Filed: Jul. 23, 2002
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: STEVEN J. GERVASIO ET AL.Bownes and Stahl, Senior Circuit Judges.to a magistrate judge.plea that we reweigh the facts de novo.Union, 262 F.3d 70, 75 (1st Cir.prove that Gervasio acted in bad faith.Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 668 (1989);plainly not a close case on appeal.
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION — NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 01-1631
BUSINESS FORMS, INC.,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
STEVEN J. GERVASIO ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Robert B. Collings, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Bownes and Stahl, Senior Circuit Judges.
Dana A. Curhan for appellants.
Robert L. Rossi, with whom Odin P. Anderson was on brief, for
appellee.
April 17, 2002
Per Curiam. The litigation underlying this appeal arises
out of failed business dealings between Business Forms, Inc. (BFI),
Steven J. Gervasio, and several entities organized by Gervasio.
When the transaction soured, BFI sued Gervasio and an affiliated
entity, Fast Forms Inc. (FFI), for breach of a non-competition
agreement, conversion, unfair trade practices, and the like.1 By
consent of the parties, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the case was tried
to a magistrate judge. The judge conducted a six-day bench trial
anent BFI's allegations and the defendants' rejoinders. He
reserved decision and thereafter wrote a meticulously reasoned
rescript in which he resolved both the factual and legal issues in
BFI's favor, and entered a substantial judgment against Gervasio
and FFI. See BFI v. Gervasio, No. 94-10645, slip op. (D. Mass.
Mar. 29, 2001). This appeal followed.
Having read the record, considered the parties' briefs,
and entertained oral argument, we find no basis to disturb the
magistrate judge's exegetic decision. To the precise contrary, we
regard this as a suitable occasion to act on our conviction that an
appellate court's time should not be spent reinventing well-
fashioned wheels. Where, as here, a trial judge crafts a first-
rate opinion, a reviewing court ought not wax longiloquent for no
more compelling reason than to hear its own words resonate. See,
1
BFI also sued Chesley Business Forms, Ltd., but the issues on
appeal do not concern that defendant.
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e.g., Corrada Betances v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 248 F.3d 40, 42
(1st Cir. 2001); Lawton v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co.,
101 F.3d
218, 220 (1st Cir. 1996); Ayala v. Union de Tronquistas de P.R.,
Local 901,
74 F.3d 344, 345 (1st Cir. 1996); In re San Juan Dupont
Plaza Hotel Fire Litig.,
989 F.2d 36, 38 (1st Cir. 1993).
Consequently, we affirm the judgment for substantially the reasons
elucidated in the opinion below. We add only three brief comments.
First: The defendants acknowledge that — apart from his
evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence — the magistrate
judge committed no error in any of his legal rulings. They
concentrate instead on his rendition of the facts. Although their
briefs contain much sound and fury, they amount, at bottom, to a
plea that we reweigh the facts de novo. That plea defies our
standard of review, which is much more circumscribed.
Following a bench trial, an appellate court is not
justified in rejecting the trial court's "findings of fact or
conclusions drawn therefrom unless, on the whole of the record,
[the court of appeals] forms a strong, unyielding belief that a
mistake has been made." Cumpiano v. Banco Santander P.R., 902 F.2d
148, 152 (1st Cir. 1990). Put another way, such findings can be
overturned only for clear error. See
id. (collecting cases); see
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). The instant record, read from a
neutral coign of vantage, does not yield a conviction that a
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mistake has been made, and no hint of any error — clear or
otherwise — is apparent.
Second: The defendants' challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence presents a question of law, which engenders de novo
review. Sierra Fria Corp. v. Evans, 127 F.3d 175, 181 n.2 (1st
Cir. 1997); Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co.,
76 F.3d 413, 420 (1st Cir.
1996). Here, however, the challenge is baseless.
A sufficiency challenge demands that we peruse the entire
record (including the inferences reasonably extractable therefrom)
in the light most hospitable to the plaintiff, without gauging
witness credibility, resolving testimonial conflicts, or assaying
the relative quality of the proof. Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit
Union, 262 F.3d 70, 75 (1st Cir. 2001); Correa v. Hosp. San
Francisco,
69 F.3d 1184, 1191 (1st Cir. 1995). So long as the
trial court's interpretation of the evidence is plausible, we may
not disturb it (whether or not we, if sitting as the triers of
fact, would have reached the same conclusion). Peckham v.
Continental Cas. Ins. Co.,
895 F.2d 830, 840 (1st Cir. 1990).
"Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the
factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous."
Id.
(quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,
470 U.S. 564, 574
(1985)).
The magistrate judge's findings pass through this screen
with ease: the record, viewed in the requisite light, contains
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ample evidence of Gervasio's perfidy and of FFI's involvement in
prohibited activities. No more is exigible.
Third: Relatedly, the defendants say that BFI did not
prove that Gervasio acted in bad faith. But state of mind is
typically inferred from circumstantial evidence, see Harte-Hanks
Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 668 (1989); Am.
Communications Ass'n v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382, 411 (1950), and the
circumstances here are adequate to ground an inference that
Gervasio acted knowingly and with scurrilous intent (and, thus, are
adequate to ground a finding of liability on all the counts lodged
against him, including the chapter 93A count).
We need go no further. Whether or not this was a close
case below — that is a matter on which we take no view — it is
plainly not a close case on appeal.
Affirmed.
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