Filed: Jan. 02, 2003
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 2 2003 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk RUTTER & WILBANKS CORP.; ELLIOTT A. RIGGS; WILLIAM R. THURSTON, Trustee; GORDON TANNER; WALTER K. ARBUCKLE TRUST; ERIC B. WELLS; KEVIN C. No. 01-1565 WELLS; CHARLES R. WIGGINS; KEN KAMON, Plaintiffs - Appellees, v. (D. Colorado) SHELL OIL COMPANY; SHELL (D.C. No. 00-Z-1854) WESTERN E & P, INC.; MOBIL OIL CORPORATION; MOBIL PRODUCING TEXAS & NEW MEXICO, INC.; MOBIL E
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 2 2003 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk RUTTER & WILBANKS CORP.; ELLIOTT A. RIGGS; WILLIAM R. THURSTON, Trustee; GORDON TANNER; WALTER K. ARBUCKLE TRUST; ERIC B. WELLS; KEVIN C. No. 01-1565 WELLS; CHARLES R. WIGGINS; KEN KAMON, Plaintiffs - Appellees, v. (D. Colorado) SHELL OIL COMPANY; SHELL (D.C. No. 00-Z-1854) WESTERN E & P, INC.; MOBIL OIL CORPORATION; MOBIL PRODUCING TEXAS & NEW MEXICO, INC.; MOBIL EX..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 2 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
RUTTER & WILBANKS CORP.;
ELLIOTT A. RIGGS; WILLIAM R.
THURSTON, Trustee; GORDON
TANNER; WALTER K. ARBUCKLE
TRUST; ERIC B. WELLS; KEVIN C. No. 01-1565
WELLS; CHARLES R. WIGGINS;
KEN KAMON,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v. (D. Colorado)
SHELL OIL COMPANY; SHELL (D.C. No. 00-Z-1854)
WESTERN E & P, INC.; MOBIL OIL
CORPORATION; MOBIL
PRODUCING TEXAS & NEW
MEXICO, INC.; MOBIL
EXPLORATION & PRODUCING U.S.,
INC.; EXXON MOBIL, INC.; CORTEZ
PIPELINE COMPANY, a partnership;
SHELL CO 2 COMPANY, LTD., a Texas
limited partnership; KINDER
MORGAN CO 2 COMPANY, a Texas
limited partnership,
Defendants - Appellees,
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BRIDWELL OIL COMPANY and
HARRY PTASYNSKI,
Applicants in Intervention -
Appellants.
CO 2 CLAIMS COALITION, LLC,
named as “United States Government,”
a Colorado limited liability company, No. 01-1567
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
vs. (D. Colorado)
SHELL OIL COMPANY; SHELL (D.C. No. 96-Z-2451)
WESTERN E & P, INC.; MOBIL
PRODUCING TEXAS & NEW
MEXICO, INC.; CORTEZ PIPELINE
COMPANY, a partnership,
Defendants - Appellees.
--------------------------------------
BRIDWELL OIL COMPANY and
HARRY PTASYNSKI,
Applicants in Intervention -
Appellants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , Chief Judge, ANDERSON , and EBEL , Circuit Judges.
These consolidated appeals are generally related to the appeal in Rutter &
Wilbanks Corp. v. Shell Oil Co. , Nos. 02-1220, 02-1221 (10th Cir. filed Dec. 24,
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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2002), in which we recently affirmed the district court’s approval of a settlement
of a group of cases arising out of litigation concerning the production of CO 2
contained within the McElmo Dome Unit in Colorado. In these appeals,
appellants Harry Ptasynski and Bridwell Oil Co. appeal the denial of their
motions to intervene in two of those actions which were the subject of the
settlement: CO 2 Claims Coalition, LLC v. Shell Oil Co. , No. 96-Z-2451 (D. Colo.
filed Oct. 22, 1996) and Rutter & Wilbanks Corp. v. Shell Oil Co. , No. 00-Z-
1854 (D. Colo. filed Sept. 22, 2000). We affirm.
Ptasynski and Bridwell were owners of overriding royalty interests
(“ORIOs”) in the McElmo Dome Unit and, as such, were part of the CO 2 Claims
Coalition lawsuit from the beginning. The Rutter & Wilbanks lawsuit sought to
represent a class of McElmo Dome ORIOs alleging essentially the same claims
regarding the pricing of CO 2 as were alleged in the CO 2 Claims Coalition action.
In August, 2001, Ptasynski and Bridwell moved to intervene as plaintiffs
under Rule 23 and 24 in Rutter & Wilbanks Corp. , and moved to intervene as
plaintiffs under Rule 24 in the CO 2 Claims Coalition case. The district court
denied these motions on multiple grounds: the motions were untimely,
Ptasynski’s and Bridwell’s interests, to the extent they were impaired at all were
impaired “by their own actions” and, in any event, were cured by their decision to
opt out of the settlement, the Texas actions they have thus far unsuccessfully
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pursued against the same defendants and alleging essentially the same claims
raise potential res judicata problems, and their allegations in support of their
claim that Plaintiffs’ attorneys cannot adequately represent them are conclusory
and nonmeritorious.
The September 2001 settlement agreement settling the CO 2 Claims
Coalition action and the Rutter & Wilbanks action gave Ptasynski and Bridwell
the right to opt out of the settlement. On December 4, 2001, Ptasynski and
Bridwell filed these appeals from the district court’s denial of their motions to
intervene. In January 2002, they exercised their right to opt out of the settlement,
and specifically reserved all of their claims. See Defendants-Appellees’ Supp.
App. at 2-3.
As indicated, Ptasynski has also been pursuing an action against the same
defendants (Shell Oil Co. and Mobil Oil Co.) in Texas alleging essentially the
same claims concerning underpayment of royalties on CO 2 gas production on the
McElmo Dome Unit. His co-plaintiff in that case is the W.L. Gray Co. (“Gray”),
the denial of whose motion to intervene in Rutter & Wilbanks we simultaneously
affirm. See Rutter & Wilbanks Corp. v. Shell Oil Co. , No. 02-1034 (10th Cir.
filed Dec. 24, 2002). That Texas action was filed in May 1997, proceeded to trial
in August 1999, and resulted in judgment for Shell and Mobil on all Ptasynski’s
and Gray’s claims except a claim for negligent misrepresentation. In February
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2002, the Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court’s entry of judgment for Ptasynski
on the negligent misrepresentation claim and affirmed the judgment in favor of
Shell and Mobil on all other claims.
Bridwell has similarly been involved in extensive litigation in various
Texas courts, most of which has resulted in rulings adverse to it and in favor of
Shell and Mobil. On August 29, 2002, the Texas Supreme Court held that an
action involving Bridwell, which had been transferred to the probate court of
Denton County, Texas, had been improperly transferred. Gerald O. Bailey has
been a co-defendant and co-plaintiff with Bridwell in a number of these Texas
actions. We have simultaneously affirmed the denial of Bailey’s motion to
intervene in Rutter & Wilbanks along with Gray’s. See id.
Defendants and Plaintiffs in this case argue that Ptasynski and Bridwell
lack standing: “Appellants seek to intervene in the Coalition and Rutter &
Wilbanks lawsuits in order to pursue their claims for allegedly underpaid
overriding royalties for McElmo Dome CO 2 . Because those cases have been
settled and Appellants have elected to opt out of the settlement, however, these
appeals must be dismissed for lack of standing.” Defendants-Appellees’ Answer
Br. at 7. Alternatively, assuming appellants have standing, Plaintiffs and
Defendants argue the trial court correctly denied their motions to intervene
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because they satisfy none of the requirements for intervention under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 24.
We first consider Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ argument that Ptasynski and
Bridwell lack standing at this point to pursue this appeal. Plaintiffs and
Defendants argue that, having opted out of the settlement of the cases with
respect to which Ptasynski and Bridwell sought intervention, they thereby lost
their standing.
It is well settled that, in order to show standing necessary to invoke
federal court jurisdiction, a party must demonstrate three things:
(1) “injury in fact,” by which we mean an invasion of a
legally protected interest that is “(a) concrete and
particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) a causal relationship
between the injury and the challenged conduct, by which
we mean that the injury “fairly can be traced to the
challenged action of the defendant,” and has not resulted
“from the independent action of some third party not
before the court”; and (3) a likelihood that the injury
will be redressed by a favorable decision, by which we
mean that the “prospect of obtaining relief from the
injury as a result of a favorable ruling” is not “too
speculative.”
In re Integra Realty Res., Inc. , 262 F.3d 1089, 1101 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of
Jacksonville ,
508 U.S. 656, 663-64 (1993)). In In re Integra , we held that parties
who had opted out of a settlement lacked standing to challenge the settlement
because they “lack[ed] any legally protected interest that could support the ‘injury
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in fact’ element necessary to demonstrate standing.” Id. at 1102; see also In re:
Vitamins Antitrust Class Actions ,
215 F.3d 26 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that
presumptive class members who had opted out of a settlement had no standing to
challenge a specific clause in the settlement). We, and other courts, have
recognized a narrow exception to this where nonsettling parties can demonstrate
that they will suffer “‘plain legal prejudice,’ as when ‘the settlement strips the
party of a legal claim or cause of action.’” In re Integra , 262 F.3d at 1102
(quoting Mayfield v. Barr ,
985 F.2d 1090, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1993)) (further
quotation omitted).
We have also held that “a plaintiff must maintain standing at all times
throughout the litigation for a court to retain jurisdiction.” Powder River Basin
Res. Council v. Babbitt , 54 F.3d 1477, 1485 (10th Cir. 1995). Other courts have
suggested that the issue is more properly framed as one of mootness: “while it is
true that a plaintiff must have a personal interest at stake throughout the litigation
of a case, such interest is to be assessed under the rubric of standing at the
commencement of the case, and under the rubric of mootness thereafter.” Becker
v. Fed. Election Comm’n ,
230 F.3d 381, 386 n.3 (1st Cir. 2000); see also Steger
v. Franco, Inc. ,
228 F.3d 889, 893 (8th Cir. 2000).
Whether framed as an issue of standing or mootness, we agree with
Plaintiffs and Defendants that Ptasynski and Bridwell no longer have the requisite
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personal interest in this action. They seek intervention in two cases which have
now settled, and the validity of that settlement has been affirmed on appeal.
During the pendency of these appeals from the denial of their motions to
intervene, they opted out of that settlement and are, in fact, pursuing their
individual claims in Texas courts. They therefore lack any personal stake or
interest in the settlement and, more particularly, in the cases which were the
object of that settlement.
Alternatively, were they able to identify some interest sufficient to avoid a
conclusion of mootness or lack of standing, we would affirm the district court’s
denials of their motions to intervene, for substantially the reasons set forth in the
district court’s written orders denying those motions.
AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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