USCA1 Opinion
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 96-1948
DAVID W. HANN,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
MICRON SEPARATIONS, INC.,
Defendant, Appellee.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]
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Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
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Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,
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and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
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William T. Murphy on brief for appellant.
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Edward J. Goddard and Day, Berry & Howard on brief for
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appellee.
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February 12, 1997
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Per Curiam. In the suit that underlies this appeal,
Per Curiam.
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plaintiff-appellant David W. Hann alleges that his quondam
employer, Micron Separations, Inc. (Micron), a manufacturer of
industrial filtration systems, disregarded a severance pay
obligation when it terminated him as its marketing director.
Micron moved for summary judgment on the ground that Hann's
written employment contract provided for such remuneration only
in the event of another company's acquisition of Micron (a
circumstance that had not occurred). A magistrate judge heard
arguments and wrote a carefully reasoned report recommending that
the district court grant brevis disposition in Micron's favor.
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The magistrate concluded, after examining the relevant evidence,
that the proof, taken in the aspect most flattering to Hann's
case, proves neither a modification of the terms of his written
employment contract nor a breach of those terms. On de novo
review, the district court accepted the recommendation and
entered summary judgment for the defendant. Hann appeals.
Having determined that oral argument would not advance the
decisional process, we summarily affirm.
On whole-record review, we believe that this is a
suitable case in which to act upon our long-held belief that
"when a lower court produces a comprehensive, well-reasoned
decision, an appellate court should refrain from writing at
length to no other end than to hear its own words resonate."
Lawton v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of Am., 101 F.3d 218, 220
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(1st Cir. 1996); accord In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire
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Litig., 989 F.2d 36, 38 (1st Cir. 1993). Hence, we affirm the
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judgment for substantially the reasons set forth in the opinion
below. We add only a small coda.
In his brief, Hann rehashes the evidence and invites us
to take a more expansive view of the facts than did the district
court. We decline the invitation. When summary judgment is at
stake, we, like the trial court, must scrutinize the record in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, "indulging all
reasonable inferences in that party's favor," Griggs-Ryan v.
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Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir. 1990) (emphasis supplied), but
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disregarding unsupported allegations, unreasonable inferences,
and conclusory speculation. See Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76
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F.3d 413, 428 (1st Cir. 1996); Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds
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Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990). If no genuine issue
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of material fact percolates through the record, then summary
judgment is proper. So viewed, the essential purpose of summary
judgment is "to pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings" and
appraise the proof to determine whether a trial is needed. Wynne
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v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 794 (1st Cir. 1992),
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cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1030 (1993). Here, a trial would serve no
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useful purpose.
We will not tarry. Despite the generosity of the Rule
56 standard vis- -vis the party opposing summary judgment, that
party is not entitled to the benefit of every inference that he
can conjure up; he is only entitled to the benefit of every
reasonable inference. See National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of
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Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
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2247 (1995). In this instance, we cannot draw the inference that
the appellant hawks. To the contrary, the statement of Micron's
president, Dr. John Greenwood, which the appellant cites as the
basis for his claim of an oral modification, simply will not bear
the weight that the appellant piles upon it.
The appellant's promissory estoppel claim fares no
better than his breach of contract claim. Under Massachusetts
law, a promisee's reliance on a promise may give rise to an
enforceable contract, but only if such reliance is reasonable.
See Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Varadian, 419 Mass.
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841, 849-50, 647 N.E.2d 1174, 1178-79 (1995); Cambridgeport
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Savings Bank v. Boersner, 413 Mass. 432, 442-43, 597 N.E.2d 1017,
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1023-24 (1992); Loranger Constr. Corp. v. E.F. Hauserman Co., 376
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Mass. 757, 760-61, 384 N.E.2d 176, 179 (1978); Hall v. Horizon
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House Microwave, Inc., 24 Mass. App. Ct. 84, 93-94, 506 N.E.2d
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178, 184 (1987); see also Coll v. PB Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 50
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F.3d 1115, 1124-25 (1st Cir. 1995) (refusing under Massachusetts
law to honor a promissory estoppel claim for an orally modified
employment contract when reliance was unreasonable). Even
assuming for argument's sake that Dr. Greenwood had apparent
authority to bind Micron to a change in Hann's severance
arrangement an assumption that the record tends to belie no
factfinder rationally could conclude that the appellant's
professed reliance on Dr. Greenwood's remark was reasonable.
Even on the appellant's version, Dr. Greenwood's statement
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amounted to no more than a passing comment. Only wishful
thinking could have led Hann to believe that his contract had
been improved by this passing comment and wishful thinking is
not enough to support a cognizable claim of detrimental reliance.
Thus, the magistrate judge and district court acted within their
proper office in rejecting the unreasonable inference on which
the appellant's case rests. See Smith, 76 F.3d at 428.
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We need go no further. Finding, as we do, that the
district court appropriately granted Micron's motion for
judgment, we summarily affirm. See 1st Cir. R. 27.1.
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Affirmed.
Affirmed.
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