Filed: Oct. 01, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: They consistently, stated that St. Hill was a large-scale, Oxycodone and cocaine base trafficker, who, received those substances via shipments from, New York.A. The district court found that the paragraph 4A conduct, was part of the same course of conduct as the offense of, conviction. § 1B1.3.
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 13-2097
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
KEVIN ST. HILL,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. John A. Woodcock, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Dyk* and Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
Stuart W. Tisdale, Jr., with whom Tisdale & Davis, P.A.
was on brief, for appellant.
Margaret D. McGaughey, Assistant U.S. Attorney, with whom
Thomas E. Delahanty II, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
October 1, 2014
*
Of the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. After Kevin St. Hill pled guilty
to distributing oxycodone, the district court found that other
uncharged drug sales by St. Hill were relevant to determining his
guideline sentencing range. St. Hill appeals, arguing that the
district court applied both the wrong standard and the wrong method
of comparison in determining what uncharged drug sales were
relevant to his sentence. We affirm.
I. Background
In December, 2012, Kevin St. Hill pled guilty (without a
plea bargain) to one count of distributing oxycodone in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). According to the
government's version of the facts, on June 26, 2012, agents from
the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA"), along with a confidential
informant ("CI"), decided to purchase $600 worth of oxycodone pills
from St. Hill. The CI called him, arranged for the sale, and drove
(with a DEA task force agent) to the location in Augusta, Maine,
where the sale was to take place. Shortly thereafter, a blue
Mustang arrived. St. Hill emerged from the Mustang, climbed into
the rear passenger seat of the DEA agent's car, and handed the CI
20 oxycodone pills. The agent then gave St. Hill $600, and St.
Hill left.
In addition to the facts as we have described them, the
Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") related that on the day of
the controlled buy, the CI had contacted St. Hill "in an effort to
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purchase cocaine and Oxycodone. St. Hill agreed to sell Oxycodone
to [the CI], but stated that he did not have any cocaine at that
time. St. Hill did note that he could obtain cocaine in several
hours." The PSR also noted that the CI had "identified St. Hill as
a large-scale trafficker of Oxycodone and cocaine in Central
Maine." St. Hill does not challenge this information on appeal.
Section 1B1.3(a) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines
requires the sentencing judge, in calculating the guideline
sentencing range, to take into consideration certain "relevant
conduct" other than the offense of conviction. Such relevant
conduct includes, for certain offenses such as that to which St.
Hill pled guilty, other drug sales that were "part of the same
course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of
conviction." U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3(a)(2)
(2012).
Paragraphs 3 and 4B of St. Hill's PSR described several
other drug sales that the parties agreed constituted relevant
conduct for purposes of calculating St. Hill's guideline sentencing
range. First, the PSR described a controlled buy on April 18,
2012, when another confidential source pulled up to the home of
Thomas Flynn in Augusta. St. Hill got into the car and sold the
source 3.7 net grams of cocaine base for $600. Second, the PSR
explained that a CI (the same one, it appears, who participated in
the controlled buy on June 26, 2012) recounted that he or she
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bought oxycodone from St. Hill three times in one week sometime in
April or May of 2012. Each time, the CI bought ten 30 mg oxycodone
pills from St. Hill. All told, the offense of conviction and the
undisputed relevant conduct resulted in St. Hill being held
accountable for selling 3.7 grams of cocaine base and roughly 1.46
grams of oxycodone.
Paragraph 4A of the PSR also attributed to St. Hill a
series of drug sales totaling an additional 76.65 grams of
oxycodone. St. Hill contested both that the sales were established
by sufficiently reliable evidence and that they were relevant
conduct under the Guidelines. The section of the PSR discussing
the sales reported as follows:
Several confidential informants were
interviewed regarding St. Hill's drug
distribution activities. They consistently
stated that St. Hill was a large-scale
Oxycodone and cocaine base trafficker, who
received those substances via shipments from
New York. The confidential informants
reported that St. Hill distributed the drugs
in the Augusta and Waterville areas of Maine
along with four or five other individuals
from New York. They describe St. Hill as the
leader of this group of individuals . . . .
One confidential informant (hereinafter CI-3)
advised that he/she obtained 30 mg Oxycodone
pills from St. Hill between January and at
least May 2012, which he/she subsequently
resold. CI-3 reported that in January 2012,
he/she received a conservatively estimated 5
(30 mg) Oxycodone pills per day for the 31
days in January. Therefore for the month of
January 2012, it is conservatively estimated
that he/she purchased 155 (30 mg Oxycodone
pills) from St. Hill. CI-3 advised that from
February 2012 through May 2012, he/she
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purchased an estimated 20 (30 mg) Oxycodone
pills per day from St. Hill. Since that period
contains a total of 120 days, it is estimated
that he/she purchased 2,400 (30 mg) Oxycodone
pills from St. Hill between February 2012 and
May 2012. Therefore, St. Hill is accountable
for distributing a total of 2,555 (30 mg)
Oxycodone pills to CI-2 [sic].
In disputing that the sales discussed in paragraph 4A of
the PSR constituted relevant conduct for sentencing purposes, St.
Hill's presentence memorandum emphasized that all of the
transactions other than those in paragraph 4A "have certain
similarities: they are for small quantities of drugs consistent
with personal use, purchased with cash and apparently not intended
for resale. They are isolated in time and do not involve
continuing agreements to purchase further drugs. Finally, they are
relatively close in time." He argued that the conduct described in
paragraph 4A of the PSR "is not relevant conduct to the offense of
conviction in that the nature of the conduct set forth in
[paragraph 4A] is different in kind from that in ¶¶ 3 and 4B as to
quantities, methods of distribution, participants, and nature of
the transactions." He argued that the transactions could not be
relevant conduct because they were neither part of a "common scheme
or plan" nor the "same course of conduct" as the offense of
conviction.
In a lengthy and detailed order, the district court
rejected St. Hill's arguments and so included the paragraph 4A
information in calculating his base offense level. This decision
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increased the Guidelines sentencing range from 30-37 months to
84-105 months. The court ultimately sentenced St. Hill to 84
months' imprisonment. St. Hill timely appealed.
St. Hill pointedly does not argue on appeal that the
Guidelines, as properly applied, would not have allowed the
district court to find that the sales described in paragraph 4A of
the PSR were relevant conduct for the purposes of sentencing on his
offense of conviction. Rather, he argues only that, in two
respects, the district court reached its conclusion by misapplying
the Guidelines standards. He argues, first, that the district
court applied the wrong legal standard because, according to St.
Hill, the district court rested its finding that the sales
described in paragraph 4A were relevant conduct on a test
applicable only to conspiracy offenses (or offenses in which the
conduct of someone other than the defendant is attributed to him
for sentencing purposes). He argues, second, that the district
court erred because it focused its attention and findings on
whether the conduct reported in paragraph 4A was sufficiently
connected only to the other undisputed relevant conduct, rather
than directly to the offense of conviction.
II. Standard of Review
St. Hill makes no claim that he presented to the district
court the two arguments he now advances on appeal, and we have
found no such presentation. Accordingly, we review for plain
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error. United States v. Tavares, 705 F.3d 4, 24 (1st Cir. 2013).
Under that standard, "[s]uccess on appeal requires [St. Hill] to
demonstrate: 1) an error; 2) that was plain or obvious; and which
3) affected his substantial rights; and also 4) seriously impaired
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial
proceedings." United States v. Santiago-Burgos,
750 F.3d 19, 24
(1st Cir. 2014).
III. Analysis
A. The district court found that the paragraph 4A conduct
was part of the same course of conduct as the offense of
conviction.
Guidelines section 1B1.3(a)(2) provides that, with
"fungible item crimes" like drug dealing, United States v. Blanco,
888 F.2d 907, 911 (1st Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks
omitted), a defendant's base offense level should be calculated
based not merely on the offense of conviction, but also on, among
other things, "all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the
defendant" "that were part of the same course of conduct or common
scheme or plan as the offense of conviction." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a).
"'Common scheme or plan' and 'same course of conduct' are two
closely related concepts."
Id. § 1B1.3 cmt. 9. The Guidelines
commentary specifies that "[f]or two or more offenses to constitute
part of a common scheme or plan, they must be substantially
connected to each other by at least one common factor, such as
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common victims, common accomplices, common purpose, or similar
modus operandi." Id. Moreover,
[o]ffenses that do not qualify as part of a
common scheme or plan may nonetheless qualify
as part of the same course of conduct if they
are sufficiently connected or related to each
other as to warrant the conclusion that they
are part of a single episode, spree, or
ongoing series of offenses. Factors that are
appropriate to [that] determination . . .
include the degree of similarity of the
offenses, the regularity (repetitions) of the
offenses, and the time interval between the
offenses. When one of the above factors is
absent, a stronger presence of at least one of
the other factors is required.[1]
Id.
St. Hill argues that the district court applied the
"common scheme or plan" standard when it should have applied the
"same course of conduct" standard. Under St. Hill's dichotomous
view of the Guidelines standard, a "common scheme or plan" can only
exist in the context of a conspiracy, or at least where someone
else's conduct is being attributed to a defendant for sentencing
1
Commentators have expressed some confusion as to why this
section uses the term "offense" rather than, for example,
"conduct." See Thomas W. Hutchison et al., Federal Sentencing Law
and Practice § 1B1.3, authors' cmt. 7(b)(2014 ed.). Although the
Guidelines generally define "offense" to include both the offense
of conviction and all associated relevant conduct, see U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.1 cmt. n. 1(H), the parties here focus on the use of "offense
of conviction" in § 1B1.3(a)(2), and present no cogent argument
based on the use of "offense" in the Guidelines commentary. Cf.
United States v. Blackwell, 323 F.3d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 2003)(in
addressing the victim-status enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2,
noting the distinction between the use of "offense" and "offense of
conviction" as it pertains to the inclusion of relevant conduct).
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purposes. While a conspiracy is certainly a good example of a
"common scheme or plan," and so the phrases are sometimes used
interchangeably, see, e.g., United States v. Wood, 924 F.2d 399,
403-04 (1st Cir. 1991), it is not readily apparent why a conspiracy
in particular, or concerted action in general, is a necessary
element that limits the definition of a common scheme or plan. In
any event, we need not follow this analysis to its conclusion
because St. Hill's starting premise--that the district court's
finding of relevant conduct hinged on a finding that the conduct
was part of a common scheme or plan--is simply wrong. The district
court plainly said that the sales described in paragraph 4A "should
be included as relevant conduct as part of a common scheme or plan
and part of the same course of conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3."
(emphasis added). Nor did the district court rest its conclusion
on factors that are pertinent only to applying the "common scheme
or plan" standard. The district court expressly considered, for
example, the "commonalities" between the various transactions
(i.e., their similarity) and the time interval between the repeated
offenses.2 So if the conduct was relevant conduct as part of the
"same course of conduct," it matters not whether it was also part
2
As noted above, two incidents are only part of the same
course of conduct "if they are sufficiently connected or related to
each other as to warrant the conclusion that they are part of a
single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses," which we
determine by assessing, inter alia, "the degree of similarity of
the offenses, the regularity (repetitions) of the offenses, and the
time interval between the offenses." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. 9.
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of a common scheme or plan. We therefore turn to St. Hill's second
argument--that the district court erred in how it decided that the
conduct described in paragraph 4A was part of the same course of
conduct as the offense of conviction.
B. There was no plain error in the district court's method
of finding that the paragraph 4A conduct was part of the
same course of conduct as the offense of conviction.
The Guidelines provide that, to be "relevant conduct,"
uncharged conduct must be connected to the offense of conviction.
See United States v. Santos Batista, 239 F.3d 16, 22 (1st Cir.
2001) ("[A] defendant must not only be responsible for any
uncharged acts to be considered in his sentencing, but those acts
also must be linked to the offense of conviction."). St. Hill
argues that a link sufficient to show the "same course of conduct"
must be proved directly between the ostensibly relevant conduct and
the offense of conviction--not merely between that conduct and some
other relevant conduct. And, indeed, several courts have so held.
See United States v. Bullock, 454 F.3d 637, 639-42 (7th Cir. 2006)
(noting that connecting disputed relevant conduct to other relevant
conduct "doesn't make it relevant to [the] actual offense of
conviction . . . . That is, it's relevant only by association with
other relevant conduct, through a kind of criminal transitivity.
That's not good enough."); United States v. Pinnick,
47 F.3d 434,
436, 438-39 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (explaining that "the government must
demonstrate a connection between count three and the offense of
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conviction, not between count three and the other offenses offered
as relevant conduct."). Cf. also United States v. Rhine, 583 F.3d
878, 885-86 (5th Cir. 2009) (describing the Guidelines as providing
that "[a] separate, unadjudicated offense may be part of a common
scheme or plan--and thus relevant conduct--if it is 'substantially
connected to [the offense of conviction] by at least one common
factor, such as common victims, common accomplices, common purpose,
or similar modus operandi.'" (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3
cmt. 9(A))(alteration in original)); United States v. Cyr,
337 F.3d
96, 102-03 (1st Cir. 2003) (reasoning that while two prior heroin
convictions were relevant conduct for the instant heroin offense,
it was permissible to treat two Xanax-related convictions imposed
jointly with those two heroin convictions not as relevant conduct).
On the basis of this reasoning, St. Hill argues that the
district court employed an improper method of comparison in
determining that the drug sales described in paragraph 4A were
relevant conduct because it examined their nexus to the other
(undisputed) relevant conduct, rather than to the offense of
conviction. St. Hill is correct that the district court did not
limit its examination to comparing the sales described in
paragraph 4A to only the offense of conviction. Nor did it limit
its description of the "same course of conduct" to facts that were
manifest in all of the sales. For example, in confirming the scale
of St. Hill's operation, the district court observed that he had
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accomplices, even though those accomplices were not obviously
involved in the offense of conviction. Similarly, in comparing the
details of the drug business (as it found them) to the conduct
described in paragraph 4A, the district court referred to St.
Hill's ostensible practice of possessing firearms, although there
were no firearms obviously involved in the offense of conviction.
See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. 9; United States v. Buck, 324 F.3d
786, 797 (5th Cir. 2003).
We observe, first, that St. Hill's trial counsel did not
object to the district court's approach. To the contrary, trial
counsel affirmatively invited the district court to examine the
extent to which the paragraph 4A conduct shared traits in common
with the conduct in paragraphs 3 and 4B. Our review of St. Hill's
contrary position on appeal is therefore for plain error, at best.
United States v. Tavares, 705 F.3d at 24.
Nor is it plain or obvious that the district court's
acceptance of counsel's invitation actually led it to err. The
district court ultimately and expressly acknowledged that the
"uncharged conduct must be relevant to the charged conduct." The
district court also focused, just as St. Hill says it should have,
on the task of explaining whether or not the ostensibly relevant
conduct "should be included in the same course of conduct or common
scheme or plan as the drug trafficking offense for which [St. Hill
stood] convicted."
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Third, even if the district court erred in failing to
limit its comparative analysis to the charged conduct and the
putative relevant conduct, St. Hill fails to demonstrate that any
such error affected his substantial rights. See United States v.
Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81 (2004) (plain error must have "a
prejudicial effect on the outcome of a judicial proceeding");
United States v. Gilman,
478 F.3d 440, 447 (1st Cir. 2007) (To
demonstrate prejudice on plain error "[i]n the sentencing context
. . . a defendant must" show "a reasonable probability that, but
for the error, the district court would have imposed a different,
more favorable sentence" (internal quotation marks omitted)). We
do not think that St. Hill has demonstrated a reasonable
probability that the district court would have reached a different
conclusion by comparing the offense of conviction only to the
paragraph 4A sales. The district court correctly noted that the
offense of conviction and paragraph 4A sales shared commonalities
in the type of drug, drug units, general price range, geography,
and time frame. St. Hill does not argue that the offense of
conviction, taken alone, would be insufficient to support a finding
that the paragraph 4A sales were relevant conduct. He simply
argues that the outcome might have been different under the proper
method of analysis. That is not enough to demonstrate prejudice
affecting substantial rights. See Gilman,
478 F.3d 440, 447;
United States v. Carozza,
4 F.3d 70, 88-89 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding
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no prejudice where defendant argued his Guidelines range "might"
have been different had the district court not erred and the
district court's calculation was "in all likelihood" correct).
Finally, given our plain error review, and St. Hill's
limited focus on whether the right standards and methods were
applied, we need not consider the extent to which the district
court, in applying the correct standard and method, should have
assigned more weight to the differences between the retail-level
deals and the wholesale supply described in paragraph 4A, a matter
not addressed in St. Hill's briefs on appeal. Cf., e.g., Rhine,
583 F.3d at 889 (finding insufficient similarity between a one-off
$5 drug sale to an individual user and participation in a
drug-trafficking ring selling drugs wholesale to mid-level
dealers).
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is affirmed.
- Concurring Opinion Follows -
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TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge (Concurring). I join the
court's opinion but write separately to note a disturbing trend in
criminal prosecutions. All too often, prosecutors charge
individuals with relatively minor crimes, carrying correspondingly
short sentences, but then use section 1B1.3(a) of the Sentencing
Guidelines ("Guidelines") to argue for significantly enhanced terms
of imprisonment under the guise of "relevant conduct" -- other
crimes that have not been charged (or, if charged, have led to an
acquittal) and have not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.3
The instant case provides a typical example of this
trend. St. Hill was arrested, charged, and pleaded guilty to
distributing twenty oxycodone pills with a net weight of 0.56
grams. Applying the Guidelines to just this offense, St. Hill's
base offense level would have been 12. See U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual ("U.S.S.G.") § 2D1.1(c)(14) (2012). Assuming the
district court's other findings remained unchanged, St. Hill's
total offense level would have been reduced to 9. With this
3
A petition for a writ of certiorari currently pending
before the Supreme Court addresses a subset of these cases in which
acquitted conduct -- for which the jury explicitly found the
defendant not guilty -- is nonetheless used by the judge at
sentencing to increase the defendant's sentence. In Jones v.
United States, petitioners argue for the ability to lodge an "as
applied" challenge to the substantive reasonableness of their
sentences. According to petitioners, their Guidelines ranges, and
thus sentences, were significantly and unconstitutionally increased
based solely on a judge-found fact which petitioners were acquitted
of at trial -- their involvement in the drug-related conspiracy.
Jones v. United States, 744 F.3d 1362 (D.C. Cir. 2014), petition
for cert. filed, (U.S. May 6, 2014) (No. 13-10026).
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offense level, and a criminal history category of IV, the
Guidelines would have yielded an advisory sentence of 2-8 months.
See id. at Sentencing Table. However, due to three incidents of
"relevant conduct" -- (1) an alleged sale of 3.7 net grams of
cocaine base to one confidential informant; (2) three alleged ten-
pill oxycodone sales totaling 0.9 grams to a second confidential
informant; and (3) the 76.65 grams of wholesale oxycodone
transactions that are at issue before the court4 with a third
confidential informant -- his base offense level jumped to 28 and
his resulting total offense level became 25. This equated to an
advisory Guidelines sentence of 84-105 months of imprisonment.
In other words, St. Hill was subject to an additional six
to eight years in prison due to isolated drug sales not directly
related to the twenty oxycodone pills which led to his conviction,
all of which he was never arrested for, never charged with, never
pleaded guilty to, and never convicted of by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. This is a prime example of the tail wagging the
dog. Even more disturbing: the government could, if it so chooses,
still charge St. Hill for these uncharged crimes in a separate
proceeding, and he could be convicted and sentenced again without
protection from the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Witte v. United
States, 515 U.S. 389, 406 (1995) ("Because consideration of
4
That St. Hill does not challenge two of the three incidents
of "relevant conduct" does not make the practice any less
disturbing.
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relevant conduct in determining a defendant's sentence within the
legislatively authorized punishment range does not constitute
punishment for that conduct, the instant prosecution does not
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition against the
imposition of multiple punishments for the same offense.").
This is not to say that section 1B1.3(a)'s "relevant
conduct" considerations have no place in sentencing defendants.
Nor is it to say that various other factors -- such as a
defendant's prior convictions, remorse, family responsibilities,
and civic contributions -- are not appropriate sentencing
considerations, or that they must be proven to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2010) ("The court,
in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall
consider . . . the history and characteristics of the defendant
. . . ."); U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1 (explaining how prior convictions are
used to calculate a defendant's criminal history category).
Rather, the point is that if the government wishes to punish a
defendant for certain alleged criminal conduct, then that conduct
should be charged in an indictment.
Using the "relevant conduct" enhancement on unrelated
narcotics transactions simply because the transactions involve
characteristics common to most, if not all, narcotics transactions
in a given region -- i.e., similar types of narcotics, comparable
amounts of narcotics, comparable prices, a common geography, and
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occurring within a relatively short time frame (and not only hours
or days but extending as long as weeks or months) -- seems to go
far beyond what the Guidelines intended. This is especially
striking when one considers that the burden of proof for this
"relevant conduct" is not the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
required to convict at trial but rather the much lower "by a
preponderance of the evidence" standard. Compare U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3
cmt. ("The Commission believes that use of a preponderance of the
evidence standard is appropriate to meet due process requirements
and policy concerns in resolving disputes regarding application of
the guidelines to the facts of a case.") with United States v.
Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2156 (2013) ("The Sixth Amendment
. . . . in conjunction with the Due Process Clause, requires that
each element of a crime be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt."). See also United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156
(1997) (citing the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3 and stating that
the Supreme Court has "held that application of the preponderance
standard at sentencing generally satisfies due process").
Put differently, if the government intends to seek an
increase in a criminal defendant's sentence for conduct that
independently may be subject to criminal liability, the government
should charge that conduct in the indictment. The Fifth Amendment
requires that "[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law," U.S. Const.
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amend. V, while the Sixth Amendment provides an accused with the
right to a trial "by an impartial jury," id. amend. VI. The
practice of arguing for higher sentences based on uncharged and
untried "relevant conduct" for, at best, tangentially related
narcotics transactions seems like an end-run around these basic
constitutional guarantees afforded to all criminal defendants. Cf.
Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2162 ("When a finding of fact alters the
legally prescribed punishment so as to aggravate it, the fact
necessarily forms a constituent part of a new offense and must be
submitted to the jury."). The government's role is to ensure
justice, both to the accused and to the public at large; it is not
to maximize conviction rates and argue for the greatest possible
sentence. And, while it is unclear to me whether this trend is due
to shaky police work resulting in cases that cannot be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, prosecutorial laziness, or other less
nefarious factors, it remains troubling regardless.
I am hardly the first to notice or call attention to this
injustice, and I am sure I will not be the last. See, e.g., United
States v. Ritsema, 31 F.3d 559, 567 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Our point is
only that the relevant conduct provision, interpreted in an overly
broad manner, has the potential of being a coarse instrument
capable of causing years of serious incidental criminality to ride
in at sentencing on the coattails of a relatively minor
conviction."); Susan N. Herman, The Tail that Wagged the Dog:
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Bifurcated Fact-Finding Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 289, 292 (1992)
("This system also imposes strict procedural obligations on
prosecutors who wish to charge a defendant with a particular crime,
but then provides them with a shortcut alternative means of having
a defendant punished for an additional offense that they might not
have been able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, so long as the
defendant has been convicted of a related offense.").5
Nevertheless, as a judge, it is my responsibility to
faithfully apply the law as articulated by both the Supreme Court
and this court, and I do not dispute that both the Guidelines and
our interpretation of them currently condone this questionable
5
See also United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1119-21
(3d Cir. 1990) (Rosenn, J., concurring) (expressing "concern that
the Government's manipulation of [the defendant's] charge and
sentencing illustrates the problem reported by many courts that the
sentencing guidelines have replaced judicial discretion over
sentencing with prosecutorial discretion," which may violate a
defendant's right to due process by allowing the government to
"deliberately collateralize at the charge and trial stage the most
critical element for [a defendant's] sentencing"), overruled by
United States v. Fisher,
502 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2007); Fed. Crim.
Procedure Comm. of the Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, The American
College of Trial Lawyers Proposed Modifications to the Relevant
Conduct Provisions of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 38
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1463, 1465 (2001)("[T]he Committee asserts that
defendants who are charged and convicted of particular criminal
offenses should have their sentences primarily based upon those
offenses, not offenses which the prosecutor has elected not to
charge or try to a judge or jury or of which they have been
acquitted."); id. at 1484 & n.150 (collecting cases in which
"judges have recognized that . . . the operation of the relevant
conduct rules is unjust from the perspective of an ordinary citizen
and therefore invites disrespect for the law").
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process. See Witte, 515 U.S. at 396, 406 (finding no
constitutional violation where the sentence was based in part on a
cocaine offense that defendant "clearly was neither prosecuted for
nor convicted of"); United States v. Lombard,
102 F.3d 1, 4 (1st
Cir. 1996) (finding no constitutional violation where the district
court "choose[s] to give weight to the uncharged offenses in fixing
the sentence within the statutory range if it finds by a
preponderance of evidence that they occurred"). I nonetheless
question whether this interpretation should be revisited -- either
by the courts or by revisions to the Guidelines.
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