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Bemis v. United States, 93-2387 (1994)

Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Number: 93-2387 Visitors: 22
Filed: Jul. 25, 1994
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT ____________________ No. 93-2387 GREGG M. BEMIS, Petitioner, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent, Appellee. See, e.g., United States v. Ingram, 979 F.2d 1179, ___ ____ _____________ ______ 1184 (7th Cir. _______ ___________ 1987);
USCA1 Opinion









UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

____________________

No. 93-2387

GREGG M. BEMIS,

Petitioner, Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent, Appellee.

___________________


APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]
___________________


____________________

Before

Torruella, Selya and Cyr,
Circuit Judges.
______________


____________________

Gregg M. Bemis on brief pro se.
______________
Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, and Annette Forde,
_________________ _____________
Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.


____________________

July 22, 1994
____________________























SELYA, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Gregg Bemis appeals
______________

pro se from the summary dismissal of his motion to vacate,

set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255.

The centerpiece of his petition is the allegation that

government prosecutors have reneged on a promise, made as

part of his 1984 plea agreement, to secure (or at least

recommend) his entry into the Federal Witness Protection

Program (FWPP) upon his release from prison. From this

premise, petitioner advances a number of claims--most of

which are no longer zoetic and, therefore, need not be

described at any length. In particular, to the extent he is

seeking release on his state sentence, that claim is now

moot. To the extent he is seeking damages for wrongful

imprisonment, that claim has been explicitly withdrawn. And

to the extent he is challenging (for reasons that are never

explained) the term of probation imposed in 1991, that claim

has received no developed argumentation on appeal and so has

been implicitly waived. See, e.g., Ryan v. Royal Ins. Co.,
___ ____ ____ ______________

916 F.2d 731, 734 (1st Cir. 1990). The dismissal of these

various claims is therefore affirmed.

Petitioner's central claim--that the government's

failure to fulfill its alleged promise regarding FWPP

participation constitutes a due process violation--is another

matter. "[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a

promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be



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said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such

promise must be fulfilled." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
__________ ________

257, 262 (1971). Contrary to the district court's

jurisdictional ruling, we believe that habeas corpus provides

an appropriate procedural vehicle for advancing a Santobello
__________

claim. See, e.g., Kingsley v. United States, 968 F.2d 109,
___ ____ ________ _____________

111 (1st Cir. 1992) (action under 2255 alleging breach of

plea agreement).

The government suggests that, if the U.S. Attorney's

Office in fact made any promise regarding FWPP participation,

such a representation would have been ultra vires, see, e.g.,
___________ ___ ____

Doe v. Civiletti, 635 F.2d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 1980), and for
___ _________

that reason unenforceable. Yet "[a] plea induced by an

unfulfillable promise is no less subject to challenge than

one induced by a valid promise which the Government simply

fails to fulfill." United States v. Cook, 668 F.2d 317, 320
_____________ ____

(7th Cir. 1982); accord, e.g., Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S.
______ ____ _____ _______

504, 509 (1984) (plea induced by "unfulfillable promises"

subject to challenge); Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d
________ _____________

944, 946-47 (1st Cir. 1973) (plea rendered involuntary

because of failure to carry out promise that was "impossible

of fulfillment"). The government's argument instead pertains









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to the appropriate form of remedy--a matter that we have no

occasion here to address.1

As a result, "the crucial question is not whether the

Government had the authority to carry out the promise which

[petitioner] claims he understood it to make, but whether it

did in fact make such a promise." Cook, 668 F.2d at 320.
____

Petitioner advances a colorable claim in the sense that, on

appeal, he has submitted two affidavits from the former

prosecutors in his case that strongly support his

allegations.2 He nonetheless has two strikes against him in


____________________

1. We do note that courts on occasion have specifically
enforced promises that would encroach on the jurisdiction of
independent entities. See, e.g., Palermo v. Warden, 545 F.2d
___ ____ _______ ______
286, 296 (2d Cir. 1976) (enforcing promise of early parole,
in face of contrary decision of Parole Board, and ordering
defendant's release as "the only meaningful relief in the
context of this case"), cert. dismissed, 431 U.S. 911 (1977);
_______________
see generally 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure
_____________ __________________
20.2, at 600-01 (1984). We also note the rather obvious
point that, should a breach of promise be found in the
instant case, the appropriate form of remedy will depend on
the nature of that promise. See, e.g., Geisser v. United
___ ____ _______ ______
States, 513 F.2d 862, 869, 872 (5th Cir. 1975) (promise by
______
Department of Justice, which district court construed as
assurance that petitioner would not be deported to
Switzerland, is interpreted by appeals court as pledge to use
its "best efforts" to persuade State Department not to do so;
as so construed, promise is specifically enforced).

2. The government, while protesting that such evidence
should not be considered, has responded by submitting the
transcript of the Rule 11 hearing and a copy of the written
plea agreement. We think it appropriate to consider such
materials, inasmuch as the district court summarily dismissed
the pro se petition here sua sponte without affording
___________
petitioner the opportunity to amend. Cf. Johnson v.
___ _______
Rodriguez, 943 F.2d 104, 108 n.3 (1st Cir. 1991) (agreeing to
_________
consider claim not raised below under such circumstances),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 948 (1992); Lesko v. Lehman, 925
____________ _____ ______

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this regard. First, the written plea agreement (signed by

petitioner, his counsel, and the U.S. Attorney) contains no

reference to the FWPP, and declares that "[n]o additional

promises, agreements or conditions have been entered into

other than as set forth in this letter and none will be

entered into unless in writing and signed by all parties."

Second, at the Rule 11 hearing, the district court read

portions of the plea agreement into the record and then

inquired of petitioner: "Except for what is contained in that

agreement, has anyone made any promises to you to induce you

to plead guilty?" Petitioner, while under oath, responded in

the negative. No mention of the FWPP was made at any time

during this hearing.

Given these circumstances, petitioner's attempt to

establish that an additional promise was made as part of the

inducement for his plea faces daunting hurdles. A defendant

is ordinarily bound by his or her representations in court

disclaiming the existence of additional promises. See, e.g.,
___ ____

Baker v. United States, 781 F.2d 85, 90 (6th Cir.) ("where
_____ _____________

Rule 11 procedures were fully adequate, absent extraordinary

circumstances, or some explanation of why defendant did not


____________________

F.2d 1527, 1538 n.8 (3d Cir.) (noting that appeals court had
directed petitioner to file affidavit from his attorney
detailing plea negotiations), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 273
_____________
(1991). It makes no difference in any event, since a remand
would be warranted even if we confined our attention to the
allegations in the petition, disregarding both sides'
additional proffers.

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reveal other terms, at least when specifically asked to do so

by the court, a defendant's plea agreement consists of the

terms revealed in open court"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1017
____________

(1986); Barnes v. United States, 579 F.2d 364, 366 (5th Cir.
______ _____________

1978) ("Where, from the transcript, the plea-taking

procedures are clear and regular on their face, a petitioner

asserting the existence of a bargain outside the record and

contrary to his own statements under oath bears a heavy

burden."); see also United States v. Pellerito, 878 F.2d
________ _____________ _________

1535, 1539 (1st Cir. 1989) (defendant cannot "turn his back

on his own representations to the court merely because it

would suit his convenience to do so"). Likewise, the use of

parol evidence to supplement the terms of an unambiguous

written plea agreement is ordinarily frowned upon, especially

where that agreement disclaims the existence of additional

promises. See, e.g., United States v. Ingram, 979 F.2d 1179,
___ ____ _____________ ______

1184 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1616 (1993);
____________

United States v. Gamble, 917 F.2d 1280, 1282 (10th Cir.
______________ ______

1990); Hartman v. Blankenship, 825 F.2d 26, 29 (4th Cir.
_______ ___________

1987); see also United States v. Hogan, 862 F.2d 386, 388
_________ ______________ _____

(1st Cir. 1988) (fact that plea agreement disclaims existence

of other promises "militate[s] strongly" against defendant's

assertion to contrary).

Yet each of these rules is subject to exception in

unusual cases. In Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977),
__________ _______



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the Court stated that no "per se rule" could be adopted
_______

"excluding all possibility that a defendant's representations

at the time his guilty plea was accepted were so much the

product of such factors as misunderstanding, duress, or

misrepresentation by others as to make the guilty plea

[unlawful]." Id. at 75; see, e.g., Gamble, 917 F.2d at 1282
___ ___ ____ ______

& n.1 (noting that case did not "come within any Blackledge
__________

exception"); United States v. Hammerman, 528 F.2d 326, 331
_____________ _________

(4th Cir. 1975) (defendant's oral disavowal of additional

promises cannot be "considered conclusive" under

circumstances). Referring to the parol evidence rule, the

Blackledge Court explicitly noted that a written contractual
__________

provision disclaiming the existence of additional promises,

while deserving of "great weight," does not "conclusively bar

subsequent proof that such additional agreements exist and

should be given force." 431 U.S. at 75 n.6; accord, e.g.,
______ ____

Kingsley 968 F.2d at 115 (explaining that "parol evidence
________

rule is not rigidly applied in construing plea agreements"

because contract issues that are involved implicate

"constitutional rights as well as concern for the fair

administration of justice") (quoting United States v. Garcia,
_____________ ______

956 F.2d 41, 43-44 (4th Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks

omitted).3


____________________

3. We acknowledge that the Blackledge holding was based in
__________
part on the sparse record of the change-of-plea hearing and
the "ambiguous status of the process of plea bargaining at

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For several reasons, we are unwilling prematurely to

foreclose the possibility that the instant case might be

sufficiently unusual to call for an exception to these rules.

First, petitioner alleges that both his counsel and the

government prosecutor advised him that the FWPP promise was

an "administrative matter" that did not need to appear in the

plea agreement or be mentioned in court. Second, he claims

that, to the extent this advice was erroneous, his counsel

provided ineffective assistance. Third, despite the

provision in the plea agreement requiring any amendments to

be in writing, the record indicates that the agreement was

later modified (to provide for the dismissal of three counts)

without such written documentation. Fourth, petitioner could

not have been expected to object, at the Rule 11 hearing or

at sentencing, to the alleged breach of promise, inasmuch as

any such breach occurred only years later. Compare, e.g.,
_______ ____

Baker, 781 F.2d at 90 ("It is significant that ... the
_____

alleged promise was broken, if at all, right before defendant

and in open court."). Fifth, the district court, having

summarily dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, has not had


____________________

the time the guilty plea was made." 431 U.S. at 76; see
___
Baker, 781 F.2d at 89 (distinguishing Blackledge on this
_____ __________
basis). Nonetheless, it cannot be said that the advent of
modern Rule 11 procedures has robbed that decision of all
currency. See, e.g., 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal
___ ____ ________
Procedure 20.5, at 668 (1984) (even where Rule 11 hearing
_________
was flawless, there are still "some circumstances" in which
an evidentiary hearing may be required) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).

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the opportunity to consider this issue. And finally, on the

limited record before us--keeping in mind, especially, the

prosecutors' affidavits (which the district court did not

have the benefit of reading) and the fact that petitioner was

placed in a security program while in prison-- the allegation

that he was promised protection cannot be dismissed out of

hand as fanciful. While it is unlikely that any of these

factors, standing alone, would warrant a remand, we think

that they are sufficient in combination to render further

proceedings appropriate.

We need go no further.4 For the reasons stated, the

judgment of the district court is affirmed in part and

reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further

proceedings.

It is so ordered.
_________________











____________________

4. We note that the district court has appointed counsel in
a related action recently filed by petitioner. Bemis v.
_____
Pappalardo, No. 94-10151 (D. Mass.). Whether the two actions
__________
ought to be consolidated, and whether counsel ought to be
appointed in the instant case, are matters we entrust to the
district court's discretion. Cf. United States v. Mala, 7
___ _____________ ____
F.3d 1058, 1064 n.7 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that "selection
of appointed counsel is a matter best left to the court in
which such counsel is to appear"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
____________
1839 (1994).

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Source:  CourtListener

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