USCA1 Opinion
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
____________________
No. 96-1573
ZENAPHON R. DEMERIS d/b/a AKI'S GULF,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CUMBERLAND FARMS, INC.,
Defendant - Appellant.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge]
___________________
____________________
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
___________
Boudin, Circuit Judge,
_____________
and Lisi,* District Judge.
______________
_____________________
Paul D. Sanson, with whom Glenn M. Cunningham, Shipman &
_______________ ____________________ _________
Goodwin and Mark G. Howard were on brief for appellant.
_______ ______________
Steven E. Kramer, with whom Stanley A. Brooks and Wellesley
________________ _________________ _________
Law Associates were on brief for appellee.
______________
____________________
October 10, 1996
____________________
____________________
* Of the District of Rhode Island, sitting by designation.
Per Curiam. This is an appeal by Cumberland Farms,
Per Curiam
___________
Inc. ("Cumberland") from a preliminary injunction granted to
Zenaphon R. Demeris, d/b/a Aki's Gulf ("Demeris") pursuant to the
Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 2801, et seq.
________
(the "Act").
Demeris was a franchisee of Cumberland motor fuel
products and rented one of its gasoline stations. A dispute
arose regarding the respective rights of Demeris and Cumberland
when the latter attempted to terminate the franchise agreement.
Demeris sought and was granted a preliminary injunction to
prevent Cumberland from effectuating the termination. By its own
terms, the preliminary injunction dissolved as of August 1, 1996,
a date which coincided with the termination period of the
franchise agreement.
Cumberland's main claim is that the District Court
abused its discretion and committed errors of law when it granted
the preliminary injunction to Demeris, due to Cumberland's clear
legal right to terminate Demeris's franchise under 15 U.S.C.
2802. However, after reviewing the briefs filed by the parties
after oral arguments, which indicated the present status of the
franchise agreement and briefed the issue of mootness, we
conclude that Comberland's claim is moot.
It is undisputed that as of August 1, 1996, Demeris had
vacated the premises in question. Furthermore, it is Demeris'
stated position that "the franchise ceased operations on August 1
[consistent with] the terms of the injunction and [pursuant to]
-2-
the parties' April 4 [settlement/franchise] agreement." It also
appears that Demeris has "decided not to contest [Cumberland's
rejection of the franchise assignment proposed by Demeris] and
has so informed [Cumberland]."
It is well settled that a case is moot "when the issues
presented are no longer 'live'." United States Parole Comm'n v.
___________________________
Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 395 (1980). The requirement that an
________
actual case and controversy exist at the time a federal court
renders its decision is a jurisdictional mandate of Article III
of the Constitution, one that precludes the issuance of advisory
or academic opinions. U.S. Const. art. III, 2 et seq.; U.S.
_______ ____
National Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents of America,
________________________ ____________________________________
Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 446 (1993). Although some limited exceptions
____
exist to a literal enforcement of this rule, see, e.g., Newspaper
___ ____ _________
Guild of Salem, Local 105 v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 79 F.3d
__________________________ _________________________
1273, 1277 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423
_______ _________ ________
U.S. 147, 149 (1975)) the instant case does not fit any of the
narrow confines of these exceptions, Cumberland's arguments to
the contrary notwithstanding. The preliminary injunction has
expired, and Demeris has accepted Cumberland's rejection of his
proposed assignee: simply put, the issues raised before us no
longer exist. See generally Wright, Miller & Cooper, 13A Federal
_____________ _______
Practice & Procedure 3533.2, at 231 (2d ed. 1984 & Supp. 1996).
____________________
If there are other issues pending between the parties, they are
not properly before us on this appeal.
In conclusion, because the preliminary injunction is no
-3-
longer in effect and the assignment of rights under the franchise
agreement has been specifically waived by the only party who can
claim them, we conclude that the issues raised by this appeal
have been mooted. Dismissal of the appeal is therefore
warranted.
So ordered. No costs.
__________ ________
-4-
