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United States v. Silsby, 94-1492 (1995)

Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Number: 94-1492 Visitors: 2
Filed: Jan. 13, 1995
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: January 13, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT ___________________ No. 94-1492 No. 94-1493 UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. SHAWN D. SILSBY, Defendant, Appellant. This resulted in the possibility of a sentence of between 81 and 87 months.
USCA1 Opinion









January 13, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT









___________________


No. 94-1492
No. 94-1493




UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

SHAWN D. SILSBY,

Defendant, Appellant.


__________________

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

[Hon. Morton A. Brody, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

___________________

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Cyr and Stahl, Circuit Judges. ______________

___________________

Tina Schneider on brief for appellant. ______________
Jay P. McCloskey, United States Attorney, and Michael M. _________________ __________
DuBose, Assistant U.S. Attorney, on brief for appellee. ______









__________________

__________________
Per Curiam. Defendant-appellant Shawn D. Silsby ___________

pleaded guilty to two counts of an indictment charging him

with possession with intent to distribute marijuana in

violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and possession of a

firearm during the commission of a drug trafficking crime in

violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Defendant also waived

indictment and pleaded guilty to a one-count information

charging him with possession with intent to distribute

cocaine and aiding and abetting in the commission of that

crime in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C.

2. The district court sentenced defendant to two concurrent

terms of imprisonment of 24 months on the drug convictions

and a consecutive term of imprisonment of 24 months on the

firearms conviction for a total of 48 months. Defendant

raises two issues on appeal.

1. The Right of Allocution. Prior to imposing ________________________

sentence, a district court must "address the defendant

personally and determine if the defendant wishes to make a

statement and to present any information in mitigation of the

sentence." Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(a)(1)(C). To meet this

requirement, "the court, the prosecutor, and the defendant

must at the very least interact in a manner that shows

clearly and convincingly that the defendant knew he had a

right to speak on any subject of his choosing prior to the

imposition of sentence." United States v. de Alba Pagan, 33 _____________ _____________

F.3d 125, 129 (1st Cir. 1994).

Defendant claims that the district court asked him

whether he had anything to say regarding the weapons charge,














but failed to so inquire regarding the drug charges. Because

defendant did not object to this alleged failure at the time,

we review for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); ___

United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1776 (1993). At ______________ _____

sentencing, the following interchange took place.

THE COURT: Does your client wish to be
heard by way of allocution?

THE DEFENDANT: I don't know. On the gun
charge, the only reason I had the gun is
I've always liked guns and like he says,
I lost the clip for it and I brought it
in to Willey's that day and I didn't have
it for drug purposes.
You know, I grew up, my stepfather's in
the military. I used to go out and shoot
skeet with him. And my real father, we
always went hunting. I just always
had a liking for guns. But I didn't have
the gun for, you know, drug purposes.

THE COURT: All right. Is there anything
else you want to say to the court?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

Sentencing Transcript, at 7. Defendant points out that the

discussion preceding his statement mostly was confined to the

effect of the gun charge on the guideline range. Thus, he

goes on, he "reasonably believed" that he was limited to

addressing the possession of a weapon.

We disagree. As defendant concedes, the court did

not limit its inquiry to the gun charge. In fact, the court

explicitly asked defendant after he had spoken about his

possession of the weapon whether he had anything else to add.

The cases cited by defendant are not on point. In United ______


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States v. Medrano, 986 F.2d 299 (9th Cir. 1993), the district ______ _______

court never addressed the defendant to see if he wished to _____

speak and the government so conceded. Id. at 302. In United ___ ______

States v. Cole, 27 F.3d 996 (4th Cir. 1994), the district ______ ____

court did not ask the defendant to speak until after imposing _____

sentence. Id. at 998. ___

2. The Downward Departure Under the Sentencing ______________________________________________

Guidelines. "Upon motion of the government stating that the __________

defendant has provided substantial assistance in the

investigation or prosecution of another person who has

committed an offense, the court may depart from the

guideline." U.S.S.G. 5K1.1. The government filed such a

motion and recommended a sentence in the vicinity of 48

months. Defendant argued for a 30-month sentence so that he

could attend the shock incarceration program run by the

Bureau of Prisons. To be eligible for this program

immediately after conviction, an individual must be sentenced

to a term of imprisonment of more than 12 months but not more

than 30 months. 18 U.S.C. 4046(a).

Based on the nature of the offenses, defendant's

criminal history and his acceptance of responsibility, the

court determined that the guideline range for the drug

convictions was 21 to 27 months (criminal history category of

II and base offense level of 15). The conviction for

possession of the gun carried a mandatory five year sentence



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to be served consecutively to the drug sentences. This

resulted in the possibility of a sentence of between 81 and

87 months. In choosing a term of imprisonment, the court

noted that the 48-month sentence already was a "pretty

healthy downward departure for cooperation." Sentencing

Transcript, at 6. Further, the court stated that in light of

the nature and seriousness of defendant's crimes, it could

not "in all good conscience" go to the level requested by

defendant. Id. at 10. ___

"[T]he court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to hear

an appeal by a party in whose favor a departure decision

operates." United States v. McAndrews, 12 F.3d 273, 276 (1st _____________ _________

Cir. 1993). In other words, a criminal defendant cannot rest

an appeal on the sentencing court's discretionary downward

departure "merely because [he] is dissatisfied with the

quantification of the court's generosity." United States v. _____________

Pighetti, 898 F.2d 3, 4 (1st Cir. 1990) (footnote omitted). ________

The exception to this rule is where the district court's

sentencing decision results from a mistake of law.

McAndrews, 12 F.3d at 276 n.2. Thus, where the court _________

erroneously believed it lacked the power to depart or

misunderstood the rules governing departure, an appeal will

lie. United States v. Mariano, 983 F.2d 1150, 1153 (1st Cir. _____________ _______

1993).





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Defendant argues that the court had intended to

impose a sentence which would have allowed him to enter the

shock incarceration program immediately and that the court

was mistaken in believing that defendant would be eligible

for the program with a 48-month sentence. The record does

not support this position. First, it is clear that the

district court judge understood the implications of a 48-

month term of imprisonment.

I think the prospects for this
defendant to rehabilitate himself seem to
be fairly good, and although I think it's
a pretty close call, I'm going to
recommend to the Bureau of Prisons that
under the circumstances that
consideration be given to the defendant
for approval of a boot camp placement.
And I do that knowing that the sentence _________________________________________
that I'm going to impose does not qualify _________________________________________
automatically to allow the defendant to _________________________________________
go into a boot camp situation, but with ______________________________
the recommendation of the court, I'm sure
that the Bureau of Prisons will at least
consider favorably the request for boot
camp placement in this case.

Sentencing Transcript, at 11 (emphasis added).1

Second, defendant's eligibility for the shock

incarceration program is not a factor the district court

could consider in determining the extent of the downward

departure. "As a basis for departing, a court may consider

____________________

1. Defendant's assertion that only those persons with
sentences under 30 months are eligible for this program also
is misplaced. The probation department representative
testified that if defendant successfully completes 18 months
of his sentence, he will be eligible for the program.
Presentence Hearing Transcript, at 10.

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mitigating factors only to the extent that they can fairly be

said to touch upon the degree, efficacy, timeliness, and

circumstances of a defendant's cooperation." Mariano, 983 _______

F.2d at 1156 (footnote omitted). Therefore, we lack

jurisdiction over defendant's challenge to his sentence.

For the foregoing reasons, these appeals do not

present any substantial questions and we summarily affirm the ______

judgments of the district court. See Local Rule 27.1. ___





































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Source:  CourtListener

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