February 21, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
_________________________
No. 94-1825
PENNSYLVANIA MILLERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
LEO H. CHEEVER, ETC.,
Defendant, Appellee.
_________________________
JOHN DOE, ETC.,
Intervenor, Appellant.
_________________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr., U.S. District Judge] ___________________
_________________________
Before
Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges, ______________
and Carter,* District Judge. ______________
_________________________
Geoffrey P. Lynch for intervenor-appellant. _________________
Kevin C. Devine, with whom Devine & Nyquist was on brief, ________________ ________________
for plaintiff-appellee.
_________________________
_______________________
_______________
*Chief Judge, U.S. District Court for the District of Maine,
sitting by designation.
Per Curiam. In Burnham v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Per Curiam. ___________ _______ __________________________
Am., 873 F.2d 486 (1st Cir. 1989) we wrote: ___
This is a hard case hard not in the
sense that it is legally difficult or tough
to crack, but in the sense that it requires
us, like the court below, to deny relief to a
[party] for whom we have considerable
sympathy. We do what we must, for "it is the
duty of all courts of justice to take care,
for the general good of the community, that
hard cases do not make bad law." United ______
States v. Clark, 96 U.S. 37, 49 (1877) ______ _____
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Lord
Campbell in East Indian Co. v. Paul, 7 Moo. _______________ ____
P.C.C. 111).
Id. at 487. These words are equally applicable here. ___
We have read the record, studied the briefs,
entertained oral argument, considered the parties' contentions,
and examined the New Hampshire precedents that necessarily direct
our disposition in this diversity case. When all is said and
done, we do not believe that we can improve measurably on the
district court's lucid exposition of the governing law, or that
any useful purpose would be served by issuing a full-length
opinion that merely recasts the district court's thesis in our
own words. Consequently, we summarily affirm the judgment below,
see 1st Cir. R. 27.1, for substantially the reasons set forth in ___
the district court's orders dated May 12, 1994, and June 27,
1994, respectively.
We add two brief comments. First, we think that this
case is clearly controlled by the New Hampshire Supreme Court's
determination in Vermont Mut. Ins. Co. v. Malcolm, 517 A.2d 800 ______________________ _______
(N.H. 1986), which we read as holding unequivocally, on policy
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language that is identical in every material respect to the
language here at issue, that perpetrating a sexual assault on a
minor is an inherently injurious act falling outside the purview
of the insurance coverage afforded by a homeowner's policy. See ___
id. at 802. Second, we do not believe that the New Hampshire ___
Supreme Court's recent decision in Providence Mut. Fire Ins. Co. _____________________________
v. Scanlon, 638 A.2d 1246 (N.H. 1994), casts any legitimate doubt _______
upon either the authoritativeness or the continued vitality of
the holding in the earlier Vermont Mut. case. ____________
We need go no further. The judgment below is summarily
Affirmed. Affirmed. ________
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