March 29, 1996
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 95-1741
DAVID L. WELLS,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
JOHN MARSHALL,
Respondent, Appellee.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Selya and Cyr, Circuit Judges. ______________
____________________
David L. Wells on brief pro se. ______________
Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General, and William J. Meade, ___________________ __________________
Assistant Attorney General, on brief for appellee.
____________________
____________________
Per Curiam. We have reviewed the record and the __________
parties' briefs and affirm the dismissal of the habeas
petition, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254, of petitioner
David L. Wells. We rely essentially on the reasons set forth
in the district court's Memorandum and Order. See Wells v. ___ _____
Marshall, 885 F. Supp. 314 (D. Mass. 1995). We add the ________
following comments.
1. Petitioner is not excused from exhausting state
remedies merely because he claims that his state trial was
unconstitutional and that the allegedly altered trial
transcript prevents him from challenging his conviction in
any state proceeding. A new superior court judge has been
assigned to petitioner's motion for a new trial and
petitioner has presented no evidence that he has been
thwarted in proceeding before this judge. Indeed, at the
April 26, 1995 hearing, the judge stated that he was ready to
hear petitioner's claims and, when petitioner indicated that
he would rather proceed in federal court, left to petitioner
the decision when to reactivate the state action. In this
situation, it hardly can be said that resort to state
remedies would be futile. See Gagne v. Fair, 835 F.2d 6, 9 ___ _____ ____
(1st Cir. 1987) (unless the state remedy is clearly
deficient, resort to the state process will not be deemed
futile). Comity therefore mandates that the state be given
the first opportunity to rule on petitioner's claims. See ___
id.; Layne v. Gunter, 559 F.2d 850, 851-52 (1st Cir. 1977) ___ _____ ______
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(where the state process was "revived" after petitioner filed
a federal habeas petition and therefore currently was
available to him, exhaustion of the state process is
appropriate), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1038 (1978). ____________
2. We do not see what relevance the problem
petitioner is experiencing with his vision has to the
exhaustion question. That is, petitioner would face the same
difficulties no matter in which court he proceeded. If
petitioner requires accommodations -- such as extended
deadlines for the filing of pleadings -- he can ask the state
court for such adjustments.
3. In closing, we remind petitioner that he must
present to the state court all the grounds for relief he
intends to raise in the federal court. See Gagne, 835 F.2d ___ _____
at 7 (in order to meet the exhaustion requirement, petitioner
"must have fairly presented the substance of his federal
habeas claim to the state court before seeking federal
review").
Affirmed. See Local Rule 27.1. ________ ___
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