Elawyers Elawyers
Washington| Change

Duffy v. AT & T Network, 94-1908 (1995)

Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Number: 94-1908 Visitors: 4
Filed: Mar. 29, 1995
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: March 29, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT ____________________ No. 94-1908 WILLIAM C. DUFFY, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. AT T NETWORK SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant, Appellee. See Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir.
USCA1 Opinion









March 29, 1995
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

____________________


No. 94-1908

WILLIAM C. DUFFY,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

AT&T NETWORK SYSTEMS, INC.,

Defendant, Appellee.


____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

____________________

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Selya and Cyr, Circuit Judges. ______________

____________________

William C. Duffy on brief pro se. ________________
Lynn Toney Collins, Thomas E. Shirley and Choate, Hall & Stewart, __________________ _________________ ______________________
on brief for appellee.


____________________


____________________



















Per Curiam. Plaintiff-appellant William C. Duffy __________

at one time was employed as an engineer by defendant AT&T

Network Systems, Inc. ("AT&T"). Almost six years after he

was allegedly pressured by AT&T personnel to resign from his

employment, he brought this pro se diversity action alleging ___ __

various tort and contract claims arising from his employment

and resignation. At the close of discovery, the district

court granted AT&T's motion for summary judgment on all

claims.

On appeal Duffy challenges the judgment only with

respect to the claims in counts one and three of the

complaint. Applying a plenary standard of review, as we must

on appeal from a summary judgment, we perceive no genuine

issue as to any material fact, and agree with the district

court that AT&T is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

See Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir. 1990) ___ ___________ _____

(standard of review); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). ________

In count one, Duffy pleaded a claim for breach of

an employment contract based on AT&T's personnel manuals. He

conceded in his deposition, however, that AT&T had retained

the unilateral right to modify each of the manuals given to

him during the course of his employment, did not negotiate

with him concerning the terms of the manuals, did not ask for

his assent to the terms, and that the manuals did not specify

any term of employment. We agree with the district court

















that these concessions fatally undermine Duffy's theory that

the manuals embodied an enforceable contract between the

parties. See Pearson v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 979 ___ _______ _______________________________

F.2d 254, 256 (1st Cir. 1992), (citing Jackson v. Action for _______ __________

Boston Community Dev., Inc., 525 N.E.2d 411 (Mass. 1988)). ____________________________

Although Duffy argues that his contract claim was not limited

to the personnel manuals, because he had pleaded "an

employment contract . . . which included . . . the terms of

the AT&T personnel manual," he offered the district court no

facts from which a reasonable trier might infer the elements

essential to formation of a contract under any theory.

As did the district court, we decline to entertain

Duffy's argument that count one should be construed to

include a claim for breach of an alleged contract to provide

unemployment benefits. This argument was offered for the __

first time at the summary judgment hearing. The district

court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting it as an

untimely attempt to amend the pleadings. Arguments not fully

developed in the lower court are deemed waived on appeal.

Ryan v. Royal Ins. Co., 916 F.2d 731, 734 (1st Cir. 1990). ____ ______________

Lastly, we see no error in the dismissal of count

three of the complaint, which attempted to assert a civil

claim for violation of the state's personnel records statute,

Mass. Gen. L. ch. 149, 52C. The statute does not expressly

provide a civil remedy for the specific violation alleged --



-3-













denial of access to personnel records -- and Duffy offered no

reasoned support below for judicial creation of the suggested

remedy. He now attempts to expand count three to include

other alleged wrongdoing of an uncertain nature which he

construes as coming within the statute's express civil remedy

provision. Again, however, as this argument was not fully

developed below, it is deemed waived on appeal. Id. ___

Affirmed. ________





































-4-






Source:  CourtListener

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer