Filed: May 08, 2000
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: Defendants, Appellees.MARY LYNN CARROLL, ESQ.intertwined with the state court claims.state rules are unconstitutional.order requiring them to post an appeal bond;appellants emergency motion for Fed.R.App.P.improper appendix and requiring filing of proper appendix;obligations under Rule 30(b).
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 00-1148
DANIEL J. O’CALLAGHAN; ALISON E. CLAPP O’CALLAGHAN,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
HOMAYOUN SHIRAZI, M.D., ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
____________________
No. 00-1149
DANIEL J. O’CALLAGHAN; ALISON E. CLAPP O’CALLAGHAN,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
v.
HOMAYOUN SHIRAZI, M.D., ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
BUCKLEY, RICHARDSON & GELINAS, LLP,
Defendant, Appellant.
PETER B. IVES, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
____________________
No. 00-1150
DANIEL J. O’CALLAGHAN; ALISON E. CLAPP O’CALLAGHAN,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
v.
HOMAYOUN SHIRAZI, M.D., ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
GAIL L. PERLMAN, HON.,
Defendant, Appellant.
MARY LYNN CARROLL, ESQ.,
Defendants, Appellees.
_____________________
No. 00-1151
DANIEL J. O’CALLAGHAN; ALISON E. CLAPP O’CALLAGHAN,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
v.
HOMAYOUN SHIRAZI, M.D., ET AL.,
Defendants.
PETER B. IVES, REVERAND; THE FIRST CHURCHES OF NORTHAMPTON,
Defendants, Appellants.
CORASH, ZURN & BELSKY, LLP AND SUCCESSORS, IF ANY, AND
SUSAN C. SCHRODER,
Defendants.
_____________________
No. 00-1152
DANIEL J. O’CALLAGHAN,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
v.
HOMAYOUN SHIRAZI, M.D., ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellants.
SEAN M. MURRAY, HON., ET AL.,
Defendants.
_____________________
No. 00-1153
DANIEL J. O’CALLAGHAN; ALISON E. CLAPP O’CALLAGHAN,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
v.
HOMAYOUN SHIRAZI, M.D., ET AL.,
Defendants.
CORASH, ZURN & BELSKY, LLP, AND SUCCESSORS, IF ANY,
Defendant, Appellant.
SUSAN C. SCHRODER,
Defendant.
_____________________
No. 00-1323
DANIEL J. O’CALLAGHAN; ALISON E. CLAPP O’CALLAGHAN,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
HOMAYOUN SHIRAZI, M.D., ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
Selya and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
Daniel J. O’Callaghan and Alison E. Clapp O’Callaghan on
brief pro se.
May 3, 2000
Per Curiam. The court is in receipt of
appellant’s opening briefs, and, after a thorough review of
those submissions and the record on appeal, we summarily
affirm the judgment in Ct. App. Nos. 00-1148 and 00-1323.
See 1st Cir. Loc. R. 27(c).
Appellants Daniel J. O’Callaghan and Alison E.
Clapp O’Callaghan (“the O’Callaghans”) raised four
challenges to the state guardianship proceeding in question:
1) the defendants/appellees violated their right of access
to courts and their rights to equal protection and due
process; 2) the Massachusetts General Rules of the Probate
Court, Rule 5 and Massachusetts Uniform Probate Court
Practices XXII are unconstitutional “as applied”; 3) their
“Federal rights” were violated because the probate judge
relied on the report of a physician who the O’Callaghans
claim was not licensed, and on the report of the guardian ad
litem, who the O’Callaghans say had a conflict of interest;
and 4) several of the defendants conspired together and
caused the state court to violate the O’Callaghans’
constitutional rights. The lower federal courts plainly
lack jurisdiction to consider these claims under the
Rooker/Feldman doctrine. See District of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923).
The Supreme Court has allowed that the lower
federal courts do have subject matter jurisdiction in some
cases involving challenges to state court proceedings, but
only where a “general challenge” to state rules or statutes
are raised, so that the claim is not “inextricably
intertwined” with the state court claims. Feldman, 460 U.S.
at 486. This court has
e
x
p
l
a
i
n
e
d
t
h
e
-6-
d
i
s
t
i
n
c
t
i
o
n
:
“
A
f
e
d
e
r
a
l
c
-7-
l
a
i
m
i
s
i
n
e
x
t
r
i
c
a
b
l
y
i
n
t
e
r
-8-
t
w
i
n
e
d
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
s
t
a
t
e
-
c
o
u
r
-9-
t
c
l
a
i
m
s
‘
i
f
t
h
e
f
e
d
e
r
a
l
c
l
a
-10-
i
m
s
u
c
c
e
e
d
s
o
n
l
y
t
o
t
h
e
e
x
t
e
-11-
n
t
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
s
t
a
t
e
c
o
u
r
t
w
r
o
n
-12-
g
l
y
d
e
c
i
d
e
d
t
h
e
i
s
s
u
e
s
b
e
f
o
-13-
r
e
i
t
.
’
”
S
h
e
e
h
a
n
v
.
M
a
r
r
,
–
F
-14-
.
3
d
–
,
2
0
0
0
W
L
2
9
8
5
6
5
a
t
*
3
(
1
-15-
s
t
C
i
r
.
M
a
r
c
h
2
7
,
1
9
9
9
)
(
q
u
o
t
-16-
i
n
g
H
i
l
l
v
.
T
o
w
n
o
f
C
o
n
w
a
y
,
1
-17-
9
3
F
.
3
d
3
3
,
3
9
(
1
s
t
C
i
r
.
1
9
9
9
)
-18-
)
.
“
I
f
t
h
e
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
[
o
f
t
h
e
-19-
s
t
a
t
e
c
o
u
r
t
]
w
a
s
w
r
o
n
g
,
t
h
a
-20-
t
[
d
o
e
s
]
n
o
t
m
a
k
e
t
h
e
j
u
d
g
m
e
-21-
n
t
v
o
i
d
,
b
u
t
m
e
r
e
l
y
[
l
e
a
v
e
s
-22-
]
i
t
o
p
e
n
t
o
r
e
v
e
r
s
a
l
o
r
m
o
d
i
-23-
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
i
n
a
n
a
p
p
r
o
p
r
i
a
t
e
-24-
a
n
d
t
i
m
e
l
y
a
p
p
e
l
l
a
t
e
p
r
o
c
e
-25-
e
d
i
n
g
.
”
R
o
o
k
e
r
,
2
6
3
U
.
S
.
a
-26-
t
4
1
5
.
A
l
i
t
i
g
a
n
t
m
u
s
t
c
h
a
l
-27-
l
e
n
g
e
t
h
e
a
l
l
e
g
e
d
l
y
u
n
c
o
n
s
-28-
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
a
l
a
c
t
i
o
n
f
i
r
s
t
i
n
-29-
t
h
e
s
t
a
t
e
a
p
p
e
l
l
a
t
e
c
o
u
r
t
s
-30-
,
a
n
d
t
h
e
n
m
a
y
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
t
h
e
U
-31-
.
S
.
S
u
p
r
e
m
e
C
o
u
r
t
f
o
r
a
w
r
i
t
-32-
o
f
c
e
r
t
i
o
r
a
r
i
.
The O’Callaghans’ first and third claims clearly
are barred by the Rooker/Feldman doctrine because they
allege that certain actions in the state court proceeding by
the defendants violated their constitutional rights; they do
not allege that the state rules themselves were
unconstitutional. Thus, the first and third claims are
“inextricably intertwined” with the state court claims. The
fourth claim also is barred by the Rooker/Feldman doctrine.
It alleges in general, conclusory terms that the appellees
conspired to cause the state court to reach a wrong result.
-33-
As framed, it simply seems to be an indirect way of again
saying that the state court’s decisions were wrong.
It is not entirely clear whether the O’Callaghans’
second claim raises a general constitutional challenge to
state rules, but even if this court were to assume (without
deciding) that it does raise a general constitutional
challenge, the claim is barred. The court is unable to
discern from appellants’ brief in what way they claim the
state rules are unconstitutional. Without a well-developed
argument on this point, the issue has been waived. See
Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 990 (1st Cir. 1995).
As the O’Callaghans’ substantive appeal lacks
merit, we likewise see no error in the district court’s
order requiring them to post an appeal bond; and we see no
error in the district court’s order denying their request to
impose a similar requirement on the cross-appellants.
Likewise, their challenge to the district court’s denial of
the motion for recusal lacks merit. Their challenge to the
denial of Fed.R.Civ.P. 27(b) relief is moot.
A number of motions also are pending in these
matters, and our summary affirmance moots most of those
motions. The following motions are denied as moot: 1)
appellants’ “emergency motion” for Fed.R.App.P. 8 order
-34-
granting injunction while appeal pending; for expedition of
appeal process; and for retention of appendices filed March
2000; 2) appellees’ motion for an order striking appellants’
improper appendix and requiring filing of proper appendix;
and 3) appellants’ motion to consolidate to the extent it
addresses appeal nos. 00-1148 and 00-1323. The motion to
consolidate is allowed to the extent it addresses the cross-
appeals; cases 00-1149, 00-1150, 00-1151, 00-1152 and 00-
1153 shall be consolidated. Appellants have withdrawn their
motion to stay, and the court denies their motion to certify
questions to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Appellants’ motion to dismiss the cross-appeals is
denied. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(h) says that
for purposes of applying Fed.R.App.P. 30 in a case involving
one or more cross-appeals, the party who filed the first
notice of appeal is the “appellant.” Since the O’Callaghans
filed their notice of appeal first, they alone were
“appellants” for purposes of determining the parties’
obligations under Rule 30(b). Thus, their argument that
appellees/cross-appellants failed to meet their Rule 30(b)
obligations fails.
-35-
With regard to an Appendix, the court directs the
cross-appellants to prepare and file a new Appendix directed
only at the claim(s) raised by the cross-appeals.
Appellants’ motion to disqualify counsel for
appellee/cross-appellant Hon. Gail L. Perlman is denied.
The O’Callaghans have failed to explain how appellee Sacks’
brief contact with co-appellee Perlman’s law firm created a
conflict of interest; and we see no conflict. Finally,
appellees/cross-appellants have moved for an appropriate
procedural and scheduling order. The request is allowed,
and the clerk is directed to set an appropriate schedule for
the cross-appeals.
The judgment in Ct.App. Nos. 00-1148 and 00-1323
is affirmed. See 1st Cir. Loc. R. 27(c). The motion to
consolidate is allowed in part; Ct. App. Nos. 00-1149, 00-
1150, 00-1151, 00-1152 and 00-1153 are consolidated; the
motion for a procedural and scheduling order is allowed; the
Clerk is directed to set an appropriate schedule for the
cross-appeals; appellants’ motion to stay has been
withdrawn; all other pending motions are denied. Cross-
appellants are directed to prepare and file an Appendix in
accordance with the procedural and scheduling order to be
issued by the Clerk.
-36-
