Filed: Feb. 16, 1999
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 16 1999 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. No. 98-2240 (D. Ct. No. CR-96-72-JC) THOMAS DAVID MARTIN, (D. N. Mex.) Defendant - Appellant. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before TACHA, McKAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assis
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 16 1999 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. No. 98-2240 (D. Ct. No. CR-96-72-JC) THOMAS DAVID MARTIN, (D. N. Mex.) Defendant - Appellant. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before TACHA, McKAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assist..
More
F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 16 1999
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 98-2240
(D. Ct. No. CR-96-72-JC)
THOMAS DAVID MARTIN, (D. N. Mex.)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, McKAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel
has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
This appeal is from an order of the district court ordering defendant to pay
$12,731.48 in restitution after remand from this court. Defendant appeals on the
ground that the district court improperly denied him the opportunity for a hearing
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
to present evidence on remand concerning the appropriate apportionment of
restitution. We affirm.
The restitution order in this case was part of a sentence imposed upon
defendant after pleading guilty to two counts of robbery affecting interstate
commerce. Defendant appealed to this court in his first appeal arguing that the
restitution amount was illegal because the total amount ordered to be paid by him
and his co-defendant exceeded the total amount of the loss. This court agreed and
remanded for resentencing. Upon remand, defendant filed a Rule 35 motion
requesting a hearing on the restitution amount. In that Rule 35 motion, defendant
waived his presence at the hearing. The district court denied the motion for a
hearing but entered three amended judgments ultimately establishing defendant’s
restitution amount at $12,731.48 in an order dated October 14, 1998.
We review the district court’s decision to hold a hearing upon resentencing
of a defendant upon remand for an abuse of discretion. See United States v.
Moore,
88 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 1996). Further, “a sentencing court has
wide discretion to fashion an appropriate sentence for an individual defendant.”
United States v. Harris,
7 F.3d 1537, 1540 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Williams v.
Illinois,
399 U.S. 235, 243,
90 S. Ct. 2018, 2023,
26 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1970)). Most
importantly, the restitution provisions of the Victim Witness Protection Act
(“VWPA”) require an individualized focus on the defendant that necessitates the
-2-
exercise of judicial discretion. See
id. Under the circumstances of this case, the
district court was under no duty to hold a hearing. The district court had
considered the facts underlying this restitution order on at least four occasions.
Nothing in the remand order from this court required the district court to hold a
hearing. Instead, the remand order was specifically limited to the error relating to
the total amount of the restitution order that exceeded the loss amount. The
district court therefore was limited in the remand from this court only to revising
the total restitution order and apportioning the restitution amount between the two
co-defendants so that the total did not exceed the total amount of the loss. The
district court did that. The district court further revised its restitution order on
remand twice, apparently reflecting the district court’s consideration of the
appropriate factors in the remand order, the facts of this case, and the
considerations under the VWPA. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that
the district court abused its discretion. The order of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Deanell Reece Tacha
Circuit Judge
-3-