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Batiste v. Scott, 93-1677 (1993)

Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Number: 93-1677 Visitors: 49
Filed: Dec. 29, 1993
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: December 28, 1993 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT ____________________ No. 93-1677 JIMMY D. BATISTE, Petitioner, v. SANDRA SCOTT, DIRECTOR OF HILLSIDE PRE-RELEASE CENTER, Respondent. Corp., 929 ______ ____ _____ ________________ F.2d 1515, 1517 (10th Cir.
USCA1 Opinion









December 28, 1993 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

____________________


No. 93-1677

JIMMY D. BATISTE,

Petitioner,

v.

SANDRA SCOTT, DIRECTOR OF HILLSIDE PRE-RELEASE CENTER,

Respondent.


____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Mark L. Wolf, U.S. District Judge]
___________________

____________________

Before

Breyer, Chief Judge,
___________
Torruella and Selya, Circuit Judges.
______________

____________________

Jimmy D. Batiste on brief pro se.
________________
Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General, and William J. Meade,
__________________ ___________________
Assistant Attorney General, on brief for respondent.


____________________


____________________






















Per Curiam. Petitioner was convicted in Boston
___________

Municipal Court in 1989 on a single count of assault and

battery with a dangerous weapon. He received a sentence of

two and one-half years, with all but one year suspended. His

ensuing attempts to challenge this conviction in state court

came to naught: the trial court denied a motion for new

trial, the Appeals Court affirmed his conviction, and the

Supreme Judicial Court denied his application for further

appellate review. Petitioner then turned to federal court,

filing a pro se, in forma pauperis petition for habeas corpus
_________________

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254 in August 1991. It was apparent

from the face of the petition that, of the eight grounds for

relief there raised, no more than six had been presented to

the state appellate courts. For this reason, a magistrate-

judge (upon reviewing the petition prior to service of

process) recommended that it be summarily dismissed for

failure to exhaust state remedies. See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy,
___ ____ ____ _____

455 U.S. 509 (1982) (requiring dismissal of "mixed"

petitions).

Petitioner responded to this recommendation in two ways.

On July 29, 1992, he filed objections to the magistrate-

judge's report, complaining inter alia of various alleged
__________

factual inaccuracies therein. Part of the relief requested

was that he be granted leave to "refile" his petition. Two

days later, he did just that--submitting an amended petition



















containing only the six "exhausted" claims for relief. This

amended petition was filed under the same docket number as

its predecessor. The district court subsequently entered an

order summarily dismissing the petition "[f]or the reasons

stated by the Magistrate Judge in her Findings and

Recommendations." It thereafter granted a certificate of

probable cause to appeal.

We are constrained to vacate and remand for further

proceedings, for the simple reason that the court appears to

have overlooked petitioner's amended petition. A habeas

petitioner, faced with a determination that his petition

contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims, has "the

choice of returning to state court to exhaust his claims or

of amending or resubmitting the habeas petition to present

only exhausted claims to the district court." Rose, 455 U.S.
____

at 510; accord, e.g., Watkins v. Ponte, 987 F.2d 27, 30 (1st
______ ____ _______ _____

Cir. 1993); Tart v. Massachusetts, 949 F.2d 490, 494 (1st
____ _____________

Cir. 1991). The petitioner here has plainly chosen the

latter option--even to the point of acknowledging (in his

appellate papers) that he will likely thereby waive his right

to federal review of his two remaining claims. See, e.g.,
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McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991); Rose, 455 U.S. at
_________ ____ ____

520-21 (plurality).

The government contends that the order of dismissal

concerned only the first petition, that the district court



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has taken no action with regard to the amended petition

(i.e., that such petition remains pending below), and that

any issues involving the amended petition are thus not

properly before us. Indeed, it goes so far as to suggest we

should not "tolerate" petitioner's "tactic" of simultaneously

propounding an amended petition while seeking review of the

dismissal of his initial petition. See Brief at 9 n.5. We
___

find this argument utterly unpersuasive. Petitioner's

unilateral decision to amend his petition to delete the

unexhausted claims was consistent not only with the procedure

prescribed in Rose, but with Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) as well
____

(since no responsive pleading had been filed). See, e.g.,
___ ____

Lacy v Gabriel, 732 F.2d 7, 11 & n.1 (1st Cir.) (Rule 15
____ _______

applies to 2254 proceedings), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 861
____________

(1984). The fact that the amended petition appears to have

been submitted beyond the deadline for objecting to the

magistrate-judge's report is thus of no moment. Having been

properly filed, the amended petition "completely replac[ed]"

the original petition, Cicchetti v. Lucey, 514 F.2d 362, 365
_________ _____

n.5 (1st Cir. 1975), with the result that the latter "no

longer perform[ed] any function in the case," 6 C. Wright, A.

Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 1476, at
______________________________

556-57 (1990). Accord, e.g., Davis v. TXO Prod. Corp., 929
______ ____ _____ ________________

F.2d 1515, 1517 (10th Cir. 1991); Boelens v. Redman Homes,
_______ ______________

Inc., 759 F.2d 504, 508 (5th Cir. 1985) ("an amended
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complaint ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it

of no legal effect, unless the amended complaint specifically

refers to or adopts the earlier pleading").

Against this backdrop, the contention that the district

court confined its dismissal to the original petition, while

leaving the amended petition pending, is unconvincing. The

language of the order contained no such suggestion. The

docket sheet reflects that, on the very day the order issued,

the case was declared "closed." And, if it were true that

the amended petition remained pending, the order of dismissal

would quite obviously not have been appealable--an obstacle

that neither the district court (in granting a CPC) nor the

government on appeal has mentioned. We must conclude that,

in approving the magistrate-judge's recommendation of summary

dismissal, the district court inadvertently overlooked the

amended petition. We therefore remand the matter for further

proceedings.

Vacated and remanded for further proceedings.
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Source:  CourtListener

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