February 26, 1996 [Not For Publication]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 95-1803
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
HERBERT E. PLYMPTON,
Defendant, Appellant.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Francis J. Boyle, Senior U.S. District Judge] __________________________
____________________
Before
Boudin, Circuit Judge, _____________
Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________
and Rosenn,* Senior Circuit Judge. ____________________
____________________
Charles J. Rogers, Jr. on brief for appellant. ______________________
Michael P. Iannotti, Assistant United States Attorney, and ______________________
Sheldon Whitehouse, United States Attorney, on brief for the United __________________
States.
____________________
____________________
____________________
*Of the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
Per Curiam. Herbert Plympton was convicted after a jury __________
trial of three counts of possession and concealment of goods
stolen from interstate commerce and sentenced to 41 months'
imprisonment and restitution totaling $444,231.69. The
convictions and sentence were submitted to this court in a
separate appeal. United States v. Black, No. 94-1852. _____________ _____
On April 18, 1995, Plympton's attorney filed a motion
requesting that $35,000 bail, posted following Plympton's
arraignment in 1993, be returned to one George Gotauco. The
government objected and filed a motion to apply the bail
funds toward the outstanding assessment, restitution, and
fine pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2044. The district court, on
July 12, 1995, denied Gotauco's motion and granted the
government's motion.
Because 28 U.S.C. 2044, by its terms, does not apply
"to any third party surety," the central issue before the
district court was whether there was sufficient evidence to
establish that Gotauco was a bona fide surety. The district
court held that he was not. On appeal, the government argues
that we need not reach this question--which presents some
difficult interpretive problems--and urges us to dismiss this
appeal because the appellant, Plympton, lacks standing to
press for the return of the bail funds to Gotauco.
The standing issue is itself difficult: There is an
argument that Plympton himself has standing but also a
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proffered counter argument by the government; and there is
also a possibility that, on a proper motion, Gotauco might
have urged that he be substituted as the appellant in place
of Plympton who did file a timely notice of appeal. Because
of the complexity of the issues, we issued an order on
January 16, 1996, requesting the parties to file supplemental
memoranda addressed both to merits and standing issues.
The government filed a timely response, but Plympton's
counsel did not do so; the Clerk's Office then contacted
Plympton's counsel who promised that the overdue response
would be filed not later than February 19, 1996. A week has
now passed, and no response has been filed. The present
appeal is dismissed for want of prosecution. Whittal v. _______
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 230 F.2d 948 (1st Cir. __________________________________
1956) (per curiam).
It is so ordered. ________________
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