Filed: Aug. 12, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: The IJ stated that she would, expect corroborating evidence or some mention by the [NCP] of, Gurung's problems in Nepal because of his very participation, and, involvement in that party., We are without jurisdiction to review that conclusion. See Soeung v. Holder, 677 F.3d 484, 488 (1st Cir.
Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 14-1428
BIRENDRA KUMAR GURUNG,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH,*
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF
THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Before
Torruella, Thompson, and Barron,
Circuit Judges.
Stephanie F. Dyson and Cayer Dyson Law, P.C., on brief for
petitioner.
Jeffrey R. Meyer, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation,
Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Joyce R. Branda, Acting
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, and Stephen J. Flynn,
Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, on brief for
respondent.
August 12, 2015
*
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Attorney General
Loretta E. Lynch is substituted for former Attorney General Eric H.
Holder, Jr. as respondent.
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Birendra Kumar Gurung is a
native and citizen of Nepal who legally entered the United States
on June 25, 2007, and received authorization to remain until
October 1, 2007, pursuant to a H2-B non-immigrant visa. Gurung
overstayed his visa and some three-and-a-half years later filed an
application for asylum based on his alleged fear of returning to
Nepal because of threats by Maoist communists. Gurung also applied
for withholding of removal and protection under the United Nations
Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). He now concedes removability
but seeks judicial review of a final order entered by the Board of
Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), which affirmed the denial of his
requests by an Immigration Judge ("IJ"). For the reasons explained
below, we deny the petition for review.
I. Background1
The following facts are taken from Gurung's testimony in
support of his application before the IJ. See Chhay v. Mukasey,
540 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2008). Gurung owned a grocery store when
he was living in Nepal and is married with two children who still
live there. In October 2000, Gurung joined the Nepalese Congress
1
The recent history of Nepal is marked by a civil war. In 1996,
following years of failed pro-democracy movements from groups
opposing the ruling royal dynasty and seeking greater social
equality, the Communist Party of Nepal ("Maoist") launched an armed
struggle. The Government of Nepal and the Maoists engaged in an
armed conflict that left thousands dead or missing. See generally
U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Nepal Conflict Report, 14-15
(Oct. 2012), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/NP/OHCHR_
Nepal_Conflict_Report2012.pdf.
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Party ("NCP") and became president of the Maghthana village
committee, for which he recruited members and disseminated
information about the party. He testified that in 2004 he was
working at his grocery store when four men came in and accused him
of speaking against the Maoists at a public meeting of the NCP.
The men beat him with a stick, but he never sought medical
treatment. Though he did go to a police station, they failed to
take a report because the police were too busy fighting the
Maoists. Some days later, army soldiers came to his village and he
told one of them that the Maoists were hiding in another village
called Tiwari. The soldiers then went after the Maoists, and
Gurung later heard that two of the Maoists disappeared.
A year after these incidents, Gurung, who happened to be
a board member for a high school at the time, heard news on the
radio that the Maoists were taking over schools and forcing
students and teachers to participate in their rallies. His school,
however, decided that they would defy the Maoists if they ever
attempted such actions against them. One day, the Maoists came to
the school and beat Gurung with a bicycle chain. He was taken to
a health post where medical treatment was offered, but since his
injuries were not severe, he left without receiving treatment.
Nine months later, Gurung received a phone call from
someone identifying himself as a Maoist and telling Gurung to stop
opposing the Maoists or they would kill him.
-3-
Fourteen months after the phone threat, Gurung was having
dinner at home when a group of Maoists entered his house and asked
him to join their cause. Unpersuaded, he argued that it was his
fundamental right to choose a different political ideology. But
the Maoists did not stop there. Gurung testified that they tied
his hands behind his back and put a knife to his neck. They also
threatened to cut his hand, throat, and tongue if Gurung continued
to speak out against them.
Gurung had had enough. He went to Kathmandu, obtained a
visa, and came to the United States. He did not apply for asylum
upon his arrival because he hoped things would improve in Nepal
after an election that was scheduled for 2008. In December 2010,
Maoists captured his property and attacked his father. Gurung now
fears the possibility of being harmed or persecuted if he is
removed to Nepal.
II. Procedural History
Having the benefit of both a BIA opinion and the IJ's
decision in this case, we examine both. See Ahmed v. Holder, 765
F.3d 96, 99 (1st Cir. 2014) ("Because the BIA wrote separately
while also approving the IJ's decision, our review is directed at
both of those decisions."). The IJ denied Gurung's requests after
holding a hearing in which she concluded that Gurung's application
for asylum was time-barred because it was filed more than a year
after Gurung arrived in the United States. Authority to apply for
-4-
asylum "shall not apply to an alien unless the alien demonstrates
by clear and convincing evidence that the application has been
filed within 1 year after the date of the alien's arrival in the
United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). Nevertheless, the IJ
considered Gurung's application under the exceptions provided for
late filings. See Chhay, 540 F.3d at 5 ("[A]n alien who files for
asylum outside the one-year window may qualify by showing either
extraordinary circumstances or changed country conditions.");
Ferdinandus v. Gonzales, 504 F.3d 61, 62 (1st Cir. 2007)
(explaining that an alien must show "changed or extraordinary
circumstances excusing [his or] her delay").
Gurung argued that the recent attack against his father
constituted changed circumstances. However, the IJ thought those
events to be consistent with the conditions faced by the Petitioner
in Nepal before his arrival in the United States, and thus did not
represent changed country conditions. The BIA agreed with the IJ's
determinations, but in reaching its conclusions, it declined to
review the IJ's finding that Gurung's application for asylum was
untimely, and thus its review did not require an analysis for
changed country conditions pursuant to the exceptions to timely-
filed petitions contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2). Instead, the
BIA held on the merits that Gurung simply did not present
sufficient evidence to meet his burden of proof for asylum, which
-5-
required him to establish that he had a well-founded fear of
persecution if returned to Nepal.
The BIA also declined to address the IJ's credibility
determinations, but agreed with her conclusions stating that even
though Gurung submitted letters showing that he had participated in
the NCP and favored democracy, there was no record of any of the
incidents with the Maoists he had described in his testimony.2
Because Gurung could not establish that he had been persecuted in
the past, the BIA stated that he was not entitled to a presumption
of future persecution and thus is ineligible for prospective
relief.
With this backdrop, because Gurung had failed to meet the
lower burden for asylum, the IJ and the BIA agreed that he also
failed to establish the higher burden for withholding of removal or
protection under the CAT, which required him to establish a clear
probability of persecution or that it is more likely than not that
he will be tortured upon returning to Nepal, respectively.
2
The IJ concluded that -- even assuming that Gurung's testimony
was credible -- he failed to meet his burden of proof by not
providing sufficient corroborating evidence that was reasonably
available or could be obtained. The IJ stated that she would
"expect corroborating evidence" or "some mention by the [NCP] of
Gurung's problems in Nepal because of his very participation, and
involvement in that party." And the IJ expected that documentation
of the seizure of Gurung's father's property would exist.
Additionally, the IJ found that Gurung seemed unresponsive at times
and that the Department of State Country Report for Nepal states
that the Maoists were returning seized property as required by a
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
-6-
This petition for review ensued.
III. Discussion
We first review Gurung's application for asylum.3 In
doing so, we must accept the BIA's and the IJ's findings of fact
"unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude
to the contrary." Sela v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 44, 46 (1st Cir. 2008)
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). That is, we review the BIA's
decision under a deferential substantial evidence standard.
Melhem, 500 F.3d at 81. Additionally, legal arguments are reviewed
de novo, but with deference to the agency's interpretation of its
statutes and regulations. Pulisir v. Mukasey,
524 F.3d 302, 307
(1st Cir. 2008).
To be eligible for asylum, an alien must establish that
he is a refugee and that he is unwilling to return to his country
"because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
3
There is no dispute that Gurung's application for asylum was not
filed within one year of arriving in the United States. However,
while we generally lack jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) to
consider applications for asylum that are found by the agency to be
time-barred, here the BIA expressly declined to address the
untimely determination made by the IJ and instead considered the
merits of Gurung's claims. Cf. Oroh v. Holder, 561 F.3d 62, 67
(1st Cir. 2009) ("Both the IJ and the BIA concluded that no
exceptions applied to excuse Oroh's untimely asylum application.
We are without jurisdiction to review that conclusion.");
Ferdinandus, 504 F.3d at 62 ("[W]e lack jurisdiction over
Ferdinandus's asylum application because the BIA's timeliness
determination is not reviewable."); Melhem v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d
78, 81 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[W]e lack jurisdiction over Melhem's
asylum application because the IJ found his application time-barred
and the BIA affirmed that determination.").
-7-
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A),
1158(b)(1)(B). While asylum is discretionary, withholding of
removal provides mandatory relief. See Romilus v. Ashcroft, 385
F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2004).
To be eligible for withholding of removal, an applicant
must prove that it is more likely than not that he will be subject
to persecution on account of a protected ground should he be
repatriated. Chhay, 540 F.3d at 6 (quoting
Pulisir, 524 F.3d at
308); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) ("[T]he Attorney General
may not remove an alien to a country if the . . . alien's life or
freedom would be threatened . . . ."). Thus, for withholding of
removal, Gurung must establish that his "life or freedom [will] be
threatened in [Nepal] on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."
8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b); see also Sela, 520 F.3d at 46.
An applicant may carry this burden either by
demonstrating past persecution or a likelihood of future
persecution. See, e.g., Melhem, 500 F.3d at 81; see also 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.16(b)(1)(i) ("If the applicant is determined to have
suffered past persecution in [Nepal] . . . it shall be presumed
that the applicant's life or freedom would be threatened in the
future . . . ."). This is also referred to as a "clear
probability" standard, which is more difficult to meet than the
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"well-founded fear" standard for asylum. See I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467
U.S. 407, 425-26 (1984); Tay-Chan v. Holder,
699 F.3d 107, 111 (1st
Cir. 2012) ("Withholding of removal imposes a more stringent burden
of proof on an alien than does a counterpart claim for asylum,
because the alien must demonstrate a clear probability of
persecution, rather than merely a well-founded fear of
persecution." (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
In petitions for asylum examined under the lower standard
of proof, "[w]here the trier of fact determines that the applicant
should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise credible
testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the applicant does
not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence."
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).4 Indeed, corroboration may be
required by an IJ, even where an applicant's testimony is deemed
credible. See Soeung v. Holder, 677 F.3d 484, 488 (1st Cir.
2012). When reviewing the decision of an IJ, we may not "reverse
a determination . . . with respect to the availability of
corroborating evidence . . . unless the court finds . . . that a
reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude that such
4
As for petitions for withholding of removal, an applicant's
testimony may be sufficient to sustain this burden of proof without
corroboration. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b). But, in evaluating the
applicant's case, if the IJ determines that the alien's "testimony
is not itself compelling[,] the absence of easily obtainable
corroborating documentation can be the final straw."
Chhay, 540
F.3d at 6.
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corroborating evidence is unavailable." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4);
see also Chhay, 540 F.3d at 6.
Because claims for withholding of removal require a
higher level of proof than claims for asylum, "[i]t follows that an
alien who cannot prevail on a claim for asylum must also lose on a
counterpart claim for withholding of removal." Seng v. Holder, 584
F.3d 13, 20 (1st Cir. 2009).
Here, the IJ stated that she listened to Gurung's
testimony, which "on some occasions . . . was not responsive to the
questions being asked of him." Additionally, the only documentary
evidence provided by Gurung was three letters from the NCP, none of
which corroborated the incidents narrated in his testimony. One of
the letters stated that he was a chairperson from 2004 to 2006 and
that he helped to promote democracy. Another letter stated that he
helped the NCP extend democracy, while the third letter stated that
he was an activist of the NCP. As to the allegations of property
seizures, Gurung only presented a letter from his wife and a letter
from his father.
On appeal, Gurung argues that he was not given formal
notice that corroboration was required and should have been
produced at the hearing and cites to Soeung in support of the
proposition that the IJ was required to afford said notice.
Furthermore, he asserts that, because the NCP is a political party,
there is no reason to expect it to issue reports on crimes suffered
-10-
by its members. Such evidence, he claims, should be requested from
law enforcement organizations. Finally, regarding the lack of
corroborating evidence on the seized property, Gurung explains that
his family did not report this to the police because the police do
not get involved in disputes with the Maoists. In fact, he argues
that he had attempted to report incidents to the police in the
past, to no avail.
Contrary to Gurung's claim, Soeung does not specifically
require that notice of reasonably available corroborating evidence
be given to the petitioner. Instead, it states that before an
applicant's failure to produce corroborating evidence can be used
against him -- in the context of a petition for asylum -- "there
must be explicit findings that (1) it was reasonable to expect the
applicant to produce corroboration[,] and (2) the applicant's
failure to do so was not adequately explained." Soeung, 677 F.3d
at 488 (citing Chukwu v. Att'y Gen.,
484 F.3d 185, 191-92 (3d Cir.
2007) (reviewing a denial of a timely petition for asylum)).
Because we conclude that the IJ did make the two findings
required by Soeung, we are unpersuaded by Gurung's argument. The
IJ considered and explained what was stated in each of the letters
provided by Gurung, and described the kind of alternate documentary
evidence and reports that Gurung could have reasonably produced to
corroborate his testimony. The IJ added that "[t]he Court would
expect corroborating evidence in the form of some mention by the
-11-
[NCP] of the respondent's problem in his country because of his
very participation and involvement in that party." The IJ also
found it "unpersuasive" that some of the incidents described by
Gurung were never reported at all. She concluded that "[Gurung]
failed to provide evidence that would corroborate his testimony and
that he did not demonstrate that evidence could not reasonably be
obtained." We are required to review these findings under a
deferential standard. Melhem, 500 F.3d at 81.
As in Sela and Chhay, there is nothing in the record that
compels us to conclude that it was not reasonable for Gurung to
produce corroborating evidence to meet his burden, or that he could
not have reasonably obtained any such corroborating evidence
regarding the events he testified about -- especially considering
that he was in communication with his political party, his father,
and his wife. We are also unpersuaded by Gurung's justifications
on appeal. The fact that the NCP is not a law enforcement agency
does not explain why Gurung could not reasonably obtain from them,
a third party, or an institution any evidence attesting to the
veracity of the incidents described in his testimony. Thus, we
agree that -- for purposes of asylum and withholding of removal --
Gurung failed to meet his burden of proof that he has a well-
founded fear of being persecuted because he has been persecuted in
the past, or that there is a clear probability that he will be
persecuted.
-12-
This brings us to Gurung's request for relief under the
CAT. To prevail, Gurung must prove that it is more likely than not
that he will be tortured upon returning to Nepal. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.18(a)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); Melhem, 500 F.3d at 82.
A petitioner may establish this risk of future harm by presenting
evidence that this would occur at the instigation of or by willful
blindness by the law enforcement authorities of the country. See
Chhay, 540 F.3d at 7.
As stated above, in reviewing the petitions for asylum
and withholding of removal, we agree that Gurung failed to meet the
burden of showing that he had been persecuted, that it is more
likely than not that he will be persecuted upon his return, or that
there is a clear probability that this will happen. Thus, we reach
the same conclusion with regard to the CAT claim. Gurung did not
prove that it is more likely than not that he will be tortured upon
his return. Melhem, 500 F.3d at 82.
Furthermore, we agree with the Government's position that
it is inconsistent for Gurung to argue that he failed to report the
incidents described in his testimony because the police are
ineffective in their fight against the Maoists. If the police are
fighting against the Maoists in the first place, it cannot also be
more-likely-than-not that they would instigate or acquiesce to
torture activities by the Maoists. We note that this argument also
contradicts some of Gurung's other claims that he and his family
-13-
failed to report to the police some of the incidents described in
his testimony because the police do not get involved in disputes
with the Maoists.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the BIA that
Gurung failed to show that he is entitled to the relief requested.
The petition for review is denied.
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