September 26, 1996 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 96-1165
DAVID JAMES WYATT,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
THE BOSTON TEACHERS UNION,
Defendant, Appellee.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Mark L. Wolf, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Cyr and Stahl, Circuit Judges. ______________
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David James Wyatt on brief pro se. _________________
Matthew E. Dwyer, John P. Sheridan and Dwyer & Jenkins on brief ________________ ________________ _______________
for appellee.
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Per Curiam. Appellant David James Wyatt appeals __________
from the dismissal of his action against appellee Boston
Teachers Union. He filed a complaint in the district court,
alleging that the Union had retaliated against him in
violation of Title VII by refusing to represent him in
opposing his termination from his job as a teacher in the
Boston public school system. The district court determined
that appellant had not filed a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission within 300 days as required
by 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e). We agree with the district court
for essentially the reasons stated in its Order, dated
December 14, 1995. We add two comments.
1. Appellant raises on appeal a new theory,
supported by new facts, concerning his argument that he did
not discover that the Union was refusing to represent him
until June 24, 1994. Appellant also raises the new argument
that he was unaware of his right to sue the Union under Title
VII until we issued our opinion in the appeal of his action
against the City of Boston and others. See Wyatt v. City of ___ _____ _______
Boston, Nos. 93-2330 and 93-2367 (1st Cir. September 15, ______
1994).
In the absence of extraordinary circumstances, we
do not consider arguments never presented to the lower court.
Clauson v. Smith, 823 F.2d 660, 666 (1st Cir. _______ _____
1987)(collecting cases). We have reviewed the record and the
briefs, and do not find such circumstances here. Thus,
appellant has waived appellate consideration of these new
assertions. See id. ___ ___
2. Using December 31, 1993 as the time appellant
learned of the alleged unlawful practice -- retaliatory
refusal of representation -- we conclude that the November
25, 1994 filing with the Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination occurred 328 days after this date. This is
outside both the 240-day limit for filing charges with an
appropriate state agency and the 300-day limit for filing
charges with the EEOC. See EEOC v. Commercial Office ___ ____ __________________
Products Co., 486 U.S. 107, 110-11 (1988) (with exceptions ____________
not relevant here, a complainant may not file a charge with
the EEOC until 60 days have passed from the initial filing
with the proper state agency; thus, to meet the 300-day time
limit for filing EEOC charges, the state complaint must be
filed within 240 days of the date the alleged unlawful act
took place).
The judgment of the district court is summarily _________
affirmed. See Local Rule 27.1. ________ ___