Filed: Nov. 16, 2000
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 16 2000 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk JEFFERSON E. LECATES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. No. 00-4026 (D.C. No. 99-CV-220) RONALD BARKER; RICHARD A. (D. Utah) ISAACSON; JEAN ISAACSON, Defendants-Appellees. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before TACHA , EBEL , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiall
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 16 2000 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk JEFFERSON E. LECATES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. No. 00-4026 (D.C. No. 99-CV-220) RONALD BARKER; RICHARD A. (D. Utah) ISAACSON; JEAN ISAACSON, Defendants-Appellees. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before TACHA , EBEL , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 16 2000
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JEFFERSON E. LECATES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 00-4026
(D.C. No. 99-CV-220)
RONALD BARKER; RICHARD A. (D. Utah)
ISAACSON; JEAN ISAACSON,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , EBEL , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff-appellant Jefferson E. LeCates appeals from the district court’s
order dismissing his complaint against the defendants. The district court
dismissed LeCates’ claims for malicious prosecution, legal malpractice and abuse
of process for failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). It dismissed
without prejudice 1
his claim for fraud on the basis that he failed to comply with
the pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). We now determine that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars all of LeCates’ claims, with the exception of his
claims for malpractice and abuse of process. Accordingly, we vacate the 12(b)(6)
dismissal of those claims barred by Rooker-Feldman and remand with instructions
to dismiss them for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm the dismissal of
the claims for malpractice and abuse of process.
1
Defendants argue that the order dismissing LeCates’ fraud claim without
prejudice was not a final order for purposes of appeal. Where a district court
intends to dismiss an entire action rather than merely dismissing a complaint, the
order of dismissal is final and appealable even if entered without prejudice. See
Mobley v. McCormick , 40 F.3d 337, 339-40 (10th Cir. 1994); see also United
States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co. ,
336 U.S. 793, 794 n.1 (1949); 15A Charles Alan
Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 3914.6 at 533-35 (2d ed. 1992). Here, as will be seen, regardless of its intent
the district court had no jurisdiction to do anything with the fraud claim other
than to dismiss it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. We therefore have jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
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FACTS
This suit arises out of a flurry of litigation between the parties in the Utah
state courts. Kent S. Walker, LeCates’ client, claimed to have relied to his
detriment on certain promises or fraudulent misrepresentations made to him by
defendants Richard A. Isaacson and Jean Isaacson (the “Isaacsons”) and/or their
corporation, Specialized Planning and Insurance, Inc. d/b/a Specialized Planning
and Insurance Services, Inc. (“SPIS”).
The parties filed three suits in rapid succession in Utah state court. The
first was a suit by the Isaacsons against Boyd Corbett, Walker’s son-in-law,
seeking to remove a lien Corbett had placed on their home. LeCates sought but
was denied leave to intervene on behalf of Walker in that suit. Walker and the
Isaacsons filed the second and third suits against each other to adjudicate
Walker’s entitlement to unearned commissions.
On September 11, 1993, LeCates filed a motion to withdraw from each of
these two cases. His motion was granted. Over one year later, in December
1994, the Isaacsons filed the fourth state court action involved here, a complaint
against LeCates seeking damages against him for his conduct in the prior
litigation under Utah Rule Civ. P. 11 and various other theories. When LeCates
failed to respond, the state district court entered default judgment against him in
the amount of $166,343.86.
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Although he believed the default judgment had been procured by fraudulent
misrepresentations to the Utah court, LeCates did not move to set aside the
default judgment. Instead, he filed this suit in the Southern District of Florida,
seeking damages from the defendants for violation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-31,
and for malicious prosecution, fraud, abuse of process and legal malpractice.
LeCates’ complaint charged that the Isaacsons had obtained the default judgment
against him by fraud and deceit in collusion with Barker. He also complained that
the defendants had attempted to collect the judgment, knowing that it was
obtained by fraud and deceit, and that they were harassing him through their
collection activities.
DISCUSSION
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that federal courts, other than the
United States Supreme Court, lack jurisdiction to adjudicate claims seeking
review of state court judgments. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman , 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. ,
263 U.S. 413,
415-16 (1923). 2
Because it is a jurisdictional doctrine, we must consider whether
2
Although the default judgment here was entered by a state district court, it
may still be precluded by Rooker-Feldman , because the doctrine “precludes not
only review of adjudications of the state’s highest court, but also the decisions of
its lower courts.” Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va. , 122 F.3d 192, 199 (4th Cir.
1997).
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Rooker-Feldman bars any of LeCates’ claims before addressing any of the
arguments he raises on the merits. See Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp. , 182 F.3d
548, 554-55 (7th Cir. 1999).
A. Fraud claim
In his fraud claim, LeCates does not request that his default in Utah state
court be set aside or that the judgment against him be overturned. Instead, he
seeks damages from the defendants for their conduct in procuring the allegedly
fraudulent judgment against him. Rooker-Feldman bars not only cases seeking
direct view of state court judgments, however; it also bars cases that are
“inextricably intertwined” with a prior state court judgment. See Feldman ,
460 U.S. at 482 n.16.
If adjudication of a claim in federal court would require the court to
determine that a state court judgment was erroneously entered or was void, the
claim is inextricably intertwined with the merits of the state court judgment.
See, e.g. , Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va. , 122 F.3d 192, 202 (4th Cir. 1997).
That is the case here. In order to grant LeCates relief on his fraud claim, it would
be necessary to determine that the Utah state court default judgment was
fraudulently obtained and therefore void. We therefore conclude that the fraud
claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
-5-
B. Deceit and collusion
Section 78-51-31 of the Utah Code provides that “[a]n attorney and
counselor who is guilty of deceit or collusion, or who consents thereto, with
intent to deceive a court or judge or a party to an action or proceeding is liable to
be disbarred, and shall forfeit to the injured party treble damages to be recovered
in a civil action.” LeCates has included a claim for treble damages under this
statute in his complaint.
Application of Rooker-Feldman to this claim is complicated by the fact that
the disciplinary provisions of the statute may apply even if the court has not been
deceived. See In re Norton , 146 P.2d 899, 900-01 (Utah 1944). In other words, it
would be possible for a court to determine that an attorney violated this section
without calling the resulting state court judgment into question.
Norton , however, concerned the disciplinary remedy, not the damages
remedy, provided in the statute. LeCates seeks treble damages based on the
amount of the judgment entered against him. In order to prove his treble damages
claim, he will have to prove that the judgment was entered by fraudulent means
(deceit and collusion), thus calling into question the validity of the default
judgment. The only support for damages would be the default judgment, and the
only support for a finding of liability would be events that were or should have
been contested in the Utah state court proceedings which resulted in the default
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judgment. LeCates’ argument that he does not seek to set aside the judgment
itself, only damages for its wrongful entry, is unavailing.
C. Malpractice claim
LeCates’ complaint includes a claim against Ronald Barker, opposing
counsel in the Utah state court actions, for legal malpractice. Malpractice claims,
when brought against an attorney who was not a party to the state court
proceeding, may lie outside the scope of Rooker-Feldman . See Kamilewicz v.
Bank of Boston Corp. , 100 F.3d 1348, 1351-52 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). LeCates argues that his claim
can be construed to attack the actions of attorney Barker in obtaining the default
judgment, not the default judgment itself. To the extent that it can be construed
to avoid Rooker-Feldman , however, the claim fails because Utah law does not
recognize a cause of action for legal malpractice against opposing counsel.
The elements of a cause of action for legal malpractice in Utah include “an
attorney-client relationship” and “duty of the attorney to the client arising from
their relationship.” Glencore, Ltd. v. Ince , 972 P.2d 376, 379 (Utah 1998). While
Utah has acknowledged the modern trend toward relaxing the privity requirement
and recognizing a cause of action by nonparties affected by a lawyer’s failure to
exercise reasonable care, its cases suggest that such a third party cause of action
arises only where there is at least a nonadversarial relationship between the
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attorney and the third party. See Oxendine v. Overturf , 973 P.2d 417, 421 (Utah
1999) (requiring that third party be an intended beneficiary of the attorney-client
relationship); Atkinson v. IHC Hosp., Inc. , 798 P.2d 733,736 (Utah 1990) (stating
that any duty attorney owes to third party is derivative of his duty to client, and
not owed to adversary in litigation). LeCates has pled no such relationship here;
his legal malpractice claim therefore fails as a matter of law.
D. Malicious prosecution/abuse of process
LeCates concedes that his malicious prosecution claim may be barred by
Rooker-Feldman . This claim cannot be determined without an outcome in state
court favorable to LeCates. Any attempt by a federal court to anticipate such an
outcome would require the court to determine that the state court judgment was
erroneously entered or void, thus running afoul of Rooker-Feldman .
The abuse of process claim is more difficult, because it is ambiguously
worded. To the extent LeCates raises an abuse of process claim targeting the
fraudulent means used to obtain the default judgment, his allegations call the
default judgment into question and therefore violate Rooker-Feldman .
At times, however, LeCates’ complaint appears to assert that Barker’s
methods in collecting the default judgment constituted an abuse of process. Such
a claim might not run afoul of Rooker-Feldman , because it targets the collection
process rather than the underlying judgment. Even if this is so, however, LeCates
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has failed to satisfy the rigorous standard applicable to an abuse of process claim
under Utah law: that the process was used against him primarily to accomplish a
purpose for which it was not designed. See Gilbert v. Ince , 981 P.2d 841, 845
(Utah 1999). Therefore, the 12(b)(6) dismissal of this claim was appropriate.
We AFFIRM the dismissal of LeCates’ claims for malpractice and abuse of
process. We VACATE the dismissal of his claims for fraud, deceit and collusion
pursuant to Utah Code § 78-51-31, legal malpractice, and malicious prosecution,
and REMAND with instructions to dismiss these claims for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
Entered for the Court
Deanell Reece Tacha
Circuit Judge
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