Filed: Apr. 16, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: ALBERT DAVIDSON, as Guardian of Marilyn Davidson; see, also Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 70–71 (1986) ([T]he mere, fact that continued adjudication would provide a remedy for an, injury that is only a byproduct of the suit itself does not mean, that the injury is cognizable under Art.
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 13-2365
ALBERT DAVIDSON, as Guardian of Marilyn Davidson;
REGINA DAVIDSON, as Guardian of Marilyn Davidson,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
ELIN HOWE, as Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of
Developmental Services,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Thompson, Circuit Judge,
and Smith,* District Judge.
Margaret M. Pinkham, with whom Elise Busny and Pinkham Busny
LLP were on brief, for appellants.
Timothy J. Casey, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Martha
Coakley, Attorney General of Massachusetts, was on brief, for
appellee.
April 16, 2014
*
Of the District of Rhode Island, sitting by designation.
LYNCH, Chief Judge. Plaintiffs Albert and Regina
Davidson are guardians of 70-year-old Marilyn Davidson (whom we
refer to as "Marilyn"), who is in state care. They appeal from the
district court's denial of a preliminary injunction in an action
purported to be brought under the federal Medicaid Act and various
implementing regulations. Davidson v. Howe, No. 1:13-cv-12634-WGY
(D. Mass. Oct. 29, 2013). Plaintiffs sought to enjoin Marilyn's
transfer from the Fernald Developmental Center, her home since 1985
and which was being closed, to her new home at the Wrentham
Developmental Center. Both are Intermediate Care Facilities
("ICFs") for the intellectually disabled operated by the
Massachusetts Department of Developmental Services ("DDS").
On appeal, the Davidsons argue in their briefs that the
district court erred in denying the injunction and in holding that
the statutory and regulatory provisions cited in their complaint,
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(31) and 42 C.F.R. § 483.430, do not create a
private right of action.
The Commonwealth argues that plaintiffs' case should be
dismissed because the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief
have been rendered moot by Marilyn's completed transfer to
Wrentham, and that plaintiffs' claim for money damages is barred by
the Eleventh Amendment. We agree that the claims for injunctive
and declaratory relief in the case are moot. The case does not
raise issues which fall into an exception for mootness. We also
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hold that the damages claim is barred by the state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity. We do not reach the question of whether there
is a private right of action under the statute and accompanying
regulations.
I.
Marilyn is intellectually disabled and has been in DDS
care for most of her life. Marilyn was first admitted to Fernald
at age six in 1949. At age sixteen, Marilyn was transferred to
Metropolitan State Hospital. Other than a short period when she
lived in Westborough State Hospital, she remained at Metropolitan
State Hospital until 1985, at which time she was transferred back
to Fernald. In 2003, the Commonwealth announced that it would
close Fernald, described as "by far the most costly of the ICFs to
run and the most seriously noncompliant with the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990[, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.]."1 M.D. ex
rel. Davidson v. Dep't of Developmental Servs. ("Davidson I"), 83
Mass. App. Ct. 463, 464 n.4,
985 N.E.2d 863, 864 n.4, review
denied,
465 Mass. 1107,
989 N.E.2d 900 (2013). In 2008, after
protracted litigation, this court held that the Commonwealth could
1
In budgetary appropriations from 2004 to 2007, the
Massachusetts legislature directed DDS (then the "Department of
Mental Retardation") to take measures to consolidate or close its
six ICFs for the intellectually disabled. Ricci v. Patrick, 544
F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2008). Among the reasons cited by the
legislature were "avoid[ing] discrimination against mentally
disabled persons by promoting their placement into community
settings" and using available resources for the care of the
intellectually disabled more efficiently.
Id.
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close Fernald without re-opening the landmark 1993 consent decree,
see Ricci v. Okin ("Ricci III"), 823 F. Supp. 984 (D. Mass. 1993),
that brought to an end more than two decades of institutional
reform litigation concerning the intellectually disabled in
Massachusetts.2 Ricci v. Patrick ("Ricci V"), 544 F.3d 8, 15-22
(1st Cir. 2008).
Under the Ricci consent decree, certain disputes about
treatment of class members are submitted to the state system. See
id. at 20. There were extensive state administrative and judicial
proceedings leading up to Marilyn's transfer from Fernald.
Following this court's decision in Ricci V, DDS began to plan
Marilyn's transfer from Fernald. DDS discussed with plaintiffs
various alternative placements including at the two ICFs that would
remain in operation (Wrentham and the Hogan Regional Center) as
well as at state- and vendor-run community-based facilities.
Davidson
I, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 474,
985 N.E.2d 863 at 871.
Plaintiffs made plain that they opposed Marilyn's transfer from
Fernald.
Id. In May 2010, DDS gave plaintiffs notice of its
specific plan to transfer Marilyn from Fernald to Wrentham.
Id. at
465, 985 N.E.2d at 865; see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123B, § 3.
Plaintiffs objected and DDS referred the matter to the
2
Marilyn is a member of the Ricci class, entitling her to
certain specialized supports and services for as long as she needs
them. See 115 Mass. Code Regs. § 6.05 (defining the Ricci class
and services available to class members).
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Massachusetts Division of Administrative Law Appeals. Davidson I,
465 Mass. App. Ct. at 465, 985 N.E.2d at 865; see Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 123B § 3. Chapter 123B, § 3 of Massachusetts General Laws is
a state law providing an administrative due process mechanism for
review of agency decisions, followed by a mechanism for judicial
review in the state courts. An evidentiary hearing was held before
an administrative magistrate. The magistrate approved the
transfer, concluding that Marilyn's transfer to Wrentham "would
result in improved services and quality of life and was in her best
interest."3 Davidson I, 465 Mass. App. Ct. at
465, 985 N.E.2d at
865; see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123B, § 3.
Plaintiffs sought state judicial review of the
magistrate's decision; the Superior Court affirmed. Davidson I,
465 Mass. App. Ct. at 465, 985 N.E.2d at 865; see Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 30A, § 14(7). Plaintiffs appealed the Superior Court decision;
in April 2013, the Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed. Davidson
I, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at
465, 985 N.E.2d at 865. And, in June 2013,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court denied further appellate
3
The magistrate declined to consider plaintiffs' various
federal law challenges to the proposed transfer, holding that Mass.
Gen Laws. c. 123B, § 3 limited his authority to determining whether
the transfer would be in Marilyn's best interest. See Davidson I,
83 Mass. App. Ct. at 466, 985 N.E.2d at 865; see also Box Pond
Ass'n v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd.,
435 Mass. 408, 416,
758
N.E.2d 604, 611 (2001) (holding that an agency's interpretation of
its statutory mandate will not be disturbed unless it is "patently
wrong, unreasonable, arbitrary, whimsical, or capricious" (quoting
TBI, Inc. v. Bd. of Health of N. Andover,
431 Mass. 9, 17,
725
N.E.2d 188, 194 (2000)) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
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review, see 465 Mass. 1107,
989 N.E.2d 900. At this point,
plaintiffs had exhausted all means of challenging the proposed
transfer under Massachusetts law.
DDS continued to plan for Marilyn's transfer. On August
22, 2013, DDS held a meeting with plaintiffs and Fernald and
Wrentham staff members to update Marilyn's Individual Transition
Plan ("ITP"). Under the updated ITP, Marilyn was scheduled to move
to Wrentham on October 22, 2013.
On October 18, 2013, plaintiffs filed a complaint in
federal district court alleging that the ITP for Marilyn's transfer
violated the federal Medicaid statute and various implementing
regulations.4 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(31); 42 C.F.R. § 483.430.
That same day, plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary
injunction, seeking to delay Marilyn's transfer from Fernald to
Wrentham until such time as DDS adopted an appropriate transition
plan.
The district court held an initial hearing on October 21,
during which it directed the parties to file additional briefing on
whether the various federal regulations cited in the complaint
created a private right of action and, if so, what legal standard
the court was to use to adjudicate plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs
4
Plaintiffs have abandoned any claims under Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134, Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), and equal
protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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filed an amended complaint on October 27. On October 28, the
district court held a second hearing, during which the court denied
plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief on the ground that the
regulations cited in the original complaint did not create a
private right of action, but nonetheless allowed plaintiffs to file
an amended complaint.5 The court held further that Marilyn's
transfer could proceed on October 31 absent a stay from this court.
Plaintiffs appealed and asked this court for a stay pending appeal.
This court denied plaintiffs' request for a stay on October 30,
reasoning that, even if plaintiffs had a private right of action,
the court "ha[d] no confidence at this stage that staying the
transfer would do Marilyn more good than harm."6 Marilyn was
transferred the next day to Wrentham and has continued to reside
there.
II.
We take up the question of mootness. In their briefs,
plaintiffs took the position the case was not moot because they say
they have ongoing claims for declaratory and injunctive relief as
to Marilyn's care and so fall under an exception to the mootness
5
In so doing, the district court appears to have authorized
retroactively the amended complaint filed by plaintiffs the
previous day.
6
We relied on testimony in affidavits accompanying the
Commonwealth's response to plaintiffs' motion to stay. In those
affidavits, both Marilyn's physician and her psychiatrist stated
that further delay would be contrary to Marilyn's best interest.
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doctrine, and because they have a remaining claim for damages from
the transfer. At oral argument, counsel for plaintiffs agreed that
the declaratory and injunctive relief originally sought, both
regarding Marilyn's now-inactive ITP, are now moot.
"The doctrine of mootness enforces the mandate that an
actual controversy must be extant at all stages of the review, not
merely at the time the complaint is filed." Am. Civil Liberties
Union of Mass. v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops ("ACLU"), 705
F.3d 44, 52 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Mangual v. Rotger–Sabat,
317
F.3d 45, 60 (1st Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"If events have transpired to render a court opinion merely
advisory, Article III considerations require dismissal of the
case."
Mangual, 317 F.3d at 60. "The burden of establishing
mootness rests with the party invoking the doctrine . . . ."
ACLU,
705 F.3d at 52.
Here, the transfer from Fernald to Wrentham has been
completed and the administrative plan under which the transfer was
effectuated is no longer in effect as to Marilyn. Absent a
cognizable claim for damages, when a challenged plan goes out of
effect, "there is literally no controversy left for the court to
decide -- the case is no longer 'live.'" ACLU, 705 F.3d at 53
(quoting Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)). More
still, a court can provide no meaningful relief to the challenging
party since, once the plan ceases to be operative, there is no plan
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left to enjoin, cf. New Eng. Reg'l Council of Carpenters v. Kinton,
284 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2002), and, "[w]ith limited exceptions,
. . . issuance of a declaratory judgment deeming past conduct
illegal is also not permissible as it would be merely advisory."
ACLU, 705 F.3d at 53.
Plaintiffs maintain that their original complaint is not
moot, first because their case nonetheless fits an exception to the
mootness doctrine, and second because they have a cognizable claim
for damages. Both arguments fail.
A. "Capable of Repetition, Yet Evading Review"
Plaintiffs argue that the issues presented are "capable
of repetition, yet evading review." S. Pac. Terminal Co. v.
Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911); see, e.g., In
re Grand Jury Proceedings,
744 F.3d 211, 218-19 (1st Cir. 2014);
ACLU, 705 F.3d at 56-57. This exception to the mootness doctrine
applies only in "exceptional situations." City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons,
461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983). Plaintiffs must show that "(1) the
challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully
litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was
a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be
subjected to the same action again." Weinstein v. Bradford,
423
U.S. 147, 149 (1975).
The Davidsons cannot meet those standards. In fact, they
litigated in the state administrative and judicial systems the
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questions about the appropriateness of Marilyn's transfer for over
three years. Their state litigation ended in June 2013; they filed
this federal suit four months later.
In any event, plaintiffs have done nothing to show a
"'reasonable expectation' or 'demonstrated probability,'" ACLU, 705
F.3d at 57 (quoting Murphy v. Hunt,
455 U.S. 478, 483 (1982) (per
curiam)), that Marilyn "will again be subjected to the alleged
illegality" as to her transfer,
id. (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 109). DDS insists that it has
no plan to transfer Marilyn again. Plaintiffs make no contrary
allegation. Fernald has now been closed.
Instead, plaintiffs try to reshape their case. They now
contend that DDS, post-transfer, is likely to afford Marilyn
inadequate care, in contravention of unspecified Medicaid
regulatory requirements. In their original complaint, plaintiffs
alleged that adherence to the ITP for Marilyn's transfer from one
ICF to another would result in undue harm to Marilyn by requiring
her to transition without adequate precautions. This is the only
"alleged illegality" at issue, and the transfer has been completed.
If plaintiffs have new complaints based on Marilyn's
post-transfer care, they must utilize their state remedies. See
Ricci V, 544 F.3d at 20 ("The Disengagement Order and state
regulations provide a procedure and a place where individual
disputes about adequacy of the services resulting from the ISP
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process may be heard. . . . Again, the Disengagement Order commits
these disputes to resolution in a state forum and under state law
and thus provides no basis for federal court intervention."); Ricci
III, 823 F. Supp. at 988 ("Individual ISP disputes shall be
enforced solely through the state ISP process.").
B. Claim for Damages
Plaintiffs' claim for damages is squarely foreclosed by
the Commonwealth's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit for
damages in federal court.7 Though the district court did not reach
this issue, we deal with it because plaintiffs have directly argued
the issue to us as part of mootness, in the interest of efficiency,
and because the record makes the issue manifest. See, e.g., In re
Keeper of Records (Grand Jury Subpoena Addressed to XYZ Corp.), 348
F.3d 16, 26 (1st Cir. 2003). As one commentator has noted, "[a]
damages claim suffices to avoid mootness only if viable." 13C
7
At oral argument, plaintiffs argued for the first time that
their claim for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is, by
itself, enough to keep this a live case or controversy. This
argument is waived. DeCaro v. Hasbro, Inc., 580 F.3d 55, 64 (1st
Cir. 2009) ("It is common ground that contentions not advanced in
an appellant's opening brief are deemed waived."). It also fails.
The Supreme Court has stated flatly that an "interest in attorney's
fees is, of course, insufficient to create an Article III case or
controversy where none exists on the merits of the underlying
claim." Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 480 (1990); see
also Diamond v. Charles,
476 U.S. 54, 70–71 (1986) ("[T]he mere
fact that continued adjudication would provide a remedy for an
injury that is only a byproduct of the suit itself does not mean
that the injury is cognizable under Art. III.").
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Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3533.3 (3d ed.
2003) (emphasis added).
"[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a
liability which must be paid from public funds in the state
treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment." Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). This is true whether the named defendant
is the state itself or, as here, a state official in her official
capacity. Rosie D. ex rel. John D. v. Swift,
310 F.3d 230, 234
(1st Cir. 2002) ("As a general matter, the Eleventh Amendment bars
suits in federal courts against unconsenting states (including
'official capacity' suits against state hierarchs)."); see also
Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) ("[A]
suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is
not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the
official's office. As such, it is no different from a suit against
the State itself." (citation omitted)).
This case does not fit into any exception to Eleventh
Amendment immunity. First, Congress may abrogate a state's
sovereign immunity through "appropriate legislation," Va. Office
for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1638 (2011);
"[s]econd, a State may waive its sovereign immunity by consenting
to suit," Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999). This court "will find
waiver only where stated 'by the most express language or by such
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overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no room for
any other reasonable construction.'" Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673
(alteration in original) (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co.,
213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909)). Other than by an express statement, a
state can waive its immunity by clear declaration that it intends
to submit itself to the jurisdiction of a federal court, Coll. Sav.
Bank, 527 U.S. at 676, by participating in a federal program that
requires waiver of immunity as an express condition, see Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234, 246-47 (1985), or by
affirmative litigation conduct, Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ.
Sys. of Ga.,
535 U.S. 613, 620 (2002).
"Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally
secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its
intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dellmuth v. Muth,
491 U.S. 223,
228 (1989)). The provisions of the Medicaid Act upon which
plaintiffs rely do not contain anything approaching an
"unequivocal[] express[ion]" of an intent to abrogate.8 Fla.
8
Plaintiffs rely principally upon 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(31),
which provides that a State Plan for medical assistance must:
with respect to services in an intermediate care facility
for the mentally retarded (where the State plan includes
medical assistance for such services) provide, with
respect to each patient receiving such services, for a
written plan of care, prior to admission to or
authorization of benefits in such facility, in accordance
with regulations of the Secretary, and for a regular
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Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 635 (1999) (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996); see also Fla. Dep't of Health &
Rehabilitative Servs. v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass'n,
450 U.S. 147, 150
(1981) (per curiam) (holding state immune from suit where
plaintiffs were seeking retroactive relief for alleged insufficient
Medicaid reimbursement). Plaintiffs make no argument to the
contrary.
As to waiver, "[s]tates do not waive their Eleventh
Amendment immunity merely by participating in the Medicaid
program." Greenless v. Almond, 277 F.3d 601, 606 n.6 (1st Cir.
2002); see also
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673 ("The mere fact that a
State participates in a program through which the Federal
Government provides assistance for the operation by the State of a
system of public aid is not sufficient to establish consent on the
part of the State to be sued in the federal courts."). Nor does a
state waive its immunity by "defend[ing] itself" upon being "haled
into federal court as a defendant against its will." Consejo de
Salud de la Comunidad de la Playa de Ponce, Inc. v.
González-Feliciano, 695 F.3d 83, 104 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 54 (2013). Plaintiffs' claim for damages is barred by
the Eleventh Amendment.
program of independent professional review (including
medical evaluation) which shall periodically review his
need for such services[.]
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III.
We remand this case to the district court with
instructions to dismiss plaintiffs' claim for damages as barred by
the Eleventh Amendment and to dismiss plaintiffs' claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief as moot.9 No costs are awarded.
9
While this appeal was pending, the district court denied,
on futility grounds, plaintiffs' motion to file a second amended
complaint.
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