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Faneuil Advisors v. O, 94-1959 (1995)

Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Number: 94-1959 Visitors: 20
Filed: Mar. 29, 1995
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: United States Court of Appeals, United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit, For the First Circuit ____________________ No. 94-1959 FANEUIL ADVISORS, INC., Plaintiff, Appellant, v. O/S SEA HAWK, (O.N. Kinchla told Harbormaster Cronin that his attorney had advised him to retake the boat;
USCA1 Opinion














United States Court of Appeals United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit For the First Circuit
____________________

No. 94-1959

FANEUIL ADVISORS, INC.,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

O/S SEA HAWK, (O.N. 559409),
HER ENGINES, TACKLE AND APPURTENANCES, IN REM, __ ___

Defendant, Appellee.

__________________

PORTSMOUTH HARBOR TOWING,

Intervenor, Appellee.

____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

[Hon. Martin F. Loughlin, Senior U.S. District Judge] __________________________
____________________

Before

Selya, Boudin and Stahl,
Circuit Judges. ______________

____________________

Harry Barnett with whom Timothy R. McHugh, Lawrence J. Mullen, _____________ __________________ ___________________
and Hoch & McHugh were on brief for appellant. _____________
Paul McEachern with whom Shaines & McEachern, P.A. was on brief ______________ __________________________
for Portsmouth Harbor Towing, intervenor - appellee.
_____________________
March 29, 1995
_____________________
















STAHL, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant Faneuil STAHL, Circuit Judge. _____________

Advisors, Inc. ("Faneuil"), appeals the district court's

order subordinating Faneuil's preferred ship mortgage on the

O/S Sea Hawk to the salvage claim of intervenor-appellee

Portsmouth Harbor Towing ("PHT"). Because the district court

predicated its order on a misunderstanding of the applicable

law, we reverse.

I. I. __

BACKGROUND BACKGROUND __________

The Sea Hawk is a forty-five foot Hatteras sport-

fishing boat built in 1974. David Kinchla, its owner during

the time relevant to this case, purchased the boat in January

1988. In August 1988, Kinchla granted a first preferred ship

mortgage on the Sea Hawk to Atlantic Financial Federal

Savings and Loan Association ("Atlantic"), which held

Kinchla's $148,000 note executed in association with his

purchase of the boat. Atlantic eventually went into

receivership and was taken over by the Resolution Trust

Corporation ("RTC"). On April 23, 1993, Faneuil purchased

Kinchla's note and the preferred ship mortgage on the Sea

Hawk from the RTC as part of a pool of fifty-six non-

performing boat loans for a total price of $1,516,000.

As Kinchla's mortgage was making its way through

the receivership netherworld, Kinchla was losing his grip on

the Sea Hawk. He stopped making payments on his note in May



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1991 and filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on January 6,

1992. On June 3, 1992, the Sea Hawk broke loose from its

mooring in the Hampton-Seabrook Harbor ("Hampton Harbor") and

drifted until it became snagged near the Hampton River

Bridge. Harbormaster William J. Cronin, an employee of the

New Hampshire State Port Authority, enlisted the aid of the

U.S. Coast Guard, which towed the boat to the state pier in

Hampton Harbor. Cronin contacted Kinchla, but Kinchla told

Cronin that he had abandoned his interest in the boat and

that the mortgage-holder intended to foreclose on it. Cronin

testified at his deposition (which was admitted in evidence)

that he attempted to reach the mortgage-holder but had no

success, apparently due to the RTC receivership.1 Because

the state has no facility of its own at Hampton Harbor to

store a boat as large as the Sea Hawk -- the state pier being

a busy, commercial fishing pier -- Cronin arranged for one

Ray Gilmore to take custody of the boat until its ownership

could be sorted out, explaining to Gilmore that he would have

a possessory lien on the boat for reasonable towing and

storage fees.

On July 15, 1992, shortly after 5 a.m., Kinchla and

his son attempted to retake possession of the Sea Hawk by

surreptitiously removing it from Gilmore's mooring in the


____________________

1. The record does not indicate exactly when Atlantic went
into receivership.

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harbor and towing the vessel under the Hampton River Bridge

and out to sea. They did not request an opening of the

drawbridge, however, and in attempting to maneuver the Sea

Hawk under the bridge, lost control of it in the current.

The Sea Hawk slammed broadside into a bridge support,

damaging the vessel's hull, and then slid under the bridge

stern-first, damaging the boat's bridge-superstructure and

outrigger tuna poles. The Coast Guard soon intercepted the

Kinchlas and took them and the Sea Hawk back to the state

pier. Kinchla told Harbormaster Cronin that his attorney had

advised him to retake the boat; both Kinchla and his son were

turned over to the police, and Kinchla was arrested. Gilmore

wanted no further involvement with the Sea Hawk, leaving

Cronin once again with the problem of what to do with the

beleaguered boat.

Here the tales diverge. Stephen Holt, one of PHT's

partners, testified that Cronin contacted him and asked if

PHT would tow the boat to Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and

store it safely in dry storage. Holt claimed that, in a

conference call with the Coast Guard, Cronin specifically

told Holt that this would be a "salvage job." Cronin

testified that he could not remember with whom he spoke at

PHT, whether he mentioned the word "salvage," or even whether

the topic of PHT's compensation ever came up. Cronin

testified that in his mind, this was a tow job. In any



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event, Holt accepted the task, and he and his son went to

Hampton to bring back the Sea Hawk. Both Holt and Cronin

inspected the boat and determined that it was in no danger of

sinking despite the damage it had just sustained.2 Holt and

his son then towed the boat out to open ocean and up the

coast to Portsmouth Harbor, a two-and-one-half-hour trip.

Initially, PHT stored the boat at Patton's Yacht

Yard in Eliot, Maine. Because PHT was paying for this

storage out of its own pocket, however, and, ostensibly, for

insurance reasons, PHT soon moved the Sea Hawk to its own

dock in Portsmouth, where Holt and his partner, Walter

Dunfey, actively maintained the boat and performed some

repairs. PHT attempted to contact the mortgage-holder on

several occasions to establish their claim, but were unable

to locate definitively any party claiming an interest in the

boat.3 PHT never brought an action to foreclose its claimed

salvage lien.



____________________

2. Indeed, Holt was prepared to place his eleven-year-old
son aboard the Sea Hawk to help steer it during the trip back
to Portsmouth, but changed his plans after determining that
the Sea Hawk had lost its steering.

3. On February 10, 1993, an attorney for PHT sent a letter
to Prentiss Properties of Dallas, Texas, which assembled the
loan documents for the RTC's pool of assets that Faneuil
purchased, informing it of PHT's "salvage and storage claim."
Faneuil apparently received this letter at some point,
because it included it in the motion for relief from the
automatic stay it filed in Kinchla's bankruptcy proceeding in
the fall of 1993.

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Finally, on October 26, 1993, with the bankruptcy

court's permission, Faneuil filed a complaint in the district

court initiating this in rem proceeding against the Sea Hawk __ ___

to foreclose its mortgage. Federal marshals arrested the

vessel on December 2, 1993, and moved it to dry storage in

Newington, New Hampshire. PHT intervened in January 1994

asserting its salvage lien. The Sea Hawk was sold at auction

on April 22, 1994, yielding $32,537.20 after deductions for

custodia legis expenses. That amount was placed in escrow, ________ _____

pending resolution of PHT's and Faneuil's competing claims to

the sale proceeds. The amount due under Faneuil's mortgage

at the time of trial was $177,676; PHT claimed expenses of

$24,606 plus attorney fees of $6,279.04, or a total of

$30,885.04, in addition to a claimed salvage award of 20% of

the value of the vessel.4 Following a one-day bench trial,

the district court held that, under the law of admiralty and

the federal statutory scheme for disbursing proceeds from a

foreclosure sale of a vessel, PHT had a valid salvage claim

that had priority over Faneuil's preferred ship mortgage, and

also that, because it had expended much time and effort in

preserving the Sea Hawk while Faneuil's purchase of the

____________________

4. PHT's requested expenses included $1,205 in towing and
repairs and $23,101 in marina charges, calculated at $1 per
day per foot, or approximately $1,400 per month for sixteen
months of storage. Great Bay Marina, which stored the Sea
Hawk for the U.S. Marshal pending the foreclosure sale,
charged a total of $900 for a period of approximately five
months.

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mortgage was "a pig in the poke," the equities dictated that

PHT should recover first. Finding all of PHT's expenses

reasonable, the district court awarded PHT $32,885,5

exhausting the sale proceeds. Faneuil now appeals, arguing

that the district court erred in ruling that PHT had a claim

for salvage or any other claim that should prime Faneuil's

mortgage.6

II. II. ___

DISCUSSION DISCUSSION __________

A. Standard of Review ______________________

We may not set aside the district court's factual

findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Dedham Water Co. ________________

v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 972 F.2d 453, 457 (1st Cir. ____________________________

1992). Where factual findings are predicated upon errors of

law, however, we accord them diminished deference. Id. See ___ ___

also B.V. Bureau Wijsmuller v. United States, 702 F.2d 333, ____ ______________________ _____________

342 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Generally an appellate court will not

reverse a salvage award unless the district court yielded to

an erroneous principle, plainly misapprehended the facts . .



____________________

5. This is $2,000 more than claimed. The court's
mathematical error was apparently induced by PHT's trial
brief, which contained the same $2,000 error.

6. Faneuil attacks on appeal other aspects of the district
court's ruling, in particular its failure to make specific
findings justifying the amount of PHT's salvage award. Our
holding as to Faneuil's primary issue on appeal obviates the
need for any discussion on these other issues.

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. or granted an award that was clearly inadequate or

unreasonably excessive.").

B. The Statutory Scheme ________________________

The relative priorities of preferred ship mortgages

and salvage claims are set forth in the Ship Mortgage Act of

1920 (codified as amended in 1988 by Pub. L. No. 100-710, 102

Stat. 4735, at 46 U.S.C. 30101-31343). Congress passed

the Act in order to provide greater protection to private

investment in the shipping industry. Chase Manhattan Fin. _____________________

Servs., Inc. v. McMillian, 896 F.2d 452, 458 (10th Cir. _____________ _________

1990); Merchants & Marine Bank v. The T.E. Welles, 289 F.2d ________________________ _______________

188, 193-94 (5th Cir. 1961). Prior to the Act's passage, a

mortgage on a ship was outranked in admiralty proceedings by

ordinary maritime liens on the ship, even those arising after

the mortgage. McMillian, 896 F.2d at 458. The Act changed _________

the law by granting the holders of preferred ship mortgages

"priority over all claims against the vessel (except for ___

expenses and fees allowed by the court, costs imposed by the

court, and preferred maritime liens)." 46 U.S.C.

31326(b)(1) (emphasis added). There are just six categories

of preferred maritime liens; one of these categories is liens

for salvage. 46 U.S.C. 31301(5).7 However, liens for

____________________

7. The subsection defines a preferred maritime lien as

a maritime lien on a vessel--
(A) arising before a preferred mortgage
was filed under section 31321 of this

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"necessaries," which include "repairs, supplies, towage, and

the use of a dry dock or marine railway," 46 U.S.C.

31301(4), are ordinary, and are thus subordinate to a

preferred ship mortgage.

C. The Law of Salvage ______________________

The admiralty doctrine of salvage, which rewards

volunteers who save ships from dangers at sea, is an

equitable doctrine that dates back to the Romans.

Wijsmuller, 702 F.2d at 337. To establish a salvage claim, __________

PHT must prove three elements: "`1. A marine peril. 2.

Service voluntarily rendered when not required as an existing

duty or from a special contract. 3. Success in whole or in

part, or . . . service [contributing] to such success.'"

Clifford v. M/V Islander, 751 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1984) ________ ____________

(quoting The Sabine, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 384 (1879)). In this __________

case, Faneuil contends that PHT's claim for salvage must fail

because the Sea Hawk was never in "marine peril," which, as

we stated in Clifford, ________


____________________

title;
(B) for damage arising out of
maritime tort;
(C) for wages of a stevedore
when employed directly by a
person listed in section 31341
of this title;
(D) for wages of the crew of
the vessel;
(E) for general average; or
(F) for salvage, including
contract salvage[.]

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occurs when a vessel is exposed to any
actual or apprehended danger which might
result in her destruction. "All services
rendered at sea to a vessel in distress
are salvage services. It is not
necessary . . . that the distress should
be immediate and absolute; it will be
sufficient if, at the time the assistance
is rendered, the vessel has encountered
any damage or misfortune which might
possibly expose her to destruction if the
services were not rendered." Reasonable
apprehension of peril, whether actual or
not, is enough.

751 F.2d at 5-6 (quoting M. Norris, The Law of Salvage 63, ___________________

at 97). Marine peril has been found to exist in a variety of

circumstances, including where a vessel: had run aground on

a rocky ledge, Wijsmuller, 702 F.2d 333; was adrift with no __________

power within a short distance of the coast, The Plymouth _____________

Rock, 9 F. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1881); was docked but was close to a ____

fire, The John Swan, 50 F. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1892); was on course _____________

at sea but where its crew was stricken with yellow fever,

Williamson v. The Alphonso, F. Cas. No 17749 (C.C. Mass. __________ _____________

1853). On the other hand, courts have found no marine peril

where a vessel: had been holed but was secured in calm

weather and was not sinking, Clifford, 751 F.2d 1; had ________

drifted out to sea during a hurricane but subsequently came

to rest and held fast on a mooring in calm waters, Phelan v. ______

Minges, 170 F. Supp. 826 (D. Mass. 1959); was adrift as the ______

result of bad weather but could have returned to port under

its own power once the weather cleared, The Viola, 52 F. 172 _________

(C.C. Pa. 1892), aff'd, 55 F. 829 (3d Cir. 1893). _____


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PHT does not contend, and the district court did

not find, that the damaged Sea Hawk was unseaworthy or in

immediate danger of sinking when PHT took possession of it at

the state pier on July 15, 1992. The district court

apparently predicated its finding that PHT had satisfied its

burden with regard to "marine peril" on the fact that the Sea

Hawk was essentially an orphaned vessel, and eventually __________

"would have sunk or deteriorated to the point that it would

have been a derelict or worthless hulk" had PHT not

volunteered as guardian:8

The peril was not immediate or absolute.
Events as already related by this court
showed that there was actual
apprehension, though not of actual
danger. Gilmore had washed his hands and
would not longer deal with the Sea Hawk.
Cronin, who seems to need a mnemonic,
wanted an immediate solution so he would
be freed of an untoward situation. The
Coast Guard did what it had to do and
disembarked from the scene . . . . But
for PHT as heretofore stated and its
expensive remedial action there is no

____________________

8. PHT advances other possible bases for a finding that
marine peril existed: Cronin's testimony that he feared that
Kinchla might return and try to steal the boat again or, even
worse, that he might sink it for insurance proceeds, and that
therefore Cronin had to move the boat out of Hampton Harbor.
This argument is preposterous. First, Kinchla had just been
arrested for trying to retake his boat; he was not likely to ________
make another attempt anytime soon. Second, even if another
attempt by Kinchla to seize his boat would have been
unlawful, it would not necessarily have posed any grave peril
to the boat. Third, Cronin's concern about Kinchla sinking ____
the boat for insurance seems entirely unfounded: Kinchla was
more than a year behind in his mortgage payments on the boat,
and the record contains no indication that Kinchla was any
more punctual in paying insurance premiums.

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doubt in the court's mind that the boat
would have deteriorated and become
valueless.

Faneuil Advisors v. Seahawk [sic], No. 93-549-L, 1994 WL _________________ _______

484380, at *4 (D.N.H. Aug. 23, 1994).

In holding that these circumstances constituted a

reasonable apprehension of marine peril, the district court

misreads the salvage cases holding that marine peril need not

be immediate or absolute. While it is true that the threat

need not be imminent, see, e.g., Williamson v. The Alphonso, ________ ___ ____ __________ ____________

F. Cas. No 17749, the cases make apparent that the threat

must be something more than the inevitable deterioration that

any vessel left untended would suffer; otherwise ordinary

maintenance, repairs and storage -- i.e., "necessaries" --

could easily give rise to salvage liens if a vessel's owner

were particularly negligent in caring for his or her boat.

Such a result could hardly be squared with the intent of the

Ship Mortgage Act.

Moreover, in stating that it had "no doubt" that

the Sea Hawk would have become a worthless hulk without PHT's

intervention, the district court glossed over an important

fact: once the Sea Hawk was intercepted by the Coast Guard

and delivered to Cronin at the state pier, the boat was in

the custody of the State of New Hampshire, which certainly

had the authority, and perhaps the duty, to remove the vessel

from the harbor and store it in a safe location. See, e.g., ___ ____



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N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 271-A:8 (1987) (giving harbormasters

authority, inter alia, "to require the removal of vessels if _____ ____

necessity or an emergency arises"); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.

270-B1 to -B7 (1987) (giving director of safety services or

representative authority to impound or order the removal and

storage of abandoned boats, and imposing lien on such boats

for all reasonable charges associated therewith). As already

stated, the Sea Hawk was in no imminent danger of sinking.

We fail to see how such a boat, in the safe custody of a

state officer with statutory authority to provide for its

safekeeping, can possibly be said to be facing "marine

peril," or how any such peril could reasonably be

apprehended.

The district court stated that Cronin "wanted an

immediate solution so he would be freed of an untoward

situation." Id. This is not marine peril; it is mere ___

inconvenience, and the state cannot transform an unwanted

tow-and-store job into a salvage job simply by declaring it

to be such (if that is in fact what Cronin attempted to do,

as Holt's testimony suggests). We have scoured the salvage

cases and located not a single one in which a seaworthy

vessel in the safe possession of the state was found to be in

marine peril. Thus, we hold that the district court's

finding that there was reasonable apprehension of marine

peril incorporated clearly erroneous factual assumptions and



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was predicated on an erroneous understanding of the

applicable law. We hold that, under these circumstances, PHT

has failed to prove marine peril or reasonable apprehension

thereof, and therefore it has failed to prove an essential

element of its salvage claim.

D. The District Court's Alternative Holding ____________________________________________

We have also considered whether PHT might be

entitled to recover on the basis of the district court's

implicit alternative ground for its holding -- namely, that

"[i]t is not fair or equitable that the plaintiff should reap

the benefits bestowed on the Sea Hawk by [PHT] when it

contributed nothing to its well being." Faneuil Advisers, ________________

1994 WL 484380, at *4. Nevertheless, the statutory scheme

permits no contrary conclusion: Congress clearly intended to

afford holders of preferred ship mortgages considerable

protections against irresponsible actions by ship owners, and

the exceptions to their priority status are explicitly

spelled out. See 46 U.S.C. 31301(5), 31326(b)(1). A lien ___

for necessaries, even one obtained by the state or its agent

under state law, is not among those exceptions. In fact, any

argument that such a lien might have priority would appear to

be entirely foreclosed by 46 U.S.C. 31307: "This chapter

supersedes any State statute conferring a lien on a vessel to







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the extent the statute establishes a claim to be enforced by

a civil action in rem against the vessel for necessaries."9

While the result we reach may appear harsh, the

priority scheme simply allows for no judicial reordering on

expansive notions of equity where the mortgage holder has

engaged in no inequitable conduct that might justify

subordination of his claim. See Maryland Nat'l Bank v. The ___ ___________________ ___

Vessel Madam Chapel, No. 93-55905, 1995 WL 25833, at *6 (9th ____________________

Cir. 1995) (holding that equitable subordination generally

requires inequitable conduct by mortgagee and reversing order

that had subordinated preferred ship mortgage). It may well

be that other doctrines might supply some basis for relief in

cases such as this one. But no such argument has been made

on appeal, and this is hardly a case for us to attempt to

find a basis on which to remand in order to explore issues

that have never been raised.

CONCLUSION CONCLUSION __________

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the

district court is


____________________

9. That a state statutory lien is superseded should come as
no surprise; not even the federal government's claims against
a vessel are given special dispensation from the priority
scheme. See General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Oil Screw Triton, ___ __________________________ _________________
VI, 712 F.2d 991, 995 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that __
government's claim for expenses in capturing and preserving
vessel seized for violation of narcotics laws -- incurred
before ship came within court's custody -- could not be ___
classified as custodia legis expenses, and thus were primed ________ _____
by preferred ship mortgage).

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Reversed. Costs to appellant. Reversed. Costs to appellant. ________ __________________



















































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