, of
course, regulate the use of its libraries or other
public facilities . . .it must do so in a
reasonable and nondiscriminatory manner, equally
applicable to all and administered with equality to
all. . . . And it may not invoke regulations as to
use--whether they are ad hoc or general--as a
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pretext for pursuing those engaged in lawful,
constitutionally protected exercise of their
fundamental rights.
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142-43 (1966).
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To be sure, the allegations that the assault by Ms.
Convery and her banning him from the library were motivated
by animus toward Wayfield's political views are conclusory.
Such conclusory allegations become facts for pleading
purposes "only when such conclusions are logically compelled,
or at least supported, by the stated facts, that is, when the
suggested inference rises to what experience indicates is an
acceptable level of probability." Dartmouth Review v.
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Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1989).
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The complaint does allege facts which, albeit
circumstantial, support the conclusion that the banning by
the Director was politically motivated. Since the state of
mind of an actor often "must be inferred from the things [a
party] says or does[,]" Anthony v. Sundlun, 952 F.2d 603,
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605 (1st Cir. 1991), circumstantial evidence alone can
support a conclusion of discriminatory intent. Id.
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First, Wayfield alleges that on the day of the incident
which led to the banning he discussed with the Director his
political views. Not only was she thus aware of those views
but Wayfield alleges that she "seemed very angry but
controlled." He then alleges that "within an hour" he was
accused falsely of stealing a menorah and was "assaulted" by
the Director. From these facts, it is possible to infer that
the accusation of stealing was a pretext and that the real
reason for the "assault" and the Director's letter banning
Wayfield was animus towards Wayfield's political views.
We also find that, although the question is very close,
the complaint alleges a cause of action against the Town of
Tisbury as well. According to the complaint, liberally
construed, the Board of Trustees of the Vineyard Haven
Library banned Wayfield from the library between December 19,
1990, and April 2, 1991 because of his political views.
While the Board purported to act only because of the
"disruptive incident" which occurred between Wayfield and
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Convery, the complaint alleges that this incident was only a
pretext, a conclusion we have decided is supported by the
facts alleged in the complaint. We do not find the possible
inference that the Board, acting on the basis of information
provided by the Director, may have been aware of, and even
shared, the Director's intent, to be so speculative as to
require dismissal of this case without any further inquiry.
Since the Board of Trustees is the body responsible for
managing the library, see Mass. Gen. L. ch. 78, 11, any
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illegal acts it may have committed would expose the town to
liability. See Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84
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(1986) (municipality is liable under section 1983 even for "a
single decision to take unlawful action . . . [which is
made] by the official or officials responsible for
establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter
in question.").
We affirm the district court's dismissal of all
Wayfield's claims except those against Ms. Convery and the
Board of Trustees in regard to the allegedly politically
motivated banning of Wayfield from the Vineyard Haven
Library. As to those claims, we vacate the dismissal of the
complaint, reverse the denial of the motion to amend the
complaint, and remand to the district court for further
proceedings.
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Affirmed in part; vacated in part and remanded. No
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costs.
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