USCA1 Opinion
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 95-1193
RICARDO CALERO-COLON, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
ISMAEL BETANCOURT-LEBRON, ETC., ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Daniel R. Dominguez, U.S. District Judge]
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Selya,
Cyr and Lynch,
Circuit Judges.
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Jose A. Pagan Nieves, with whom Elisa A. Fumero Perez, Jose A.
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Pagan Nieves Law Offices and Nector Robles Abraham were on brief for
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appellants.
Lorraine J. Riefkohl, Assistant Solicitor General, with whom
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Carlos Lugo-Fiol, Solicitor General, and Jacqueline Novas-Debien,
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Deputy Solicitor General, were on brief for appellees.
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October 17, 1995
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CYR, Circuit Judge. Ricardo Calero-Col n ("Calero")
CYR, Circuit Judge.
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and Eric Robles-Abraham ("Robles") challenge a district court
ruling dismissing their civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.
1983 for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). As the district court
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incorrectly concluded that their claims were time-barred, we
vacate the judgments and remand for further proceedings.
I
I
BACKGROUND1
BACKGROUND
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On February 9, 1993, Calero commenced this action
against various police officers of the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico and their confidential informants. Robles followed suit on
November 2, 1993, and the cases were consolidated. At the heart
of both complaints are allegations that Jos Crespo-Guill n
("Crespo") an undercover Puerto Rico police officer and a
confidential informant named Rosa, persuaded certain Commonwealth
authorities to provide front money for undercover drug buys which
never were intended to take place. The complaints asserted that
Crespo and Rosa falsely identified appellants as the "sellers" in
two concocted undercover drug buys, thereby causing arrest
warrants to issue against each. Calero was arrested on August 1,
1990, and Robles on March 20, 1992, for allegedly selling one
ounce of cocaine to Crespo. On July 1, 1992, Calero was acquit-
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1Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals are reviewed under the rubric that
all reasonable inferences from well-pleaded facts are to be drawn
in appellants' favor. P rez-Ruiz v. Crespo-Guill n, 25 F.3d 40,
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42 (1st Cir. 1994).
2
ted; Robles was acquitted on July 2, 1993.
Although both Calero and Robles maintained their
innocence from the moment of their respective arrests, each
claims that he did not know the true nature and extent of the
scheme that led to the arrest until after he had been acquitted.
In all events, within months of their respective acquittals,
Calero and Robles initiated lawsuits alleging violations of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion and violations of Puerto Rico law. Shortly thereafter, the
appellees moved to dismiss on the ground that the claims were
time-barred.
The district court deemed appellants' claims analogous
to the common law torts of false arrest and malicious prosecu-
tion. It found that the one-year limitation borrowed from Puerto
Rico law barred their respective false arrest claims, which
accrued at the dates of arrest.2 Although the court ruled that
their "malicious prosecution" type claims were not time-barred,
it held them not actionable under section 1983, whether on a
substantive or procedural due process theory. See Albright v.
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Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994) (refusing to recognize substantive
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due process right to be free from prosecution not based on
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2See Albright v. Oliver, 975 F.2d 343, 345 (7th Cir. 1992),
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aff'd on other grounds, 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994); Johnson v. Johnson
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County Comm'n. Bd., 925 F.2d 1299, 1301 (10th Cir. 1991); Rose v.
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Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 351 (3d Cir. 1989); McCune v. City of Grand
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Rapids, 842 F.2d 903, 907 (6th Cir. 1988); Davis v. Harvey, 789
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F.2d 1332, 1333 n.1 (9th Cir. 1986); Singleton v. City of New
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York, 632 F.2d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
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920 (1981).
3
probable cause); P rez-Ruiz, 25 F.3d at 43 (commonwealth law
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affords adequate post-deprivation remedy for "procedural due
process" type "malicious prosecution" claims). As no trialworthy
federal claims remained, the pendent commonwealth law claims were
dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3).
See Figuera Ruiz v. Alegria, 896 F.2d 645, 650 (1st Cir. 1990).
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II
II
DISCUSSION3
DISCUSSION
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A. Applicable Limitation Period
A. Applicable Limitation Period
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Section 1983 creates "a species of tort liability" for
redressing deprivations of federal constitutional rights. Heck
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v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2370 (1994) (quoting Memphis
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Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (1986)). The
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limitation period governing personal injury actions under the law
of the forum state is borrowed for application to section 1983
claims. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-80 (1985); Guzman-
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Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 29 F.3d 3, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1994). The one-
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year limitation period prescribed in Article 1868(2) of the Civil
Code of Puerto Rico, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, 5298(2) (1991),
governs these section 1983 claims.
B. Accrual Rules Governing Section 1983 Claims
B. Accrual Rules Governing Section 1983 Claims
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The question before us is whether appellants brought
their section 1983 claims within the applicable one-year period
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3We review Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals de novo. Clarke v.
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Kentucky Fried Chicken of Cal., Inc., 57 F.3d 21, 22 n.1 (1st
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Cir. 1995).
4
prescribed by Puerto Rico law. The dispute focuses on when the
one year began to run; in other words, when their respective
causes of action accrued. Federal law provides the applicable
accrual rule. Guzman-Rivera, 29 F.3d at 4-5.
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Section 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff "knows or
has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the
action." Street v. Vose, 936 F.3d 38, 40 (1st Cir. 1992) (quot-
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ing Torres v. Superintendent of Police, 893 F.2d 404, 407 (1st
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Cir. 1990)). For purposes of determining when a claimant knew or
had reason to know of the alleged injury, we look to the common
law cause of action most closely analogous to the constitutional
right at stake. Heck, 114 S. Ct. at 2371. As the elements in
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any species of section 1983 "tort" are ordained by its constitu-
tional prototype, we first identify the particular constitutional
right allegedly infringed. See Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct.
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807, 811 (1994).
These complaints specifically state that Puerto Rico
police officers arrested Calero and Robles pursuant to a warrant
predicated on false allegations by Crespo and Rosa. Thus,
appellants' section 1983 claims directly implicate both their
Fourth Amendment right to be free from any unreasonable seizure
of their persons, see Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1502-03
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(3d Cir. 1993) (discussing Fourth Amendment standards in case
involving arrest based on warrant), and their Fourteenth Amend-
ment right to be free from criminal prosecution without due
5
process of law.4
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4Appellants have not appealed from the district court ruling
dismissing their Fourteenth Amendment claims. See supra, pp. 3-
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4.
6
The district court found the Fourteenth Amendment due
process claims more closely analogous to the tort of malicious
prosecution, but that the Fourth Amendment claims more closely
resembled the common law tort of false arrest. Even though
malicious prosecution5 and false arrest6 may seem distinct
enough in abstract definition, however, in a wrongful arrest case
particularly an arrest conducted pursuant to a warrant based
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on false allegations the lines between the two may become
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blurred. In the present case, we believe appellants' Fourth
Amendment claims more closely resemble the common law tort of
malicious prosecution as well.7
The Supreme Court has noted that the common law cause
of action for malicious prosecution, unlike false arrest, permits
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5Generally speaking, in order to state a cause of action for
malicious prosecution, a claimant must allege: (1) the commence-
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ment or continuation of a criminal proceeding by the defendant
against the plaintiff; (2) the termination of the proceeding in
favor of the accused; (3) the absence of probable cause for the
criminal proceeding; and (4) actual malice. Landrigan v. City of
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Warwick, 628 F.2d 736, 745 n.6 (1st Cir. 1980).
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6Typically, the elements of a false arrest claim are said to
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be that: (1) the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff; (2)
the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement; (3) the plaintiff
did not consent to the confinement; and (4) the defendant had no
privilege to cause the confinement. See Restatement (Second) Of
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Torts 35, 118 cmt. b (1965). Neither actual malice nor lack
of probable cause is an element of false arrest.
7Although there is no substantive due process right to be
free from malicious prosecution, see P rez-Ruiz, 25 F.3d at 42,
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the Supreme Court has held that a "malicious prosecution" type
claim may be actionable under the Fourth Amendment in a section
1983 action. Albright, 114 S. Ct. at 813. See also Malley v.
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Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) (discussing liability of police
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officer who allegedly applied for arrest warrants, without
probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
7
damages for confinement pursuant to legal process. Heck, 114 S.
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Ct. at 2371. The interest at stake in a malicious prosecution
claim is the right to be free from deprivations of liberty
interests caused by unjustifiable criminal charges and proce-
dures. In contrast, false arrests infringe upon the right to be
free from restraints on bodily movement.8 The remedies avail-
able in the two tort actions mirror the different interests at
stake. Damages for false arrest are restricted to the time
period between the initial detention and the issuance of legal
process, whereas the tort of malicious prosecution contemplates
general damages as well as compensation for any arrest and
imprisonment preceding the termination of the criminal proceed-
ing. Id.
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The critical inquiry that distinguishes malicious
prosecution from false arrest in the present context is whether
the arrests were made pursuant to a warrant. Singer v. Fulton
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County Sheriff, No. 94-9093, 1995 WL 470283, at *5 (2d Cir. Aug.
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9, 1995). As a general rule, an unlawful arrest pursuant to a
warrant will be more closely analogous to the common law tort of
malicious prosecution. An arrest warrant constitutes legal
process, and it is the tort of malicious prosecution that permits
damages for confinement pursuant to legal process. On the other
hand, wrongful warrantless arrests typically resemble the tort of
false arrest. Id.
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8For a cogent discussion of the two torts in the section
1983 context, see Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, No. 94-9093,
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1995 WL 470283 (2d Cir. Aug. 9, 1995).
8
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that for purposes
of determining the appropriate accrual rule both the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment claims more closely resemble the common
law tort of malicious prosecution. Consequently, appellants'
section 1983 claims did not accrue until their respective crimi-
nal prosecutions ended in acquittals. Heck, 114 S. Ct. at 2371;
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Guzman-Rivera, 29 F.3d at 5.
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All that remains is to apply the accrual rule. Calero
was acquitted on July 1, 1992. Well within the one-year limita-
tion on February 9, 1993 he commenced the present action.
Similarly, Robles was acquitted on July 2, 1993, and brought suit
on November 2, 1993. Thus, their section 1983 claims are not
time-barred.
III
III
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
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In sum, reference to common law tort principles is
appropriate in identifying the most suitable rule of accrual for
application to section 1983 claims, always bearing in mind the
legislative aims which Congress sought to advance by establishing
a federal forum for redressing deprivations of constitutional
rights. Cf. Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1831 (1992) (noting
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that common law immunities are not necessarily applicable to
section 1983 claims). Accordingly, the essential elements of
actionable section 1983 claims derive first and foremost from the
Constitution itself, not necessarily from the analogous common
law tort. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-97 (1989)
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9
(analyzing excessive force claim under Fourth Amendment stan-
dards). Consequently, on remand Calero and Robles must establish
that their respective Fourth Amendment rights were violated by
one or more appellees. See, e.g., Lippay, 996 F.2d at 1502-03
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(discussing one theory of liability for violating the Fourth
Amendment).
The district court judgments are vacated, and the case
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is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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Costs are awarded to appellants.
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- Concurring Opinion Follows -
10
LYNCH, Circuit Judge, concurring. I write separately
LYNCH, Circuit Judge, concurring
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to stress my understanding that in Fourth Amendment claims under
1983 arising out of a warrantless arrest the statute of limita-
tions may typically, but does not necessarily, begin to run at
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the time of arrest.
There may be circumstances in which plaintiffs neither
knew, nor had reason to know, at the time of their warrantless
arrests that they had suffered a constitutional injury and so the
statute would not begin to run upon arrest. Similarly, the
arrest may lead to a chain of events leading to a different
characterization of the entire constitutional injury, and so a
different accrual date. See Robinson v. Maruffi, 895 F.2d 649,
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654-55 (10th Cir. 1990). That the common law of false arrest has
often been interpreted to establish that the common law cause of
action accrues upon the arrest1 does not answer the question of
the accrual date for 1983 actions. The Supreme Court in
Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994), and earlier cases,
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see, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989), has
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instructed federal courts to look to the true nature of the
constitutional claims being asserted, rejecting labels.
As Judge Cyr's very thoughtful opinion states: "[t]he
essential elements of actionable section 1983 claims derive first
and foremost from the Constitution itself, not necessarily from
the analogous common law tort." Accordingly, the law does not,
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1But see Justice Ginsburg's views in her concurring opinion
in Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 814-817 (1994).
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I believe, bind the accrual date for the constitutional tort in
warrantless arrests inevitably and invariably to the date of
arrest. The case of a warrantless arrest is not before us, and
no more now need be said.
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