February 29, 1996     [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            UNITES STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT







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        No. 95-1750



                                     PETER WHITE,



                                Petitioner, Appellant,



                                          v.



                               SHEILA HUBBARD, ET AL.,



                               Respondents, Appellees.





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                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT



                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS



                  [Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, Chief U.S. District Judge]
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                                        Before



                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
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                          Boudin and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
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            Peter White on brief pro se.
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            Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General, and William J. Duensing,
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        Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Bureau, on brief for appellees.





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                 Per Curiam.  In  this habeas corpus proceeding  under 28
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            U.S.C.    2254,  petitioner  Peter White  complains that  the



            Massachusetts Parole Board abridged his due process rights by



            waiting some eleven years before executing a parole violation



            warrant  against him.    During that  period, petitioner  was



            first awaiting  trial on, and then  incarcerated for, several



            federal offenses.  We  agree with the district court  that no



            constitutional claim has been presented.  



                 Petitioner is  mistaken in arguing that  he was entitled



            to a revocation  hearing prior  to his  release from  federal



            custody  in 1992.    Prior thereto,  as the  Magistrate-Judge



            observed,  petitioner  was never  "taken  into  custody as  a



            parole violator by execution  of the warrant"--the event that



            triggers  the right to a prompt revocation hearing.  Moody v.
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            Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 89 (1976); accord, e.g.,  United States
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            v.  Chaklader, 987 F.2d 75,  77 (1st Cir.  1993) (per curiam)
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            (noting that  the speedy revocation  hearing protection under



            the  Due Process Clause is "not triggered when the warrant is



            placed  as a detainer at an institution where the ... parolee



            is already in custody  awaiting disposition of an intervening



            charge or serving a  sentence for a crime committed  while on



            [parole]") (quoting United States  v. Wickham, 618 F.2d 1307,
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            1309 n.3 (9th Cir. 1979)).



                 Also misplaced is the  related contention that the delay



            between issuance  and execution  of the  warrant here was  so







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            unreasonable  as to have resulted  in a waiver  of the parole



            board's  authority  to  return  petitioner to  prison.    See
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            generally, e.g., Bennett  v. Bogan, 66 F.3d  812, 818-19 (6th
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            Cir. 1995); United  States v.  Tippens, 39 F.3d  88, 90  (5th
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            Cir.  1994) (per  curiam); United  States v.  Hill, 719  F.2d
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            1402, 1403-05 (9th  Cir. 1983);  In re Zullo,  420 Mass.  872
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            (1995).  Petitioner  insists that the warrant could have been



            served  between the time he was released  on bail in 1981 and



            the time he commenced his federal incarceration in 1983.  Yet



            it is difficult to conclude that the board acted unreasonably



            in deferring action while  the federal charges were pending--



            especially since state  law called  for such a  result.   See
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            Mass. Gen. L. ch. 127,   149 (1981); see, e.g.,  In re Zullo,
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            37  Mass. App. Ct. 371,  373 (1994), vacated  and remanded on
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            other grounds,  420 Mass. 872  (1995); Smith v.  State Parole
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            Board, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 145, 150 n.12 (1983). 
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                 Petitioner in  any event has failed  to demonstrate that



            he was prejudiced by the delay.  No suggestion has been  made



            that  deferral of  the revocation  hearing  "undermine[d] his



            ability to contest the  issue of the violation or  to proffer



            mitigating  evidence."   Tippens, 39  F.3d at  90.   Instead,
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            petitioner  contends  only  that   he  was  deprived  of  the



            opportunity   to  serve  his   federal  and  state  sentences



            concurrently.  Virtually the identical argument was  rejected



            in Moody, where  the Court noted  that the parole  commission
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            retained  the  discretion   "to  grant,  retroactively,   the



            equivalent  of  concurrent  sentences  and  to   provide  for



            unconditional  or  conditional release."    429  U.S. at  87;



            accord,  e.g., Tippens, 39 F.3d at 90; Chaklader, 987 F.2d at
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            77;  United States v. Fisher,  895 F.2d 208,  211 (5th Cir.),
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            cert. denied, 495 U.S.  940 (1990).  That the board  here, in
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            the  end, chose not to exercise its discretion in this manner



            is  without   constitutional   significance.     See,   e.g.,
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            Chaklader, 987 F.2d at 77.
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                 Affirmed.
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