Filed: Apr. 23, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: sentenced. The district court, indeed mentioned Martin's addiction to heroin and her daily quest, to secure the drug but the court did not focus on these things, during its inquiry into whether the two predicate offenses were, part of a single common scheme or plan. See Godin, 489 F.3d at 436.
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 12-1990
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
NICOLE MARTIN,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. John A. Woodcock, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Dyk,* and Thompson,
Circuit Judges.
James A. Clifford, with whom Law Office of James Clifford, LLC
was on brief, for appellant.
Renée M. Bunker, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Richard W. Murphy, Acting United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
April 23, 2014
*
Of the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. Following a tip from a
confidential informant, law enforcement officers pulled over the
vehicle of Nicole Martin on March 28, 2007. A search turned up
heroin, cocaine, and oxycodone. Martin was arrested, indicted, and
ultimately pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute. At
sentencing, relying on two prior felony convictions that Martin
had, the judge treated her as a career offender and handed down a
108-month sentence. Martin appeals that sentence. In a nutshell,
she disputes her career offender status because, according to
Martin, her two prior convictions should have been treated as one
for sentencing purposes. After a painstaking review of the record
and the applicable law, we affirm her sentence.
I. BACKGROUND1
The crime that led to this appeal occurred in March 2007
but before we get into the details of what happened, we must travel
further back to when the convictions, upon which the judge's career
offender determination rested, occurred. These convictions stemmed
from two controlled purchase transactions by undercover Maine Drug
Enforcement Agency ("MDEA") agents who were investigating a heroin
wave that was flooding Hancock County, Maine.2 The first purchase
1
Because there was no trial, we draw the facts from the
change of plea colloquy, the presentence reports, and the
transcript of the sentencing hearing. See United States v.
Colón-Solís, 354 F.3d 101, 102 (1st Cir. 2004).
2
Any city, town, or county referred to in this opinion is
located in Maine.
-2-
was on September 27, 2001 in Bass Harbor ("the September 2001
offense"), and the second was two weeks later on October 11, 2001
in Bar Harbor ("the October 2001 offense"). A brief summary of the
transactions and subsequent convictions sheds light on how the
present controversy emerged.
A. The 2001 Offenses
On September 27, 2001, MDEA Special Agent Ruth Duquette
and a confidential informant met Martin at her home in Trenton.
Duquette, Martin, and the informant then drove to Martin's dealer's
house in Bass Harbor to purchase some heroin. Her dealer, Chris
Richardson, was not home when they arrived. After paging
Richardson, the trio met up with him at a Texaco station.
Richardson arrived at the Texaco station, accompanied by another
man. Richardson did not have any heroin on him, but could get some
from the guy who was with him. Special Agent Duquette handed
Richardson $400 for a bundle -- i.e., ten bags of heroin -- and
Richardson promised to meet back up with them at his house, with
the heroin, by 6:00 p.m. Duquette, Martin, and the confidential
informant then proceeded to Richardson's house to wait for him.
Meanwhile, Richardson made a heroin run to his supplier's house in
Southwest Harbor. He returned unaccompanied to his home, with the
full bundle. Special Agent Duquette received nine bags of heroin
and Martin kept one for herself as commission.
-3-
Two weeks later, on October 11, 2001, a second controlled
purchase of heroin went down. This one took place near the
clothing store in Bar Harbor where Martin worked. Special Agent
Duquette waited until Martin's shift was over at 9:00 p.m. to
approach her. When she asked Martin for assistance getting a hold
of more heroin, Martin revealed she did not have anything at that
time, but could help her out in an hour. Special Agent Duquette
returned by 9:52 p.m. Around 10:00 p.m., Martin met with a man in
a car registered to Cameron Brown.3 After approximately twenty
minutes, Martin returned to Special Agent Duquette's car and got
in. Wary of police presence that night, Martin instructed Duquette
to drive down the street. Once there, Martin got out of the car,
and again, spoke with people in the Brown car. After Martin
returned to Special Agent Duquette's vehicle, the pair drove to a
nearby business, and pulled up on the side of it. Duquette handed
Martin $250: $200 for the heroin and $50 as commission. Martin got
out of the vehicle, met with someone from the Brown car, and came
back with four "double bags" of heroin.
B. Martin is Convicted for the 2001 Offenses
On February 5, 2002, a state grand jury returned a two-
count indictment charging Martin with unlawful trafficking in
scheduled drugs. The indictment charged Martin with trafficking
3
The registration information was learned when Duquette
transmitted the car's license plate number to an MDEA surveillance
team in place.
-4-
heroin in connection with both the September 2001 offense and the
October 2001 offense. Martin pleaded guilty to trafficking heroin
on October 11, 2001, and as a result, the charge for the September
2001 offense was dismissed.
Meanwhile federal proceedings were underway as well. On
April 9, 2002, a federal grand jury in Bangor returned a one-count
indictment charging Martin with possession with the intent to
distribute heroin on September 27, 2001 -- i.e., for the September
2001 offense. Martin was arrested and charged by federal
authorities. Martin pleaded guilty.
On September 10, 2002, Martin was sentenced for the
September 2001 offense by a federal judge (who was aware of the
pending state charges) to a year and a day in prison, and three
years' supervised release. The next day, on September 11, 2002,
Martin was sentenced in state court for the October 2001 offense to
a term of four years' imprisonment, all but one year of which was
suspended, and three years' probation.
With this backdrop in place, we fast forward a few years
to the circumstances that gave rise to Martin's most recent
conviction, from which this appeal stems.
C. The 2007 Offense
On March 28, 2007, MDEA agents received a tip from a
confidential informant who had recently bought two 80-milligram
oxycodone tablets from Martin. According to the confidential
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informant, Martin would be driving from Portland to Bangor with a
drug delivery. Acting on this lead, MDEA agents spotted her
vehicle heading north on Interstate 95 and kept it under close
surveillance. Bangor police officers ultimately stopped Martin as
she exited the interstate.
By the time MDEA agents arrived on the scene, Martin was
already outside her vehicle speaking with a police officer. MDEA
Special Agent Brad Johnston, who knew Martin from prior encounters,
approached her and asked if she was on federal supervised release.
Martin acknowledged she was. Special Agent Johnston then asked her
if there were any drugs in the car. Martin responded
affirmatively, and directed him to her purse on the front passenger
seat. The search of Martin's purse revealed 21 bags of heroin, 4.4
grams of cocaine, and 25 and one-half 40-milligram oxycodone
tablets. According to Martin, she had gotten the drugs from a
dealer in Portland, and had been selling for approximately a month:
cocaine for $80 a gram, heroin for $15 a bag, and oxycodone tablets
for $40 each.
Martin was charged by a federal grand jury in a three-
count indictment with possession with the intent to distribute
cocaine, oxycodone, and heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1). Martin entered into a plea agreement with the
government and, on July 5, 2007, Martin pleaded guilty to all
counts of the indictment and admitted to violating the conditions
-6-
of her supervised release. All that remained was for Martin to be
sentenced.
D. Sentencing
The primary sentencing-related issue was whether Martin
should be treated as a career offender in light of her two previous
felony convictions (stemming from the September 2001 offense and
the October 2001 offense). For Martin, the difference between
career offender status and non-career offender status was
significant: if she did not qualify as a career offender, the
applicable sentencing range was 27 to 33 months, but if she did, it
was 188 to 235 months. The United States Probation Office's final
presentence report recommended that Martin be treated as a career
offender. Martin disagreed.
The dispute centered around § 4B1.1 of the 2006 United
States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (the "Guidelines"). Greater
detail on the applicable law will come later, but for now it
suffices to note that under § 4B1.1, a defendant should be treated
as a career offender if (among other things not relevant to this
appeal) she has at least two prior felony convictions of a
controlled substance offense. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).4
Martin, in her sentencing memoranda, argued that she did
not satisfy this requirement. In short, she claimed that her prior
4
Martin was sentenced under the 2006 version of the
Guidelines. Citations to the Guidelines are to the 2006 version
unless otherwise noted.
-7-
felony convictions for the September 2001 offense and the October
2001 offense should not be counted separately under the Guidelines,
but rather as one. She argued that the two offenses were part of
"a single common scheme or plan," i.e., part of the MDEA's
overarching drug investigation. Martin also alleged that the two
convictions were consolidated for sentencing purposes, pointing out
that the sentences were imposed within a day of each other and ran
concurrently. The government pushed for career offender status.
It noted in its sentencing memorandum that Martin's conduct charged
in the federal and state cases had occurred on different occasions,
in two different towns, and the heroin had been provided to Martin
by two different sources.
An evidentiary hearing was held on November 20, 2008, to
probe the issue. Prior to the hearing, the district court judge
had reviewed the sentencing transcripts of both the federal
sentencing hearing for the September 2001 offense and the state
sentencing hearing for the October 2001 offense. During the
hearing, the court heard testimony from Special Agent James Carr,
an MDEA agent involved in the Hancock County investigation that led
to Martin's prior convictions. The two-count state court
indictment and the one-count federal court indictment were also
introduced into evidence. Equipped with all of this evidence,
along with documentation previously submitted by the parties, such
as the MDEA reports for the two controlled purchase transactions
-8-
between Martin and Special Agent Duquette, the district court took
the issue of Martin's career offender status under advisement.
E. The District Court's Opinion
On December 3, 2008, the district court issued its
decision. It noted that applying the concept of a common scheme or
plan to a drug addict like Martin was "admittedly problematic"
because, in essence, each and every day Martin was engaged in some
type of scheme or plan to procure heroin in the confined geographic
area where she lived (Mount Desert Island). Nonetheless, the court
did not think the underlying offenses were part of a single common
scheme or plan.5 Looking for some kind of connective tissue
between the two offenses, the court found that Martin had not
anticipated or planned the October 2001 offense at the time of the
September 2001 offense, and therefore no common scheme or plan
existed. Thus, Martin's criminal history included two prior felony
convictions of a controlled substance offense, which warranted
career offender designation pursuant to § 4B1.1 of the Guidelines.
The court sentenced her to imprisonment for a term of 108 months
5
The court also rejected Martin's argument that the September
2001 offense and the October 2001 offense had been consolidated for
sentencing. The court found no formal order or indicia of
consolidation, explaining, "the [federal and state] charges were
initiated in separate courts by separate charging instruments
through separate grand juries and brought before separate judges on
separate days with separate docket numbers and resulted in separate
judgments and commitments." Martin does not dispute this finding
and has abandoned her sentencing consolidation argument on appeal.
-9-
(in other words, nine years). Martin timely appealed her sentence;
her sole challenge is to her classification as a career offender.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court's interpretation of a sentencing
guideline's meaning and scope calls for de novo review. United
States v. Carrero-Hernández, 643 F.3d 344, 349 (1st Cir. 2011).
The determination of whether a prior conviction qualifies as a
predicate offense for purposes of the career offender guidelines is
a question of law we review de novo. United States v. Tavares,
705
F.3d 4, 32 (1st Cir. 2013). As for the court's application of the
Guidelines to the facts, we give that due deference, United States
v. Greig,
717 F.3d 212, 217 (1st Cir. 2013), and will not find
clear error as "long as the district court's decision is based on
reasonable inferences drawn from adequately supported facts,"
United States v. Santos,
357 F.3d 136, 142 (1st Cir. 2004).
A district court's findings of fact are also reviewed
only for clear error. Carrero-Hernández, 643 F.3d at 349. Under
a clear error standard, a district court's plausible interpretation
of the facts cannot be rejected just because the record might
sustain a conflicting interpretation. In re O'Donnell,
728 F.3d
41, 45 (1st Cir. 2013). "[T]o find clear error, a finding must hit
us as more than probably wrong -- it must prompt a strong,
unyielding belief, based on the whole of the record, that the judge
-10-
made a mistake." Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Primer on Career Offender Guidelines
Before we delve into the merits of Martin's claimed
errors, we pause to say a little more on the relevant law.
According to § 4B1.1, a defendant sentenced in federal court should
be treated as a career offender if: (1) the defendant was at least
eighteen when she committed the instant offense; (2) the instant
offense is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance
offense; and (3) she "has at least two prior felony convictions of
either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense."
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).6
To have two prior felony convictions for purposes of
career offender status, not only must a defendant have at least two
felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense under her belt, but the sentences for these
felony convictions must be such as to be counted separately under
the provisions of § 4A1.1(a), (b), or (c). U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(c).
"Prior sentences imposed in unrelated cases are to be counted
6
Prongs one and two are not at issue in this case; there is
no dispute that Martin's March 28, 2007 offense constituted a
controlled substance felony offense or that she was eighteen when
she committed it. As for prong three, there is also no
disagreement that her prior felony convictions are convictions for
controlled substance offenses. The only issue is whether they
should effectively be considered one conviction.
-11-
separately," while "[p]rior sentences imposed in related cases are
to be treated as one sentence for purposes of § 4A1.1(a), (b), and
(c)." Id. § 4A1.2(a)(2).
Although seemingly straightforward, what counts as a
related case versus an unrelated case can get tricky. According to
§ 4A1.2's accompanying commentary, for prior sentences to be
related -- and thus treated as one for purposes of career offender
status -- the underlying offenses must have either "occurred on the
same occasion," been "part of a single common scheme or plan," or
been "consolidated for trial or sentencing." Id. § 4A1.2, cmt.
n.3.7 As we referenced, the "part of a single common scheme or
plan" conception is what is germane to this case. With the
relevant law sketched, we proceed to our analysis.
B. The Standard for a Single Common Scheme or Plan
As we alluded to above, when deciding whether Martin
qualified for career offender status, the district court required
that, in order for multiple drug transactions to constitute a
single common scheme or plan, the transactions had to have been
agreed to (or at least planned, discussed or contemplated) by the
defendant at the time of the first transaction. It first noted
this court's directive that the phrase "common scheme or plan" be
7
The Guidelines have been subsequently amended to require
that multiple prior sentences be counted separately unless they
"resulted from offenses contained in the same charging instrument,"
or "were imposed on the same day." U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2) (2013).
-12-
given its "ordinary meaning." For this proposition, the court
cited United States v. Godin, 489 F.3d 431 (1st Cir. 2007) (vacated
on reh'g on other grounds by
522 F.3d 133 (1st Cir. 2008)) and
United States v. Elwell,
984 F.2d 1289 (1st Cir. 1993). Godin, the
district court continued, stood for the proposition that a scheme
or plan implies the existence of "some kind of connective tissue,"
i.e., an initial plan involving multiple acts or steps taken to a
single end. The court expanded on this concept, noting that the
Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Marrero,
299 F.3d 653, 657
(7th Cir. 2002), "described the test as being 'whether the second
crime was anticipated and planned when the original crime was
planned or committed.'"
Martin argues that the standard employed by the district
court for evaluating whether a common scheme or plan exists is more
stringent than the standard actually set by this Court for doing
so. Specifically -- despite the fact that the district court
relied on both cases -- Martin insists the court's standard runs
afoul of our directive in Elwell and Godin to give the phrase "part
of a single common scheme or plan" its "ordinary meaning."
Martin's argument is hard to follow but, as best we can tell, she
claims that the phrase's ordinary meaning calls for a focus on both
the factual commonalities between the offenses (e.g., temporal and
geographical proximity, the common criminal investigation, the
modus operandi) and the intentions of all the parties involved in
-13-
the transactions, including the agents. Martin alleges the
district court deviated from this supposed ordinary meaning by
focusing too narrowly on Martin's intent8 alone, as well as her
"character or habits."9 Because we are considering the district
court's interpretation of a sentencing guideline's meaning, our
review is de novo. See Carrero-Hernández, 643 F.3d at 349. We
start by taking a look at the cases cited by Martin, and relied on
by the district court.
Elwell involved a defendant, Hobart Willis, who pleaded
guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 846,
as well as distribution under 21 U.S.C. § 841. 984 F.2d at 1291.10
8
Martin vacillates in her brief, using the phrases
"subjective intent" and "specific intent" interchangeably, even
though the phrases denote different concepts. It seems clear to us
that Martin simply means to refer to her own intent, i.e., Martin
claims the court honed in too much on her intentions alone.
9
It is not entirely clear what Martin means by "character or
habits." We suspect she is referring to the district court's
mention of her addiction to illegal drugs. Assuming this is the
case, we can readily dispose of this argument. The district court
indeed mentioned Martin's addiction to heroin and her daily quest
to secure the drug but the court did not focus on these things
during its inquiry into whether the two predicate offenses were
part of a single common scheme or plan. The court, it appears, was
simply commenting on how the common scheme or plan concept can be
difficult to apply to habitual drug users who, in some instances,
are constantly scheming to obtain more drugs. A whole reading of
the court's decision makes clear that Martin's addiction did not
play a role in the court's ultimate determination that there was no
agreement between Martin and Duquette that a second deal would
follow.
10
Elwell discussed the appeals of three defendants: David
Elwell, Richard Moretto, and Hobart Willis. All three had been
indicted, along with six other persons, for conspiring to
-14-
The district court sentenced him to 210 months' imprisonment under
the career offender guidelines due to five prior felony convictions
on his record for five bank robberies committed on different dates
during a brief period of time in 1968. Id. at 1292, 1294. At
sentencing, Willis had argued unsuccessfully that the prior bank
robberies should be treated as a single felony conviction because,
among other things, they "were part of a common plan to rob banks."
Id. at 1294-95. He requested an evidentiary hearing at which
fellow bank robbers would testify as to this common plan, if his
proffer of the facts was not accepted.
Id. at 1295. The district
court did not accept Willis's proffer, declined to hold an
evidentiary hearing, concluded the bank robbery convictions were
separate offenses, and sentenced Willis as a career offender.
Id.
On appeal, we found that the defendant's proffer that the
five bank robberies were part of an overarching conspiracy was not
implausible, held the district court could not simply ignore it,
and remanded the case with specific instructions for re-sentencing.
Id. at 1296. Our discussion of "a single common scheme or plan" in
Elwell was brief, given that the relevant issue on appeal was
limited to whether the district court could disregard the
defendant's proffer and deny his request for an evidentiary
distribute cocaine and other related offenses. See
Elwell, 984
F.2d at 1291. Both Willis and Moretto had been sentenced as career
offenders, but the issue of "a common scheme or plan" was only
discussed in regards to Willis's appeal. See
id. at 1294-97.
-15-
hearing. However, we did indicate that "the 'common scheme or
plan' language should be given its ordinary meaning." Id. at 1295.
Pertinent to our current discussion, Elwell offers nothing more
than an unremarkable reminder of the common adage of statutory
construction to give words their ordinary meaning.
The second case Martin hangs her hat on is Godin, 489
F.3d at 431. In Godin, defendant Jennifer Godin pleaded guilty to
obstructing commerce by robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and to
using and carrying a firearm, including brandishing the weapon
during and in relation to the robbery, under 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1)(A)(ii). 489 F.3d at 433. She was sentenced as a career
offender to 262 months in prison because of two prior convictions
for the burglaries of two different apartments in the same
building.
Id. at 434. The burglaries had been committed six days
apart and were both motivated by a desire for revenge.
Id. at 434-
35, 436. In both instances, Godin "knew the victim, had some
grievance, kicked in the apartment door and stole various items."
Id. at 435. Godin argued that given these factual commonalities,
both burglaries should be considered part of a common scheme or
plan.
Id. at 436. The district court disagreed.
Id.
Taking up Godin's claims on appeal, we acknowledged that
the concept of a single common scheme or plan is a "vague" one,
which lacked a "formal test."
Id. But a framework did not
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completely elude us. We reiterated Elwell's dictate that "the
'ordinary meaning' of the phrase 'single common scheme or plan'
should be used." Id. (citing Elwell, 984 F.2d at 1295). Doing so,
we held that a "scheme or plan implies some kind of connective
tissue like an initial plan encompassing multiple acts or a
sequence of steps to a single end."
Godin, 489 F.3d at 436 (citing
United States v. Joy,
192 F.3d 761, 771 (7th Cir. 1999)). This
meant (for Godin) that "burglaries of two different apartments
committed by one actor several days apart need[ed] something more
than resemblance of mode or motive even if that were relevant."
Id. We concluded that the district court was correct in
determining that, despite the factual commonalities, Godin's two
burglaries were not part of a single common scheme or plan.
Id.
The relevant law sketched, we turn to Martin's contention that the
district court employed a standard that did not comport with Elwell
and Godin. Simply said, she is wrong.
Although Godin does not set a hardline standard to work
with, it does provide us guidance. From Godin, we know that
factual commonalities between offenses are not enough to support a
contention that the offenses were part of a single common scheme or
plan. After all, the offenses at issue in Godin -- two prior
burglaries of different apartments in the same building -- were
riddled with factual commonalities, including the same motive for
-17-
vengeance, yet we placed little weight on them. Rather, something
more is needed. That is precisely what the district court required
here.
Keeping in mind the "ordinary meaning" dictate, the
district court looked for something over and above tangible
similarities between the predicate crimes and it reasonably
concluded that, to consider multiple drug transactions as part of
a single common scheme or plan, "the series of transactions ha[d]
to be agreed to at the outset." Accordingly, the district court
focused its inquiry on "whether the second crime was anticipated
and planned when the original crime was planned or committed."
Indeed neither Elwell or Godin took precisely this same tack, but
that is not dispositive. As we explained, determining what
constitutes a common scheme or plan is an imprecise science at
best. See Godin, 489 F.3d at 436. What is important is the
existence of a so-called "connective tissue," such as "an initial
plan encompassing multiple acts or a sequence of steps to a single
end."
Id. The district court, honing in on Martin's intent,11
looked for a connective tissue -- that is, whether Martin had laid
11
Perhaps the district court could have been more clear about
the fact that its inquiry was directed at whether Martin, as
opposed to the MDEA agents, had anticipated or planned the October
2001 offense when the September 2001 offense was planned or
committed. That it was not, however, is inconsequential. While
not expressed in so many words, the single common scheme or plan
the district court was looking for was that of the defendant's.
-18-
an initial plan to conduct multiple drug deals with Duquette or, at
the very least, contemplated just such a thing happening. This
approach makes sense and is consistent with both Elwell and Godin.
Furthermore, some of our sister circuits have read the phrase
"single common scheme or plan" precisely as the district court did
here. See United States v. Joy, 192 F.3d 761, 771 (7th Cir. 1999)12
(holding that "because the terms 'scheme' and 'plan' are words of
intention, . . . crimes are part of a single common scheme or plan
only if they were jointly planned or when one crime would normally
entail the commission of the other"); United States v. Irons,
196
F.3d 634, 638 (6th Cir. 1999) (same); United States v. Robinson,
187 F.3d 516, 520 (5th Cir. 1999) (same); United States v.
Chapnick,
963 F.2d 224, 227 n.5 (9th Cir. 1992) (same); see also
United States v. Chartier,
970 F.2d 1009, 1016 (2d Cir. 1992)
(finding that "the term 'single common scheme or plan' must have
been intended to mean something more than simply a repeated pattern
12
In Joy, the Seventh Circuit considered whether a theft
conviction and a deceptive practices conviction were related under
§ 4A1.2(a)(2) as part of a single common scheme or plan. 192 F.3d
at 770-72. The court held that it is for the defendant to show "he
intended to commit both crimes from the outset or he intended to
commit one crime which necessarily involved committing the other."
Id. at 771. The fact that two crimes have the same modus operandi,
are close in time, or are similar in nature does not mean these
crimes are related as part of a single common scheme or plan. See
id. According to the Seventh Circuit, the "test is one of
singularity, not similarity."
Id. Of note, Marrero, 299 F.3d at
656, the Seventh Circuit case relied on by the district court,
cited Joy favorably.
-19-
of criminal conduct" and that the concept involves "subjective as
well as objective elements").
In the end, Martin's argument that she should not be the
spotlight of the district court's scrutiny gets her nowhere. The
district court's focus on whether Martin planned or contemplated
her second offense at the time of her first was not overly narrow
as Martin suggests; rather it was in accord with our case law and
law from other circuits as well. It was also appropriate for the
court to center in solely on Martin's plans and designs. Indeed a
dual focus on the intentions of Martin and the MDEA agents (as
advocated for by Martin on appeal) makes little sense. The
operative inquiry here is whether Martin's crimes should be counted
as one or as two for purposes of her sentencing. The only person
whose intentions are relevant to that inquiry is Martin. After
employing the requisite de novo review, we conclude the district
court applied a proper standard.
C. Whether a Single Common Scheme or Plan Existed
Our determination as to the standard employed by the
district court does not however bring our analysis to an end ;
Martin has a back-up contention. She says that under any standard
-- even the district court's purported "heightened" one -- the
court erred in finding no common scheme or plan. Our assessment of
Martin's claimed error is deferential. To the extent that she
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disputes the district court's findings of fact, we review only for
clear error. See Carrero-Hernández, 643 F.3d at 349. Similarly,
we give due deference to the court's application of the Guidelines
to the facts. See
Greig, 717 F.3d at 217. We start by saying a
little more about the district court's holding.
Relying on Elwell and Godin, the district court held that
the September 2001 offense and the October 2001 offense were not
part of a common scheme or plan because, notwithstanding the fact
that both offenses stemmed from the same law enforcement
investigation, "there was no agreement with Ms. Martin at the first
deal that a second one would follow." According to the district
court, "to squeeze multiple drug transactions into a 'common scheme
or plan,' the series of transactions has to be agreed to at the
outset." In Martin's case, it found the October 11th deal was a
separate transaction, arranged through a different supplier, "which
was not planned, discussed, or contemplated at the first
transaction."
Martin's main quibble is with the court's factual finding
that there was no agreement between her and Special Agent Duquette
regarding a second transaction. She claims the record evidence, in
particular Special Agent Carr's13 evidentiary hearing testimony and
his MDEA report, establishes that there was in fact an arrangement
13
To remind the reader, Special Agent Carr was an MDEA agent
who was involved in the Hancock County investigation that led to
Martin's 2001 convictions.
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between her and Duquette at the time of the September 27th drug
deal that a second transaction would follow. Martin points to the
following testimony. On direct examination by defense counsel,
Special Agent Carr was asked whether there was any contact between
Martin and Special Agent Duquette after the September 27th
purchase. Carr responded in the affirmative and, when asked to
elaborate, he stated: "After the initial purchase from Ms. Martin
on -- in the end of September, we had Agent Duquette place a phone
call to Ms. Martin and arrangements to make -- to make another
purchase." We fail to see how this testimony supports the notion
that a second deal was discussed or contemplated, much less agreed
to by Martin, before or during the commission of the September 2001
offense.
Carr's testimony explicitly states it was not until after
the initial purchase that Special Agent Duquette was instructed to
call Martin to arrange a second deal. Despite Special Agent Carr's
unambiguous testimony, Martin thinks one can infer that a phone
call was in fact made on or near September 27th. For support she
points out that not only did a subsequent deal ultimately follow,
but Duquette showed up right before Martin got off work on October
11th, which (according to Martin) implies that Duquette was aware
of Martin's work schedule. Martin's hypothesis that the call
happened on or about September 27th is certainly plausible but,
unfortunately for her, there are equally plausible competing
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inferences. Perhaps Duquette did not call Martin until the morning
of October 11th (or even a couple days before) at which time
arrangements were made for Duquette to meet Martin at the end of
her shift. Or, also conceivable, is a scenario in which Duquette
-- knowing Martin's work schedule based on information gathered by
surveillance -- never called Martin and simply surprised her in
person on the 11th. There is no need to kick around any more
possibilities. A district court's plausible interpretation of the
facts cannot be rejected on clear error review just because the
record might sustain a conflicting interpretation. See In re
O'Donnell, 728 F.3d at 45. Carr's testimony does not help Martin.
Special Agent Carr's MDEA report for the September 2001
offense, which Martin also draws our attention to, provides no
better support. She claims the MDEA report, which was written
after the September heroin purchase but before the October one, is
proof of an existing agreement. Martin relies on the following
language from the report: "Duquette . . . would be acting in an
undercover capacity as a buyer of heroin and would be introduced to
Martin for future drug transactions without the use of a
[confidential informant]." This also does nothing for Martin's
cause. It in no way establishes that Martin herself agreed to,
planned, or considered a second drug transaction at the time of the
first. Rather what it does show is the MDEA's plan to try and
engage with Martin in future heroin purchases. What the district
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court logically looked for was the defendant's intention to engage
in additional crimes as part of a larger scheme or plan. The fact
that Martin was targeted by a single law enforcement investigation
is irrelevant to her intent to commit more than one offense with
Duquette.14
Not only does the evidence cited by Martin (Carr's
testimony and the MDEA report) fail to convince, but other evidence
before the district court works against her. For one, there was
Special Agent Duquette's report for the September 2001 offense.
This very detailed two-page report chronicles the events that
transpired on September 27, 2001, but does not mention, or even
hint at, another transaction with Martin being in the works. Also
in front of the district court was Special Agent Ralph Bridges's
report regarding the October 2001 offense.15 According to this
report, Special Agent Duquette "was going to attempt to make
14
There is somewhat contradictory evidence regarding the
MDEA's plan going forward after September 27th. Carr, at one
point, testified that the plan was actually to try and get Martin
out of the picture. He testified that Special Agent Duquette, on
September 27th, spoke with Richardson directly about getting more
heroin. Carr explained that they were trying to get Martin out of
the fray and deal with Richardson directly. As Carr said, the
typical practice of the agents was to "try to find the source" and
"cut out the middleman," i.e., Martin. This evidence is of no help
to Martin and not important to our analysis. For one, it cuts
against Martin's theory that a second deal was in the works. But
more importantly, as we said, our focus is on the defendant's
intentions and not law enforcement's.
15
Special Agent Bridges was part of the MDEA surveillance team
involved in the September 27 and October 11 transactions.
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contact with Nicole Martin" on October 11, 2001 (emphasis added).
Bridges's report further states that when Duquette approached
Martin for more heroin, Martin stated she "did not have anything
right now, but to come back in an hour, and she could help [Special
Agent] Duquette out then." That Duquette was going to "attempt" to
contact Martin on October 11th, and that Martin did not have
"anything" -- be it heroin or a supplier -- in place when the two
met cuts against Martin's claim that she and Duquette had
previously agreed to meet for a second drug transaction. If
anything can be inferred, it is that Martin was caught off-guard by
Special Agent Duquette's October visit.
In addition to the dearth of evidence tending to support
the existence of an agreement for -- or expectancy of -- a second
transaction, there was other evidence bolstering the district
court's determination that Martin's two prior convictions were not
related by a single common scheme or plan. Namely, there is a
variety of factual dissimilarities between the September 2001
offense and the October 2001 offense. The drug deals occurred in
two different towns, two weeks apart. Martin obtained the drugs
from distinct sources, whom each charged different amounts for the
drugs. The means by which Martin herself was compensated were also
at odds. In connection with the first deal, her payoff was a bag
of heroin. For the second deal, it was $50 cash.
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Given the above, we have no trouble concluding that there
is enough evidence on the record to sustain the district court's
factual finding that Martin had not agreed to, planned, or
anticipated the October 2001 offense prior to or during the
commission of the September 2001 offense. This is a plausible
interpretation of the facts; we will not second-guess it.
Moreover, the district court did not clearly err when it determined
that Martin's two offenses were not part of a single common scheme
or plan and therefore should be counted separately. There was
ample record support for this conclusion, as chronicled above. The
district court properly sentenced her as a career offender pursuant
to § 4B1.1(a) of the Guidelines.
IV. CONCLUSION
We are mindful that our ruling results in Martin
receiving a significantly longer sentence than she would have had
she not been sentenced as a career offender. The result is
unquestionably unfortunate for Martin. That being said, there is
simply no merit to her claims of error. For the aforementioned
reasons, we affirm.
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