Filed: Sep. 14, 2006
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: Solicitor General, on brief for appellees Fernando Fagundo and, Héctor López-García.state a claim, and that dismissal was affirmed by this court.or could have been raised in the previous case.that they did not seek money damages against Judge López).district courts decision on this point fails.
Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 05-1942
AURORA ADAMES, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
___________________
THE ESTATE OF EXEQUIEL CASTRO RIVERA,
Plaintiff,
v.
FERNANDO FAGUNDO and HECTOR LÓPEZ-GARCIA,
Defendants, Appellees,
___________________
THE PUERTO RICO HIGHWAY AND TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY,
Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, Appellee,
___________________
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF
PUERTO RICO, INC. and L.P.C.&D., INC.,
Third-Party Defendants.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jose A. Fuste, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lynch, and Howard, Circuit Judges.
Ramón E. Castro, on brief pro se.
Leticia Casalduc-Rabell, Assistant Solicitor General, Maite
Oronoz-Rodríguez, Deputy Solicitor General, Mariana Negrón-Vargas,
Deputy Solicitor General, and Salvador J. Antonnetti-Stutts,
Solicitor General, on brief for appellees Fernando Fagundo and
Héctor López-García.
Raúl Castellanos-Malavé, on brief for co-appellee Puerto Rico
Highway and Transportation Authority.
Pamela D. González, on brief for third-party defendant
L.P.C.&D. Inc.
September 14, 2006
Per Curiam. After a thorough review of the record and of
the parties’ submissions, we affirm. We agree that the claims
against the Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority
(PHRTA) and Fernando Fagundo are barred by principles of res
judicata. “Under the federal law of res judicata, a final judgment
on the merits of an action precludes the parties from relitigating
claims that were raised or could have been raised in that action.”
Maher v. GSI Lumonics, Inc., 433 F.3d 123, 126 (1st Cir. 2005)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The appellants
admit that they raised two of the instant claims – those having to
do with invasions onto their land in September and November 2003 –
in the previous federal proceeding. The remaining claims have to
do with the proceedings in the expropriation court, and the
appellants argue that they could not have raised those claims in
the previous federal cases because they occurred after the filing
of those Complaints. Nevertheless, appellants could have brought
those claims in the previous federal litigation by moving to amend
their Complaint. Leave to amend should be “freely given,” see Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(a), and Rule 15(c) specifically provides for
supplemental pleadings “setting forth transactions or occurrences
or events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought
to be supplemented.” Their claims should have been added to the
previous litigation because they are all part of the appellants’
overarching due process claim that the PHRTA has had a “callous
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indifference to citizens’ civil rights” throughout the process of
the highway construction project. See Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of
America, 924 F.2d 1161, 1165 (1st Cir. 1991) (res judicata bars all
related claims that could have been brought in previous action)
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2) (a party may “state as many
separate claims or defenses as the party has”); Fed. R. Civ. P.
18(a) (party may join “as many claims [] as the party has against
an opposing party)).
Appellants also argue that res judicata does not apply
here because the previous federal cases were not dismissed on the
merits. See Maher, 433 F.3d at 126 (res judicata requires previous
adjudication on the merits). But clearly the appellants are wrong
in the characterization of the previous dismissal. The procedural
and substantive due process claims were dismissed for failure to
state a claim, and that dismissal was affirmed by this court. Such
a dismissal is with prejudice unless the order of dismissal
explicitly says otherwise (and here, there is no such explicit
statement). See U.S. ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hosp.,
360 F.3d 220, 242 (1st Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied,
543
U.S. 820 (2004). Because the previous dismissal was with
prejudice, res judicata precludes relitigation of claims that were
or could have been raised in the previous case.
We also agree that the claims against the Honorable
Hector López-Garcia are barred by the doctrine of judicial
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immunity. Citing Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984), appellants
argue that judicial immunity does not apply to claims for
injunctive and declaratory relief under section 1983 (they concede
that they did not seek money damages against Judge López). While
Pulliam did hold that judicial immunity was not a bar to claims for
injunctive or declaratory relief under section 1983, see
id. at
541-42, that case was superseded by statute in 1996. “[I]n any
action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission
taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall
not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable.” Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110
Stat. 3847 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996)). The
appellants do not argue that the statutory exceptions set out in
this provision should apply. Accordingly, their challenge to the
district court’s decision on this point fails.
Finally, we note that dismissal of this action was proper
for another reason: the claims which directly challenge the result
of the state expropriation proceedings are barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263
U.S. 413 (1923). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars “cases brought
by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced
and inviting district court review and rejection of those
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judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544
U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The doctrine applies where plaintiff
explicitly seeks review of a state court judgment and also where
review is implicitly sought. See Federación de Maestros v. Junta
de Relaciones del Trabajo,
410 F.3d 17, 24 (1st Cir. 2005). The
appellants lost in the state proceeding; they complain that they
were injured as a result of Judge López’s ruling; and judgment
entered in the state case in November 2003, long before this case
was filed in November 2004. They claim that the state proceeding
was manipulated by the PHRTA, that Judge López was biased, that he
illegally suppressed evidence, and that he acted without
jurisdiction. To the extent appellants are asking the federal
court to review Judge López’s decisions, their claims are barred by
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Affirmed. See 1st Cir. R. 27(c).
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