Elawyers Elawyers
Washington| Change

Johnson v. DiPaolo, 95-2138 (1996)

Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Number: 95-2138 Visitors: 2
Filed: Oct. 04, 1996
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Walter D. Johnson on brief pro se._________________ _____________________, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Bureau, on brief for appellee.criminal appeal in state court.held, the district court dismissed the petition as moot.States v. Luciano-Mosquera, 63 F.3d 1142, 1158 (1st Cir.
USCA1 Opinion












October 4, 1996 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT



____________________


No. 95-2138

WALTER D. JOHNSON, JR.,

Petitioner, Appellant,

v.

PAUL DIPAOLO,

Respondent, Appellee.


____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Mark L. Wolf, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

____________________

Before

Selya, Cyr, and Boudin,
Circuit Judges. ______________

____________________

Walter D. Johnson on brief pro se. _________________
Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General, and Elisabeth J. Medvedow, _________________ _____________________
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Bureau, on brief for appellee.


____________________


____________________















Per Curiam. Petitioner Walter Johnson filed the instant __________

petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 1993, complaining

primarily of delay attending the progress of his direct

criminal appeal in state court. In response, the district

court issued a conditional writ directing respondent (a state

official) to undertake efforts to get the appeal back on

track. These measures proved successful: new counsel was

appointed and the Massachusetts Appeals Court agreed to

reinstate the appeal. Once oral argument in the appeal was

held, the district court dismissed the petition as moot.

Subsequently, the Appeals Court vacated petitioner's

conviction, and the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) accepted the

case for further review.

To the extent we can decipher petitioner's arguments on

appeal, he apparently contends that the delay here was

sufficiently protracted so as to compel reversal of his

conviction and to necessitate his unconditional release from

custody. We disagree. "Whether an appellate delay results

in prejudice sufficient to warrant reversing a conviction

rests, most importantly, on a showing that it has impaired

the appeal or the defense in the event of retrial." United ______

States v. Luciano-Mosquera, 63 F.3d 1142, 1158 (1st Cir. ______ ________________

1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1879 (1996); accord, e.g., _____________ ______ ____

Simmons v. Beyer, 44 F.3d 1160, 1170-71 (3d Cir.), cert. _______ _____ _____





-2-













denied, 116 S. Ct. 271 (1995); Cody v. Henderson, 936 F.2d ______ ____ _________

715, 719-22(2d Cir. 1991). No such showing hasbeen made here.

In the event petitioner is subjected to a new trial, he

remains free at that time to argue that the appellate delay

has impaired his ability to defend himself at retrial. See, ___

e.g., Hayes v. Evans, 70 F.3d 85, 86 (10th Cir. 1995). ____ _____ _____

Alternatively, in the event petitioner's conviction is

ultimately affirmed by the SJC, the dismissal here is without

prejudice to the filing of a new habeas petition advancing

any constitutional challenges petitioner might have to his

underlying conviction that were raised in petitioner's

present petition in the district court but not resolved by

the district court in light of its ruling on the issue of

delay.

Affirmed. _________























-3-






Source:  CourtListener

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer