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Mahan v. Plymouth County, 94-1835 (1995)

Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Number: 94-1835 Visitors: 7
Filed: Sep. 07, 1995
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary:  Medical, officers are corrections officers with some medical training.direct judgment as a matter of law in favor of Bouchie.section 1983 claim lay.5PHC argues that the district court ruling should be af-, firmed on the ground that Tegretol would not have alleviated, Mahan's anxiety attacks.
USCA1 Opinion









UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

____________________

No. 94-1835

RICHARD MAHAN and FELICIA MAHAN,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.


PLYMOUTH COUNTY HOUSE OF CORRECTIONS, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.

____________________


APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

____________________


Cyr, Circuit Judge, _____________

Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________

and Boudin, Circuit Judge. _____________

____________________



Matthew Cobb, with whom Law Firm of Matthew Cobb was on brief for ____________ ________________________
appellants.
James B. Lampke for appellee Town of Hull. _______________
Matthew J. Buckley, with whom Law Office of Matthew J. Buckley ___________________ _________________________________
was on brief for appellee Walter Bouchie.
Steven M. Walsh for appellee Plymouth County Sheriff's __________________
Department.


____________________

September 7, 1995
____________________















































































CYR, Circuit Judge. On November 14, 1989, Walter CYR, Circuit Judge. ______________

Bouchie, a detective with the Town of Hull Police Department

("Hull Police Department"), executed a valid arrest warrant

against plaintiff-appellant Richard Mahan ("Mahan") for the rape

of Sheila Commesso.1 The arrest took place in Mahan's hatchback

automobile. Bouchie and other officers searched the hatchback

incident to the arrest and damaged a cord over the hatch area and

a pocket tape recorder in the car.

Following the arrest, Mahan was taken to the Hull

Police Station for "booking." Once the "booking" had been

completed, Bouchie began interrogating Mahan without giving

Miranda warnings. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). _______ ___ _______ _______

Mahan asked if he had the right to speak with an attorney.

Bouchie informed him that an attorney would be appointed at

arraignment. Mahan asserted a right to remain silent until an

attorney was present. Bouchie then said, "[Y]ou are going to

talk to me or I will lock you up in that cell down there, and you

won't get out." When Mahan would not relent, he was placed in

the holding cell. No further questioning occurred.

Within hours of the arrest, a representative of the

Hull Police Department was sent to Mahan's home to pick up a

bottle of medicine Tegretol which had been prescribed in

early 1989 for depression and seizures caused by a head injury
____________________

1The evidence and inferences are related in the light most
favorable to Mahan, the party opposing judgment. See Favorito v. ___ ________
Pannell, 27 F.3d 716, 719 (1st Cir. 1994); Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a); _______
Velez-Gomez v. SMA Life Assur. Co., 8 F.3d 873, 874 (1st Cir. ___________ ____________________
1993); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.

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Mahan sustained many years earlier. The Tegretol bottle, clearly

marked with Mahan's name, the name and telephone number of the

prescribing physician, and the dosage to be administered, was

delivered to the Plymouth House of Corrections ("PHC") when Mahan

was transferred there around 9:00 or 10:00 p.m. on Tuesday,

November 14. There is no record evidence that Mahan informed any

corrections officer or other PHC personnel, prior to November 21,

as to the actual symptoms he experienced while detained. The PHC

corrections officers repeatedly refused Mahan's requests for

Tegretol during the period November 14-21.2

Mahan first arrived at PHC late Tuesday evening,

November 14, after the medical officer's regular hours. PHC

corrections officers later informed Mahan that a medical officer

was present at PHC on Tuesdays and Thursdays only. On November

15 and 16, Mahan was taken to court for arraignment and bail

review. Thus, he was not seen by a medical officer on Thursday,

November 16, since he did not return from court until after the

medical officer had left for the day. Four more days passed

before a medical officer met with Mahan on Tuesday, November 21.

In accordance with PHC policy, the medical officer declined to

administer Tegretol to Mahan without first contacting the pre-

scribing physician. Within one or two days after Mahan met with

the medical officer on November 21, PHC administered the Tegretol

____________________

2PHC policy prohibits administering prescription medicines
to a detainee without clearance from a "medical officer" and on ___
days the detainee is scheduled to appear in court. Medical
officers are corrections officers with some medical training.

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to Mahan and his symptoms were alleviated.

Although Mahan was experiencing severe depression and

anxiety attacks, and continuously complained to various correc-

tions officers that he needed the Tegretol, there is no record

evidence that he ever informed PHC personnel that he was experi-

encing these or any other symptoms prior to November 21. Nor is

there any evidence that PHC personnel ever witnessed, or other-

wise became aware of, any such symptoms. Mahan testified to an

anxiety attack on the night of November 15, which was witnessed

by a cellmate.3 A guard who happened by the cell shortly after

this incident, inquired whether Mahan was all right. To which

Mahan replied simply: "I don't know. I don't feel good." Thus,

there is no evidence remotely suggesting that PHC personnel had

ever been made aware that Mahan's condition might warrant any

deviation from the standard medical clearance policy.

After Mahan was released on bail, he was tried and

acquitted, then initiated this section 1983 action, see 42 U.S.C. ___

1983, against Detective Bouchie and the Town of Hull for

wrongful arrest and interrogation, and against PHC for wrongfully

withholding his prescription medicine. Felicia Mahan filed a

pendent claim for loss of consortium. Prior to trial, the

district court granted summary judgment for the Town of Hull.

____________________

3The cellmate neither testified nor provided a deposition
concerning the circumstances surrounding any anxiety attack or
other symptom experienced by Mahan. Mahan himself testified that
he asked his wife to tell his lawyer that PHC personnel were
refusing to administer Tegretol. Yet the lawyer neither testi-
fied nor is there any evidence that he ever contacted PHC.

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The Mahans proceeded to trial on their claims against Bouchie and

PHC.

During the trial on liability, Mahan and/or his wife

testified to the above-described events. In addition, before the

district court ordered judgment as a matter of law under Rule

50(a), Mahan proposed to call the prescribing physician, to

testify that Mahan had a "serious medical need" for Tegretol.

Rather than admit the proffered testimony, the district court

presumed, for purposes of the Rule 50(a) motion, that Mahan had a

"serious medical need" for Tegretol.

Thereafter, the district court directed verdicts for

Bouchie and PHC, ruling that Mahan had proffered insufficient

evidence to establish an unconstitutional deprivation in connec-

tion with his arrest; the Miranda claim failed as a matter of _______

law, since no interrogation actually occurred after Mahan re-

quested an attorney; and PHC had not acted with "deliberate

indifference" in withholding Mahan's prescription medicine.

A decision to grant summary judgment is reviewed de __

novo, Velez-Gomez v. SMA Life Assur. Co., 8 F.3d 873, 874 (1st ____ ___________ ____________________

Cir. 1993), as is a judgment entered as a matter of law, Favorito ________

v. Pannell, 27 F.3d 716, 719 (1st Cir. 1994). _______

A. The Arrest A. The Arrest __________

Under section 1983, a municipality may be answerable in

damages under section 1983 to a person who is subjected to a

deprivation of his constitutional rights as a result of official

action taken pursuant to a "custom or usage" of the municipality.


6












See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, ___ ______ ____________________________________

691 (1978). Mahan claims that there was sufficient evidence that

the Town of Hull, by "custom and usage," investigated criminal

complaints inadequately, thereby causing arrests without probable

cause. He relies on our decision in Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871 _________ ______

F.2d 1151, 1157 (1st Cir.) (single incident may provide some ______ ________ ____

proof of municipal policy where, inter alia, large contingent of _____ ____

municipal police officers engaged in concerted assaultive con- _________

duct), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 820 (1989). Bordanaro held, _____ ______ _________

however, that evidence of a single incident is insufficient, in __

and of itself, to establish a municipal "custom or usage" within ___ __ ______

the meaning of Monell. Id. at 1156-57. ______ ___

Mahan has not brought his case near the Bordanaro _________

umbrella, let alone under it. He produced no evidence of prior

incidents of inadequate investigation by the Hull Police Depart-

ment. Nor has he introduced direct evidence of improper investi-

gatory methods or practices employed by the police in this case.

Thus, we discern no error in the district court decision granting

summary judgment on the section 1983 claim against the Town of

Hull.

B. The Arrest and Search B. The Arrest and Search _____________________

As there was insufficient evidence to support a trial-

worthy claim against the Town of Hull, there was no actionable

section 1983 claim against Detective Bouchie relating to Mahan's

arrest. Mahan presented no evidence that Bouchie acted unreason-

ably in executing the valid arrest warrant, nor in effecting the


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arrest and contemporaneous automobile search. See United States ___ _____________

v. Doward, 41 F.3d 789, 791 (1st Cir. 1994) (police entitled to ______

search hatch-area of automobile incident to lawful arrest of

driver), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1716 (1995). The damage to the _____ ______

hatchback cord and the tape recorder, see supra p. 2, do not ___ _____

establish a trialworthy Fourth Amendment "unreasonable" search

claim. There was no error in the district court decision to

direct judgment as a matter of law in favor of Bouchie.

C. The Miranda Claim C. The Miranda Claim _________________

Mahan claims that Bouchie violated his Miranda rights _______

by refusing to read the required Miranda warnings and threatening _______

to place him in the holding cell if he declined to respond to

questioning without an attorney present. We do not agree.

An "accused must be adequately and effectively apprised

of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully

honored." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. Although Bouchie did not _______

give the required Miranda warnings, it is undisputed that Mahan _______

made no statements pertinent to the Commesso investigation in

response to interrogation. Upon Mahan's assertion that he wished

to have an attorney present during interrogation, Bouchie ceased

all interrogation. Every court of appeals which has spoken to

this matter in similar circumstances has held that no actionable

section 1983 claim lay. See Weaver v. Brenner, 40 F.3d 527, 535 ___ ______ _______

(2d Cir. 1994); Wiley v. Doory, 14 F.3d 993, 996 (4th Cir. 1994) _____ _____

(Powell, J., sitting by designation); Mahoney v. Kesery, 976 F.2d _______ ______

1054, 1061-62 (7th Cir. 1992); Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, ______ ______


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1242-44 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992); Warren _____ ______ ______

v. City of Lincoln, Neb., 864 F.2d 1436, 1442 (8th Cir.), cert. _____________________ _____

denied, 490 U.S. 1091 (1989); Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, ______ _______ ______

1263 (10th Cir. 1976). We now join their ranks. There was no

actionable section 1983 claim relating to the alleged Miranda _______

violation.4

D. The Eighth Amendment Claim D. The Eighth Amendment Claim __________________________

Mahan challenges the district court ruling directing

judgment as a matter of law on the claim that PHC refused to

administer his Tegretol for seven days. This claim implicates

the established PHC clearance policy preventing corrections

officers from administering prescribed medicines on days the

detainee is scheduled to appear in court and until permitted to ___

do so by a "medical officer."

Eighth Amendment claims by pretrial detainees alleging

denials of medical assistance essentially turn on whether the

challenged official action constituted "deliberate indifference"

to a "serious medical need". Consolo v. George, 58 F.3d 791, _______ ______

793-94 (1st Cir. 1995); Bowen v. City of Manchester, 966 F.2d 13, _____ __________________

____________________

4Although there can be no question that the alleged threat
by Bouchie to keep Mahan in the holding cell until he responded
to further questions assuming it were credited by the fact-
finder would be fully deserving of official sanction, it did
not rise to the egregious level of police misconduct required for
an actionable 1983 claim absent evidence that it succeeded in
overbearing Mahan's will to exercise his Miranda rights. Cf. _______ __
Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1240-50 (police who engaged in conduct that ______
"shocks the conscience," by attempting to "grill [suspect] until
he confessed," and questioning him for thirty minutes despite
assertion of right to counsel, are subject to liability under
1983 even though defendant does not incriminate himself).

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17 n.13 (1st Cir. 1992). A "serious medical need" is one "that

has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment, or one

that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize

the necessity for a doctor's attention." Gaudreault v. Munici- __________ _______

pality of Salem, Mass., 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. ______________________ _____

denied, 500 U.S. 956 (1991). The prescription indicated, and the ______

district court assumed, that Mahan needed, and would benefit

from, Tegretol. The record thus established a serious medical

need.5

As the district court found, however, the record does

not establish a trialworthy claim that PHC was "deliberately

indifferent" to Mahan's "serious medical need." The Supreme

Court recently defined "deliberate indifference" in the prison

context. See Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994). In ___ ______ _______

order to be found "deliberately indifferent," prison officials

must be shown to have been subjectively aware of a condition ____________

requiring their intervention. Id. at 1980-82. The evidence in ___

this case established one component of the "subjective awareness"

requirement; viz., PHC corrections officers were well aware that

Tegretol had been prescribed for Mahan, and that he repeatedly

requested it.

Nevertheless, the record on appeal contains no evidence

____________________

5PHC argues that the district court ruling should be af-
firmed on the ground that Tegretol would not have alleviated
Mahan's anxiety attacks. Given the presumption of "serious
medical need" apparently indulged by the district court, which
obviated the necessity for Mahan's prescribing physician to
testify, see supra p. 4, we must reject this suggestion. ___ _____

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from which a rational factfinder could conclude that PHC person-

nel were informed, or otherwise learned, of the serious symptoms

Mahan actually experienced while detained, such as would have

made them subjectively aware of a condition requiring their

intervention prior to November 21. Id. at 1980-82; cf. Miranda ___ __ _______

v. Munoz, 770 F.2d 255, 257-59 (1st Cir. 1985) (acknowledging _____

that prison officials knew pretrial detainee's epilepsy not under

control). Absent evidence of subjective awareness, there could

be no "deliberate indifference" to Mahan's serious medical need.

Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1980-82. Consequently, the Eighth Amend- ______

ment claim failed as a matter of law. See United States v. John ___ _____________ ____

Doe, a/k/a Pizarro-Calderon, No. 94-1096, slip op. at 11-12 (1st ___________________________

Cir. Aug. 4, 1995) (appellate court may affirm district court

ruling on any ground supported in record).

Our ruling should not be misconstrued as condoning the

status quo, however, but merely as indicating that PHC cannot be

held liable for failing to adjust its policy to accommodate a

"serious medical need" of which it was not made aware.6 In

these circumstances, Mahan simply failed to introduce evidence

essential to enable a reasonable factfinder to conclude that PHC

violated his Eighth Amendment rights.

The district court judgment is affirmed. All parties ________
____________________

6We add that the seemingly inflexible PHC policy relating to
prescription medicines, coupled with the limited "medical offi-
cer" hours, could well have resulted in serious harm to Mahan
during the extended and stressful period the medicine needed to
control his previously diagnosed condition was withheld. See ___
Miranda, 770 F.2d at 259 (detainee died after epileptic seizure). _______


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shall bear their own costs.




















































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Source:  CourtListener

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