Filed: Oct. 23, 2001
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: nonexertional limitations.1For the same reason, we reject claimant's contention that, the ALJ erred in failing to give controlling weight to his, treating physician's opinion., Rodriguez Pagan v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 819, F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.unskilled work.evidence was required.
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 00-2565
ISRAEL FALCON-CARTAGENA,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Lipez, Circuit Judges.
Melba N. Rivera-Camacho on brief for appellant.
Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Camille Velez-Rive,
Assistant U.S. Attorney, and Robert J. Triba, Regional Chief
Counsel, Social Security Administration, on brief for appellee.
October 11, 2001
Per Curiam. Claimant Israel Falcon-Cartagena
appeals from a decision of the district court upholding the
Commissioner's denial of disability and disability insurance
benefits under the Social Security Act. After carefully
reviewing the briefs and record below, we affirm the
Commissioner's decision.
The issues on appeal center around two questions:
(1) whether, as of September 30, 1997, the date he was last
insured, claimant had the exertional capability to perform
sedentary work, and (2) whether the ALJ's reliance on the
Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the "Grid"), 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, was improper in light of his
finding that claimant suffered from significant
nonexertional limitations. Claimant also contends that the
ALJ improperly discounted his subjective complaints of pain.
I. Exertional Limitations
We conclude that there was ample support in the
record for the ALJ's assessment of appellant's exertional
capabilities. Although claimant's treating physician
concluded that he was disabled, that is an issue reserved
for the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1); Irlanda
Ortiz v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 955 F.2d
765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991); Rodriguez v. Secretary of Health
and Human Services,
647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir. 1981).
Moreover, the treating doctor's opinion was inconsistent
with other evidence in the record including treatment notes
and evaluations performed by both examining and non-
examining physicians, and the record as a whole was adequate
to support the findings.1 Ward v. Commissioner of Social
Security,
211 F.3d 652, 655 (1st Cir. 2000);
Rodriguez, 647
F.2d at 222.
The same can be said for the ALJ's findings
concerning the appellant's subjective complaints of pain.
Although claimant suffered from "a clinically determinable
medical impairment" -- tenosynovitis and myositis -- "that
can reasonably be expected to produce the pain alleged,"
Avery v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 797 F.2d
19, 21 (1st Cir. 1986), there was also evidence to the
contrary, and the ALJ personally observed claimant at the
hearing. "[W]e pay particular attention to an ALJ's
1For the same reason, we reject claimant's contention that
the ALJ erred in failing to give controlling weight to his
treating physician's opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2);
Rodriguez Pagan v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 819
F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1987); Lizotte v. Secretary of Health and
Human Services,
654 F.2d 127, 130 (1st Cir. 1981).
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evaluation of complaints of pain in light of their
subjective nature." Ortiz v. Secretary of Health and Human
Services, 890 F.2d 520, 523 (1st Cir. 1989) (citations and
internal quotations omitted).
II. Nonexertional Limitations
Claimant's nonexertional impairments present only
a slightly closer question. Where a claimant has a
nonexertional impairment in addition to an exertional limit,
the decision to rely on the Grid to sustain the
Commissioner's burden of proof depends upon whether the
claimant's nonexertional impairments significantly affects
his ability to perform the full range of jobs at the
relevant exertional level. See Rose v. Shalala, 34 F.3d 13,
19 (1st Cir. 1994); Heggarty v. Sullivan,
947 F.2d 990, 996
(1st Cir. 1991);
Ortiz, 890 F.2d at 524.
Here, the ALJ found that claimant had a
"significant" nonexertional limitations that made it
"impossible for him to perform tasks requiring constant
overhead reaching and engage in complex, non routine and
skilled tasks." However, the ALJ determined that claimant's
capacity for the full range of (unskilled) sedentary work
was not significantly compromised, and, using Rule 201.23 of
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the Grid as a "framework," concluded that claimant was not
disabled. Because the ALJ reached this determination
without taking any vocational testimony, he is deemed to
have relied exclusively on the Grid to show that jobs that
claimant could perform existed in the national economy. See
Ortiz, 890 F.2d at 524 n.4.
A. Mental Restriction
The relevant medical evidence shows that claimant
suffered from "slight" or "mild" major depression, and
exhibited symptoms of nervousness, anxiety, somatic
difficulties, chest pain, and hypertension. Claimant's
treating physician noted that he frequently had trouble
understanding instructions. A treating psychiatrist and a
consulting psychiatrist evaluated claimant and reported that
claimant had a relatively normal mental status except for
a depressed mood, poor concentration, poor recent memory,
and diminished judgment and insight. Psychiatric RFC
assessments and Psychiatric Review Technique Forms ("PRTF")
rated claimant as moderately limited in his activities of
daily living and in several work-related areas of
functioning, but only slightly or not significantly limited
in all other areas of functioning.
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In his decision, the ALJ expressly adopted the
opinions of the psychiatrists who rated claimant's abilities
to do work-related activities. To the extent claimant's
treating physician's opinion that claimant was unable to
work is inconsistent with those reports, we note that the
treating doctor is not a psychiatrist and that, in any case,
her opinion on the ultimate issue of disability is not
controlling. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1); Irlanda Ortiz, 955
F.2d at 769;
Rodriguez, 647 F.2d at 222. Accordingly, we
think that the ALJ was justified in relying on the expert
medical opinions of the state psychiatrists, and his
decision demonstrates that he gave due consideration to the
effect of claimant's mental impairment on his capacity for
unskilled work. Further, since the RFC and PRTF reports
indicate that claimant was at the most moderately limited in
areas of functioning required for unskilled work, we
conclude that they adequately substantiate the ALJ's finding
that claimant's mental impairment did not affect, more than
marginally, the relevant occupational base.
B. Reaching Restriction
Finally, with respect to claimant's limitation on
reaching, we recognize that, since reaching is an activity
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required in almost all unskilled jobs, significant
limitations on reaching may eliminate a large number of
occupations a person could otherwise do. See Social
Security Ruling 85-15, Titles II and XVI--Capability to do
Other Work--The Medical-Vocational Rules as a Framework for
Evaluating Solely Nonexertional Impairments (S.S.A. 1985),
available in 1985 WL 56857. In this case, the ALJ did not
find that claimant's overall ability to reach was
significantly affected. Rather, the ALJ concluded that
claimant was unable to perform only tasks requiring
"constant overhead reaching with the left arm." Since this
specific ability is only a narrow subset of the full range
of reaching, and the evidence as a whole does not suggest
that the ALJ's characterization of claimant's limitation was
understated, we think the ALJ was justified in concluding
that claimant's reaching restriction had only a marginal
effect on the relevant occupational base. Accordingly, the
ALJ's use of the Grid was proper and no further vocational
evidence was required.
Affirmed. Loc. R. 27(c).
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