USCA1 Opinion
November 20, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 95-1365
EDWIN OCASIO-APONTE,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
JOSE ARIEL NAZARIO, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Salvador E. Casellas, U.S. District Judge]
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Before
Lynch, Circuit Judge,
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Watson,* Senior Judge, and
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Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge.
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Francisco J. Rodriguez Juarbe on brief for appellant.
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Carlos Lugo-Fiol, Solicitor General, Jacqueline Novas-Debien,
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Deputy Solicitor General, Lorraine J. Riefkohl, Assistant Solicitor
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General, Department of Justice, Jose Carlos Garcia-Selva and Sigrid
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Lopez-Gonzalez Law Offices, on brief for appellees.
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*Of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by
designation.
Per Curiam. Appellant Ocasio-Aponte appeals the
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dismissal of his action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, by the
United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico,
on the ground that his complaint was time barred because it
had not been filed within the applicable one year statute of
limitations period. We affirm.
Ocasio-Aponte's action arising out of the termination of
his government employment was filed in federal court on April
23, 1992. Although his alleged injury occurred in 1988, the
parties agree that the statute of limitations had been tolled
by an action filed in the Commonwealth Supreme Court in 1989.
This action was dismissed by the Commonwealth Superior Court
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Supreme
Court of Puerto Rico subsequently denied Aponte-Ocasio's
petition for review and motion for reconsideration. The
parties were notified of the court's denial of the motion for
reconsideration on April 22, 1991. The Supreme Court of
Puerto Rico issued its mandate to the Superior Court on May
1, 1991.
The sole question in this case is when the tolling
period ended. According to Ocasio-Aponte the tolling period
lasted until mandate issued; according to appellees, the
period lasted only until the parties were notified on April
22, 1992, of the court's denial of Aponte-Ocasio's motion for
reconsideration. Both parties agree that the instant action
is time barred if, but only if, the tolling period ended on
or before April 22, 1991.
State law, here the law of Puerto Rico, controls the
question of the duration of the tolling period. Wilson v.
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Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269 (1985); Gonsalves v. Flynn, 981
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F.2d 45, 47 (1st Cir. 1992). As the district court held,
under Puerto Rico law, the tolling period ends when the court
enters a final judgment. Duran Cepeda v. Morales Lebron, 112
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D.P.R. 623, 12 Official Translations 776, 785 (1982); Fresh-
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O-Baking Co. v. Molinos de Puerto Rico, 103 P.R.R. 707, 717
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(1975). A judgment is final, at the latest, when it has been
"rendered and notified with the proper legal formality,"
Sanchez v. Municipality of Cayey, 94 P.R.R. 89, 96 (1967).
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Finality is not dependent on the date on which mandate issues
to the lower court. See Dominguez v. Fabian, 36 P.R.R. 509,
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511 (1927) (judgment final, for purposes of taking appeal,
from date rendered and filed with court not from date on
which mandate issues).
Under Puerto Rico law, a final judgment in the instant
case was rendered, at the latest, on April 22, 1991; for, on
that date, the parties received formal notification from the
Puerto Rico Supreme Court that Ocasio-Aponte's motion for
reconsideration had been denied. As of April 22, 1991,
therefore, the tolling period was at an end and the statute
of limitations began to run anew. Rodriguez Narvaez v.
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Nazario, 895 F.2d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 1990). Since the present
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action was filed more than one year from this date, the
district court was correct in finding it time barred.
Affirmed.
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