Filed: Sep. 11, 2003
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: Garcia, United States Attorney, Camille Velez-, Rive, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee. Claimant's Allegations of Disabling Pain.and Human Services, 869 F.2d 622, 623 (1st Cir.that the pain was not a significant nonexertional limitation. Grid Rule No. 203.29, Table No. 3.
Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 03-1296
MARILYN SILVA-VALENTIN,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Justo Arenas, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Lynch and Howard, Circuit Judges.
Melba N. Rivera-Camacho and Melba N. Rivera Camacho & Assoc.
on brief for appellant.
Robert J. Triba, Regional Chief Counsel, Social Security
Administration, H.S. Garcia, United States Attorney, Camille Velez-
Rive, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
September 11, 2003
Per Curiam. Claimant Marilyn Silva-Valentin appeals from
the district court's judgment affirming the denial of Social
Security disability benefits. The Commissioner of Social Security,
upon reviewing the record, found (1) that claimant retained the
capacity for the performance of essentially the full range of
medium work, except for having to avoid highly stressful activities
and the use of her hands for fine manipulations, and (2) that
claimant's mental impairment and her complaints of disabling pain
nonetheless did not impose significant nonexertional limitations on
her capacity for such work. The Commissioner therefore used the
Medical Vocational Guidelines (the "Grid"), 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, App. 2, as a framework, to conclude that claimant was
not disabled. We affirm the district court's judgment for
essentially the reasons stated by the magistrate judge in his
Opinion and Order. We add only the following comments.
1. Claimant's Allegations of Disabling Pain. Given the
dearth of any medical findings regarding, or any treatment for,
claimant's hand, back, or neck conditions, during the relevant time
period -- February 5, 1998 through December 31, 1999 -- the
decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ) not to fully credit
claimant's complaints of disabling pain is well-supported in the
record. As we have stated, "[i]n determining the weight to be
given to allegations of pain . . . complaints of pain need not be
precisely corroborated by objective findings, but they must be
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consistent with medical findings." Dupuis v. Secretary of Health
and Human Services,
869 F.2d 622, 623 (1st Cir. 1989) (per curiam)
(emphasis added). In other words, there must be some evidence to
support the claimant's complaints, and there is very little here.
See
id.
2. Claimant's Treating Physician's Opinion of
Disability. On appeal, claimant argues that the ALJ should have
credited the opinion of Dr. Reyes, claimant's treating
psychiatrist, that her depression was completely disabling. Social
Security Ruling 96-2p, Giving Controlling Weight to Treating Source
Medical Opinions,
1996 WL 374188, outlines the process to be used
to determine the weight to be given to the opinions of treating
physicians. To be controlling, among other things, the opinion
must "not [be] inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in
the case record."
Id. at *1.
We first note that, during the relevant time, Dr. Reyes
reported that claimant's judgment was logical and her intellectual
functioning was fair. Further, Dr. Reyes's opinion of a disabling
condition is inconsistent with the other evidence in the record,
particularly the examination of claimant by Dr. Tejeda and the RFC
assessment completed by the non-examining physician. See Gordils
v. Secretary of Health and Human Services,
921 F.2d 327, 329 (1st
Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (the opinion of an examining consultant and
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a non-examining physician who completed an RFC assessment can
constitute "substantial evidence").
Both of these other reports essentially indicated that,
at most, claimant had moderate difficulties in concentrating, but
that, at a minimum, her thought processes were intact, and she
retained the ability to engage in simple work. Combined with Dr.
Reyes's own observation that claimant's intellectual functioning
was fair, it would be difficult to say that the ALJ erred in not
giving controlling weight to the opinion of Dr. Reyes that claimant
was disabled. As we have stated, conflicts in the evidence are for
the Commissioner, not the courts. See Rodriguez v. Secretary of
Health and Human Services,
647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir. 1981).
3. The Use of the Grid. Claimant finally argues, in a
very conclusory manner, that, due to her nonexertional limitations,
reliance on the Grid was prohibited; rather, she maintains, the
testimony of a vocational expert was required. In relation to
claimant's pain, and as noted above, the record supports the ALJ's
conclusion that claimant's complaints were not credible as to the
severity and disabling nature of the pain. Thus, there also is
substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's decision
that the pain was not a significant nonexertional limitation.
As for claimant's mental impairment, although the
question is closer, we nonetheless think that the use of the Grid
was appropriate in this case. In particular, claimant here has
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essentially the same profile as the claimant in Ortiz v. Secretary
of Health and Human Services,
890 F.2d 520 (1st Cir. 1989), where
we affirmed the use of the Grid. The only difference is that
claimant, in the case at hand, was rated as being moderately
limited in accepting supervision and in coping with changes in the
work place.
In relation to the latter restriction, however, the RFC
evaluator specified, in the comment section of the RFC assessment
form, that claimant could respond to "minimal changes" in the work
setting. Further, both Drs. Reyes and Tejeda opined that claimant
was cooperative, an indication that although she was rated as
having moderate limits in accepting supervision, she certainly was
not precluded from coping with having a supervisor. Finally, and
as in Ortiz, "claimant's characteristics did not position [her]
near the disabled/not disabled dividing line under the Grid rules."
See
id. at 527-28; Grid Rule No. 203.29, Table No. 3.
Affirmed.
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