USCA1 Opinion
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 94-2061
VLADIMIR COLLAZO-LEON,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
UNITED STATES BUREAU OF PRISONS, ET AL.,
Defendants - Appellants.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]
___________________
____________________
Before
Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges,
______________
and Carter,* District Judge.
______________
_____________________
Sean Connelly, Attorney, United States Department of
_______________
Justice, with whom Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Mar a
_____________ _____
Hortensia R os-G ndara, Assistant United States Attorney, and
_______________________
Paul W. Layer, United States Bureau of Prisons, were on brief for
_____________
appellants.
Marcia G. Shein, with whom Law Office of Miller & Shein, was
_______________ ____________________________
on brief for appellee.
____________________
April 7, 1995
____________________
* Of the District of Maine, sitting by designation.
____________________
-2-
CARTER, Chief District Judge. Appellee Vladimir
CARTER, Chief District Judge
______________________
Collazo-Le n, a pretrial detainee at the Metropolitan Detention
Center at Guaynabo, Puerto Rico, brought a habeas corpus action
alleging that he had been denied both substantive and procedural
due process by the United States Bureau of Prisons (BOP) when he
was placed in disciplinary segregation for ninety days and had
his telephone and visitation privileges taken away for six months
as punishment for misconduct. After being placed in segregation,
Collazo-Le n applied for a writ of habeas corpus which the
magistrate judge recommended that the court deny. The district
court disagreed and granted the petition finding that the
practice violated substantive due process of law. The BOP
appeals the district court's grant of a writ of habeas corpus to
Collazo-Le n.
FACTS
FACTS
_____
Collazo-Le n was named in eleven counts of a thirteen-
count indictment, returned in the District of Puerto Rico,
charging conspiracy to import and distribute cocaine. On April
7, 1994, while being held in pretrial detention, Collazo-Le n
appeared before a disciplinary hearing officer (DHO), was
informed of disciplinary charges against him, and, based upon an
affidavit, was found to have attempted escape and to have offered
a bribe to a prison guard to induce his assistance in Defendant's
escape attempt. The charges for both acts arise out of the same
set of facts: Collazo-Le n offered a prison guard one million
dollars to get him "to the avenue." The sanction imposed by the
-2-
DHO for the attempted escape was sixty days of segregation and
the loss of visiting privileges for six months. The sanction
imposed by the DHO for the offer of a bribe was thirty days
segregation and the loss of telephone privileges for six
months.1
Collazo-Le n was placed in segregation and applied for
a writ of habeas corpus, charging a denial of both substantive
and procedural due process. 28 U.S.C. 2255. The magistrate
judge found that Collazo-Le n had been afforded procedural due
process and that the practice of placing a pretrial detainee in
disciplinary segregation, and taking away his telephone and
visitation privileges as punishment for misconduct, was
permissible under the circumstances. Accordingly, the magistrate
judge recommended that the district court deny the writ of habeas
corpus. Despite this recommendation, the district court granted
the writ, permitting Collazo-Le n's return to the general prison
population before the end of his ninety-day segregation.
The district court did not address the magistrate
judge's finding on Collazo-Le n's claim for denial of procedural
due process. Instead, the court directed all its attention to
the substantive violation finding that the express intent of the
prison regulation authorizing segregation was "punishment," 28
____________________
1 The terms of disciplinary segregation are to be served
consecutively. The segregation consists of being placed in a
room for twenty-three hours a day, with the remaining hour used
for active or passive recreation. Collazo-Le n's loss of
telephone and visiting privileges does not include any
restriction of those activities which involve communication with
his attorneys.
-3-
C.F.R. 541.20(a),2 and that "less drastic resources were not
considered" as alternatives to the segregation and loss of
privileges. The court concluded that the disciplinary action
taken amounted to impermissible punishment and served no
legitimate regulatory purpose in the effective management of the
correctional institution. Thereafter, the district court denied
the BOP's motion for reconsideration. The BOP now appeals the
district court's decision.
DISCUSSION
DISCUSSION
__________
The BOP argues that the district court expanded the
principle established by the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish,
____ _______
441 U.S. 520 (1979), and created a rule that the Constitution
prohibits the discipline of pretrial detainees. Collazo-Le n
____________________
responds that the district court correctly found that the
2 Section 541.20(a) provides:
Constitution prohibits disciplining pretrial detainees who
Except as provided in paragraph (b) of
this section, an inmate may be placed in
violate prison rules in the manner imposed here because doing so
disciplinary segregation only by order of
the Disciplinary Hearing Officer
amounts to impermissible punishment.3 To a great extent, both
following a hearing in which the inmate
has been found to have committed a
prohibited act in the Greatest, High, or
Moderate Category, or a repeated offense
in the Low Moderate Category. The DHO
may order placement in disciplinary
segregation only when other available
dispositions are inadequate to achieve
the purpose of punishment and deterrence
necessary to regulate an inmate's
behavior within acceptable limits.
3 Collazo-Le n also argues that the case is moot because he is
no longer a pretrial detainee but has pled guilty and was
scheduled to be sentenced on February 16, 1995. The BOP responds
that there remains a live controversy. In its brief, the BOP
explains that if this Court reverses the district court, it
intends to carry out the remainder of the ninety-day segregation
term and the six-month telephone and visitation suspensions. We
agree with the BOP that there remains a live controversy.
-4-
parties' arguments are built on semantics: labeling the action as
either permissible discipline or impermissible punishment. This
Court, however, does not find that there is any meaningful
distinction between the terms "punishment" and "discipline" in
this case.
In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, the Supreme Court
____ _______
examined some aspects of the constitutional rights of pretrial
detainees. Bell teaches that punishment cannot be inflicted
____
upon pretrial detainees prior to an adjudication of guilt in
accordance with due process of law. The inquiry, however, does
not end with the designation of a condition of confinement as
"punishment." To distinguish between impermissible and
permissible measures, the Bell Court stated:
____
A court must decide whether the
disability is imposed for the purpose of
punishment or whether it is but an
incident of some other legitimate
governmental purpose. See Flemming v.
___ ________
Nestor, [363 U.S. 603,] at 613-617. . . .
______
[I]f a particular condition or
restriction of pretrial detention is
reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental objective, it does not,
without more, amount to "punishment."
Conversely, if a restriction or condition
is not reasonably related to a legitimate
goal -- if it is arbitrary or purposeless
-- a court permissibly may infer that the
purpose of the governmental action is
punishment that may not constitutionally
be inflicted upon detainees qua
___
detainees.
Id. at 538-39 (footnotes omitted).
___
Bell was a class action seeking injunctive relief and
____
challenging various general conditions, practices, and policies
-5-
to which all pretrial detainees were subjected, including double-
___
bunking, strip-searches, and various other security measures.
The conditions imposed on the pretrial detainees in Bell involved
____
no direct or individualized disciplinary or deterrent purpose.
Here, by contrast, the segregation and loss of privileges are
directly related to the exercise of the prison staff's
disciplinary authority by both punishing Collazo-Le n for his
institutional misconduct and deterring him from engaging in it in
the future. In Bell, the Court was not faced with the situation
____
where discrete sanctions were imposed on individual pretrial
detainees as discipline for specific in-house violations.
Although factually distinguishable, the theoretical
constitutional premises of Bell's analysis provides some rational
____
guidance in this case.
On the authority of Bell, it may be divined that even
____
if a restriction or condition may be viewed as having a punitive
effect on the pretrial detainee, it is nonetheless constitutional
if it also furthers some legitimate governmental objective such
as addressing a specific institutional violation and is not
excessive in light of the seriousness of the violation. Bell,
____
441 U.S. at 538-39; Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320
_________ _____
(1982)(requiring that restrictions on the liberty of an
involuntarily confined mental patient be reasonably related to
legitimate government interests in imposing those restrictions).
Among the legitimate objectives recognized by the Supreme Court
are ensuring a detainee's presence at trial and maintaining
-6-
safety, internal order, and security within the institution.
Bell, 441 U.S. at 540. If there is a reasonable relation between
____
the sanctions and legitimate institutional policies, an intent to
punish the detainee for prior unproven criminal conduct cannot be
___________________________________
inferred. Accordingly, this Court must determine whether the
punishment imposed here was incident to some legitimate
governmental purpose.
In this case, the district court looked at whether the
sanction imposed on Collazo-Le n was of a "punitive" character.
The court found it to be punitive, reasoning that because after
Collazo-Le n serves his time in segregation, he will present "the
same risk of flight and the same security hazard that he did when
[the BOP] determined that his conduct justified placing him in
isolation," the discipline did not serve the BOP's legitimate
goal of providing a safe and orderly environment for inmates.
This Court finds that statement by the district court
particularly curious. Although Collazo-Le n may continue to be a
risk to security after release from segregation that does not
mean that legitimate governmental goals are not served by the
disciplinary action. If the district court's statement regarding
Collazo-Le n's continued security risk is taken to its logical
conclusion, any type of discipline imposed would not be allowable
because Collazo-Le n must, inevitably, be returned to the general
prison population. This overlooks entirely any reasonable
expectation that the discipline will have a deterrent effect on
the Defendant.
-7-
The administrators of the prison must be free, within
appropriate limits, to sanction the prison's pretrial detainees
for infractions of reasonable prison regulations that address
concerns of safety and security within the detention environment.
The district court found that the severity of the sanction on the
pretrial detainee for "whom no attempt is made to deal with his
disciplinary problem by means of less drastic actions, compel[s]
the conclusion that the purpose in segregating is to punish." We
agree that the measure is punishment, but we disagree that it is
improper under the circumstances of this case. The Supreme Court
has warned that when
determining whether restrictions or
conditions are reasonably related to the
Government's interest in maintaining
security and order and operating the
institution in a manageable fashion,
courts must heed our warning that '[s]uch
considerations are peculiarly within the
province and professional expertise of
corrections officials, and, in the
absence of substantial evidence in the
record to indicate that the officials
have exaggerated their response to these
considerations, courts should ordinarily
defer to their expert judgment in such
matters.'
Id. at 540-41 n.23 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827
___ ____ _________
(1974)). This recognition is a clear approval of a broad
exercise of discretion by prison authorities to take reasonable
and necessary action, including punishment, to enforce the prison
disciplinary regime and to deter even pretrial detainees from
violation of its requirements. What the Constitution prohibits
is the undue expansion of the exercise of such authority for the
-8-
purpose, or with the unintended effect, of punishing the pretrial
detainee for the acts that are the basis for his prosecution and
his consequent pretrial detention. In other words, reasonable
punishment may be imposed to enforce reasonable prison
_______
disciplinary requirements but may not be imposed to sanction
prior unproven criminal conduct. Recognizing the need to accord
prison officials considerable latitude in matters of internal
discipline, we will not interfere with the execution of
reasonable means, such as the internal discipline effort involved
here, adopted by the BOP to achieve a legitimate governmental
objective. We cannot say that the sanctions imposed, in light of
the seriousness of the violations, were so extreme as to be
unreasonable by the constitutional standard.
For the reasons discussed above, the district court's
grant of the writ of habeas corpus on the substantive due process
grounds is VACATED. The case is REMANDED to the district court
_______ ________
to determine whether Collazo-Le n's right to procedural due
process was violated.4
____________________
4 Collazo-Le n's attorney argues that she did not know that on
May 23, 1994, the magistrate judge was going to hold a hearing on
the merits of the habeas corpus petition. Rather, she "believed
that the only issue to be considered [at the hearing] was
releasing petitioner from sanctions until proceedings relating to
due process and constitutional issues could be presented in more
detail by all parties." Response to Magistrate's Report and
Recommendation (Docket No. 11) at 2. This appears to be a
reasonable conclusion given the magistrate judge's Order to Show
Cause (Docket No. 7). That Order provides, in part:
The Warden, Metropolitan Correctional
Facility, Guaynabo, is ordered to show
cause in my courtroom on Monday, May 23,
1994, at 10:00 a.m., why petitioner
-9-
____________________
should not be released from disciplinary
confinement pending resolution of the
2241 motion now before the court.
Petitioner and respondent are granted
until May 26, 1994, to file memoranda of
law on the only other issue before the
court, whether a pretrial detainee can be
administratively punished during such
detention without the benefit of even a
cursory hearing to determine his
innocence or guilt of such charges.
On May 23, 1994, the magistrate judge held the hearing and
filed his recommended decision in the matter including the merits
of the procedural due process violation. The recommended
decision was docketed on May 24, 1994. The implication from
counsel's argument is that she was not prepared at the hearing to
present all evidence on the issue of the procedural due process
violation. The district court, as noted above in the text, did
not address this issue. On remand the district court should
extend a de novo review to this aspect of the magistrate judge's
__ ____
decision.
-10-
