Elawyers Elawyers
Washington| Change

Barker v. Social Security, 96-1622 (1996)

Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Number: 96-1622 Visitors: 2
Filed: Oct. 09, 1996
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: This appeal followed.tenderness in the knee. Johnson, a State agency consultant, reviewed the, 2, medical evidence and concluded that claimant does not have an, impairment which limits her ability to perform basic work-, related functions.how the Secretary evaluates pain), 416.929 (same).
USCA1 Opinion












[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT



____________________


No. 96-1622

MEGAN BARKER,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant, Appellee.


____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

[Hon. Morton A. Brody, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

____________________

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Selya and Stahl, Circuit Judges. ______________

____________________

David A. Chase and Macdonald & Chase on brief for appellant. ______________ _________________
Jay McCloskey, United States Attorney, James M. Moore, Assistant _____________ ______________
United States Attorney, and Thomas D. Ramsey, Assistant Regional __________________
Counsel, Region I, Social Security Administration, on brief for
appellee.


____________________

OCTOBER 09, 1996 OCTOBER 09, 1996
____________________













Per Curiam. Claimant-appellant Megan Barker challenges ___________

the denial of disability benefits under the Social Security

Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income

programs. We affirm.

In 1982, claimant tripped on a concrete stair and fell

on her left knee while running with her company in the United

States Army. She suffered a contusion or laceration, and she

was removed from regular duty for a short period of time.

Barker finished her term in the military and received a

regular discharge in 1984. Thereafter, she worked at various

jobs (mainly cashiering) until August 1992.

In 1993, claimant applied for disability benefits due to

patellofemoral pain syndrome. She complained of swelling and

pain in her left knee, especially if she walks or stands a

lot. She also complained that her knee occasionally "locks

up" or "gives out." She stated that she has had pain in her

knee since her injury in 1982, but that the pain has gotten

worse. She described the pain as constant and claimed that

it is unrelieved by medication (Ibuprofen or Motrin).

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that claimant

has patellofemoral pain syndrome, but that it does not

significantly limit her ability to perform basic work-related

functions. Having concluded that Barker does not have a

severe impairment, the ALJ terminated the review process at

Step 2, or the severity stage, of the five-step sequential



-2-













inquiry. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987); McDonald ___ _____ _______ ________

v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 795 F.2d 1118 (1st ____________________________________

Cir. 1986). The decision of the ALJ became the final

decision of the Secretary when the Appeals Council denied

review. Claimant appealed to the district court, which

referred the matter to a magistrate judge for report and

recommendation. The magistrate recommended affirmance, and

the district judge adopted the magistrate's recommendation.

This appeal followed.

The medical records submitted by the claimant are from

the Veterans Administration (VA). These records reveal that

claimant's left knee was examined on two occasions by a VA

physician for the purpose of determining whether she is

eligible for a VA disability rating. In addition, the VA

Disability Council sent claimant to see Dr. Pepe, an

orthopedic consultant. Dr. Pepe examined claimant on one

occasion, December 9, 1992. Although he diagnosed

patellofemoral pain syndrome, Dr. Pepe's objective findings

are almost entirely negative. On March 11, 1993, the VA

assigned claimant a 30% disability rating. At that time,

objective findings were said to show a small amount of

effusion in the left knee, as well as some warmth and diffuse

tenderness in the knee. On October 19, 1993, claimant

arrived at Dr. Pepe's office without an appointment and spoke

to him briefly in the hallway. Following this conversation,



-3-













Dr. Pepe wrote a short note in which he stated: "[The

claimant] says she has pain in her legs that precludes

sitting or standing at work. Would recommend no sitting or

standing in order to help the pain."

As an initial matter, we are persuaded that the ALJ

could properly reject Dr. Pepe's October 19, 1993 assessment

essentially for the reasons stated by the magistrate in his

recommended decision.1 We add that there is conflicting 1

medical evidence in the record. None of the medical

consultants found any limitation in claimant's ability to sit

or stand.2 Moreover, Dr. Pepe's note is conclusory and 2

devoid of objective medical findings. See 20 C.F.R. ___

____________________

1The magistrate stated: 1

Given that Dr. Pepe had last examined the
plaintiff nearly ten months before
writing the October [19], 1993 note, that
he had no advance notice of her visit
(and thus no opportunity to review her
file), and that he wrote the note at the
plaintiff's request and without examining
her anew, the Administrative Law Judge
was entitled to disregard it . . .

Report and Recommended Decision at 5-6.

2Dr. Johnson, a State agency consultant, reviewed the 2
medical evidence and concluded that claimant does not have an
impairment which limits her ability to perform basic work-
related functions. Dr. Goffin, a second State agency
consultant, completed a Residual Functional Capacity
Assessment which indicates no limitation in claimant's
ability to sit or stand. Dr. Babcock, a medical advisor,
testified at the administrative hearing that he had "a lot of
trouble placing much credibility in [Dr. Pepe's] note" in
light of the fact that Dr. Pepe did not examine claimant
before writing it.

-4-













404.1527(d) (explaining how the Secretary weighs medical

opinions), 416.927(d) (same); Matney ex rel. Matney v. ________________________

Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992) ("The ALJ need ________

not accept an opinion of a physician--even a treating

physician--if it is conclusory and brief and is unsupported

by clinical findings.").

We also think the ALJ could properly reject the

credibility of claimant's statements concerning the limiting

effects of her pain and other symptoms. See Irlando Ortiz v. ___ _____________

Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st ____________________________________

Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (explaining that it is the

responsibility of the Secretary to determine issues of

credibility). The VA treatment record is quite sparse, and

most of the objective medical findings are negative.

Claimant's allegations that her pain significantly limits her

ability to sit or stand is inconsistent with the opinions of

the medical consultants. In addition, the ALJ properly could

find that claimant's allegations are inconsistent with her

reported activities.3 See 20 C.F.R. 404.1529 (explaining 3 ___

how the Secretary evaluates pain), 416.929 (same).



____________________

3Claimant is able to do housework (including dusting, 3
vacuuming, laundry, and washing dishes) and, according to one
of her reports, she is able to do grocery shopping. She also
drives her car, visits friends, and has taken a computer
training course. Each of these activities involves sitting
or standing.


-5-













For the foregoing reasons, we are persuaded that the

Secretary's severity finding is supported by substantial

evidence. Accordingly, the judgment below is affirmed. ________















































-6-






Source:  CourtListener

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer